Mustafa Kemal'in askerleri

[porucnik vasic]

Да, гори је.

 

Хм, најмање три месеца ванредног стања а можда и дуже.

Шта ће бити са Шабанчијем, Кочом и осталим озбиљнм приватном школама?

[aram]

sad ova tri meseca moze da vlada dekretima, da menja sam zakone, ne treba mu ni parlament ni nista... veselo

[Pontijak]

Koliko shvatam ono sto pise beowl gulen je kao sajentoloska crkva ali na deseti stepen

 

Послато са SM-J320FN уз помоћ Тапатока

[Dr Arslanagić]

Koliko znam, i Koč i Šabanči su u nemilosti već duže vreme.

[MancMellow]

Ono što oni (vlast) sad zapravo rade je da debelo retardiraju tzv meku moć Turske izvan granica (posebno zapadno od Turske). Bez obzira što to nije bila, kako bih rekao, "državna" moć.

Edited July 20, 2016 by MancMellow

[Lord Protector]

 

The Gulen movement

 

The Fethullah Gulen group, like the Nursi movement from which it derives, has been categorized as a tradition transmitted through print and study. I will briefly consider the recent (post-2000) activities of the Fethullah Gulen movement in the United States. In this case we have a local form of networking based on patterns of Turkish Anatolian Sufism trying to make organized inroads into the American/global scene. It may be objected that this movement is not explicitly “Sufi” and in fact eschews features of Sufi organizations such as initiation. I prefer to consider it as a variety of “post-tariqa” Sufism, a development emerging in the modern period that represents a new articulation of Sufi networking. Successful exportation of some activities of the Gulen movement has occurred in the ex-Soviet republics since 1994 due to the establishment of schools and consequent outreach in the Turkish language. Due to its original and continued emphasis on education as a vehicle for inculcating moral values in the modern world while promoting a scientific outlook, one may characterize the Gulen movement as building on a network model based on the school, especially

of the madrasa type. In this type of network the links between student and teacher are life-long and in some cases close to the master–disciple ties of Sufism. “Exemplary” figures, Gulen, the Aghabeys (older brothers), and the other teachers facilitate Islamic learning and morally edifying discussions and dispense hospitality and service to the members and clients who in turn are supported in sharing this with ever-widening circles. Hakan Yavuz divides the activities of Gulen’s movement into two phases:

1 The first period consists of religious community building 1966–1982 in which Gulen (b. 1938), a state-appointed religious teacher and preacher (hoca), tutored a spiritually oriented and intellectually motivated core group of followers to build a religious community in Izmir. Gradually the circle of supporters expanded beyond local students and businessmen to include outreach to many Turkish cities. Institutions were founded that would focus on the needs of an upcoming generation by providing dormitory facilities and ultimately an extensive network of primary and secondary schools.

2 During the second phase (1983–1997) the Gulen movement expanded into the public sphere and loosened some of its boundaries.29 Increasing outreach involved a middle segment of Turkish society amenable to Islamization or moral rectification as subtly encouraged through television, radio, news, publishing, educational, and other support aspects of the movement. During this time Gulen’s “inclusive and liberal interpretation of Islam as a religion of love, peace and social responsibility helped him build bridges and add new circles to the movement”.30 The movement judiciously positioned itself in mainstream Turkish society by developing important holdings in the media, financial and educational sectors. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in the 1990s the Gulen movement expanded its outreach, internationalizing by founding schools in Central Asia, especially in Turkish speaking areas. The year 1997 marked a new phase after Gulen left Turkey to reside in the United States at a time of severe government pressure on what were perceived to be Islamizing currents threatening the secular Turkish state. His movement, now some six million strong in Turkey, continues to expand its outreach globally through schools and, more recently, through activities in the United States. The main outreach in the US is currently not to fellow Muslims – but rather to the academic and inter-faith communities. Outreach efforts have included sponsoring fast-breaking dinners (Iftars), conferences, the promotion of Turkish culture through events such as Mevlevi performances, as well as the founding of charter schools. Increasingly, American business and political networks are tapped for participation and mutual support. These initiatives resonate with Fethullah Gulen’s stated objectives of encouraging a tolerant Islam engaged with the modern world through scientific education and tolerance while cooperating with those of diverse religions and backgrounds. Activities of this group engage this chapter’s theme of global and local because one thrust of Gulen’s outreach is that Turkish Islam can model on a

global scale a moderate and tolerant expression of the religion – a combination of Sufi Islam and Turkish culture. In addition, Gulen turns from the Arab world to the West – evidenced by a focus on English rather than Arabic in the movement’s schools. In what sense could we say that this Turkish movement is either similar to, or unlike, classical practices of Sufism? In fact, the writings of both Nursi and Gulen31 critique traditional forms of Sufi organization and suggest that the scope of Sufism for these times should be compatible with modern knowledge (science) and social formations. Baya (initiation)32 and tariqa identification are not practiced in any of the Nur movements despite their Naqshbandis roots.33 A remaining question is – if this movement represents a new style of modern global Sufi networking that could be more easily communicated across cultures – how is the local/Turkish cultural element going to be negotiated in the future? This question of Turkish cultural identity among Sufis in the West has already arisen in the case of the Mevlevi and Jerrahi Sufi movements in the United States. The American Mevlevi Sufis (under Jelaluddin Loras,34 or Kabir Helminski,35 for example) seem to have moved more towards the New Age attitude of eclecticism and gender equality, allowing women to perform the sema turning ritual, for example.36 The American Helveti-Jerrahis have internally differentiated themselves into sub-branches, both regionally and according to the extent to which adherence to the shari’a is emphasized and traditional gender norms maintained, thereby negotiating Turkish Muslim and American New Age norms in various permutations.37 Clearly the Gulen movement in the United States is less interested in direct recruitment, which in Turkey takes place through social networks such as family, education and religious meetings. Broader creation of a “community of discourse” occurs as associates become committed through “moral obligation” to work for a better society through reforming the private sphere. This message is transmitted in Turkey through media (newspapers, television, radio) and publications (300 bookstores) and small study circles that support and propagate the movement’s philosophy. Most Gulen followers in Turkey are young people who, while at high school or university, adopted a more “Islamic” and service-oriented philosophy that at least for a time may alienate them from secularized relatives. The objectives of the movement in the West are therefore somewhat ambiguous. Is the goal an expansion of the project of “moral reform” and “tolerance” to the entire world (globalism) or it is a means to gaining credibility in the Turkish homeland?

 

Sufis in Western Society Global networking and locality, Edited by Ron Geaves, Markus Dressler and Gritt Klinkhammer 

Edited July 20, 2016 by slow

[namenski]

Ono što oni (vlast) sad zapravo rade je da debelo retardiraju tzv meku moć Turske izvan granica (posebno zapadno od Turske). Bez obzira što to nije bila, kako bih rekao, "državna" moć.

Mozda se moc same Turske retardira^tm i to je cena koju su danasnji turski vlastodrsci ocigledno spremni da plate.

Ono sto se mozda previdja je, kad je vec neko pomenuo Iran, to je cinjenica da islamizam^tm - pocev od Irana ne tako davno, napreduje i da je stigao bukvalno i geografski na prag Evrope, Azija obaska.

Kao sto je i cinjenica da imamo priliku da uzivo posmatramo 1 globalni fenomen: namerno nisam pomenuo islam, militantni islam, terorizam, ISIS, itd, itd, itd, kao propratne pojave, ali tesko da moze da se spori da se moderna civilizacija koja je proglasena globalnom, susrece sa izazovom jedne civilizacije koja - sta god i kako god - predstavlja u mnogo cemu negaciju vrednosti za koje se zdravo za gotovo uzimalo da su univerzalne.

Bas kao sto ne moze da se spori cinjenica da su te vrednosti prijemcive za - ovog trenutka - vise od milijardu ljudi sa tendencijom skoro pa eksponencijalnog rasta.

Daleko od toga da se smeju praviti istorijske paralele, jos je opasnije svoditi stvar samo na religiju, a najopasnije je odmahnuti rukom i proglasiti ono sto se poslednjih decenija dogadjalo sa ekspanzijom islama za nenormalnost, bolest, nazadnjastvo, itd, itd. 

[Lord Protector]

Koliko shvatam ono sto pise beowl gulen je kao sajentoloska crkva ali na deseti stepen

 

 

New Age derviši protiv Muslimanskog bratstva

 

 

Edited July 20, 2016 by slow

[MancMellow]

Mozda se moc same Turske retardira^tm i to je cena koju su danasnji turski vlastodrsci ocigledno spremni da plate.

Ono sto se mozda previdja je, kad je vec neko pomenuo Iran, to je cinjenica da islamizam^tm - pocev od Irana ne tako davno, napreduje i da je stigao bukvalno i geografski na prag Evrope, Azija obaska.

 

 

Napreduju fantastično. Levantska (i srednjoazijska) civilizacija nikada u istoriji nije bila ovako sistemski ponižavana na svakom zamislivom planu od Zapada i Dalekog istoka (a i Indija se kandiduje). Ovo je njihovo apsolutno dno od nastanka civilazacije pre 7000 godina. I ISIS i terorizam su rezultat toga. Ako ne pronađu unutrašnje snage da se reformišu i modernizuju crno im se piše. Ovo je katastrofa gde se oni nalaze, od Nigerije do Avganistana. 

 

Pardoniram, ima još jedan datum koji ima jaku™ kandidaturu - 146 pne. Ok, da kažemo od Rima. Možda.

Edited July 20, 2016 by MancMellow

[namenski]

Napreduju fantastično. Levantska (i srednjoazijska) civilizacija nikada u istoriji nije bila ovako sistemski ponižavana na svakom zamislivom planu od Zapada i Dalekog istoka (a i Indija se kandiduje). Ovo je njihovo apsolutno dno od nastanka civilazacije pre 7000 godina. I ISIS i terorizam su rezultat toga. Ako ne pronađu unutrašnje snage da se reformišu i modernizuju crno im se piše. Ovo je katastrofa gde se oni nalaze, od Nigerije do Avganistana. 

Moze biti.

Bas kao sto moze biti i da je u boldovanom deo odgovora za privlacnost koju sam pomenuo.

A moze biti i da je vakat da zapadna civilizacija preispita neke sopstvene takozvane temeljne vrednosti, redefinise pojmove kao sto su napredak, reformisanje, modernizacija, demokratija...

Terorizam se, na primer, vec redefinisao i to poprilicno uspesno.

A bez obzira na sve, bice da smo - neopravdano i nedopustivo - previse, nadam se ne i beznadezno - zapadnocentricni^tm

[Pontijak]

New Age Derviši protiv Muslimanskog bratstva

Ma ne znam sta da mislim. U Istanbulu sam bio pre 33 godine a sve se promenilo od tada. Do daljeg verujem onom sto napise beowl i ponavljam koji smo mi kurton od drzave sto nemamo takve ljude u diplmatiji nego imamo kao savetnice raspale mlade kurve koje jebe ovaj olos na vlasti i kao nagradu ih postavlja u mip

 

Послато са SM-J320FN уз помоћ Тапатока

[MancMellow]

Moze biti.

Bas kao sto moze biti i da je u boldovanom deo odgovora za privlacnost koju sam pomenuo.

A moze biti i da je vakat da zapadna civilizacija preispita neke sopstvene takozvane temeljne vrednosti, redefinise pojmove kao sto su napredak, reformisanje, modernizacija, demokratija...

Terorizam se, na primer, vec redefinisao i to poprilicno uspesno.

A bez obzira na sve, bice da smo - neopravdano i nedopustivo - previse, nadam se ne i beznadezno - zapadnocentricni^tm

 

Nisam, i, prvo, tj drugo, nije samo Zapad, Pogledaj Kinu, Japan, ma i Tajland. Jednostavno tonu.

[namenski]

Nisam, i, prvo, tj drugo, nije samo Zapad, Pogledaj Kinu, Japan, ma i Tajland. Jednostavno tonu.

Bez uvrede - jesi.

Bas kao svi sto smo: samo sam pokusao da skrenem paznju na 1 aspekt cele stvari, nesporan sva je prilika.

KIna, Japan, ma i Tajland su danas kulture, civilizacije koje prema spolja funkcionisu/nastupaju prema zapadnom obrascu i pomocu zapadnih mehanizama, pocev od ekonomije, preko politike, pa zakljucno sa strateskim i vojnim elementima kome uostalom i imaju da zahvale za uspesnost^tm i mogucnost da ponizavaju...

Uostalom, problem moze da se postavi i na sledeci nacin: kako to da se globalizacija (sto je samo drugo ime za planetarnu dominaciju zapadnih vrednosti) primila u zemljama koje si pomenuo, a ocigledno se nije primila u islamizovanim^tm zemljama.

I, sto je najgore, ne samo da se nije primila, vec je izrodila^tm alternativu koja je ocigledno prihvatljiva za veliki broj ljudi.

[arheolog1981]

Horda divljaka

 

Edited July 20, 2016 by arheolog1981

[Prospero]

Narodni odisaj