Sirija

[iDemo]

Asada ne diraju a mozda je i najgori od svih

Istina, jos nisu rukom - moraju na daljinski nekako da se snalaze - i tako zadnjih par godina...

[porucnik vasic]

Na šta misliš, na predaju rebela u onom jednom kvartu?

Па то, шта се тамо дешава, нешто Стаљинград типа или се то приводи крају?

[Muwan]

Staljingradska faza je, mislim, okončana još prošle (ili čak pretprošle) godine kada su rebeli sporazumno izašli iz gradskog jezgra a mi videli one fotke na kojima ništa od civilnih objekata nije ostalo u komadu. Ali taj sporazum valjda nije obuhvatio jedan kvart malo zapadno od grada gde su rebeli ostali da pružaju otpor i evo sada su i oni izašli uz posredovanje UN. Ima naznaka da bi još par pobunjeničkih enklava moglo da se evakuiše na sličan način. Verovatno računaju da im je bolje da izadju i vrate se u borbu na nekom drugom mestu nego da sede u okruženju i čekaju da ih pronadje avio bomba.

[vathra]

Primwtno je da SAA i Rusi prethodnih meseci zaobilaze gradsku borbu, iako napadaju na više frontova. Takođe se vidi da u kontranapadima pobunjenici imaju velike gubitke, jer se bore u uslovima koji više odgovaraju đrotivniku. Ukratko, iako idu sporo, vladine snage imaju taktiku na koju pobunjenici zasad nemaju odgovor. Ako se ovako nastavi, oni će pokušavati da brane teritoriju, i može da im se desi da svuda puknu na kraju

[Jozef K.]

A kako se to tacno krade nafta, cekam vec godinama da mi neko objasni proces, ali nista

 

on topic:

Koje su mape najverodostojnije? Wiki?

[Budja]

Figura nije relevantna za teorije zavere. Relevantnije je ko eksploatise i prodaje naftu sirom sveta, a narocito u Aziji. Pretpostavljam da je i tu mesana salata.

[hazard]

A kako se to tacno krade nafta, cekam vec godinama da mi neko objasni proces, ali nista

 

1. Instaliraš ,,prijateljski" da ne kažem marionetski režim u naftnoj državi X

2. Na ,,fer i otvorenom tenderu" nekim čudom sve koncesije sa naftna polja u državi X dobiju naftne firme iz tvoje zemlje

3. Nakon tih tendera potpišu se ugovori koji su ,,vrlo povoljni" po te firme iz tvoje zemlje

4. Posle toga nije bitno da li tu naftu kupuješ ti, neko drugi, treći, ili četvrti, jer tvoji zemljaci uzimaju veliki % 

5. Profit $$$ (ovde nema onog nepoznatog koraka kao u internet memama)

 

Kao primer videti pod Reza Pahlavi, Iran, Muhamed Mosadeh, Britanija, SAD, MI6, CIA, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

[Budja]

1. Instaliraš ,,prijateljski" da ne kažem marionetski režim u naftnoj državi X

2. Na ,,fer i otvorenom tenderu" nekim čudom sve koncesije sa naftna polja u državi X dobiju naftne firme iz tvoje zemlje

3. Nakon tih tendera potpišu se ugovori koji su ,,vrlo povoljni" po te firme iz tvoje zemlje

4. Posle toga nije bitno da li tu naftu kupuješ ti, neko drugi, treći, ili četvrti, jer tvoji zemljaci uzimaju veliki % 

5. Profit $$$ (ovde nema onog nepoznatog koraka kao u internet memama)

 

Kao primer videti pod Reza Pahlavi, Iran, Muhamed Mosadeh, Britanija, SAD, MI6, CIA, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

 

To je tacno, no, recimo, za Libiju je neko kacio koncesije koje su bile prilicno diversifikovane.

Za Irak ne znam.

[Muwan]

Nije toliko poenta u tome ko krade naftu, koliko u tome da irački sistem tj. infrastruktura tj. narod koji treba da je koristi više ne vide ni filera od te nafte. Ništa više ne stiže u fondove za školstvo, zdravstvo itd. - desetine milijardi dolara jednostavno ispare negde između naftnih polja i državnog budžeta. Ostane doduše koja milijarda za vojsku i to se odmah ulupa u hiljade tona američke gvožđurije koja će u nekom trenutku fino poslužiti onom ko je zapleni u borbama.

[Jozef K.]

Pored zapadnih kompanija veoma veliko, ako ne i potpuno većinsko prisustvo u Iraku imaju kinezi. A naravno da su prisutni i Rusi.

 

Poslao tapatalk

[Prospero]

A Raqqa of the Mind

 

James Meek on the bombing of Syria

 

 

People mistrust originality, especially in politicians. The safe political performance is an enactment of the familiar. David Cameron’s statement to Parliament on 23 November in support of Britain attacking Syria from the air gave us two such enactments. One is the voice that accompanies TV adverts from large corporations with millions of customers, like high street banks or big energy firms: smooth, friendly, confident, reassuring, making simple, slogan-like promises that pierce the delicate middle ground between what might plausibly be real and what can only be aspiration. ‘Our pilots can strike the most difficult targets at rapid pace and with extraordinary precision, and provide vital battle-winning close air support to local forces on the ground.’ Imagine it with stirring orchestral music.

 

The other is the voice of a doctor, spelling out to a patient with a chronic and unpleasant – though not fatal – set of conditions how he is going to treat one of them. It isn’t clear that it’s going to work, or how it’s going to affect treatments for the other conditions. The combination of conviction, detail and sympathy in the doctor’s discourse obscures the fact that his focus on the immediate treatment is being offered as a substitute for acknowledging that the syndrome as a whole is incurable. ‘The initial objective is to damage ISIL and reduce its capacity to do us harm. And I believe that this can, in time, lead to its eradication.’

 

These aren’t the worst of voices. They’re the voices of modern democracy: corporate power and knowledge reaching out to the individual citizen, offering to take responsibility, simplifying things. We, the individuals, can tell ourselves we hate advertising, that we know the corporate voice is beholden to other, more powerful agents than us; we can tell ourselves we want the doctor to tell us the truth, even if it’s that we shall be wheezy and disfigured for ever. The reality is that few of us are averse to the basic trick of advertising, which is to offer a sweeter, ideal, nobler version of the world we know – a kind of live mythologising. Most of us prefer the doctor, even amid clear uncertainty, to make a reassuring proposal of action. ‘I’m going to prescribe a course of …’ ‘The first thing we’re going to do is …’

 

The difficulty occurs when in this poignant communion between politician and country, between bank and consumerdom, in this consultation between doctor and patient, leader and electors (and here it’s reasonable to take MPs at face value as voters’ franchisees), a third party is present. A live third party: not a banking product, or an illness, or tax credits for Britons alone, or even the abstract notion of terrorism, but another country. The country is present, but doesn’t have a voice. British air attacks on Syria, before they are an attack on Islamic State, are an attack on Syria, a foreign country, whose citizens have no say in our affairs, and which has not attacked us, or our allies.

 

The question of Syria’s voice in whether or not it gets to be bombed is important. There can be an assumption among the anti-intervention crowd that Syria’s voice, or Iraq’s voice, or Afghanistan’s, or Libya’s, will always be ‘Don’t!’ But a country’s voice is, of course, many voices, and it’s solipsistic for the British left to take it for granted that the entire collective voice of Syria will oppose the RAF joining other foreign aircraft in a certain amount of partial warfare in their country. Britain’s anti-interventionists – I am one of them – shouldn’t be deluded into thinking there’s something virtuous about the stance.

 

Demonstrating that Britain is not a tool of neoliberal neoimperialists and wanting to keep foreign blood off Britain’s figurative hands is fine, but it is to Britain’s advantage, not Syria’s. If Britain’s warplanes leave Syria alone, and nothing else changes, the savagery will continue: the cruel fanatics of IS, the other somewhat less gothic jihadi groups, the ruthless Bashar al-Assad and his Russian allies, the Kurds and the disparate local anti-Assad guerrillas will continue to slaughter one another, and the millions of Syrians just trying to keep going will suffer, or flee. Refusing to wade into a fight between a bunch of strangers is sensible, and may be to their benefit in the long term, but it is closer to selfishness than kindness.

 

Cameron’s case for war came in the form of a response to a report by the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on the pros and cons of RAF airstrikes. After hearing a series of witnesses, including a number of Syrians, the committee, made up of six Conservative, four Labour and one Scottish Nationalist MP, was unequivocal: we should not bomb. Given that subsequent events have effaced the work of what is a much-ignored body at the best of times, it’s worth quoting the essential conclusion:

 

 

We agree that it is a key British national interest to defeat ISIL and we consider this to be a necessary goal for the UK. However, we believe that there should be no extension of British military action into Syria unless there is a coherent international strategy that has a realistic chance of defeating ISIL and of ending the civil war in Syria. We consider that the focus on the extension of airstrikes against ISIL in Syria is a distraction from the much bigger and more important task of finding a resolution to the conflict in Syria and thereby removing one of the main facilitators of ISIL’s rise. We were not persuaded by the Government’s attempts to treat ISIL in Syria and the broader Syrian civil war as separate issues.

 

 

The report was published on 29 October. A week later, IS claimed responsibility for bringing down a Russian airliner over Egypt with a planted bomb, killing 224 people. Two weeks later, 43 were killed in a double suicide bombing in Beirut, claimed by IS; the next day a group of young men acting in IS’s name killed 130 people in Paris.

 

It was with the shock of those attacks, particularly Paris, still reverberating, that Cameron made his statement to Parliament, trying to answer a series of questions the committee said needed to be resolved before another vote on bombing Syria could be held. Early on, Cameron talks about the RAF’s capabilities, and whether they will make any difference to the long-running and not very successful bombing campaigns against IS in Syria by the US and other countries (Russia’s more recent air raids have mainly attacked Assad’s non-IS opponents). The US-led coalition has dropped and shot thousands of weapons in Syria since September 2014, during which time IS, although it has lost ground in some areas, has made gains in others.

 

The point about capabilities was a red herring: the issue was whether the RAF should attack Syria or not, not how well it would do if it did. But the way Cameron dealt with it was an interesting illustration of the murkiness of his case. He makes it sound as if two of the military systems he mentions – Reaper drones and the Raptor reconnaissance pod – are British, when both are made in the US. When it comes to the pride of the RAF, the Brimstone missile, he says, quite correctly, that it is ‘something that even the Americans do not have’. This line was eagerly picked up by the Sunday Times, among others, which reported, under the headline ‘Cameron to Order Killing of Isis Leaders’: ‘US officials have asked Britain to deploy the RAF’s Brimstone missile, which minimises civilian casualties, because it raises the prospect of targeting the ISIS leadership in Syria if intelligence locates them in built-up areas.’

 

Well, maybe. And yet MBDA, the trans-European firm that makes it, has been trying to sell Brimstone to the Americans for years. They are still trying to sell it. By all accounts it’s a very clever weapon. But if it’s the case that the US military could have killed IS leaders in Syria 14 months ago simply by buying a $150,000 missile from Europe, and chose not to, this is a scandal in which the American media, including the Sunday Times’s Murdoch stablemates across the pond, have shown curiously little interest. It is, of course, possible that the US is satisfied with the leader-killing equipment it already has at its disposal, namely, its vast drone fleet, able to dawdle over the same spot for hours, waiting for their moment, and that Cameron’s talking up of Brimstone was promotional flim-flam, aimed at distracting listeners from the thinness of his main case.

 

Few would argue with Cameron’s argument that IS is a threat to Britain, although not the existential threat he conjures up with the phrase ‘to our country and to our way of life’. ‘In the last 12 months,’ he says,

 

our police and security services have disrupted no fewer than seven terrorist plots to attack the UK, every one of which was either linked to ISIL or inspired by their propaganda, so I am in no doubt that it is in our national interest for action to be taken to stop them – and stopping them means taking action in Syria, because it is Raqqa that is their headquarters … For as long as ISIL can peddle the myth of a so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria, it will be a rallying call for Islamist extremists all around the world, and that makes us less safe.

 

 

There are inconsistencies here in the wavering between different definitions of IS. Is it a proto-state, with infrastructure that can be attacked and formal command chains that can be severed from the air? The phrases ‘stopping them means taking action in Syria’ and ‘Raqqa is their headquarters’ suggests that the prime minister wants us to agree that it is. Or is it a nebulous, diffuse set of compadres, ideas and websites, easily moved around the world? The seven disrupted plots – on which we have to take Cameron’s word – are not ‘masterminded by’ IS, ‘ordered by’ IS or ‘organised by’ IS. They are ‘linked to ISIL or inspired by their propaganda’. Cameron’s contempt for IS’s ‘so-called caliphate’ suggests he wants us to agree with him that there is no geopolitical substance to the outfit. In which case what is the point of bombing Raqqa again?

 

The justification for Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq was, ultimately, counter-terror in the wake of 9/11. It is easy to forget how dubious a pretext the US and Britain would have had for invading Iraq even if that country had possessed weapons of mass destruction – the unsubstantiated fear that the relatively secular, resolutely statist dictator Saddam Hussein would randomly launch a terror attack on the west. Sequence is important here. It was only once those interventions were well underway, not before, that the London attacks of 7 July 2005 took place.

 

It doesn’t make sense for Cameron to argue that extra air attacks on Raqqa will help prevent IS attacks on London, when the recent attacks in Paris happened 14 months into an intensive series of air raids on and around IS-held areas, led by the world’s leading military power, which has spared no airborne military resources or technology to try to wipe IS from the earth. Russia’s recent experience, where it lost a passenger jet to an explosive device soon after it began bombing Syria, seems to confirm the intuitive assumption that bombing is more likely to provoke terrorism than to thwart it.

 

We have been here before, with al-Qaida and then with the Taliban: Western governments have mistaken a super-decentralised network, somewhere between a franchise and an ethos, for an agency with a postal address. The attacks in Paris certainly had IS links – some of the attackers had been to Syria or tried to get there – but most, if not all, were French or Belgian, who sought out IS because they had been radicalised at home, and who did most of their killing with Kalashnikovs from the former Yugoslavia.

 

It is useful for an IS aspirant to have a Raqqa to go to for training, for battle experience, for validation by a set of jihadi peers. But for a mobile terrorist franchise like IS or al-Qaida, Raqqa is a concept, not a place. Once Osama bin Laden’s Raqqa was in Sudan. Then it was in southern Afghanistan. It could be in Pakistan, in Somalia, in Yemen, in northern Nigeria, in the Russian Caucasus, or all these places at once.

 

When you begin reading about the Brimstone missile, you notice that one of the things its fans tend to mention is how well it performed in Libya. Earlier this year, an IS affiliate took over part of Libya: Sirte, a Mediterranean city less than four hundred miles from Malta and the south coast of Sicily and close to large oil fields. It was Gaddafi’s home town. The Wall Street Journal reported recently that IS had been encouraging would-be European recruits to head for Sirte rather than Syria or Iraq. The Journal tells of strict sharia law in Sirte, hospitals abandoned after failed attempts at gender segregation of staff, and public crucifixions. IS emerged as a force in Libya after Western air attacks, including by the RAF, tipped the balance in the uprising against the Gaddafi regime.

 

Critics of Western intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya lament the deaths of civilians, the eruption of previously contained sectarian or tribal conflicts, and the provocation of terrorist attacks on the interveners’ home countries. Less talked about is a fourth unpleasant consequence – more interventions. For all the concern at the spread of Salafist ideology around the world, there is surprisingly little concern at the spread of interventionist ideology – the creed that country A is entitled to take military action against, or within, country B, without the consent of the government of country B (if it has one) or any evidence that it poses a threat to country A.

 

Such overt interventions – that is, not through proxies – happened many times between the United Nations being set up and the end of the Cold War. Britain and France intervened in Egypt, the USSR intervened in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the US intervened in Grenada. But the pivotal intervention was Iraq. What we are beginning to see is how the US and Britain’s invasion of that country not only seemed to other countries to legitimise their own interventions, but has inspired a set of newly prosperous countries to acquire and use the interveners’ tools. Since 2003, we have seen Russian military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine; we have seen Saudi intervention in Yemen, with airstrikes galore. In August last year, the United Arab Emirates seemed to surprise the United States by using the fancy fighters and airborne refuelling aircraft it had bought from Western countries to fly thousands of miles and, with Egypt’s help, bomb Libya. As Cameron was mustering support for his Syria bombing vote, China announced it was setting up its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, close to the American base that flies drones to Somalia and Yemen.

 

In the long term, heavily armed, interventionist-minded states rubbing up against one another seem a greater danger than scattered bands of intolerant dreamers performing their sporadic acts of terror. The First World War, rather than the anarchist terror that so alarmed governments of the day, was the real existential threat to European states in 1914. In the short term, strong states are the answer to IS. Not states that demonstrate their strength by bombing Syria, but states that demonstrate their strength by guiding their clients within Syria towards a suspension of fighting as a prelude to peace. In the case of the Iranians and the Russians, the clients are Assad and his cronies and the Alawites and Christians of the coast. In the case of the Americans, they are the Kurds. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Turkey, as well as the US, which also plays this angle, the clients are scores of Sunni Syrian rebel groups who are too busy fighting Assad to turn their attention to the IS co-religionists in their rear. It’s a mess – not necessarily a hopeless one. But until the Saudis and the Turks can agree a way to get their Sunni clients (many sponsored privately) to declare a ceasefire with Assad and his allies, organise themselves politically and launch a concerted assault on IS, whatever caliphate exists need not fear the combined destructive effect of foreign air power and local ground troops.

 

The strangest aspect of Cameron’s pitch for the RAF to join in attacks on Syria is that he clearly knows all this. He stresses the limits to air power, but his case is riddled with contradictions. He argues, simultaneously, that IS can’t be defeated without a political settlement; that a political settlement is on the way; and that Britain can’t wait for a political settlement before it starts military action. He argues, simultaneously, that what Syrian Sunnis most want is for Assad to fall; that Sunni support for Britain’s position is essential; and that toppling Assad is a lesser priority for Britain than attacking IS. He argues, simultaneously, that ‘destroying ISIL helps the moderate forces’ [sic] and that the destruction of IS can’t be brought about without moderate forces – an army, he maintains, of 70,000 opposition fighters ‘who do not belong to extremist groups’.

 

Cameron’s claim that an army of 70,000 moderate Syrian rebels was available to turn its attention from Assad to IS was startling. Soon after the prime minister’s statement, Charles Lister, a conflict analyst at the Doha branch of the Brookings Institution think tank who specialises in the Syrian civil war, put up a guest post on the Spectator’s website, headed ‘Yes, there are 70,000 moderate opposition fighters in Syria.’ Cameron’s estimate, Lister said, came from the Joint Intelligence Committee, but it chimed with his own work. He put the figure higher, at 75,000, spread out across more than a hundred different factions, many of them already vetted by the CIA and reckoned non-Islamist enough to be given US weaponry (including the TOW anti-tank missile, the weapon whose effectiveness partly triggered Assad’s plea for Russian support). But Lister pointed out that besides them, there were another 27,500 fighters in two ‘supergroups’, Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham, who were anti-Assad, anti-IS, unacceptably Islamist to the Americans, and too powerful to be left out of peace talks.

 

Still, it sounded quite positive for Cameron. Until I contacted Lister. It turned out he wanted to step back from the use of the word ‘moderate’, preferring ‘mainstream’ – ‘mainstream’ in local Syrian terms, in other words, which could, from the point of view of Notting Hill, be very Islamically conservative indeed. Western rebel-counters, he said, required only two things of a mainstream rebel – that they be anti-IS, and that they required a role in a peace settlement. Which leaves a lot of room for enthusiasts of beheadings and Salafist mischief overseas; and which explains the Joint Intelligence Committee’s coyness about the breakdown of the prime minister’s 70,000 figure. One MP, Louise Haigh, interpreted a briefing from Mark Lyall Grant, the Cabinet’s national security adviser, as government acceptance that 30,000 of the 70,000 were radical Islamists. Others at the briefing disputed her take, but the government has yet to offer a clear account of who the 70,000 are.

 

It got worse. ‘Almost none of these groups will be dropping their fight against the Assad regime any time soon,’ Lister said.

 

Fighting Assad, Iran and now Russia is their foremost priority. ISIS comes second …This makes some of the PM’s claims highly questionable within existing dynamics. It is only the socially-rooted, largely Sunni mainstream opposition that has the true potential to defeat ISIS in Syria. But they will not realise that potential with the Assad regime in power. That’s where the British ‘ISIS first strategy’ falls apart.

 

In an analysis in October, Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande of another US think tank, the Institute for the Study of War, were more pessimistic still. They tracked the way Russian intervention in Syria had obliged many Syrian rebels – they listed 228 separate factions – to cut deals or make alliances with the Syrian al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. Their report described al-Nusra as ‘one of the most capable groups on the battlefield’, and characterised Ahrar al-Sham as their allies. In the light of Cameron describing MPs who voted against British attacks on Syria as ‘terrorist sympathisers’, it would be good to know how many al-Qaida allies figured in the prime minister’s army of 70,000.

 

Some of the Foreign Affairs committee were convinced by the time Wednesday’s vote on military action took place. During hearings its Conservative chairman, Crispin Blunt, a former army officer, responded to a sally by one witness who pointed out that past interventions had failed because they had ‘smashed things up’ and then not stayed to repair them. Blunt asked: ‘Is that not an argument for not getting involved in the first place?’ Yet by Wednesday, he had swung so far in favour of air strikes that he wanted the RAF to bomb the al-Nusra front as well as IS. His fellow Tory committee member John Baron was not persuaded. ‘Time and time again,’ he said, ‘the executive makes a convincing case, often with the support of intelligence sources, and time and time again it turns out to be wrong … We have stood at this very point before. We should have no excuse for repeating our errors and setting out on the same tragic, misguided path once more.’

 

[freakns]

1. Instaliraš ,,prijateljski" da ne kažem marionetski režim u naftnoj državi X

2. Na ,,fer i otvorenom tenderu" nekim čudom sve koncesije sa naftna polja u državi X dobiju naftne firme iz tvoje zemlje

3. Nakon tih tendera potpišu se ugovori koji su ,,vrlo povoljni" po te firme iz tvoje zemlje

4. Posle toga nije bitno da li tu naftu kupuješ ti, neko drugi, treći, ili četvrti, jer tvoji zemljaci uzimaju veliki % 

5. Profit $$$ (ovde nema onog nepoznatog koraka kao u internet memama)

 

Kao primer videti pod Reza Pahlavi, Iran, Muhamed Mosadeh, Britanija, SAD, MI6, CIA, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

1. amerikanci ne rade to, oni samo pomazu da se uvede demokratija

2. pa kada amerikanci nude najpovoljnije uslove. recimo, najjaci lobi u americkom kongresu je naftni lobi. amerikanci napadnu jedan diktatorski rezim, da pomognu narodu tamo, i posto je u toj drzavi nafta sasvim slucajno, onda americki politicari iskoriste svoje veze i naftne kompaije iz US of A daju tako povoljne uslove, na svoju stetu maltene. 

3. to su tenderi koji su vrlo povoljni za narod u toj drzavi, americke naftne kompanije su tu samo slucajno

4. nije istina. istina je da je nebitno ko kupuje naftu, ali procente uzimaju drzavnici doticne zemlje, nikako ne amerikanci. nikome zbog ovog nije milo, oni bi te pare rado dali napacenoj deci, ali demokratija ima svoju cenu, jbg

5. profita ima, ali on nije cilj. cilj je demokratija. profit je samo neminovna pojava. 

 

ne znam zasto pises te stvari, jer sam siguran da Vasa vrlo dobro zna sta se desava. ali eto, lepo mu da se pravi neobavesten, i dok mu ne pokazes neki debeli cek koji je neka americka kompanija stavila sebi u dzep Irak je humanitarna akcija koja nikakve veze nema sa naftom. isto kao sto je i rusko bombardovanje Sirije iskljucivo borba protiv terorizma i ISIS-a(mada mi se cini da je Vasa odlucio da ne veruje u potonje)

 

cela ova hajka u Siriji, analize i budi bog sta sve, svi zaboravljaju da krenu od najvaznijeg pitanja. ko i na koji nacin ce da zaradi pare od ovoga?

[Prospero]

Kako je taj premoćni naftni lobi pored svoje snage dozvolio onakav pad cena nafte za pola godine? kad napadaju države i organizuju pučeve zar ne bi bar nešto uradili povodom potpunog sjebavanja profitnih margina za koju godinu unapred?

 

Neki pučić, neka likvidacija, neki ratić da se smanji dotok nafte na tržište ili da sjebu OPEC i njegovu proizvodnju, nešto, bilo šta...?

 

 

Ne pije ti taj fokus vodu, Friče.

Edited December 4, 2015 by Prospero

[freakns]

Kako je taj premoćni naftni lobi pored svoje snage dozvolio onakav pad cena nafte za pola godine? kad napadaju države i organizuju pučeve zar ne bi bar nešto uradili povodom potpunog sjebavanja profitnih margina za koju godinu unapred?

 

Neki pučić, neka likvidacija, neki ratić da se smanji dotok nafte na tržište ili da sjebu OPEC i njegovu proizvodnju, nešto, bilo šta...?

 

 

Ne pije ti taj fokus vodu, Friče.

vidi, nisam toliko obavesten o stanju stvari sa naftom, tako da je moguce da gresim. 

ali daj da pogledamo samo par stvari.

kada su amerikanci prvi put uleteli na bliski istok? kada su spasavali Kuvajt

ko je najveci americki saveznik na bliskom istoku, pored toga sto ne da nisu demokratija, vec su kraljevi, imaju najradikalniji islam na zemaljskoj kugli i kolevka su al-Qaede? Saudi Arabija

ko je amerikancima bio najveci trn u oku na bliskom istoku? Sadam Husein.

ko je amerikancima bio najveci trn u oku u juznoj americi? Hugo Chavez

ko je amerikancima bio najveci trn u oku u Aziji? Kim Jong Il

 

sta je zajednicko za sve ove drzave i drzavnike? nafta, ako se izuzme severna koreja... gde amerikanci jedino nisu umesali svoje prste xsdnjih 20 godina? jbt, opet severna koreja... 

Kuvajt su spasili, sa kucom Sauda su na prst u dupe, Huseina su ubili, Chaveza su 15 godina pokusavali predstaviti kao najgoreg diktatora, ali valjda narodu po juznoj americi pun kurac njihovih prica... jedino se nesto ne trzaju oko Kim Jong Ila prvo pa sad oko Kim Jong Una

 

al ajde, sve ja tripujem i ovo su teorije zavere. priznajem, pogresio sam.

samo mi odgovori na ovo pitanje. sta amerikanci rade u Iraku zadnjih 10 godina?

[Prospero]

Vade kestenje iz vatre koju su raspirili, pokušavaju da prisustvom spreče širenje Irana, da prisustvom pojačaju bezbednost zalivskih monarhija, da namignu Kurdima da stoje uz njih....