Sirija

[Indy]

Trebalo bi jednostavno da postoji blanko zabrana bilo kakvog izvoza oruzja tamo na ME, pod bilo kakvim izgovorima i u bilo kakvoj situaciji (ukljucujuci i retko stanje mira). (Naravno, da vazi i za Izrael.)

[Bane5]

Nagovestaj jedne od mogucih posledica nakon eventualne pobede pobunjenika/opozicije.To je sasvim realan scenario, ali nije jedini. Da bude jos gore to je samo jedna od niza linija konflikta koji ce godinama/decenijama potresati ovu nesretnu drzavu.via AP:

BEIRUT (AP) — Western-backed opposition fighters and a faction of al-Qaida-linked rebels turned their guns on each other Saturday in Syria's largest city, battling for control of a key checkpoint in the latest eruption of infighting among the forces trying to topple President Bashar Assad's regime, activists said.The clashes between rebels affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant throws a spotlight on the growing phenomenon rebel-on-rebel violence that has sapped strength from the broader anti-Assad movement. It also underscores the rebels' enduring inability more than two years into the conflict to unite around a unified command, as well as the deepening rift between more secular opposition fighters and Islamic extremists in the rebel ranks.The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Saturday's clashes were focused on the strategic checkpoint in Aleppo's Bustan al-Qasr district that serves as the sole gateway between rebel-held eastern districts and the government-controlled areas in the west. Earlier this week, al-Qaida-linked militants seized the checkpoint and closed it for several days, cutting the flow of food supplies to the rebel-held quarters of the city. That spurred protests by residents suffering from food shortages at the start of the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan.The Observatory said the fighting rattled the neighborhood throughout the morning, but subsided by the afternoon as the al-Qaida-linked rebels pulled out of the area. It was not clear which group was in control of the checkpoint, where residents were staging a protest to vent their anger at soaring food prices. The area also witnessed clashes between rebels and government troops.One of the most troubling outbursts of infighting among opposition fighters took place Friday, when the FSA said one of its commanders, Kamal Hamami, was shot dead by al-Qaida militants in the Jabal al-Turkoman mountain area in the coastal province of Latakia. Hamami, known as Abu Basir, served in the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, a group headed by a secular-minded moderate that has the support of Western powers.Activists monitoring Syria's more than 2-year-old conflict have previously reported sporadic infighting among rebel groups over control of the territory they've captured in the north along the border with Turkey. Those clashes were mostly between Kurdish and Arab rebels, and have subsided since a ceasefire agreement was reached earlier this year.The fighting between moderate and jihadi groups that have for months battled Assad's regime together have become more frequent in recent weeks. The clashes have largely focused on border crossings with Turkey and vital installations, like bakeries, water wells, petrol stations and checkpoints in the north, according to the Observatory.Another activist said the fighting is aimed at establishing control over the flow of food and aid to the residents. Each group is also trying to set up governing structures over the territory in the north the opposition has controlled for a year and take a cut of money from goods being smuggled into Syria over the border with Turkey.The activists did not want to be quoted by name for fear of reprisal from both groups.Militant Islamic groups, including those with links to al-Qaida, have been the most effective fighting force on the opposition side in the past year, spearheading many of the attacks that captured military bases, towns and villages and whole neighborhoods in Aleppo. In late February, Islamic battalions led the assault and conquered the eastern city of Raqqa, making it the first Syrian city to entirely fall under rebel control. Moderate factions are now fighting jihadi groups for a say in running of Raqqa.

Edited July 13, 2013 by Bane5

[Prospero]

General Failure in SyriaWithout the Officers' Support, the Insurgents Can't WinZoltan BaranyJuly 17, 2013Free Syrian Army fighters take up positions prior to an offensive against Assad loyalists in Deir al-Zor, July 11, 2013. (Khalil Ashawi / Courtesy Reuters)Since the uprising began in Syria more than two years ago, a reported 90,000 people have died, millions have been displaced, and much of the country now lies in ruins. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s senior military officers remain loyal to him. Some observers initially believed that, upon seeing the regime’s uncompromising response to the demonstrations, many officers would follow the example of their Tunisian and Egyptian colleagues and defect. But that was never likely. In fact, the continued support of the regime by the majority of the officer corps was entirely predictable, as was, therefore, the high probability that the uprising would not succeed. Outside intervention will not now change their calculations -- except to make them, perhaps, even stauncher Assad supporters -- which means that Washington’s hopes for a speedy end to the war will likely be disappointed.Although we are not good at predicting when uprisings might break out, we do know one critically important thing about them: once they do begin, they cannot succeed without the support of the regime’s coercive apparatus, most particularly the regular army. What, then, determines the generals’ stance in a revolution? As I argued in last April’s issue of the Journal of Democracy, it is possible to make a highly educated guess.An army draws on four distinctive sources of information as it formulates its response to a revolution. Most critically, the generals assess the cohesiveness and composition of the armed forces that serve under them -- are there divisions along ethno-religious lines, between elite and regular units, between branches of the armed forces, between volunteer and drafted officials? Second, they consider the regime, its treatment of the armed forces, its record of governance, and its directions to the military during the revolution. The third piece of information that military leaders take into account is society, in particular relations between armed forces and society, the popularity of the uprising, and key characteristics of the protests, such as their size and composition. Finally, the army considers the international situation, including the threat of foreign intervention.To be sure, these factors are not created equal: some go farther than others in explaining the armed forces’ position on the revolution. Moreover, variables that may be extremely important in one case -- say, sectarian divisions within the officer corps -- may be of trivial significance in others. In the case of the Arab Spring, though, foreseeing the role of the military was not at all difficult. Looking at the recent Arab upheavals, for instance, no one with even a passing familiarity of Bahrain would have been surprised that the all-Sunni Bahraini security establishment sided with the Sunni ruling elites against the mostly Shiite rebels. Anticipating that the Tunisian army would support the revolution was somewhat more difficult but not impossible, considering that the force was a highly professional conscript army that was never involved in politics; that it was a marginalized component of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s security establishment; that the regime had little legitimacy in the eyes of its soldiers and the population; and that the uprising was extremely popular.So what about Syria? In this case, too, making an educated guess that the army would stick by the leaders was not particularly challenging. Here, the sectarian composition of the Syrian armed forces was the most important factor. Even though thousands of conscripted soldiers and mostly lower-level officers deserted or joined the uprising, the top brass -- with a few exceptions -- and most of the officer corps have continued to side with the regime.The Syrian leadership, perhaps more than that of any other Arab republic, has been keenly aware of threats to topple it. Between 1949 and 1970, at least ten coups d’état were mounted in Damascus, often with various military factions fighting one another. Assad’s father, President Hafez al-Assad, a former air force general, was a participant in at least three of them (1962, 1966, 1970) and realized the necessity of coup-proofing his regime. Once in power, Assad made the military his own, managed to unify the different factions of officers, and created a number of internal security organizations -- subordinated directly to him -- that spied on each other and on the regular armed forces in an attempt to guarantee the military’s loyalty. In a very real sense, the Assads have been preparing for a popular insurrection all their political lives.Meanwhile, the Syrian officer corps has been dominated by the minority Alawite sect (to which the Assads belong) since at least 1955, when Alawites took over the military section of the Baath Party. Today, roughly four-fifths of the officer corps, as well as the commanders of the numerous intelligence agencies, are Alawite. The sect does not staff the entire officer corps, of course, but Alawites hold virtually all the sensitive and important positions. There are nearly a dozen paramilitary forces in the country, and all of them are led by Assad-family confidants and consist of highly motivated fighters loyal to the regime. Bashar’s brother, Maher, a brigadier general, is the commander of the Republican Guard as well as of the army's elite Fourth Armored Division; these two special units, along with Syria's secret police, form the core of the country's security forces.To take another example, although most Syrian air force pilots were Sunni, the air defense force that controlled logistics and communication was mainly Alawite, which prevented the pilots from making a play for power. Further, many divisions that consisted mainly of drafted Sunni soldiers have either diminished in size as conscripts defected or else have not been deployed to quell the uprising; instead, the regime has increasingly turned to the army’s Third and Fourth Divisions, special forces, and irregulars, often called shabiha, which are heavily Alawite or belong to other minorities sympathetic to the regime.As is common among armies of authoritarian states, the Syrian military is also heavily indoctrinated -- the political scientist Kenneth Pollack in his Arabs at War considered it the most politicized army in the Arab world -- and loyalty to the regime often outweighs professional merit in determining who gets promoted. As a result, the top brass consider the rule of Assad and the Baath Party to be entirely legitimate, and they are well aware that they can expect the worst should the opposition eventually come out on top. Moreover, the army may be confident, as some commentators are, that the insurrection does not represent the popular will. According to an essay by Musa al-Gharbi in a recent issue of Middle East Policy, the overwhelming majority of Syrians are ambivalent about or opposed to the rebellion. In other words, Alawites -- and other supporters of Assad’s rule -- would have nothing to gain but everything to lose if the government was toppled. Consequently, they are in the fight to the bitter end, as they have declared repeatedly.In terms of the international context, although Syria has plenty of enemies in the region, some of whom have helped the rebels, it is by no means a pariah state like Qaddafi’s Libya. Its close relationship with Hezbollah’s military arm in Lebanon has yielded significant military assistance. And Syria’s alliance with Iran may be the most enduring in the Middle East. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and its elite Quds Force have not only trained Syrian soldiers but have fought with them. Both Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard have vowed to continue to fight against the rebels in Syria even if Assad is overthrown. The Assads’ regime has had a decades-long friendship with Russia, which, along with Iran, has continued to supply it with armaments, including sophisticated new missile systems.The Obama administration’s recent decision to arm the Syrian rebels is unlikely to make much of an impact on Assad’s generals and senior officers. They have been so deeply engaged in the protection of the regime that switching sides after more than two years of brutal fighting would be an unappealing option. In fact, Washington’s decision may well strengthen the commitment both of Syrian officers and of Damascus’ allies to save Assad’s regime. So, for that reason, the war will likely continue to drag on.

[Zaz_pi]

Harec

Israel tones down opposition to Western arming of Syrian rebels Change in attitude stems from desire to weaken Hezbollah and pro-Iran forces taking part in the Syrian conflict.Israel has in recent weeks scaled back its opposition to the arming of rebels in Syria, due to concern that their weakened position could lead to greater victories for Hezbollah and other Iran supporters fighting...

Sta kazes Bane? Kakve su tvoje procene?

[Bane5]

mracne.

[Zaz_pi]

mracne.

To sigurno. Nego, koliko se secam, ti si nesto pricao kako Izrael podrzava Asada a protiv FSA? Cak si me napadao kada sam govorio da Izrael igra na sto vecu podelu u Siriji i da po potrebi podrzava FSA.edit: ubacen quote Edited July 18, 2013 by Zaz_pi

[Bane5]

To sigurno. Nego, koliko se secam, ti si nesto pricao kako Izrael podrzava Asada a protiv FSA? Cak si me napadao kada sam govorio da Izrael igra na sto vecu podelu u Siriji i da po potrebi podrzava FSA.edit: ubacen quote

takodje sam uglavnom sve to u mojim postovima uslovljavao promenom dogadjaja ne terenu.takve stvari su i dalje posledice samo pracenja onoga sta se desava na terenu.ti uveliko imas vesti o tome da su i sad i velika britanija stopirale odluke o naoruzavanju pobunjenika, a do juce se o tome govorilo kao o gotovoj stvari.sve se promenilo u kratkom roku.isto tako je i sa mogucim potezima izraela i to smo tada pominjali, ova vest koju prenosis je upravo to.naravno uz uslov da je ova vest zasnovana na relevantnom izvoru i da se to mozda i potvrdi. Edited July 18, 2013 by Bane5

[Zaz_pi]

To prenosi Harec.Sigurno se to ranije nije desavalo iako sam ja davao konkretne izvore da je Izrael i ranije, po potrebi, podrzavao FSA. Mozda je ovo za tebe nesto novo?!Elem, cudo da nisi stavio da je Izrael napao skladiste SAA u Latakiji pre 10ak dana. Cak se prica da je napad dosao preko Turske.

[Bane5]

mislim da je malo glupo da bas sve prenosim ovde.napad na pomenuto skladiste je (po drugima) izveden sa mora i unisteno je u potpunosti.koliko je tih "odluka" koje prenose mediji pa se malo sta od njih ne ostvari.delom to je razumljivo jer mediji pisu svasta, ali sa druge strane delom je i ovaj rat naterao da u moru interesa ne preovlada nijedan dovoljno snazan iza kojeg bi zapadne sile (pa i izrael) mogli da stanu.da su birali rat ili asad, izrael bi birao asada. da su birali fsa ili nusra, birali bi fsa. da su birali za i protiv hezbolaha u ratu inicijalno bi birali protiv jer ovim ucescem hezbolah oruzano jaca. sada po toj logici biraju da se oni medjusobno tamane i time (pre svega) formacijski slabi hezbolah.kao sto vidis od pocetka do kraja su izbori izraela i svaki je preneo neki medij i svaki sledeci je potkrepljen logikom onoga sto ih je stiglo iz sirije, a ne ono sto su inicaijano zeleli.

[Zaz_pi]

Znam da ne prenosis sve vec selektivno. I, sa time nema problem osim kada pocnes da napadas onoga koji ti to kaze. :)Nekako si zaboravio da stavis poredjenje: sta Izrael bira izmedju FSA i SAA? Inace, zanimljivo zemisljena konstrukcija

[Bane5]

to pitanje je izlisno jer je sadrzano u onom o ratu ili asadu. uz to, SAA vise ne postoji, ona se raspala. postoje ostaci te vojske koju dominantno kontrolise alavitski oficirski kadar. sve sto je moglo da prebegne, prebeglo je. uz asada su (ako ne racunamo saveznike spolja) osim ostataka SAA i dve grupacije naoruzanih civila. jednu je inicijalno organizovala baath partija i u arapskim izvestajima ih oznacavaju imenom "shabiha". druga oruzana grupa civila koja se bori za asada je "quwat ad-difa'a al-watani" sto bi znacilo "national defense force". narocito ova druga grupa nosi osobinu da u njoj prakticno nema sunita.

[Zaz_pi]

da su birali rat ili asad, izrael bi birao asada. da su birali fsa ili nusra, birali bi fsa. da su birali za i protiv hezbolaha u ratu inicijalno bi birali protiv jer ovim ucescem hezbolah oruzano jaca. sada po toj logici biraju da se oni medjusobno tamane i time (pre svega) formacijski slabi hezbolah.

Cekaj da vidim sta si sve rekao u dva poslednja upisa: Izrael podrzava Asada-Asad je glavna pomoc Hezbulaha, i pre sukoba(moj dodatak), u regionu-Izrael je protiv Hezbulaha i Nusre-protivnici FSA su Hezbulah i Nusra, glavni protivnici Izraela. Zasto bi Izrael bio protiv FSA a za Asada? Edited July 18, 2013 by Zaz_pi

[Bane5]

mislim da sam bio vrlo precizan i da sam jednu stvar konstantno ponavljao.svaki od tih "poteza" i "odluka" koje bi ili koje je izrael povlacio uslovljene su desavanjima na terenu, a ne nekom proracunatom politikom.prva stavr oko pitanja "rat ili asad" je nesto sto se desava pre sukoba. tada bi birali asada. kad je vec rat izbio biraju manje zlo.pre otvorenog ulaska hezbolaha u rat, bili su protiv jer im je time pistup hezbolaha oruzju bivse sirijske vojske drasticno povecan i primorava izrael na kontinuirano pracenje prevoza istog ka jedinicama hezbolaha. da podsetim da je bar jedna vojna akcija izraela u siriji upravo bio napad na konvoj koji je navodno prevozio oruzje za hezbolah.na kraju, usled produzavanja sukoba i prilicnih gubitaka koje je "bozija partija" imala na terenu, neko sabira 2+2 i zakljucuje da izraelu odgovara ovo zaglibljavanje u beskrajni sirijski sukob jer slabi hezbolah formacijski bez obzira na sve ostale okolnosti.i da se opet vratim na pocetak i ponovim valjda 20-ti put (ako treba ponovicu jos neki put) izrael nije saveznik ni FSA ni asada. izrael vodi politiku zastite svojih interesa, ali tako da povlaci poteze na koje je shodno njima primoran. niti su ti principi tajna niti se ja niti bilo ko mora slagati sa tim.inicijalno (pre pocetka sukoba ovih razmera) svakako da je manje zlo za izrael bio ostanak asada i citirao sam izvore koji to smatraju realnom cinjenicom.

Edited July 19, 2013 by Bane5

[Zaz_pi]

Da te samo podsetim: Hezbulah je bio saveznik Asada i pre rata. Tokom Libanskog rata 2006 je dobijao oruzje od Sirije. Izrael se u tom ratu nije bas proslavio. Glavne linije snadbevanja im idu preko Sirije. Hezbulah je znacajno ojacao od 2006. To i sam potvrdjujes:

vatrena (raketna) moc 'bozije partije' je od rata 2006. do danas po izraleskim procenama povecana 2-3 puta,

U stvari, Hezbulah ulazi u rat u Siriji da bi zastitili Asada zbog zastite snadbevanja u Libanu, ne da nesto narocito dobije vec da ne izgubi pozadinu. Tako da tvoja cela konsturkcija nema veze sa vezom, stavise suprotno je od onoga sto pricas.Barem si negde u pravu, Izraelu je sada mnogo lakse da napada konvoje Hezbulaha, koji odavno idu iz Sirije.Nisi pricao tako pre koji mesec:

i to izrael koji bi najvise voleo da je asad mogao da ostane na vlasti i drzi zemlju pod punom kontrolom.

Od ovoga tvoga upisa je sve krenulo.A, da vidimo sta sam ja rekao a ti na to reagovao:

Sirija koja je stabilna i relativno jaka je baza za Hezbulah i PLO. A, najvaznije, Asad je bilzak Iranu. Podeljena Sirija u unutrasnjim sukobima to nije. Stavise, onda se Hezbulah mora baviti Sirijom, sto Izraelu odgovara. Sto se upravo desava.Ja ne imputiram nista, vec si to ti rekao. Izrael ne zeli Asada na vlasti, sto se jasno vidi i po njihovom delovanju. Oni zele podeljenu Siriju. Nijedna ta milicija nema snagu SAA, niti ce imati. Oni su smesni za Izrael.Al Nusra je u Alepo dosla preko Turske. I, nije samo ona. Ima vise islamistickih grupa koje vladaju teritorijom, pre svega na severu, i usli su tamo preko Turske, koja im je pomagala. FSA je slaba. Zato nikakva mirovna konferencija ni ne moze uspeti. Zato sto organizacije koje kontorlisu odredjene oblasti nisu ni pozvani jer su Al Kaida.Ali imam jedno pitanje: da li tim imas neku misiju? Primetio sam da sa prilicno zara nastupas kada se radi o dogadjajima u/oko Sirije

posto ti je sve tako jasno nisi ni morao da ulazis u raspravu.ja to zovem raspravom pa kad imam neku informaciju ili stav ja to na neki nacin branim.sa druge strane, ti si sve to vec uveliko znao, sve funkcionise u jednom dahu.otuda je tvoje pitanje na kraju izlisno.ceo ovaj tolik je srecom sacuvan. od prve strane pa nadalje. postoje tu svi moji postovi (mnogo vise o libiji nego o siriji) i nijednog se ne stidim.ako tu postoji neka "misija" onda cu se svecano pokloniti genijalcu koji to tvrdi.da li to znaci da nemam pravo na stav?i to stav koji hocu da branim.ps. ako je nusra nadirala preko jordana (kako si napisao ranije) odakle sad turska u toj prici?pps. ja nigde nisam napisao da izrael smatra asada za saveznika (sada te molim da mi citiras post na osnovu kojeg to tvrdis ili ces ispasti osoba koja zaista inputira i prisiva kvalifikacije koje nikad nisam napisao niti tvrdio jer to nije tacno) vec da bi voleli da on ostane na vlasti uz punu kontrolu nas sirijom jer je za njih asad manje zlo od rasula u siriji. pricu o "snazi" tih milicija je moguce proveriti upravo ovih dana na terenu - eno ga hezbolah protiv nekih od njih i dnevni gubici su mu veci nego u libanskom ratu 2006. dovoljno?

Izrael kaze:

Israel tones down opposition to Western arming of Syrian rebelsChange in attitude stems from desire to weaken Hezbollah and pro-Iran forces taking part in the Syrian conflict.Israel has in recent weeks scaled back its opposition to the arming of rebels in Syria, due to concern that their weakened position could lead to greater victories for Hezbollah and other Iran supporters fighting...

Asad nije od juce iranski saveznik. Jasno je iz ovoga da oni zele sto vise podeljenu Siriju.Potpuno si bio u krivu. Uzgred, kao sto sam napisao, Izrael je svoj poslednji napad na SAA izvrsio uz pomoc Turske. Da, znam, sta ces ponovo reci :)PS Ipak bi titulu najvecg poznavaoca situacije u Siriji dao:

[Bane5]

lepo si sve to citirao ali si zapravo samo potvrdio moje tvrdnje iznete u ovim postovima i ja bi ih opet ponovio.dvadeset drugi put, izraelu je asad u punoj konotroli nad sirijom drazi od svakakvih pobunjenika.svako pitanje asad ili rat postavlja se pre pocetka rata.izrael bi tada birao asada.to je protivnik kojeg poznaje, to je sistem koji izrael poznaje i to je na kraju dosta korektan pasivni posmatrac desavanja na golanu.da je sve ostalo na asadovoj kontroli nad sirijom izrael bi imao svakako manje briga.ne znam cemu citiranje oko uloge hezbolaha, svako otvioreno ucesce hezbolaha u sirijskom ratu njima daje jos vise oruzja. drugo je linija snabdevanja koja ide odredjenim (uglavnom ogranicenim) kanalima, drugo je kad hezbolah dobije sve na izvolte ukljucujuci i (mozda) hemijsko oruzje i sav raketni arsenal koji je sirija imala i koji dobija (kupuje).

Edited July 19, 2013 by Bane5