Sirija

[Indy]

Pa jbm ga, taj je budala, a to su izgleda i ostali koji pisu o istom.Nego, koji moj pa i zalazim ovde... sve moj do mojega.

Edited May 10, 2013 by Indy

[Gandalf]

Pa jmb ga, taj je budala, a to su izgleda i ostalikoji pisu o istom.

znacajna je razlika izmedju ova dva teksta. prvi je obican spin, ovo je nesto drugo. jedno je napisati da su bombasi samoubice indikatori prisustva Al-Kaide (budalastina), nesto drugo tvrditi da su dzihadi prisutni i vrlo aktivni u Siriji (cinjenica koju niko ne spori).

[Indy]

Whatever

[Anduril]

...jedno je napisati da su bombasi samoubice indikatori prisustva Al-Kaide (budalastina), nesto drugo tvrditi da su dzihadi prisutni i vrlo aktivni u Siriji (cinjenica koju niko ne spori).

Naravno da se radi o znacajnoj indikaciji.Imas na svetu mnogo gerila (ukljucujuci one na Kosovu, Bosni ili Juznoj Americi) ali su masovni samoubilacki napadi bombama daleko najkarakteristicniji za dzihadiste.Sta ces, levicarske gerile ne veruju da ce u nebo a kod dzihadista je to redovan deo programa.Inace, u Siriji se desava upravo ono sto sam pisao pre godinu, dve - MZ nije naoruzala stanovnistvo i legitimne politicke grupacije pa primat preuzimaju ekstremisti i grupacije koje deluju kao strani agenti u sukobu. Rat je postaje sve vise proksi sukob Irana, Rusije i Hezbolaha sa SAD, Turskom i Izraelom.Buducnost Sirije time izgleda sve vise kao buducnost Libana osamdesetih a Damask ce biti novi Bejrut.

[Prospero]

razne kombinacije su u igriIsrael's Man in DamascusWhy Jerusalem Doesn't Want the Assad Regime to FallEfraim HalevyMay 10, 2013Article Summary and Author BiographyEFRAIM HALEVY served as chief of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002.Israeli intervention in Syria's civil war has remained very limited. In part, that is because of Israel's long history with the Assad regime, which has consistently maintained peace along the two countries' border. Ultimately, Israel has more confidence in President Bashar al-Assad than in any foreseeable successor.A man holds a roll of pictures of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during a rally in support of him in Damascus, 2011. (Khaled al-Hariri / Courtesy Reuters)In October 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin telephoned Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to inform him that peace was at hand between Israel and Syria. Two weeks later, Rabin was dead, killed by a reactionary Jewish Israeli fanatic; the peace agreement that Rabin referenced died not long thereafter. But Israeli hopes for an eventual agreement with the Assad regime managed to survive. There have been four subsequent attempts by Israeli prime ministers -- one by Ehud Barak, one by Ehud Olmert, and two by Benjamin Netanyahu -- to forge a peace with Syria.This shared history with the Assad regime is relevant when considering Israel’s strategy toward the ongoing civil war in Syria. Israel’s most significant strategic goal with respect to Syria has always been a stable peace, and that is not something that the current civil war has changed. Israel will intervene in Syria when it deems it necessary; last week’s attacks testify to that resolve. But it is no accident that those strikes were focused solely on the destruction of weapons depots, and that Israel has given no indication of wanting to intervene any further. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the fall of Bashar al-Assad.Israel knows one important thing about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve some form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially recognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of Hafez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1974, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage point along their shared border. Indeed, even when Israeli and Syrian forces were briefly locked in fierce fighting in 1982 during Lebanon’s civil war, the border remained quiet.Israel does not feel as confident, though, about the parties to the current conflict, and with good reason. On the one hand, there are the rebel forces, some of whom are increasingly under the sway of al Qaeda. On the other, there are the Syrian government’s military forces, which are still under Assad’s command, but are ever more dependent on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, which is also Iranian-sponsored. Iran is the only outside state with boots on the ground in Syria, and although it is supporting Assad, it is also pressuring his government to more closely serve Iran’s goals -- including by allowing the passage of advanced arms from Syria into southern Lebanon. The recent visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Salehi to Damascus, during which he announced that Iran would not allow Assad to fall under any circumstances, further underscored the depth of Iran’s involvement in the fighting. It is entirely conceivable, in other words, that a post-Assad regime in Syria would be explicitly pro–al Qaeda or even more openly pro-Iran. Either result would be unacceptable to Israel.Of course, an extended civil war in Syria does not serve Israel’s interests either. The ongoing chaos is attracting Islamists from elsewhere in the region, and threatening to destabilize Israel’s entire neighborhood, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. It could also cause Assad to lose control of -- or decide to rely more on -- his stockpile of chemical weapons.Even though these problems have a direct impact on Israel, the Israeli government believes that it should deal with them in a way that does not force it to become a kingmaker over Assad’s fate. Instead, it would prefer to maintain neutrality in Syria's civil war. Israel does not want to tempt Assad to target Israel with his missile stockpile -- nor does it want to alienate the Alawite community that will remain on Israel’s border regardless of the outcome of Syria’s war.Last week’s attacks were a case in point. Israel did not hesitate to order air strikes when it had intelligence that arms were going to be funneled from Syria to Hezbollah. Although Israel took care not to assume official responsibility for the specific attack, Minister of Defense Moshe Yaalon publicly stated that Israel’s policy was to prevent the passage of strategic weaponry from Syria to Lebanon. But parallel with that messaging, Israel also made overt and covert efforts to communicate to Assad that Jerusalem was determined to remain neutral in Syria’s civil war. The fact that those messages were received in Damascus was reflected in the relatively restrained response from the Assad regime: a mid-level Foreign Ministry official offered a public denouncement of Israel -- and even then the Syrian government offered only a vague promise of reprisal, vowing to respond at a time and in a manner of its choosing.As brutal as the Syrian war has become, Israel believes that another international crisis is even more urgent: Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear program. Jerusalem has long believed that mid-2013 would be an hour of decision in its dealings with Iran. In the interim, Israel wants to focus its own finite resources on that crisis -- and it would prefer that the rest of the world does the same.That is not to say that Israel will make efforts to actively support Assad; like most other countries, Israel believes that it is only a matter of time until the Syrian leader is forced from power. But a country of Israel’s size needs to prioritize its foreign policy goals, and Jerusalem does not feel like helping shape an adequate alternative to Assad is in its interest or within its capacity. It will leave that task to others. Indeed, Israel has welcomed the initiative by Russia and the United States to organize a peace conference aimed at resolving the conflict. In the run-up to the conference, Jerusalem will be sure to remind both Washington and Moscow that they share an interest in preventing a permanent Iranian or jihadist presence on Syrian soil.In that sense, it is safe to say that Assad is not the only recipient of covert communications from Israel. That leaves two questions -- when the White House will decide what its own policy will be, and how it will implement it.

[Prospero]

drugarstvo je samo među nama :)

[Bane5]

sad ispade da su sve pobunjenicke jedinice u siriji fundamentalisti, teroristi i pripadnici alkaide.prema proceni izraelaca trenutno je u siriji oko 1400 pobunjenickih jedinica (mahom lokalno organizovanih) sa snagom od oko130-140000 ljudi.najveci broj njih je jos uvek je u zoni onih koji su ideoloski bliski sekularnim vrednostima pa do onih koje idu do umerenog islamizma (sunitskog).tu spadaju svi oni koji se bore pod krovnim imenom fsa (free syrian army).problem radikalnih milicija nastaje i uvecava se ulaskom ovog rata u beskraj.bolje naoruzane i organizovane, sa kampovima za obuku, ove jedinice postaju generatori sve veceg broja boraca jer su za stepenik blize vojnoj strukturi od ostalih.najpoznatija medju njima je ovde vec pominjana jabhat al-nusra (cesto se skraceno pise jan). na listi je teroristickih organizacija kod vecine zapadnih zemalja.od ostalih koje naginju fundamentalizmu postoji krovna vojna organizacija syrian islamic front koji cine 10-ak milicija. ova organizacija je samo forma bez strukture i zajednickog vodjstva.poslednja zabluda oko ovih jedinica je ta da su sastavljene iskljucivo od stranaca i placenika. njih svakako ima, ali je nemoguce utvrditi koliko.s obzirom na lokalno organizovanje, vecina ostalih pobunjenickih jedinica sastavljena je od sirijaca, u najvecoj meri od sunita, minimalnog procenta hriscana i jos manjeg procenta alavita.osnov vojnog organizovanja opozicionih/pobunjenickih snaga cine dezerteri iz bivse sirijske vojske.

[Gandalf]

Naravno da se radi o znacajnoj indikaciji.Imas na svetu mnogo gerila (ukljucujuci one na Kosovu, Bosni ili Juznoj Americi) ali su masovni samoubilacki napadi bombama daleko najkarakteristicniji za dzihadiste.

prvo, elementarna stvar - svi koji idu pod plast Al-Kaide su dzihadi/salafi, nisu svi dzihadi/salafi Al-Kaida.drugo, bombase samoubice proteklih par decenija koriste leve, desne, gornje i donje gerile. koristili su ih Hezbolah, Hamas, Al-Aksa, PFLP, Tamilski tigrovi, PKK, Al-Kaida, i drugi. sto ce reci... islamisti, marksisti-lenjinisti, dzihadi, etnicke gerile. najveci broj samoubilackih napada (do Iraka) su izveli tamilski tigrovi, najefikasniji je bio Hezbolah.samoubilacki napad moze da bude indikator nivoa militantnosti gerilaca. obzirom da su gerilci uvek i svuda militantni po definiciji, samoubilacki napad je indikator da je sunce jutros izaslo na istoku. Edited May 10, 2013 by Gandalf

[Anduril]

Bane5, ti si najbolji poster na ovom topiku i nemoj dozvoliti da ti ovo klasicno forumsko podmetanje i zamajavanje jede vreme i energiju.Kao sto vidis - "samo dve stvari su beskonacne - svemir i ljudska glupost" - tako da nemoj bisere pred svinje.

[Bane5]

ne zajebavaj.ali imas pivo za pokusaj.

[Prospero]

ekipico :P

[Budja]

Anduril je u pravu.Ne slazem se uvek sa tobom u interpretaciji big picture, ali jesi poster koji daje najvise zanimljivih i relevantnih informacija sa terena.A ove decije fore prozivanja iz osmog razreda osnovne Liban/Libija nisu za komentarisanje.

[Prospero]

Alawites and Christians in Syria–United in UncertaintyBy Gracy Howard • June 20, 2013, 4:25 AMRecent reports on the Syrian civil war depict a messy conflict, with terror and atrocity on both sides. The New York Times captured this in a story yesterday concerning the Alawite people, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s own sect.Reporter Robert Worth spoke with Alawites who related stories of brutality and murder. One Alawite woman named Ibtisam Ali Aboud, whose husband was killed by a Sunni friend, said, “We never used to feel any distinction between people of different sects … Now they are ready to slaughter us … We are the ones who are being targeted.”The Alawites have justly received condemnation for their abetting of Assad’s atrocities in the past (and present): Worth reflects back on the 1982 Hama massacre, in which Alawites helped kill 10,000 to 30,000 people in less than a month.But Worth describes the Alawite community as the war’s “opaque protagonist, a core of loyalists whose fate is now irrevocably tied to Assad’s.” He writes:

“Most outsiders agree that Assad cynically manipulated the fears of his kinsmen for political survival, but few have asked — or had the opportunity to ask — how the Alawites themselves feel about Assad, and what kind of future they imagine now that the Sunni Arab world has effectively declared war on them.”

Aliaa Ali, daughter of a retired Alawite military officer and French teacher, told Worth she used to be pro-revolution. But she now believes Alawites who join the opposition “are being used as tools. Or they think they can turn this jihadi war into a democratic revolution. But they will never succeed.”Alawite novelist Samar Yazbek disagrees. She said Assad has used the Alawite community as “human shields” to maintain power. “They believe the regime’s rhetoric, that they would be massacred if Assad falls … They are very afraid, and very confused.”An April 2013 special report by the U.S. Comission on International Religious Freedom noted,

“Many minority religious communities have tried to stay neutral in the conflict, but opposition forces increasingly see their non-alignment, or perceived non-alignment, as support for the al-Assad regime. Minority religious communities thus have been forced by circumstances to take a position either in favor of the al-Assad regime, which historically provided them some religious freedom protections, or in favor of the uncertainties of the opposition. As these sectarian fissures deepen, it is increasingly likely that religious communities will be targeted not for their political allegiances, but solely for their religious affiliation.”

The Alawite religion, according to Worth, is “a strange, mystic blend of Neoplatonism, Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism.” Islamist theologian Ibn Taymiyya said in the 14th century that Alawites were “more infidel than Jews and Christians, even more infidel than many polytheists,” and authorized a jihad against them.Alawites are not the only minority feeling fearful and trapped. The aforementioned U.S. Commission reported, “the Christian population of the city of Homs—approximately 160,000—has almost entirely fled for safety, with reports suggesting that only 1,000 Christians remain.” As Andrew Doran noted in an article for The American Conservative in May, many Christians “fled [iraq] to the relative freedom and tolerance of Syria, only to find themselves again fleeing persecution, often hunted by Syria’s rebels… The Obama administration, bewilderingly, has chosen to support Syria’s rebel groups without any apparent thought of the consequences.” Two Syrian Orthodox bishops were kidnapped by an unknown party on April 22, and although the opposition has reported they are “in good health,” there is no actual news on their whereabouts.Aliaa Ali also speculated on fears inherent in the toppling of Assad: “Yes, there have been atrocities… But you have to ask yourself: What will happen if Bashar falls? That’s why I believe victory is the only option. If Bashar falls, Syria falls. And then we, here, will all be in the niqab, or we will be dead.”As America steps into this chaotic civil war, it is becoming increasingly evident that we may not necessarily know who we are fighting for – or for that matter, who we are fighting against. Worth’s story illustrates the fact that “loyalty” does not always stem from admiration or love. Sometimes, it stems from fear.

[Gandalf]

neki minimalan cilj je da se spreči puna obnova asadove moći na celoj (ili na najvećem delu) teritoriji sirije, kako bi se onemogućio funkcionalni iranski pipak prema sredozemlju i izraelu. postoji sigurno i neki maxi cilj a to je makar pozerska demokratija koja nije antagonistička prema zapadu i izraelu

ne postoji dobitna kombinacija za americku administraciju. kako god se zavrsi, za Amere moze da bude samo malo ili znatno gore od statusa quo ante. u teoriji, najbolja moguce varijanta bi bila neka umereno-muslimanska vlast koju parama kontrolisu Saudijci. u praksi, Saudijci znaju samo da daju pare, za bilo sta vise nisu sposobni.mada u samoj administraciji verovatno ima ljudi koji misle da je najbolja varijanta ona u kojoj ce se Sirijci maksimalno isklati medju sobom, pa bi lepo bilo da rat potraje sto duze. Edited June 20, 2013 by Gandalf

[Yoda]

ne postoji dobitna kombinacija za americku administraciju. kako god se zavrsi, za Amere moze da bude samo malo ili znatno gore od statusa quo ante. u teoriji, najbolja moguce varijanta bi bila neka umereno-muslimanska vlast koju parama kontrolisu Saudijci. u praksi, Saudijci znaju samo da daju pare, za bilo sta vise nisu sposobni.mada u samoj administraciji verovatno ima ljudi koji misle da je najbolja varijanta ona u kojoj ce se Sirijci maksimalno isklati medju sobom, pa bi lepo bilo da rat potraje sto duze.

Contradictio in adiecto. Edited June 20, 2013 by Yoda