Sirija

[Sirius]

  Izvrteli su jednu vest i totalno joj izmenili smisao. Pobunjenici su odavno aktivni u Damasku a sada je u pitanju full scale attack, pitanje je da li je sračunato i namerno poveden ili je sve počelo spontano (navodno su vladine trupe prve krenule i naletele na šta su naletele). Uglavnom, pobunjenici su tajno prebacivali ljude a i dosta je prebega u glavnom gradu. Poenta je da ima mnogo civila u tim zauzetim predgrađima i da im vladine trupe ne daju da se izvuku a da ovi drugi ne žele da se predstave kao neko zbog koga civili stradaju. To je na RTS-u predstavljeno kao malte-ne bezizlazna situacija, te kako su rebeli na pragu predaje  

Nisu oni nista izmislili jer oni samo bukvalno prenose ono sta nadju na Guardianu, Al Jazeere ili Reutersu. Odnosno, radi se o cobanima budalama. Meni nije samo jasno kako ti znas da ovo nije samo pritisak na clanice SB UN a ne nekakav odlucujuci napad na Damask? To su iz FSA uvek radili pred sednice SB UN kako bi se pritisli Rusi i Kinezi. Pre par meseci je bio Homs i tada se tvrdio nesto slicno kao i danas za Damask a u stvari je tada pokusano da se izvrsi pritisak na Ruse i Kineze u SB UN.Na osnovu cega tvrdis da je ovo nekakav odlucujuci napad? Sigurno da su prebacivali ljude u dvomilionski Damask ali to su radili i ranije i nije prvi put da bude pucanja po Damasku. Damask je blizu Libanonske granice i moguce je ubacivati se u njega.

[Tutankamon]

Nisu oni nista izmislili jer oni samo bukvalno prenose ono sta nadju na Guardianu, Al Jazeere ili Reutersu. Odnosno, radi se o cobanima budalama. Meni nije samo jasno kako ti znas da ovo nije samo pritisak na clanice SB UN a ne nekakav odlucujuci napad na Damask? To su iz FSA uvek radili pred sednice SB UN kako bi se pritisli Rusi i Kinezi. Pre par meseci je bio Homs i tada se tvrdio nesto slicno kao i danas za Damask a u stvari je tada pokusano da se izvrsi pritisak na Ruse i Kineze u SB UN.Na osnovu cega tvrdis da je ovo nekakav odlucujuci napad? Sigurno da su prebacivali ljude u dvomilionski Damask ali to su radili i ranije i nije prvi put da bude pucanja po Damasku. Damask je blizu Libanonske granice i moguce je ubacivati se u njega.

Zato što pratim Guardian i gomile tvitova i par blogova koji se bave tematikom i od kojih se ovi (Al Jazzera i ostali) snabdevaju informacijama. Te video uratke koje ti gledaš na Guardianu (ako uopšte pratiš) ja u najmanju ruku odgledam nekoliko sati ranije ako ne i više od toga. Nigde nisam rekao da je ovo odlučujući nego full scale attack, što će reći da nije hit and run kombinacija...oni drže par predgrađa već nekoliko dana...imali su sličan pokušaj pre par nedelja u Doumi ali su ispušili ali je i tu i dalje nezgodna situacija (ginu i dalje Asadovi vojnici tamo)...Tvoj problem je što ti samo čitaš naslove ili najvažnije vesti pa ne znaš recimo kakva je situacija u Homsu, Hami, Alepu, Idlibu i ostalim gradovima gde se ubijaju pa na osnovu toga pričaš neku svoju nesuvislu priču (daleko je veći "pritisak" bio masakr u Huli od dešavanja u Homsu)

[Sirius]

Zato što pratim Guardian i gomile tvitova i par blogova koji se bave tematikom i od kojih se ovi (Al Jazzera i ostali) snabdevaju informacijama. Te video uratke koje ti gledaš na Guardianu (ako uopšte pratiš) ja u najmanju ruku odgledam nekoliko sati ranije ako ne i više od toga. Nigde nisam rekao da je ovo odlučujući nego full scale attack, što će reći da nije hit and run kombinacija...oni drže par predgrađa već nekoliko dana...imali su sličan pokušaj pre par nedelja u Doumi ali su ispušili ali je i tu i dalje nezgodna situacija (ginu i dalje Asadovi vojnici tamo)...Tvoj problem je što ti samo čitaš naslove ili najvažnije vesti pa ne znaš recimo kakva je situacija u Homsu, Hami, Alepu, Idlibu i ostalim gradovima gde se ubijaju pa na osnovu toga pričaš neku svoju nesuvislu priču (daleko je veći "pritisak" bio masakr u Huli od dešavanja u Homsu)

I Hula je bio kao i ranije Homs. To se sve desavalo pred sednice SB UN. A, inace nemam pojma kako je u nabrojanim mestima. Doduse, sva nabrojana mesta se nalaze blizu granice Sirije sa Libanonom i Turskom pa pretpostavljam da se svakodnevno vode borbe.

[Bane5]

RTS-ov problem nije Guardian, njegov problem je inertnost, neobavestenost i kalupiranost informacija. asad se bori protiv pobune, on brani, oni drugi su potpomognuti spolja i hoce vlast. simplifikovano i uglavnom tacno, ali bas zbog pojednostavljivanja ispada da se na ovom obrascu lako moze, ako pratis RTS, zakljuciti koje dobar, a ko los. RTS sve vreme svesno ulazi u taj ugao pracenja rata u siriji.ps. uzgred, pozivanje na "izraelske izvore" tokom celog "arapskog proleca" je identicno verovati da ce smak sveta zaista doci 12. decembra.sve ovo na konto citiranja istih u raznim vestima (ujedno i RTS-ovim).

[Sirius]

Meni samo nije jasno zbog cega je bitno kako RTS prenosi vesti sa Guardiana na svom internetu izdanju? Zasto se uopste RTS i pominje u tom kontekstu kada mozes da saznas mnogo vise na internetu o dogadjajima u Siriji a da ne odes na RTS sajt?

[Аврам Гојић]

zato sto ne placamo taj servis da bi oni sirili Asadovu propagandu, valjda je to dovoljan razlog

[Bane5]

@Sirius,generalno, rts jeste nasa briga kao javni servis.ukoliko javni servis nase drzave ima takav nacin informisanja o necemu i ako se to cesto kosi sa objektivnoscu iz raznih razloga, onda bilo ko koga to zanima ima pravo bar na komentar. taj komentar ne mora da bude i nesto sa cim ces se sloziti.

Edited July 17, 2012 by Bane5

[Budja]

zato sto ne placamo taj servis da bi oni sirili Asadovu propagandu, valjda je to dovoljan razlog

Cini mi se da je Lazanski mnogo manje aktivan nego u Libiji, tj. da je pro-Asad propaganda znacajno manja nego pro-Gadafi propaganda i to u onoj meri u kojoj i zapadni mediji imaju vecu distancu prema pobunjenicima nego u Libiji (recimo, priznanje da su pre pad dana u mestu X( zaborvaih kako se svase) pobijeni pobunjenici a ne civili), sto je i normalno s obzirom da nema intervencije u koju su direktno upleteni.Ili, da se izvestajima o pomeranju hemijskog oruzja ne mora bas 100% verovati.

[iDemo]

Jel' je proksi ili nije proksi rat?

In sixteen months, the situation in Syria has mutated from an uprising in a few outlying cities into a full-scale civil war. Now it has mutated again into a proxy war between the Great Powers. The Russians have been arming the regime—it was a Russian air defense system that shot down the Turkish F-4 Phantom jet—and the West is now arming the rebels. The Saudis and the Gulf states are funneling weapons straight to the Sunnis, especially to anyone with Salafist and Islamic radical credentials. Arms are trickling across the borders with Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan; the CIA has been given the difficult task of ensuring that at least the Turkish weapons are channeled to the right people and away from al-Qaeda affiliates. Who the right people are is anybody’s guess. In a village war, not even the CIA can be sure.

[Prospero]

Jel' je proksi ili nije proksi rat?

ja bih iz teksta izdvojio ovo:

What makes Syria a hinge-moment is that Russia and China are proving that they have no strategic interest in transitions beyond dictatorship, not just in Syria but anywhere else. Both Russia and China see Syria not through the prism of international peace and security or human rights, but through the logic of their own despotism. For Putin, Syria is Chechnya; for China it is Tibet. They understand Assad perfectly. He is doing what they have done many times and they want the world to understand that they will support any dictator facing similar challenges. None of this should have come as a shock. By now we ought to know the Russian and Chinese regimes for what they are. But it is a surprise.At the end of the Cold War in 1989, we told ourselves history had a libretto—a story about liberty—set to a happy tune. Once regimes like Russia and China allowed market reforms, political reforms would follow, since peoples with economic freedom were bound to demand democracy too. The people have done so repeatedly since 1989 and both regimes have shut them down. Our idea that history had a libretto of freedom led the West to misread Russia and China’s strategic intentions. We brushed aside signs that they were refusing to embrace our view of the world. Russia resisted NATO expansion to its border and refused to give the alliance a green light over Kosovo, but we thought their need for foreign capital would soften their intransigence over time. Chinese leaders dug in when asked to devalue their currency and they continued to imprison dissidents. But we assumed they would cooperate with us on other issues because they sought integration into the global economy. For too long we believed they were behind us on the march to freedom but were heading in the same direction.

kao nastavak sage o zapadnim očekivanjima i razočarenjima u druge. ;) i još podcrtava razlike u njihovoj nepremostivosti i ultimativnosti, s tim da ne uviđa istosti imperijalnog cinizma koji baštine sve zemlje dovoljno jake da utiču na tuđe režime.

[iDemo]

i još podcrtava razlike u njihovoj nepremostivosti i ultimativnosti, s tim da ne uviđa istosti imperijalnog cinizma koji baštine sve zemlje dovoljno jake da utiču na tuđe režime.

Al' ovi shire demokratiju pa su, stoga, pozitivni likovi, ne?

[Аврам Гојић]

Al' ovi shire demokratiju pa su, stoga, pozitivni likovi, ne?

U osnovi, da.

[Prospero]

Al' ovi shire demokratiju pa su, stoga, pozitivni likovi, ne?

kada bi širili demokratiju, to bi bilo ok. pošto ne šire, onda ništa.edit: komentar na text:

Daniel Liss • 2 days ago Ignatieff paints a false contrast between 'free, Western liberal democracies' and 'oppressive, Eastern free-market autocracies', both in terms of the freedom they grant their own people, and in the drivers of their foreign policy . To properly understand the differences between the two systems, and to evaluate each on moral grounds (which of course is what Ignatieff is implicitly doing: West good, East – Middle Eastern, Russian, Chinese autocracies – bad) it is necessary to 1) compare each by the freedom it offers its own citizens, in freedom's political and economic variants, and 2) to compare each on the drivers of its foreign policy.Political freedom should normatively serve three key purposes: give people the feeling of hope and possibility not found in countries with pervasive and invasive security services; protect minority rights; and promote economic freedom. The liberal democracies do very well on the first two metrics, but on the third it has fared far worse over the past 20 years. Economic freedom in the West since 1990 has largely been surrendered to the dominance of neoliberal market ideology. The U.S. has a Gini coefficient higher than both Russia and China, while the majority of Western Europe and Canada have also become markedly more unequal over the past 20 years. In many ways, lack of economic freedom in a politically free country is more insidious than in an oppressive country, because citizens, by virtue of the hope and sense of possibility engendered by political freedom, don’t realize that the political-economic system discriminates against them and purposefully excludes them. The difference is that those in oppressive countries aren’t brainwashed – they know the system discriminates against them, and hence they lack the hope of the lower-middle class in Tennessee that economic success is attainable if only one works hard enough.Where the ‘free’ liberal democracies still perform better than the likes of China and Russia is in their protection of minority rights. But just because Western liberal democracies have been effective at protecting minority rights, it does not follow that democracies in the East will be as successful. To succeed, a democracy must indeed be ‘liberal’ – have a clear rule of law and constitutional minority protections. This aspect of democracy notoriously difficult to bring about – see the recent Egyptian and Iraqi experiments in democracy as examples. Ironically, outside the West it has often been repressive, autocratic states that have been successful at protecting minority rights, with Syria being a perfect example. Over the past 40 years until just recently, the Syrian regime used its heavy security presence to ensure freedom of expression for its minorities (albeit not Kurds).So how, exactly, is the free-market, increasingly economically unequal, post-financial crisis West morally superior to the Eastern dictatorships? Because they offer political freedom as a panacea (or veil) for systematic economic exclusion? I think not.The inability of the West to claim the moral high ground is even more glaring when it comes to foreign policy. As Ignatieff’s article is about Syria, let’s talk about Syria – who the West supporting, and why. I personally revile the pervasive torture and murdering of civilians of the Assad regime, but what makes us in the West think that the increasingly radical Sunni elementsfighting the government will be any better? Does no one else see the sick irony of the U.S. rooting on the largely extremist Sunni Muslim rebel force in Syria after declaring those same Muslims America’s number one enemy over the past 11 years? When Assad falls, I see no reason to believe a liberal democracy will develop in the place of his regime. Instead, it seems most likely that the poor, religious Sunnis that make up the bulk of the FSA will outmaneuver the internal secular elements and exiles in the fight for power. An oppressive Alawite dictatorship that ensured minority rights will be replaced by an oppressive, religious Sunni dictatorship that will enact revenge on Christians and Alawites for their support for the regime. How is one alternative superior to the other? Why, then, is the ‘West’ supporting the rebels. In short, it’s because they want to break the Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian-Hezbollah axis. It’s for the same selfish geostrategic reasons as Russia and China under the guide of moral superiority and international law. Such geostrategic foreign policy drivers are not new -- let us not forget that it was the West that supported Mubarak for 30 years when it pleased its interests, in addition to countless other dictators the world over.In short, while Western liberal democracies clam the moral high ground, they have no right to do so – not by the virtue of their domestic political and economic systems, nor by the morality of their foreign policy.

Edited July 18, 2012 by buffalo bill

[Аврам Гојић]

Izuzetno efikasan bombaski napad u Damasku: ubijen ministar odbrane tokom sastanka kabineta.

[Аврам Гојић]

kada bi širili demokratiju, to bi bilo ok. pošto ne šire, onda ništa.

pa to. jako je tesko polemisati sa time "oni sire demokratiju", posto je u to upakovano toliko gluposti da se ne moze nikako rasplesti. na kraju dodjes i do toga da je pobunu u Egiptu napravila CIA, i tu vise nema daljeg razgovora.