Mustafa Kemal'in askerleri

[dillinger]

Posle nekog sumanutog rata i totalne radikalizacije suni muslimana na celom području. 

 

Iran normalno da podržava. Ne znam šta je tu čudno. Šta Iran će da zamenu US u spoljnoj politici Turske? I od kad je Persija "prirodan saveznik" Turske, molim te?

 

Za Tursku je najgore što može da se desi je da US digne ruke od njih (što se neče desiti, samo kažem). 

 

Prirodna po prirodi režima.

 

Za Tursku je najgore da se konfrontira sa opakim susedima za račun Vašingtona, i Erdogan je shvatio od novembra do danas da je manje važan od Baltika.

Edited July 21, 2016 by dillinger

[Meazza]

Teško će se Rusija i Turska dogovoriti. Totalno, da upotrebim taj izraz, ali totalno "neprirodni" saveznici.

U kom smislu?

[MancMellow]

Prirodna po prirodi režima.

 

To uvek ispadne slabije i manje važno od svega ostalog. 

 

 

Za Tursku je najgore da se konfrontira sa opakim susedima za račun Vašingtona, i Erdogan je shvatio od novembra do danas da je manje važan od Baltika.

 

Misliš da Turska može da bira da li će biti rival Rusiji tj Rusija njoj? Jel znaš koliko puta su oni pokušavali da dogovore nešto trajnije. Pa i tokom poslednje decenije. Ali i unazad 100 godina, ako ne i 300. Masu puta, ne zna se broj. Turska i Rusija su rivali time gde jesu i time što jesu i ne postoji režim koji to može da promeni. Kad komunisti i Ataturk nisu uspeli da uspostave trajno priateljstvo, niko neće uspeti.

 

Druga je stvar što mogu povremeno da se dogovaraju oko sekundarnih interesa i što taktički na određeni i rok jednoj ili drugoj državi može da odgovara privremeno ograničeno snaženje ove druge, ali to je već tema za neki drugi topik...

Edited July 21, 2016 by MancMellow

[MancMellow]

U kom smislu?

 

iznad

[Pontijak]

Turski pilot je u novembru prošle godine sam doneo odluku da obori ruski avion Su-24 koji je,prema verziji turske strane, već napustio vazdušni prostor Turske.

 

 

 

voistinu hvala bogu

Ahahaha koje spinovanje pa ovo ni kod orvela nema tako briljantnih primera. A to sto je onda erdogan urlikao podrsku cinu obaranja ruskog aviona to nista? Ma da mu nisu ukrali licnu kartu tada kao batici? Bokte stvarnost nadmasila knjizevnost. Jebes 1984. Citajte turska zvanicna saopstenja

 

Послато са SM-J320FN уз помоћ Тапатока

Edited July 21, 2016 by Pontijak

[MancMellow]

Sad sledeći put kad neko dođe u neku sličnu priliku da pritisne neko dugme ima 10 puta da razmisli da li je "sam doneo tu odluku" ili ne. 

[mackenzie]

https://youtu.be/eINVguT3j08

 

O.o

[Prospero]

STATEMENT

Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the declaration of the State of Emergency in Turkey

 

21/07/2016

 

 

We are following the developments regarding the State of Emergency Turkey has declared after the attempted coup, which the European Union condemned, very closely and with concern.

 

This declaration comes in the wake of the recent unacceptable decisions on the education system, judiciary and the media. As outlined in the conclusions of the Council and in the discussion of the European Commission this week, we call on Turkish authorities to respect under any circumstances the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right of all individuals concerned to a fair trial.

 

The declaration of State of Emergency gives the executive far reaching powers to govern by decree. Under the terms of the Turkish Constitution, core fundamental rights shall be inviolable even in the State of Emergency.

 

President Erdogan stated that the measure will in no way affect democracy, the rule of law or fundamental freedoms. We indeed expect that they will be fully respected, and that the authorities will act with restraint, as outlined clearly by the European Union in the Council conclusions on 18 July. Any temporary suspension of the European Convention of Human Rights needs to follow the rules foreseen for such a derogation.

 

The EU will continue to monitor the situation very closely, including the practical implications of the State of Emergency. We expect the parliament and all forces represented in the democratic institutions of the country to play their constitutional role at full.

 

[Bojan]

Ja se svakako slažem da je Turska važan strateški partner Amerike i veoma je teško da će se to promeniti. Ali ipak valja razmotriti i par detalja oko sadašnjeg trenutka.

 

Iako je Barak Obama, kao i mnogi predsednici pre njega, doneo Nacionalnu bezbednosnu strategiju, neki smatraju da je ta strategija najlošija do sada. I to u smislu njene težine i efektivnosti. Toliko je loša da se čak ni republikanci nisu poduzeli posla da takav dokument kritikuju. Evo jednog dokumenta (Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy), koji pored kritike/nedostatka Obamine strategije

 

 

 

 

The vagueness of the Obama administration’s NSS reflects the absence of rigorous strategic thinking in the president’s national security agencies. As in the document, different parts of the U.S. government are running to catch up with emerging threats. There is little systematic integration of policies, there are few consistent priorities, and capabilities are rarely aligned closely with goals and aspirations. In fact, the recent NSS is largely driven by a desire to avoid using certain capabilities, rather than a focused discussion of what U.S. capabilities are supposed to achieve.

 

 

 

 

daje kratak pregled ostalih strategija od II svetskog rata naovamo. Zanimljivo je videti da je Nikson-Kisindžer strategija detanta u skladu sa politikom nesvrstanih.

 

Jack Matlock  je čovek koji je pisao Reganovu bezbednosnu strategiju, kojom je napuštena politika detanta i koji je tu strategiju na kraju i realizovao na terenu, kao ambasador u Moskvi od 87-91.

 

 

 

 

NSDD 75 was a short 9-page document that opened with three clear strategic goals: reverse Soviet expansionism through competition in “all international arenas”; promote internal change within the Soviet Union “toward a more pluralistic political and economic system”; and negotiate with the “principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.”

 

 

 

 

On danas smatra da je strategija prema Rusiji potpuno pogrešna i da se čak uopšte ne postupa strateški. Zanimljivo je njegovo svedočenje pred kongresnim komitetom za spoljne poslove od 17. juna ove godine, na ovu temu, gde se malo dotakao i Turske:

 

 

 

 

The larger an alliance becomes, the more varied will be the security ambitions of its members. When our interests are not closely aligned, an American security guarantee can create a moral hazard. What is to keep an “ally” from picking a fight unnecessarily and then expecting the United States to win it for him? To some degree, this may be happening already. To take just one contemporary example, I have trouble finding much concurrence between American security interests and Turkish behavior.

 

 

 

 

Na kraju, mislim ono što je najinteresantnije jeste saslušanje nekoliko američkih dužnosnika i eksperata za pitanje Turske od strane gorepomenutog komiteta za spoljne poslove, koje je održano samo nekoliko dana pred puč. 

 

 

 

 

“While it is right for the United States government to do everything it can to work with Turkish authorities, recent actions by the Turkish President to single out and officially label the movement of Fethullah Gulen as a terrorist group is counterproductive. Likewise, ongoing efforts to marginalize the Kurds, limit media freedom and weaken Turkey’s judiciary should ring alarm bells around the world.”

 

 

 

 

Ovde je ceo snimak tog saslušanja (Turkey Democratic Decline), gde eksperti govore o jako lošem stanju u Turskoj (priča počinje na 9:15).

[Prospero]

 

 

 

The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism

by Cihan Tuğal

The brief rise and precipitous fall of “Islamic liberalism”

Just a few short years ago, the “Turkish Model” was being hailed across the world. The New York Times gushed that prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) had “effectively integrated Islam, democracy, and vibrant economics,” making Turkey, according to the International Crisis Group, “the envy of the Arab world.” And yet, a more recent CNN headline wondered if Erdogan had become a “dictator.”

 

In this incisive analysis, Cihan Tuğal argues that the problem with this model of Islamic liberalism is much broader and deeper than Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. The problems are inherent in the very model of Islamic liberalism that formed the basis of the AKP's ascendancy and rule since 2002—an intended marriage of neoliberalism and democracy. And this model can also only be understood as a response to regional politics—especially as a response to the “Iranian Model”—a marriage of corporatism and Islamic revolution.

 

The Turkish model was a failure in its home country, and the dynamics of the Arab world made it a tough commodity to export. Tuğal’s masterful explication of the demise of Islamic liberalism brings in Egypt and Tunisia, once seen as the most likely followers of the Turkish model, and provides a path-breaking examination of their regimes and Islamist movements, as well as paradigm-shifting accounts of Turkey and Iran.

 

 

 

pdf

 

 

Edited July 21, 2016 by Prospero

[namenski]

Sad sledeći put kad neko dođe u neku sličnu priliku da pritisne neko dugme ima 10 puta da razmisli da li je "sam doneo tu odluku" ili ne. 

Uvek im ostaju Grci, tu slicnih problema nema  -_-

[Pontijak]

A i ako nekome padne na pamet taj pucisticki plan pazljivije ce ga planirati i drzace se onog narativa ubij zakolji da protivnik puca ne postoji. Nikada necemo saznati sta bi bilo da su pucisti svom silom udarili po erdoganovim gradjanima i da picke od generala koji su ispalili puciste nisu jos grdjom silom udarili sa istim narativom. Mozda bi se turska raspala a mozda bi puc i uspeo

 

Послато са SM-J320FN уз помоћ Тапатока

Edited July 21, 2016 by Pontijak

[MancMellow]

 

 

 

 

The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism

by Cihan Tuğal

The brief rise and precipitous fall of “Islamic liberalism”

Just a few short years ago, the “Turkish Model” was being hailed across the world. The New York Times gushed that prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) had “effectively integrated Islam, democracy, and vibrant economics,” making Turkey, according to the International Crisis Group, “the envy of the Arab world.” And yet, a more recent CNN headline wondered if Erdogan had become a “dictator.”

 

In this incisive analysis, Cihan Tuğal argues that the problem with this model of Islamic liberalism is much broader and deeper than Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. The problems are inherent in the very model of Islamic liberalism that formed the basis of the AKP's ascendancy and rule since 2002—an intended marriage of neoliberalism and democracy. And this model can also only be understood as a response to regional politics—especially as a response to the “Iranian Model”—a marriage of corporatism and Islamic revolution.

 

The Turkish model was a failure in its home country, and the dynamics of the Arab world made it a tough commodity to export. Tuğal’s masterful explication of the demise of Islamic liberalism brings in Egypt and Tunisia, once seen as the most likely followers of the Turkish model, and provides a path-breaking examination of their regimes and Islamist movements, as well as paradigm-shifting accounts of Turkey and Iran.

 

 

 

pdf

 

 

 

 

"uzeo" ja i ovu drugu :)

[MancMellow]

Iz Muharrem Eksi: The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model' in the Muslim World, 95-96 (From Soft Power Image to Perception of Sectarian (Islamist-Sunni) Foreign Policy)

 

 

From Soft Power Image to Perception of Sectarian (Islamist-Sunni) Foreign Policy The fact that the AKP governments increased the dose of Islamist discourse and Israel criticism which it used as an instrument to open space in its Middle East policy caused the fall of its soft power image as well as causing loneliness in foreign policy by the perception that it followed a Sunni, Sectarian and Islamist foreign policy.

 

Likewise, the position of Turkey is clearly explained by the statement of øbrahim Kalın, chief advisor of the President, in 2013 where he used the phrase “precious loneliness”178. The perception and criticisms on the Islamization of the Turkish foreign policy starting with the invitation of Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas, to Ankara in 2006 reached to a peak with the policy of AKP governments to create a Sunni axis in the Middle East179. Likewise, the AKP support to the Sunni opposition against the Shiite Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq improved relations with Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Tunis and almost created an Sunni axis. However, this axis was destroyed by the Syria crisis and deterioration of relations with Egypt after the removal of Mohamed Morsi from office by a military coup.

 

The relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia were disintegrated by the Saudi Arabia’s support to General Sisi who came to power by the military coup while AKP supported Ikhwan and Morsi in Egypt. Turkey developed close relations with Qatar, however, the Sunni axis was broken when Qatar too left the position of Turkey after pressure by Saudi Arabia leaving Turkey alone in its Middle East policy. Turkey-Iran relations were improved in the Iran nuclear issue but Turkey seemed to be excluded in the changing Middle East equation after the reconciliation of Iran with USA and the West by-passing Turkey. 178 “Dıú politikada 'de÷erli yalnızlık' dönemi”, Hürriyet, 21 A÷ustos 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dispolitikada-degerli-yalnizlik-donemi-24553602 96

 

In addition, Turkey was limited with the regional Kurdish administration in Iraq. Relations with Libya were also not good although AKP government changed its policy where it initially opposed to the NATO intervention. Turkey became a lonely country in the Middle East and this position of Turkey can be based on the lack of anticipation of the Arab Spring process. Arab Spring process was the greatest challenge to the foreign policy of the AKP government. Davuto÷lu’s failure to anticipate the Arab Spring transformation in the Middle East, a region where he claims to have full knowledge of, caused Turkey to be caught unprepared. In addition, AKP government followed high profile in the Middle East and stood out during crisis and problem periods which really resulted in foundering in the Middle East swamp which the previous governments tried to avoid.

Edited July 21, 2016 by MancMellow

[porucnik vasic]

To uvek ispadne slabije i manje važno od svega ostalog. 

 

Misliš da Turska može da bira da li će biti rival Rusiji tj Rusija njoj? Jel znaš koliko puta su oni pokušavali da dogovore nešto trajnije. Pa i tokom poslednje decenije. Ali i unazad 100 godina, ako ne i 300. Masu puta, ne zna se broj. Turska i Rusija su rivali time gde jesu i time što jesu i ne postoji režim koji to može da promeni. Kad komunisti i Ataturk nisu uspeli da uspostave trajno priateljstvo, niko neće uspeti.

 

Druga je stvar što mogu povremeno da se dogovaraju oko sekundarnih interesa i što taktički na određeni i rok jednoj ili drugoj državi može da odgovara privremeno ograničeno snaženje ove druge, ali to je već tema za neki drugi topik...

Слабо ти ово.