Terorizam kao takav

[Turnbull]

Cenim da bi Radagast i BB imali šta zanimljivo i stručno da kažu o ovoj temi, ali evo da započnem ja.

Koga mrzi da gleda:

The romance of terrorPeople don't become terrorists because they are poor or uneducated, schooled in radical religion or brainwashedScott Atran

The question: Can you do counterterrorism without theology?Especially for young men, mortal combat in the service of a great cause provides the ultimate adventure and maximum esteem in the eyes of many and, most dearly, in the hearts of their peers. One heroic cause for disaffected souls in the world today is jihad, through which anyone from anywhere can make a mark against the most powerful countries and armies in the history of the world. How glorious to cut off Goliath's head with a box cutter – or at least cause him a big headache.Yet, although many millions of people express sympathy with al-Qaida's viral social movement or other forms of violent political expression that abuse religion and support terrorism, relatively few willingly use violence. Following a 2001-2007 survey of 35 predominantly Muslim nations, aGallup study estimated that 7% of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims thought that the 9/11 attacks were "completely justified". That's about 100 million people; however, of these many millions who express support for violence against the outgroup, there are only thousands willing to actually commit violence.This is also true in the Muslim diaspora, which provides the overwhelming majority of al-Qaida followers. In the European Union, fewer than 3,000 suspects have been imprisoned for jihadi activities out of a Muslim population of perhaps 20 million. In the United States, fewer than 500 suspects have been arrested for having anything remotely to do with support for holy war against America after 9/11, with less than 100 cases being considered serious out of an immigrant Muslim population of more than two million.If so many millions support jihad, why are only relatively few willing to kill and die for it? Although heroic action for a great cause is the ultimate end, the path to violent extremism is mostly a matter of individual motivations and small group dynamics in specific historical contexts. Those who go on to violence generally do so by way of family and friends within specific "scenes": neighbourhoods, schools (classes, dorms), workplaces, common leisure activities (soccer, barbershop, café), and, increasingly, online chat rooms.The process of self selection into violence within these scenes is stimulated by a massive, media-driven political awakening in which jihad is represented as the only the way to permanently resolve glaring problems of global injustice. When this perceived injustice resonates with frustrated personal aspirations, violence may be seen as a way out. Al-Qaida and its associates do not so much recruit as attract and enlist those disaffected people who have already decided to embark on the path to violent extremism with the help of a few fellow travellers.Research shows that terrorists generally don't commit terrorism because they are extraordinarily vengeful or uncaring, poor or uneducated, schooled as children in radical religion or brainwashed, criminally-minded or suicidal, or sex-starved for virgins in heaven. Most have no personal history of violent emotions and generally peaceful in their daily lives but become "born again" into a radical cause.Before and just after 9/11, jihadis, including suicide bombers, were on average materially better-off and better-educated relative to their populations of origin. Many had college educations or advanced technical training. A background in science, particularly engineering and medicine, was positively associated with the likelihood of joining jihad. Now, the main threat to the west isn't from any organisation, or from well-trained cadres of volunteers, but from an al-Qaida-inspired viral social movement that is particularly contagious among young adults who are in transition stages in their lives: immigrants, students, those still in search of friends, mates or jobs.The popular notion of a "clash of civilizations" is woefully misleading. Violent extremism represents the collapse of traditional territorial cultures, not their resurgence, as people unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search of a social identity. Individuals now mostly radicalise horizontally with their peers, rather than vertically through institutional leaders or organisational hierarchies: in small groups of friends – from the same neighbourhood or social network – or even as loners who find common cause with a virtual internet community. Appeals to moderate Islam are about as irrelevant as older people appealing to adolescents to moderate their music or clothes.In the long run, perhaps the most important counterterrorism measure of all is to provide alternative heroes and hopes that are more enticing and empowering than any moral lessons or material offerings (jobs that help to relieve the terrible boredom and inactivity of immigrant youth in Europe and the underemployed throughout much of the Muslim world, will not alone offset the allure of playing at war). It is also important to provide alternate local networks and chatrooms that speak to the inherent idealism, sense of risk and adventure, and need for peer approval that young people everywhere tend toward. It could even be a 21st-century version of what the Boy Scouts and high school football teams did for immigrants and potentially troublesome youth as America urbanised a century ago. Ask any cop on the beat: those things work. It has to be done with the input and insight of local communities, and chiefly peer-to-peer, or it won't be effective: deradicalisation, like radicalisation itself, works mainly from the bottom up, not from the top down. This, of course, is not how you stop terrorism today, but how you do it for tomorrow.

Edited May 24, 2013 by Syme

[Prospero]

uh, s koje strani prići temi? :)hajde prvo ovako, očišćeno od ideologije:

Where earlier approaches attempted to identify the attributes of individuals,states, and systems that produced conflict, the “rationalist approach towar” now explains violence as the product of private information with incentives tomisrepresent, problems of credible commitment, and issue indivisibilities. In thisnew approach, war is understood as a bargaining failure that leaves both sidesworse off than had they been able to negotiate an efficient solution. This rationalistframework has proven remarkably general—being applied to civil wars, ethnic conflicts,and interstate wars—and fruitful in understanding not only the causes of warbut also war termination and conflict management. Interstate war is no longer seenas sui generis, but as a particular form within a single, integrated theory of conflict....As I argue later, terrorists resort to violence not becauseof private information, incredible commitments, or indivisible issues, althoughthese factors may also matter, but because no bargain is acceptable to them underthe current distribution of capabilities. The terrorist act itself is designed to shift thebalance of power between the parties and to produce a better bargain at some pointin the distant future. Bargaining over particular issues now is subordinated to abroader strategy of using violence to change the relative capabilities of the twosides....Since September 11, we have been particularly concerned with what is often termedextremist terrorism. But this begs the question of what we mean by the terms terroristand extremist —traits that are often in the eyes of the beholder. Terrorism isthe irregular use of violence by nonstate groups against nonmilitary targets and personnelfor political ends. Almost by definition, since they often target civilians,terrorists lack moral strictures against the use of violence. Extremism is harder todefine, but two attributes seem key. First, extremists hold political preferences that,in any distribution of opinion, lie in one of the “tails.” In other words, their politicalbeliefs are not widely shared even within their own societies. Second, extremistscurrently lack the means or power to obtain their goals. Both traits are important inunderstanding their choice of strategy....The strategy adopted by extremist terrorists follows from their preferences and,more important, from their political weakness relative to their goals. Their strategyis to shift the balance of power in their favor and, over time, to shift the bargainingrange closer to their ideals. Practically, this implies that no overt bargaining is likelyto occur at the time of the terrorist act. The object is not to bargain over what is acceptabletoday, but to change the range of what is acceptable tomorrow. Analytically,the strategy implies that the balance of capabilities and, thus, the future divisionof the issue is endogenous, part of the game itself. This is a particularly hardproblem to characterize, and no formal model is presented here. Endogenizing capabilitieswithin a model of bargaining lies beyond current techniques, but the phenomenonof extremist terrorism suggests that this may be a theoretically and empiricallyfruitful direction for future research. The intuition can nonetheless becaptured, I think, by a verbal extension of the basic approach presented earlier.Constrained by their relative weakness, extremists adopt strategies with twocharacteristics. First, in a form of political jujitsu, extremists use the strengths of thetarget against itself. On September 11, we saw how a free, democratic, modern, andindustrial society could be seized from within to inflict massive destruction uponitself. Although it undoubtedly required substantial planning and training, it tooklittle in the way of advanced weaponry to turn airplanes into bombs. The numericaland perhaps overall weakness of Al Qaeda did not matter here since it relied on theinterdependencies of an industrial economy and the political and economic opennessof a democratic society to produce the necessary instruments of destruction.Second, extremists seek to provoke a response from the target that, through itsdisproportionate and indiscriminate nature, punishes the broad population of whichthe terrorists are part. In doing so, the extremists are really aiming to change thepreferences and beliefs of moderates in their own societies. As the result of a disproportionateresponse, some moderates may be radicalized by their suffering collateraldamage; the larger the response, the greater the possibility that innocent civiliansare killed. This can produce a desire for revenge that manifests itself ingreater support for the extremists. Moderates also observe the response of the targetand draw inferences about how it is likely to behave in negotiations over outstand-ing differences. Moderates have preferences that differ from the target, of course,but they are by definition willing to negotiate a settlement. In many cases, however,they may be uncertain about the preferences of the target state; specifically, theymay not know whether it too is moderate and willing to negotiate an acceptablesettlement or whether, like the extremists in their own society, it may use violenceto impose a settlement that they cannot accept. “Hard” bargaining by the target inon-going disputes—where it seeks the best deal for itself—is consistent with both“types” of targets and thus does not allow the moderates to distinguish which set ofpreferences the target possesses. When terrorists provoke the target into disproportionateretaliation, they hope to demonstrate to their own moderates that the targetis in fact extremist, it is unlikely to settle disputes on acceptable terms, and theyshould ally with the terrorists to “defend” their interests. In short, by provoking thetarget into massive retaliation, the terrorists hope to radicalize their own moderatesand drive them into their arms. If successful, the terrorists enlarge their group ofsupporters, increase the number of soldiers willing to fight for the cause, expand thefinancial and other resources upon which they can draw, and augment their overallpower....It is precisely because extremists are too weak relative to their ambitions thatthey must resort to this strategy of baiting the target into aggressive retaliatory acts.The wanton destruction of property and lives in the target state is designed in acold, cruel, and all too rational way to bring about this retaliation. Indeed, the moreheinous the terrorist act, the more likely the target will respond in an overly aggressivefashion. When this strategy works, the extremists increase their numbers andbargaining power—and those bargains that initially were impossible become possible....Carried out again and again, the cumulative effect of terrorism can, over time,shift the bargaining range significantly in favor of the terrorists The “silence”in the rationalist approach to war arises from the assumption offixed or, at most, exogenously changing capabilities. The distribution of power,even if evolving over time, provides the basic structure within which the parties negotiate.The phenomenon of extremist terrorism demonstrates that changing thedistribution of capabilities can be an action available to actors and thus needs to beincorporated into the strategic setting. In this way, terrorism forces us to rethinkhow we model and, in turn, understand violent conflict....Many factors affect the likely response to a terrorist attack. Key to any choice,however, is a central tradeoff between success and what might be called support.The larger the response, the more likely it is to succeed in eradicating the terroristsand deterring future attacks. But at the same time the larger the response, the morelikely it is that moderates will be radicalized, either because of the collateral damagethey suffer or because they infer that the target itself is more extreme than theypreviously believed and is willing and able to use force to impose a solution theycannot accept. In other words, the larger the response, the more support the targetwill likely lose. This implies that there is some optimal response that balances theprospects for success against the loss of support for the target.Managing this tradeoff can be tricky, of course. By restraining its response, thetarget runs a larger risk of failure and, thus, future attacks. By retaliating strongly,however, the target risks radicalizing moderates and plays into the hands of the extremists,ultimately expanding their support and power. Disabling the extremistswhile limiting damage to the moderates may be difficult, if not impossible. Indeed,the terrorists count on this.... This is also an areawhere a more formal model promises significant insights. The important point here,however, is that the tradeoff between success in eliminating terrorism and sustainingpolitical support for the target is real and binding.This leads to an even more important conclusion: in the fight against terrorism,some measure of restraint can be wise policy. “More” is not necessarily better butmay, in fact, erode support for the target. This further implies that in the fightagainst terrorism, as elsewhere, the quest for absolute security is a chimera.Through massive uses of force, targets might eliminate terrorism. However, thiswould not only require a considerable investment of resources but also alienatemoderates and undermine support for the target throughout the international community.States must learn to live with some risk of terrorism for the indefinite future....

ps - malo sam izvukao iz konteksta, ceo tekst je iz 2002. i manje-više savet americi šta da radi uz neke, čini mi se, promašene analogije. no, pristup terorizmu kao racionalnom ekstremizmu je bitan kao jedan od pogleda.

[Agni]

uh, s koje strani prići temi? :)hajde prvo ovako, očišćeno od ideologije:ps - malo sam izvukao iz konteksta, ceo tekst je iz 2002. i manje-više savet americi šta da radi uz neke, čini mi se, promašene analogije. no, pristup terorizmu kao racionalnom ekstremizmu je bitan kao jedan od pogleda.

Nije bas ubedljivo objasnjenje. Osnovni problem mu je sto racionalnost i interese pripisuje grupi umesto pojedincu, odnosno ono sto Brubaker naziva "grupizmom". U kontekstu u kojem je to objasnjenje pretpostavljam nastalo - proucavanju rata izmedju drzava - to moze da prodje, jer zbog institucionalnog jedinstva drzava one donekle mogu biti smatrane kolektivnim akterima. Problem nastaje kad se takva analiza iz medjudrzavnog konteksta izmesti u situaciju gde ne postoje unapred definisani kolektivni akteri. Naprimer ova tvrdnja: "The object is not to bargain over what is acceptable today, but to change what is acceptable tomorrow", ne moze da racionalnoscu objasni postupak bombasa samoubice, za koga sutra ne postoji, vec samo odluku organizacije kojoj terorista pripada i koja ce ga nadziveti. Ali, "ekstremisti", ako pod njima podrazumevamo salafiste, nisu organizovana grupa, a ogromna vecina njih nisu ni teroristi (a kao sto smo videli u poslednje vreme, cak i teroristi deluju sve vise i vise individualno). Pravo pitanje je stoga zasto neki pojedinci postaju ekstremisti i zasto neki pojedinci koji su postali ekstremisti postaju i teroristi. Drugim recima, pitanje razloga teroristickog nasilja nije pitanje sta je racionalno ciniti za ekstremiste / teroriste, nego kako je doslo do toga da im se neko pridruzi in the first place.

[Prospero]

o racionalnsti pojedinca je teško raspravljati bez psihologije (not my forte); ako pričamo o (i)racionalnosti bombaša samoubice mogli bi se podsetiti da mnogi od njih tim činom osiguraju finansijski benefit za svoju porodicu i potomstvo, sve to naspram siromaštva u kome su dotad živeli. karikiram, no hoću da kažem da je to možda i pitanje stajne tačke i filozofije sopstvene žrtve za neki viši cilj.meni se čini da holistički pristup pitanju terorizma još uvek nije moguć, jednostavno nemamo adekvatnih teorijskih modela.evo npr ovde se kritikuje instrumentalno-racionalni i političko-racionalni pristup ali se lepo kaže da ni alternativni pristupi nemaju celovitu eksplanatornu moć.

[Agni]

o racionalnsti pojedinca je teško raspravljati bez psihologije

Nemam pretenziju da raspravljam o motivima i racionalnosti terorista, samo sam napisao sta vidim kao manu clanka koji si citirao. Primeti da se u njemu pojedinac i njegova racionalnost ni ne pominju, tako da on ne potpada pod kategoriju rational action teorija koje kritikuje drugi tekst: pominju se strane u sukobu, teroristi i ekstremisti, uvek u mnozini, u svojstvu aktera sa zajednickim ciljem i kolektivnim mozgom.

[Indy]

O racionalnosti pojedinaca se mozda ne moze raspravljati i bez njihovog mozdanog skena, ili testiranja na mind-altering parazite (kao toxoplasmosis). U dovoljno velikoj populaciji apsolutni broj takvih individua moze da bude sasvim dovoljan da bi bili konstantni izvor nevolja.Ne u nekoj vezi s time, secam se barem jednog slucaja gde je bombas samoubica na bliskom istoku imao terminalni rak, pa je odlucio da uradi nesto "korisno" pre nego sto se uskoro ionako odjavi.A ovaj konkretni poslednji slucaj u Londonu meni dosta lici na ovo.

"Running amok" is used to refer to the behavior of someone who, in the grip of strong emotion, obtains a weapon and begins attacking people indiscriminately, often with multiple fatalities.^[12] The slang term going postal is similar in scope. Police describe such an event as a killing spree. If the individual is seeking death an alternate method is often suicide by cop.Amok is often described as a culture-bound (or culture-specific) syndrome,^[13][14] which is a psychological condition whose manifestation is strongly shaped by cultural factors. Other reported culture-bound syndromes are latah and koro. Amok is also sometimes considered one of the subcategories of dissociative disorders (cross-cultural variant).

[burazer]

gledam ovu sliku pravo u očiWas the London killing of a British soldier 'terrorism'?Tragičan dogadjaj u Londonu govori o još jednom neuspehu Globalne Politike (USA) da nametne pravila igre u zonama katektirane agresije, koja se izmiče od sakrivanja, prikazivajući svoje pravo lice i tako pokreće novo zamišljanje!?

On nije Runamuck. Edited May 25, 2013 by burazer

[Indy]

Nije ni pri sebi, stagod da je.

[burazer]

A' Ovaj, nije Runamuck, takodje!? decak mu kaze, 'ti si milosrdni andjeo', a On,(Ubije se jedan americki vojnik dnevno) Edited May 25, 2013 by burazer

[Indy]

Zaokupio si veoma pogresno drvo. :)

[burazer]

off:ziveli!on:...sada ce @Syme da preokrene temu na 'Terorizam kao ovakav'.

[Agni]

A ovaj konkretni poslednji slucaj u Londonu meni dosta lici na ovo.

Meni ne lici: amok "pogadja" pojedince, ovde su bila dva napadaca, koji uz to nisu bas napadali ljude " indiscriminately".

[Indy]

Da. Verovatno je pre staro dobro mozgoispiranje.

[burazer]

Da. Verovatno je pre staro dobro mozgoispiranje.

Rat je igra teceg stepena zbog krvavog ishoda u isplati (payoff). svako moze u svakom trenutku da izadje i prekine igru. Ali!15 minuta, bilo je dovoljno. Ingrid loyau-Kennett.

[Indy]

Sta ja znam, zrtve obicno ne uspeju da "izadju i prekinu igru". Odnosi se samo na vinovnike.