Sirija

[Tutankamon]

To su gluposti. Zašto bi oni bacili atomku na Izrael? Zato što Netanjahu tako kaže?

Kao da su svih njih 70 miliona Iranaca majmuni, neuračunljiva bića... Zna se čemu služi atomka i zašto je Severna Koreja ima.

 

Njihova vlast ih očigledno tako tretira jer ih bukvalno ne pita za ništa...a budali na vlasti svakakve gadosti padnu na pamet

[Muwan]

A i ne bi loše bilo da bace atomsku bombu na Izrael. To je baš svetovno

 

Da bismo cinično špekulisali o bacanju iranske atomke na Izrael, poželjan preduslov bi bio da Iran napravi jednu.

 

Izrael, sa druge strane, nema taj problem jer ima par stotina nuklearki na lageru pa bismo možda mogli da malo špekulišemo na koga će oni nešto da bace.

[Utvara]

Njihova vlast ih očigledno tako tretira jer ih bukvalno ne pita za ništa...a budali na vlasti svakakve gadosti padnu na pamet

Tako rečeno, svaka vlast je nelegitimna "jer ne pita bukvalno narod ni za šta". Po tom kriterijumu, treba Vučića da obesimo na Terazijama kao diktatora koji radi potpuno suprotno od onoga što "narod" želi... Vlast u Izrealu i Netanjahu ubija strane državljane (likvidira naučnike u Iranu) i vrši državni terorizam, bombarduje suverene države oportuno (bombarduje Siriju povremeno) itd.  

 

Ja se ne bih složio da je iranska vlast nelegitimna i nenormalna. Iranska vlast je barem delimično izabrana na izborima i kao takva legitimna je i pravno utemeljena. Takva je kakva je.

 

Da napravim digresiju vezanu za Siriju: Da je Iran imao ranije nuklearku, da li bi se sve ovo dogodilo? Kakav efekat bi to proizvelo na Zalivske države i Zapad? Mislim da ovo nije ŠBBKBB pitanje.

Mogu da se popišmane uskoro, ako im Rusi daju vetar u leđa i ako se stvari dovoljno zagovnaju tj. Bašar padne ili Izraelci udare sa nekim komandoskim prepadom/bombardovanjem, pa da zaista krenu zdušno u taj projekat, pod ruskim kišobranom?

[Jozef K.]

Što reče neko nije ovde tema Iran vs Izrael, već vidim da oni kojima smeta islamista u fsa, ne smeta mu islamista iz Irana, ako je uz Asada. To je taj na daleko čuveni principijelizam.

 

Poslao tapatalk

[Muwan]

Neko je na temi eksplicitno rekao da mu ne smeta umešanost Irana u Siriji?

[Jozef K.]

Ako nije, moj previd. Provejava, doduše.

 

Poslao tapatalk

[Muwan]

Eh, svašta nešto provejava na temi. Ako bismo se ozbiljno hvatali za ta provejavanja već bismo uveliko bili podeljeni i zavadjeni poput zaraćenih strana u Siriji.

[Prospero]

Par zanimljivih crtica:
 
 
 

Why Russia Needs an Exit Strategy in Syria
 Mikhail Barabanov
 
 October 9, 2015
 
...
It has become obvious that the Kremlin's decision to intervene in Syria militarily was largely prompted by plans for a Syrian “no fly zone” that Western nations have been discussing behind closed doors in recent months. Such a zone was intended to protect the forces of Syria's “moderate opposition” from the Syrian Government Army (Syrian Arab Army, a.k.a. SAA). It is perfectly clear that such a “no-fly zone,” one intended to replicate the 2011 Libya scenario, would actually have meant a transition to a large-scale air campaign directly waged by Western nations (along with Turkey and the Gulf Arab states) against Assad’s ground force. This would have dramatically undermined the latter’s already precarious military situation.     
Any decision on a “no fly zone,” which the West had all but agreed upon by September, has been torpedoed by Russia’s resolute deployment under the banner of fighting the IS. The question is how long--and how efficiently--the Russians will be able to fly that banner.
...
The Russian intervention in Syria occurred at a time when the situation of Assad’s forces somewhat stabilized. Notably, the Russians refrained from intervening in July and early August 2015, when the SAA suffered substantial blows at the hands of its opponents (first and foremost, radical Islamists). By September, Assad had managed to restore the frontline’s integrity, while the Islamist assault had lost its steam. This once again demonstrates that, in making its decision to intervene in Syria, Moscow gave more consideration to external factors (such as the threat of Western intervention) than to internal Syrian aspects.
...
A major problem for the pro-Assad forces has been created by large Islamist enclaves (mostly in Homs and Rastan) on territory under their control; the enclaves tie up a sizable proportion of SAA forces. The top priority for the Assad loyalists is to eliminate those enclaves. To the extent one can tell, a sizable share of Russian air strikes is currently de facto meant to assist an onslaught on those enclaves.

Should the enclaves be liquidated, Assad forces' subsequent objectives would be to completely sanitize the area around Aleppo, stabilize their positions in the south of Syria and, preferably, recapture the major communication hub of Palmyra from IS, driving the latter into the Syrian desert. If those objectives are achieved, the Assad regime's military and political position would significantly improve, and the regime’s survival would no longer be at stake.

However, the opposition forces (both moderates and Islamists) likewise are building up their potential for warfare. The US and allies have been supplying the “moderate” opposition with massive amounts of weaponry, and it looks like the Russian intervention in Syria has only put this process in higher gear. In December or January, the opposition forces of all hues could be expected to undertake a large-scale offensive along key directions. Rebuffing the offensive would be a crucial task for both SAA and the Russian air group. The very existence of the Russian group could be a serious factor delaying the opposition's offensive, for instance until January, which would benefit the government forces. In Syria, the period from February to April is taken up by the Khamsin (sandstorm) season; it largely rules out active operations of the parties.
...
Although the USA currently intends to intensify its campaign against IS all the way to a potential offensive by Kurdish and "moderate" opposition forces on Raqqa, the IS capital in Syria, such enterprise, it would seem, will probably fail. In my opinion, the Caliphate could only be destroyed through a large-scale military intervention of Western ground forces led by the USA, which is unlikely to be feasible in the next few years. On the other hand, given this situation, the Russian forces in Syria are able to only partially engage IS, leaving the principal goals of the anti-IS fight to the Americans, while Russia can devote itself to wearing out other anti-Assad groups.

 

[dillinger]

Što reče neko nije ovde tema Iran vs Izrael, već vidim da oni kojima smeta islamista u fsa, ne smeta mu islamista iz Irana, ako je uz Asada. To je taj na daleko čuveni principijelizam.

 

Poslao tapatalk

 

 

A to je taj nadaleko čuveni principijelizam, drugim rečima relativizacija kako su Hezbolah i Al Kaida jedno te isto. No dobro, Izrael je centar sveta i ravnaćemo se prema nekome samo na osnovu toga kakav mu je odnos prema državi Izrael

Edited October 10, 2015 by dillinger

[Bane5]

 

Sputnik ‏@Sputnik_Intl 27m27 minutes ago

Orthodox priest blesses #Russia's missiles of peace in #Syria

 

'missiles of peace'

[Muwan]

Rusi nemaju © na missiles of freedom i missiles of democracy pa im ostaje samo ova bljuvotina.

[Lord Protector]

Kosachev: #Russia has established contacts with moderate opposition of #Syria, 'We contacted them with missiles'

 

 

Edited October 10, 2015 by slow

[Dagmar]

'missiles of peace'

 

 

Neoriginalno zaista.

[Eraserhead]

 

 

 

A mislio sam da nece biti odvratnije ekipe od Cejnija i kompanije u USA.

[Prospero]

Ne smem ni da tražim šta li je sve Rogozin ovih dana pisao. 

 

 

Btw, zakleo bih se da je sama fotka svećenja™ Suhoja malko ranija, možda sa MAKSa iz avgusta, ili generalno iz letnjeg perioda, a čini mi se i da špalir vojske pozadi nosi letnje bluze koje ne verujem da nose krajem septembra ili u oktobru. Tj. mislim da je SPutnjik malo fulao, ali nebitno.

Edited October 10, 2015 by Prospero