Mustafa Kemal'in askerleri

[Muwan]

Na istoku je sve gore i gore. Tri vojnika i jedan policajac su ubijeni jutros u odvojenim napadima.

 

Vlada uzvraća izveštajima™ koji kažu da su desetine pripadnika pkk ubijene u vazdušnim napadima ove nedelje.

[MancMellow]

super. to je poslednje što je trebalo regionu. 

[Muwan]

Da te dodatno oraspoložim:

 

1. Vladu nemamo.

2. Pregovori o koaliciji ne napreduju.

3. Postoji solidna mogućnost da vladajuća partija želi da ponovi izbore ali da pre toga odradi maksimalnu kampanju protiv HDP ne bi li ovi ostali ispod 10%.

4. Pri tome je vladajuća garnitura u fazonu pre će sve da nestane u plamenu nego što ćemo mi mirno odstupiti.

5. Radikali (MHP) takođe vide svoju šansu u novim izborima jer svaka tenzija a pogotovo rat sa Kurdima njima podiže procenat.

6. Tehnička vlada se upustila u ozbiljnu kampanju vazdušnih napada.

7. Pri tome su to trebali da budu napadi na ID da bi posle prvih par udara po njima sve živo od avijacije bilo bačeno na PKK i tako već danima.

8. PKK je napustila primirje i sad se na istoku gine svakodnevno.

9. Retorika vodećih političara je jeziva.

10. Pri tome je i HDP izgubila kompas pa je javno optuživala vlast da stoji iza samoubilačkog napada od prošle nedelje.

11. Vlast sada traži da se liderima HDP ukine imunitet, otvoren je predistražni postupak.

 

 

I tako...

[Аврам Гојић]

vanredni izbori bili bi u novembru, ne?

 

Inace ja nisam poznat kao neko ko onako konspiroloski optuzuje Vasington na prvu loptu, ali upada mi u oci da je ova kampanja protiv Daesh..pardon, protiv PKK usledila posle operativnog dogovora sa USA u vezi sa koriscenjem baze Indzirlik, kao i to da ne vidim sa Zapada nista osim hvale za mudru politiku Ankare.

 

Hoce li SAD da se bori protiv ISIS ili nece?

[Muwan]

Mesčini da hoće i da je Incirlik tome i namenjen. Ali je Ankara iskusno ispregovarala nešto zauzvrat a to je zeleno svetlo za ovu kampanju protiv PKK koja je zapravo kampanja sprečavanja uspostavljanja jedinstvene kurdske teritorije u Siriji (do sada je ID završavala taj posao, sada se oni puštaju niz vodu pa će sprečavanje morati da se radi direktno i uz minut ćutanja za mirovni proces).

 

SAD su "umešane" u smislu da stavljaju turski interes ispred kurdskog ali u isto vreme hoće da počiste ID kako ovi ne bi profitirali iz svega toga.

[MancMellow]

Da te dodatno oraspoložim:

 

1. Vladu nemamo.

2. Pregovori o koaliciji ne napreduju.

3. Postoji solidna mogućnost da vladajuća partija želi da ponovi izbore ali da pre toga odradi maksimalnu kampanju protiv HDP ne bi li ovi ostali ispod 10%.

4. Pri tome je vladajuća garnitura u fazonu pre će sve da nestane u plamenu nego što ćemo mi mirno odstupiti.

5. Radikali (MHP) takođe vide svoju šansu u novim izborima jer svaka tenzija a pogotovo rat sa Kurdima njima podiže procenat.

6. Tehnička vlada se upustila u ozbiljnu kampanju vazdušnih napada.

7. Pri tome su to trebali da budu napadi na ID da bi posle prvih par udara po njima sve živo od avijacije bilo bačeno na PKK i tako već danima.

8. PKK je napustila primirje i sad se na istoku gine svakodnevno.

9. Retorika vodećih političara je jeziva.

10. Pri tome je i HDP izgubila kompas pa je javno optuživala vlast da stoji iza samoubilačkog napada od prošle nedelje.

11. Vlast sada traži da se liderima HDP ukine imunitet, otvoren je predistražni postupak.

 

 

I tako...

 

Pa ja ne znam da li radi upravo suprotno i da im se ovakvim razvojem situacije bas moze desiti da se kurdi maksimalno motivisu da svi glasaju za HDP u kom slucaju ovi sigurno prelaze 10%. 

 

Sto se tice Sirije, ok razvaljivace oni ID, ali koji bi bio endgame? Svi ostali mi se cine daleko slabiji i od ID, i od Kurda i od Asada. 

[Anduril]

Pregled situacije sa Kurdima i IS u Ekonomistu:

 

 

Turkey, America and the Kurds
Awkward allies
Turkey may have joined the American-led coalition against Islamic State, but there are plenty of strings attached
Aug 1st 2015 | ANKARA | From the print edition

Timekeeper

WHEN news broke of a deal between Turkey and America over Syria last weekend, it was welcomed as a game-changer. But it has speedily become clear that the agreement is riddled with ambiguity and divergent agendas. That should not come as a surprise: the idea that two countries with such a fraught recent relationship were burying their differences to defeat Islamic State (IS) was always unlikely.

The apparent change of heart in Ankara came after the murder of 32 young activists at a Kurdish cultural centre in the border town of Suruc on July 20th. Having long turned a blind eye to IS (and other Sunni jihadist groups fighting Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria), the Turkish government seemed to have been shocked out of its complacency about the menace it poses.

In fact, Turkey had been edging towards taking a more active role in the coalition against IS for several weeks, which may well have been the trigger for the suicide attack. The reasons included growing alarm about the strengthening relationship between the Americans and the Kurds; active recruiting by IS inside Turkey’s big cities; and worry over the damage being done to Turkey’s reputation by its tolerance of IS. In June Barack Obama publicly criticised Turkey for failing to stem the flow of foreign fighters and arms across its border into Syria.

Although the details of the deal remain sketchy, Turkey has agreed to two long-standing demands from Washington. The first was to allow American warplanes to fly strike missions against IS positions from the big NATO airbase at Incirlik. With far less flying time to IS-held territory than from bases in the Gulf, aircraft can spend more time over their targets, respond more rapidly to real-time information from surveillance drones and maintain a higher tempo of operation. The second demand was that Turkish F-16 bombers would now join the coalition effort against IS.

In return, the Americans agreed to help establish a 65-mile IS-free zone along a western section of the Turkish-Syrian border, running from north of Aleppo to the Euphrates. That helped Ankara save face, but it is not the no-fly zone that the Turks have been demanding since the civil war in Syria erupted. That was intended to create a haven from the forces of Bashar Assad, particularly his aircraft, whereas the aim of this zone is merely to exclude IS.

In briefings earlier this week, the Turks expressed the hope that the zone would eventually provide a refuge for some of the 1.8m Syrian refugees in Turkey. Before that, though, the main aim of pushing IS out of the area is to sever the access-route to Turkey through which it funnels foreign recruits. As quickly as air strikes have killed the militants (about 1,000 are thought to be dying every month) replacements have filled their shoes. Having lost one crossing in the east at Tel Abyad to the Kurds in June, IS relies on another one, further west, Jarabulus, which is in the zone (see map).

The Turks hope for other benefits for themselves. As well as making this an IS-free zone, they would like to make it a Syrian Kurd-free zone as well, thwarting the Kurds’ plan to seize the contiguous territory they need to carve out a self-governing entity on Turkey’s frontier akin to the more or less autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq. That is a prospect that Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pictured, left) still fears far more than IS’s potential for mayhem. Although Turkey’s declared Syria strategy has been all about getting rid of Mr Assad, its support for the jihadists has always been at least as much about keeping the Kurds in check.

The real target

That fact can be seen from the targets chosen by the Turkish air force in the past few days. It has carried out some limited strikes against IS in north-west Syria, but it has shown more zeal in pounding positions held by the supposedly separatist Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, ending a two-year ceasefire against one of IS’s fiercer foes. The Turks are not bombing IS in Syria’s Euphrates valley, where it is fighting Syrian Kurd YPG militias. (The YPG is the armed wing of Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Union, an offshoot of the PKK.) Yet American planes are flying in support of YPG units fighting IS near Tel Abyad.

The Americans, who worked closely with the YPG during last year’s bitter defence of Kobane, rate the Kurdish militia as their most reliable ally against IS on the ground in Syria and intend to increase co-operation. The Turks say that although they regard the PKK as a terrorist organisation, just like IS, they have no plans to go after the YPG. However, there are reports (denied in Ankara) of Turkish tanks shelling YPG positions this week close to Jarabulus. A proven Turkish attack against the YPG would cross a red line, warn American officials. Yet for all its heroics in areas it seeks to control, the YPG is not going to take the fight to IS’s stronghold in Raqqa. For that, the coalition almost certainly needs to include Sunni Arabs.
An interactive guide to the Middle East's tangled conflicts

Other differences will be no less tricky to resolve. One is that the Turks and Americans do not agree on which rebel groups they will work with in expelling IS from the zone. That is vital, because neither country has any intention of putting boots on the ground. The Turks have long been close to Ahrar al-Sham, a well-organised Islamist group that has received arms from the country’s intelligence agency and Qatar. The Americans may just about be able to stomach Ahrar and its offshoots—it is at least authentically Syrian and has no designs on the West, though its informal links to the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda are deeply problematic.

Another of Turkey’s aims is to bring American aircraft into direct confrontation with Mr Assad’s waning but still effective (at least for terrorising civilians) air force. That is something the Americans wish to avoid, not wanting to mount a major operation to take out Syria’s air-defence system. Operating across the swathes of Syria the regime no longer controls has not been difficult. But the south-west corner of the zone covers still-contested ground.

Mr Erdogan also hopes for domestic political gains from his deal with the Americans. The PKK has provided Mr Erdogan with the excuse he needed to send his bombers after it by killing police officers and soldiers. The group alleges that the police were complicit in the Suruc atrocity. If the PKK responds with further outrages, it will play into the president’s hands. Renewed PKK terrorism will tarnish the HDP, a mainly Kurdish political party that denied Mr Erdogan’s AK party a majority in the election in June, and thus the power to change the constitution to create an executive presidency. Mr Erdogan could hold a snap election in a bid to get the right result.

Realising that its previous strategy had failed, Turkey has now joined the coalition against IS as an active participant. But even the concept of a very limited anti-IS zone is half-baked. Nobody has explained when and how it will be enforced or governed. The anti-IS coalition has long suffered from conflicting aims and weak commitment. That is not about to change.

 

 

I jos malo podataka o rizicima u ekonomiji o kojima sam pisao jos pre nekoliko godina:

 

 

Turkey’s economy
Flightless
Political worries increase the fragility of an economy badly in need of reform
Aug 1st 2015 | ANKARA AND ISTANBUL | From the print edition

Timekeeper

New dawn, gathering clouds

THERE is much to make investors jittery about Turkey. It is becoming ever more involved in the chaos in neighbouring Syria (see article). The Kurdish insurgency in the east of the country appears to have restarted. Politicians are still wrangling over a coalition after an indecisive election in June. The country may be in for a period of unstable, short-lived government or even a fresh election. Worse, Turkey has long been identified as one of the most vulnerable emerging markets, with slowing growth, a large current-account deficit and high corporate dollar-denominated debt. It is little wonder that the lira has been one of the world’s weakest currencies this year.

Fans of the Justice and Development (AK) party and its longtime leader (now president), Recep Tayyip Erdogan, like to boast of its stellar economic record since first forming a government in 2002. It is true that, after the bumpy 1990s and the humiliating bust of 2001, which ended in an IMF bail-out, AK presided over a decade of strong growth with relatively low inflation. The banks are solid and well-capitalised, foreign investment has soared and Turkey has acquired an investment-grade credit rating from some agencies. The country is this year’s chair of the G20, a club of big economies, and Mr Erdogan wants it to be one of the world’s ten biggest economies by 2023 (it is 18th now).

Yet a closer examination finds AK’s record far less shiny. During its time in government, economic growth has been, at best, middling by emerging-market standards. It has recently slowed sharply: GDP is expected to expand by barely 3% this year after only 2.9% growth in 2014 (see chart). Thanks partly to the tumbling lira, inflation is stuck at around 8%. Unemployment, at almost 10%, remains high. Turkey’s consumer-confidence index recently touched a six-year low.

Turkey’s external position also makes it peculiarly vulnerable. The combination of low saving and high investment means that it has long run a large current-account deficit: in 2014 it was, at 6% of GDP, proportionately the biggest in the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard University, points to what he calls the deteriorating quality of Turkish growth. Over recent years, any given level of growth has been associated with a rising current-account deficit, not a falling one.

Foreign-currency borrowing in Turkey is high and rising, especially among non-financial businesses. The economy’s total external financing needs are now put at around $200 billion a year. According to the IMF, the foreign debts of banks and other companies shot up from around 5% of GDP in 2008 to 18% of GDP in 2013. With the lira’s fall making such loans more expensive to service, these numbers are worryingly high.

Some investors take comfort from Turkey’s robust public finances, in contrast to the 1990s (and to neighbouring Greece). Public-sector debt has fallen from 80% of GDP in 2001 to only 33% today. Yet it is not the public sector that is the problem. The fear that the private sector’s borrowing binge will lead to a crisis is exacerbated by the prospect of higher interest rates in America, expected as soon as September. That is likely to draw capital away from emerging markets.

These worries are heightened by a loss of faith in Turkish institutions. When the central bank began raising interest rates in early 2014, Mr Erdogan attacked it for being part of the “interest-rate lobby”. He insists that high interest rates cause inflation, not the other way round. A perceived weakening of the rule of law also makes it hard to attract foreign investors. Earlier this year the head of the Turkish employers’ federation roused Mr Erdogan’s ire by saying, “A country where the rule of law is ignored, where the independence of regulatory institutions is tainted, where companies are pressured through tax penalties and other punishments, where rules on tenders are changed regularly, is not a fit country for foreign capital.”

The slump in Turkish growth is not just a short-term or cyclical problem. As one London-based analyst argues, it is structural, reflecting domestic as well as external imbalances. Turkish savings are too low. Regulation is excessive: Turkey comes bottom of the OECD league for product-market regulation. In the World Bank’s rankings for ease of doing business, Turkey comes 136th for building permits, 79th for starting a new business and 109th for resolving insolvency. Labour-market participation is low, especially among women, for whom it has actually fallen under AK’s tenure. Turkey has no technology industry to speak of and spends little on research and development. Many economists reckon it is caught in a middle-income trap, from which it can escape only through substantial structural reforms.

Sadly, none of the parties jostling for a place in government seems interested in that. Under AK, investors were reassured by the presence of the experienced Ali Babacan as a deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, but he is stepping down. Some hope for a return of the man who, with the IMF’s help, rescued Turkey in 2001: Kemal Dervis. That would depend on AK forming a coalition with the main opposition Republic People’s Party (CHP), but it has not yet settled on a partner. The jitters seem likely to last.

 

Edited July 31, 2015 by Anduril

[Dr Arslanagić]

Propali pregovori između AKP i MHP. Šta dalje?

[hazard]

Izbori?

Da li je moguće da je ,,genijalni" plan Erdoganov ,,bomardujmo malo Kurde, pa će HDP pasti ispod 10%"?

[Muwan]

O tome se ozbiljno špekuliše ali to su ipak samo špekulacije. Ono što je opipljivo je to da je otkopavanje ratne sekire sa Kurdima i korišćenje Islamske države kao paravana za all-out vazdušne udare po PKK gotovo izvesno uskratilo AKP i poslednji kurdski glas u velikim gradovima. A nije da nisu imali te glasove, štaviše. Ove nedelje je direktor agencije koja je najbolje pogodila rezultate prethodnih izbora upozorio da bi u ovakvoj situaciji na ponovljenim izborima lako moglo da se desi da HDP postane jedini izbor za kurdske birače, dakle opšta homogenizacija nekih 17-18% biračkog tela i tako bi HDP rezultatski ostavila MHP u prašini i postala treća najjača partija u zemlji. Iz tog ugla gledano, plan "bomardujmo malo Kurde pa će HDP pasti ispod 10%" mogao je da osmisli samo kompletan mentol... erm...

 

Ako je bilo takvog plana, logika™ je bila da će ne-kurdski glasači HDP (kojih ima 2-3%) okrenuti leđa toj opciji i glasati za nekog drugog. To će se možda i desiti ali će barem isto toliko Kurda okrenuti leđa vladajućoj partiji i pri tome neće glasati za neke liberalne levake koji nemaju nikakve šanse da uđu u parlament nego svi ti glasovi idu direktno na vodenicu HDP. Sve i da plan nije postojao povučeni potezi će dovesti do ovakvog raspleta, nakon čega sledi povlačenje još glupljih i štetnijih poteza. Talas koji je AKP uzjahala pre 13 godina se najzad spustio i sad valja plivati a oni numeju. Sad su u spirali glupih poteza koje povlače što iz očaja što iz čistog idiotizma, a to će sve naravno da košta zemlju i naciju.  

 

Novi izbori su 97% izvesni, kraj oktobra ili početak novembra. Juče je osam vojnika poginulo u samo jednom roadside bombingu.

Edited August 20, 2015 by beowl

[Gandalf]

Pocelo je tako sto je su pripadnici PKK ubili 2 ili 3 pandura, nakon samoubilackog napada IS. Turska avijacija je onda udarila po IS i PKK, pa je PKK uzvratio... (dok su se ISovci za sada ogranicili na antiAKP propagandu)

[Muwan]

Otako je pokrenut mirovni proces (i PKK obustavila borbu) desilo se u nekoliko navrata da pogine par vojnika na istoku pa niko nije zbog toga podizao 70 F-16 u udarne talase.

[Gandalf]

Otako je pokrenut mirovni proces (i PKK obustavila borbu) desilo se u nekoliko navrata da pogine par vojnika na istoku pa niko nije zbog toga podizao 70 F-16 u udarne talase.

kontekst. u datoj situaciji, ocekivano je da turska vojska udari jako i na IS i na PKK. sto ce reci, u kolikoj meri je u pitanju Erdoganova zelja da postigne politicke poene, a u kolikoj meri je drzavni odgovor?

 

naime, rekao bih da AKP ne moze da profitira od ovoga. diskutabilno je da uopste ocekuju da profitiraju, posebno imajuci u vidu da je vecina Turaka protiv znacajnijeg vojnog angazovanja u Siriji.

 

(da li je to bilo ispravno ili ne, u kolikoj meri je turski odgovor bio "proporcionalan"... je neka druga prica.)

Edited August 24, 2015 by Gandalf

[Muwan]

Naravno da ne mogu da profitiraju od ovoga. Pitanje je da li ta nemogućnost profita dokazuje da su podizanjem kompletne avijacije na PKK samo hteli da upriliče državni odgovor bez ikakve skrivene računice ili, pak, ukazuje na to da su upali u spiralu idiotskih poteza kakve idioti obično povlače kada balon koji jašu krene da se izduvava. Ja tipujem na ovo drugo.

[barrcode]

AKP 41.7

CHP 25.5

MHP 15.7

HDP 14.7