Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[Radoye]

@ Radoye: ova mapa je malo u rangu onog mita o tome kako je nemacki jezik zamalo postao zvanicni jezik u SAD. Nemci su se uglavnom veoma brzo asimilovali a mnogi koji se izrazavaju kao recimo Amerikanci imaju zapravo englesko nasledje.

Naravno da su se u Ameriku svi asimilovali (pa ona je ipak melting pot - ni americki Englezi nisu vise ni blizu Englezi u onom smislu kao njihovi rodjaci u Britaniji) i naravno da medju onima koji se izjasnjavaju kao "Amerikanci" ima i Engleza (zapravo ima i svih ostalih ukljucujuci i Nemaca), ali cak i da uzmemo da je 100% "Amerikanca" cisto engleskog porekla i onda je zbir Engleza + "Amerikanaca" procentualno otprilike jednak procentu Nemaca u SAD (po zadnjem popisu Nemaca ima 15,2 %, Engleza i "Amerikanaca" u zbiru 15,9%).

 

Svaka kultura koja se asimilovala u americki melting pot mu je dodala i nesto svoje, tako da je ta celina danas drasticno drugacija i mentalitetom i kulturom od one koja se pre 400 godina iskrcala sa Mejflauera (a koju su cinili Englezi - Britanci, doduse malo ekstremniji i zajebanijeg religioznog usmerenja od tadasnjeg britanskog mejnstrima).

 

U prvoj polovini 20-tog veka mnogi imigranti Nemci su i dalje odrzavali veoma zive veze sa maticom i vrsili snazan uticaj da SAD ostanu na utabanom izolacionistickom kursu i da se ne mesaju u ratove u Evropi. Vladalo je snazno anti-Britansko raspolozenje (pored nekoliko ratova koje su vodili protiv Britanaca tokom XIX veka, SAD su tokom celog ovog perioda sponzorisale brojne upade naoruzanih bandi pro-irskih revolucionara na teritoriju Kanade), i sve to je doprinelo da je Vudrou Vilson na jedvite jade uspeo da izboksuje u kongresu objavu rata Nemackoj - bezmalo pune dve godine nakon potapanja Luzitanije sto je (kao) bio povod za ulazak u rat, toliko je snazan otpor bio.

 

U svetlu svega toga uopste ne treba da cudi da su americki marinci pred prvi svetski rat imali slemove dizajnirane po ugledu na nemacke.

 

EDIT: typo

Edited February 17, 2014 by Radoye

[Prospero]

http://archive.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard66.html

http://archive.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard91.html

 

ja u suštini volim rotbardove istorijske osvrte, i ne bih nešto sporio u ovim tekstovima, sem što bih primetio da su posvećeni americi i njenom ulasku u rat, koji je naravno već počeo, a ne evropi i njenim elitama. poslovna™ prilika rata je za pobrojane kod rotbarda već postojala, dok je evropska elita morala prvo "kreirati sebi priliku" započinjanjem rata, da se tako izrazim.

 

 

s druge strane, jedan fergusonov   osvrt:

 

...

In 1914 as today, substantial pools of private capital operated with minimal regulation. In 1899, for example, the banks owned and managed by the Rothschild family had a combined capital of 41 million pounds, which exceeded that of the five biggest German joint-stock banks put together. Such firms essentially existed to manage the vast wealth of the partners and their relatives. The three decades before 1914 were golden years for this financial elite. Inflation expectations were securely anchored. Europe's central banks had nearly all committed themselves to the gold standard by 1908, which meant that nearly all had to target their gold reserves, raising rates (or otherwise intervening) if they experienced a specie outflow. Long term interest rates were low. Although the yield on the benchmark British consol rose by over 100 basis points between 1897 and 1914, that was from an all-time nadir of 2.25 percent. What we would now call "emerging market" spreads narrowed dramatically, despite major episodes of debt default in the 1870s and 1890s. With the exception of those of Greece and Nicaragua, none of the sovereign or colonial bonds trading in London in 1913 yielded more than 200 basis points above consols, and most paid considerably less. The yields on the bonds of the other great powers, which accounted for about half the foreign sovereign debt quoted in London, declined steadily after 1880, suggesting that political risk premiums were also falling. Before 1880, Austrian, French, German, and Russian bonds had tended to fluctuate quite violently in response to political news; but the various crises of the decade before 1914 such as those over Morocco and the Balkans caused scarcely a tremor in the London bond market. Although the major stock markets did not perform spectacularly, Britain's essentially flat-lined after the 1895-1900 "Kaffir" (gold mine) bubble burst, and the Dow Jones failed to recover its January 1906 high in the aftermath of the 1907 panic the volatility of returns trended downward. There is at least some evidence to connect these trends with a secular upward shift in liquidity, due partly to increased gold production and, more importantly, to financial innovation, as joint-stock banks expanded their balance sheets relative to their reserves, and savings banks success fully mobilized the assets of middle- and lower-class investors.

 

All these benign economic trends encouraged optimism. To many businessmen, from Ivan Bloch in tsarist Russia to Andrew Carnegie in the United States, it was self-evident that a major war would be catastrophic for the capitalist system. In 1898 Bloch published a massive six-volume work titled The Future of War, which argued that because of recent technological advances in the destructiveness of weaponry, war essentially had no future. Any attempt to wage it on a large scale would end in "the bankruptcy of nations." In 1910 the same year that Carnegie established his Endowment for International Peace the left-leaning British journalist Norman Angel  published The Great Illusion, in which he argued that a war between the great powers had become an economic impossibility precisely because of "the delicate interdependence of inter national finance." In the spring of 1914 an international commission published its report into the "outrages" committed during the Balkan wars of 1912-13. Despite the evidence he and his colleagues confronted of wars waged? Voutrance between entire populations, the commission's chairman noted in his introduction to the report that the great powers of Europe (unlike the petty Balkan states) had "discovered the obvious truth that the richest country has the most to lose by war, and each country wishes for peace above all things. One of the British members of the commission, Henry Noel Brailsford a staunch supporter of the Independent Labour Party and author of a fierce critique of the arms industry "The War of Steel and Gold" declared:

 

In Europe the epoch of conquest is over and save in the Balkans and perhaps on the fringes of the Austrian and Russian empires, it is as certain as any thing in politics that the frontiers of our national states are finally drawn. My own belief is that there will be no more wars among the six great powers.

 

Yet within just a few weeks of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip which happened on June 28, 1914 all this optimism was confounded. The first age of globalization came to an end with a bang, closely followed by the sucking sound of liquidity draining with astounding speed out of the global financial system. On July 22 the Times of London made the first English-language allusion that I have been able to trace to the possibility that the crisis in the Balkans precipitated by the archduke's assassination might have negative financial consequences. The report appeared on page 19 and read as follows:

 

       STOCK EXCHANGE DEPRESSED BY FOREIGN POLITICAL NEWS LATE RALLY IN AMERICANS Stock markets at the opening were entirely overshadowed by the news that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia [sic] are daily growing more strained. . . . Owing to the increasing gravity of the situation in the Near East the attention of members [of the Stock Exchange] has for the moment appeared to be diverted from the Ulster crisis [caused by Protestant opponents of Irish Home Rule] . . . there being a general disinclination to increase commitments in view of the obscurity of the outlook both at home and abroad.

 

 

Considering the vast body of literature that has been written about the origins of the First World War, tracing these back as far as the 1870s, or at least the 1900s it is remarkable that from the vantage point of contemporary financial journalism the war had virtually no origins at all. Other evidence strongly supports the proposition that to investors, who were among the best-informed people in the world at that time, the war came as a complete surprise. As late as August 1, the headline on the front page of the New York Times was the wildly optimistic "CZAR, KAISER AND KING MAY YET ARRANGE PEACE." But that same day saw the following stark headline on the lead financial page of the London Times: 

 

   STOCK EXCHANGE CLOSED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE 

   SETTLEMENTS POSTPONED

 

 

As the Economist observed in its leading article: 

 

On Sunday [July 26] . . . Europe was suddenly confronted with the fear of a great war on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. . . . The world . . . seems to be returning to a basis of cash and barter . . . and unless a proclamation neutrality relieves the strain worse may ensue. . . . The City [of London] has seen in a flash the meaning of war.

 

.....

 

The earliest symptom of the crisis was a rise in shipping insurance premiums in the wake of the Austrian ultimatum. Bond and stock prices began to slip as prudent investors sought to increase the liquidity of their positions. Exchange rates shifted dramatically as a result of efforts by cross-border creditors to repatriate their money: sterling and the franc surged, while the ruble and the dollar slumped. By July 30 panic reigned. The first firms to come under liquidity pressure in London were the jobbers on the Stock Exchange, who relied heavily on borrowed money to finance their holdings of equities. As sell orders flooded in, the value of their stocks plunged below the value of their debts, forcing a number into bankruptcy. Also under pressure were the commercial bill brokers in London, many of whom were owed substantial sums by continental counterparties that were now unable or unwilling to remit funds. Their difficulties in turn affected the acceptance houses (the elite merchant banks), who were first in line if the foreigners defaulted, since they had "accepted" the bills. If the acceptance houses went bust, the bill brokers would go down with them, and possibly also the larger joint-stock banks, which lent millions every day on call to the discount market. The joint-stock banks' decision to call in loans deepened what we would now call the credit crunch. As everyone scrambled to sell assets, stock prices fell, compromising brokers and others who had borrowed using shares as collateral. Domestic customers began to fear a banking crisis. Queues formed as people sought to exchange banknotes for gold coins at the Bank of England. The effective suspension of London's role as the hub of international credit helped spread the crisis from Europe to the rest of the world.

 

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the crisis of 1914 was the closure of the world's major stock markets for periods of up to five months. The Vienna market was the first to close, on July 27. By July 30 all the continental European exchanges had shut their doors. The next day London and New York felt compelled to do the same. Although a belated settlement day went ahead smoothly on November 18, the London Stock Exchange did not reopen until January 4, 1915. Nothing like this had happened since its founding in 1773. The New York market reopened for limited trading (bonds for cash only) on November 28, and something like normal service resumed the following month, but wholly unrestricted trading did not resume until April 1, 1915. Nor were stock exchanges the only markets to close in the crisis. Most U.S. commodity markets had to suspend trading, as did most European foreign exchange markets. The London Royal Exchange, for example, remained closed until September 17. It seems likely that had the markets not closed, the collapse in prices would have been as extreme as in 1929, if not worse.

 

...

 

The stakes for investors had thus been very high in the summer of 1914, although few of them seem to have known it before the storm broke. The impact of the war was very far from uniform on the various asset classes open to a typical capitalist of the prewar years. John Maynard Keynes's archetypal prewar rentier, sipping his tea and playing the global markets from the comfort of his London boudoir, had little suspected what havoc would be wrought by "the projects and politics of militarism and imperial ism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion." These forces were indeed the serpent in the paradise of pre-1914 globalization. But the serpent's bite was more fatal to some portfolios than to others.

 

...

 

The First World War of the historians is thus so overdetermined that it emerges as a crisis that was highly probable. That is why most historical accounts of the war's origins depict a series of escalating crises, as in these chapter titles from Taylor's Struggle for Mastery in Europe:

 

The Last Years of British Isolation, 1902-5

The Formation of the Triple Entente, 1905-9

The Years of Anglo-German Hostility, 1909-12

The Balkan Wars and After, 1912-14

The Outbreak of War in Europe, 1914.

 

Yet the reality remains that, ex ante, World War I was not a high probability event; otherwise more contemporaries would have seen it coming. The investment community of the City of London was made up of sophisticated, well-informed people, as familiar with the corridors of power as with their own counting houses. That the war took them so unaware suggests that most traditional historical explanations of what happened are fatally flawed. Does this mean that the war was a "black swan," in Nassim Taleb's sense of an event to which people myopically attached a zero probability? Not quite. It would be more correct to say that a big war belonged in the realm of uncertainty.56 People before July 1914 knew that a great war was possible; hack writers made English readers' flesh creep with imaginary scenarios like a German conquest of England, complete with Berlin-style cafeterias on a renamed "Regentstrasse." But it was impossible to attach a probability to such a scenario. 

 

...

edit: nezavršena misao, par boldova.

[Anduril]

 

ja u suštini volim rotbardove istorijske osvrte, i ne bih nešto sporio u ovim tekstovima, sem što bih primetio da su posvećeni americi i njenom ulasku u rat, koji je naravno već počeo, a ne evropi i njenim elitama. poslovna™ prilika rata je za pobrojane kod rotbarda već postojala, dok je evropska elita morala prvo "kreirati sebi priliku" započinjanjem rata, da se tako izrazim.

 ...

Upravo to je problem - Rothbard nije istoricar pa je moja zamerka gde da nadjemo ovakve osvrte, ili jos bolje citave knjige/dugogodisnje projekte, od same struke - posebno u Evropi.

I sada zamisli kako neki britanski ili nemacki istoricar pocne da ceprka po arhivima o ulozi velikih i mocnih pre i posle ratova pa onda pocne sa prozivkama svih onih dinastija redom. No way.

Uz to, na politicare je takodje lakse svaliti krivicu jer velika vecina Krupova nikad nije stigla na sud gde bi bila otvorena njihova privatna arhiva a jos manje svi podaci o njihovim ulogama pa se to ostavlja konspirologiji.

 

I analogija sa Srbijom je sasvim na mestu kao i sa vecinom ratova. Reci da je iskljucivo Milosevic i par ljudi oko njega krivo je totalna budalastina - posebno ako imamo u vidu da je ekonomska osnova tog rezima ostala i dalje napredovala.

 

Sto se tice Fergusona:

 

Yet the reality remains that, ex ante, World War I was not a high probability event; otherwise more contemporaries would have seen it coming.

Namerno sam ranije uzeo analogiju i sa finansisjkim krizama jer pobija i ovaj argument - naravno da vecina nije videla ni da kresovi iz 1929, 1987. ili iz 2008. dolaze. Medjutim, te krize su za nekolicinu bili itekako predvidljive ukoliko se na stanje posmatralo iz nesto objektivnijeg i kritickog ugla. A Ferguson je sve samo ne objektivan.

 

Mislim, sam argument da su ratovi zapravo stetili big biznisu je totalno generalizovan i netacan. Treba samo pogledati troskove masovnog naoruzavanja pre 1. Svetskog rata. Pa zatim pozajmice za to pre i tokom rata. Naravno da big biznisu ne odgovara totalni raspad sistema i totalni rat, kao sto ni Vol Stritu ne odgovara totalna finansijska katastrofa, ali sve ispod toga i sistem na ivici je znacajnom delu uvek odgovarao. No risk, no reward; no pain, no gain.

Edited February 18, 2014 by Anduril

[Radoye]

[Turnbull]

Zigfrid Sasun ( 1886-1968)

 

Slava žena

Volite nas kad smo junaci, kad smo s dopustom

Kod kuće, ili na mjestu vrijednom spomena

Ranjeni. Obožavate ordenje, i vjerujete, uz to,

Da je sramota rata viteštvom iskupljena.

Pravite nam granate. Rado slušate priče sve te

O prljavštini i pogibli, nježno ganute; kruna ste baš

Našeg dalekog žara dok se borimo, i oplačete,  

Kad nas ubiju, lovorom okićen spomen naš.

 

Ne možete povjerovati da se britanske čete

"Povlače" kad posljednja paklena groza ih satre

I bježe, slijepe od krvi, spotičući se o užasna 

Trupla. O ti njemačka majko, koja kraj vatre

Drijemaš dok čarape za svoga sina pleteš -

Lice mu gaze sve dublje sred blata masna.

 

Vilfrid Ouen (1893 - 1918)

 

Ispraznost

Na sunce ga pomakni - nekad njega   

Nježnim dodirom je budilo u kući,  

O nezasijanim poljima šapćući,

Svagda, čak i u Francuskoj ga iz sna 

Budilo, do toga jutra, tog snijega.

Ako šta može da sad pokrene ga,

To dobro staro sunce zna.

 

Pomisli kako sjeme budi, glinu

Nekad na hladnoj zvijezdi probudi.

Zar bescjen-udovi, zar te osjetljive

Slabine, još tople, neće da ožive?

Zar je zbog tog glina rasla u visinu?

Što su se trudili zraci sunca ludi

Da zemljin san prekinu?

 

Himna osuđenoj mladeži

Kakva zvona tim što stoka su za klanje?

Samo gnjev topovske paljbe strahovite

S mucavim puščanim reskim čegrtanjem

Nek im odbrbljaju što brže molitve.

 

Ne glas, niti jedan, hora žalobnoga,

Ne od molitvi i zvona lakrdija, - 

Žal ludog, vrištavog hora šrapnelskoga

I pozivi truba s tužnih grofovija.

 

Kakve bismo njima palili svijeće?   

Neće u rukama nego sred zjenica

Dječijih za zbogom sjati svjetlost sveta. 

 

Njin pokrov - bljedilo djevojačkih lica:

Nježnost nijemoga sjećanja - cvijeće.

U svaki dug suton spuštanje roleta. 

 

*Prevod Marko Vešović

[Yoda]

Izvor?

 

[Zaz_pi]

Nemacki razlozi za objavu rata Rusiji.

 

 

Russia standing army had been the largest in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, and it was still much bigger than anybody else’s in the approach to the First World War, with 1.3 million frontline troops and, it was claimed, up to 5 million reserves. Russia’s military expenditures, too, were extremely high and with the “extraordinary” capital grants on top of the fast-rising “normal” expenditures may well have equaled Germany’s total. Railway construction was proceeding at enormous speed prior to 1914—threatening within a short time to undermine the German plan (i.e., the so-called Schlieffen Plan) to strike westward first—and money was also being poured into a new Russian fleet after the war with Japan. Even the Prussian General Staff claimed to be alarmed at this expansion of Russian might, with the younger Moltke asserting that by 1916 and 1917 Prussia’s “enemies’ military power would then be so great that he did not know how he could deal with it.” Some of the French observers, by contrast, looked forward with great glee to the day when the Russian “steachiefs that “Russia is rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her friendship at almost any cost.”From Galicia to Persia to Peking, there was a widespread concern at the growth of Russian might.mroller” would roll westward and flatten Berlin. And a certain number of Britons, especially those connected with the St. Petersburg embassy, were urging their political chiefs that “Russia is rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her friendship at almost any cost.”

 

 

 

Ovo je samo delimicno tacno,

 

Was Russia really on the point of becoming the gendarme of Europe once more, as these statements might suggest? Assessing that country’s effective strength has been a problem for western observers from the eighteenth century to the present, and it has always been made the harder by the paucity of reliable runs of comparative data, by the differences between what the Russians said to foreigners and said to themselves, and by the dangers of relying upon sweeping subjective statements in the place of objective fact. Surveys, however thorough, of “how Europe judged Russia before 1914” are not the same as an exact analysis of “the power of Russia” itself. From the plausible evidence which does exist, however, it seems that Russia in the decades prior to 1914 was simultaneously powerful and weak—depending, as ever, upon which end of the telescope one peered down. To begin with, it was now much stronger industrially than it had been at the time of the Crimean War. Between 1860 and 1913—a very lengthy period—Russian industrial output grew at the impressive annual average rate of 5 percent, and in the 1890s the rate was closer to 8 percent. Its steel production on the eve of the First World War had overtaken France’s and Austria-Hungary’s, and was well ahead of Italy’s and Japan’s. Its coal output was rising even faster, from 6 million tons in 1890 to 36 million tons in 1914. It was the world’s second-largest oil producer. While its long-established textile industry also increased—again, it had many more cotton spindles than France or Austria-Hungary—there was also a late development of chemical and electrical industries, not to mention armaments works. Enormous factories, frequently employing thousands of workers, sprang up around St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other major cities. The Russian railway network, already some 31,000 miles in 1900, was constantly augmented, so that by 1914 it was close to 46,000 miles. Foreign trade, stabilized by Russia’s going onto the gold standard in 1892, nearly tripled between 1890 and 1914, when Russia became the world’s sixth-largest trading nation. Foreign investment, attracted not only by Russian government and railway bonds but also by the potentialities of Russian business, brought enormous amounts of capital for the modernization of the economy. This great stream of funds joined the torrents of money which the state (flushed from increased customs receipts and taxes on vodka and other items of consumption) also poured into economic infrastructure. By 1914, as many histories have pointed out, Russia had become the fourth industrial power in the world.

 

Na prvi pogled izgeda dobro ali nije bilo bas tako. Stoljpin je rekao, kada je ulazio u reforme posle Revolucije 1905, da Rusiji treba 20 godina mirnog razvoja da bi postala najveca sila na svetu. Dogodilo se sve suprotno. Pri cemu su Francuska i Srbija igrale veliku ulogu u tome, namerno forsirane od Nemacke da bi sprecio ruski razvoj. Nisam siguran da su UK i SAD bile daleko od tog stava, stavise.

Jedan od velikih problema za Rusiju, medju mnogim, je bio ovaj

 

 

What was perhaps even more significant was the extent to which Russian industrialization, despite some indigenous entrepreneurs, was carried out by foreigners—a successful international firm like Singer, for example, or the large numbers of British engineers—or had at the least been created by foreign investors. “By 1914,90 percent of mining, almost 100 percent of oil extraction, 40 percent of the metallurgical industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry and even 28 percent of the textile industry were foreign-owned.” This was not in itself an unusual thing—Italy’s position was somewhat similar—but it does show an extremely heavy reliance upon foreign entrepreneurship and capital, which might or might not (as in 1899 and 1905) keep up its interest, rather than upon indigenous resources for industrial growth.

 

Zar ovo nr bi trebalo da bude prednost po mnogima ovde?

Edited February 26, 2014 by Zaz_pi

[Tihajeza]

Čitam dnevnik mog pradede, koji je vodio od dana mobilizacije, do povratka kući sa solunskog fronta.
1915. 15 septembra, dobija prekomandu za jug i kako se nalazi na nekom položaju blizu svog sela, zaustavlja neke seljake koji su tamo krenuli, da po njima pošalje pismo kući.

pa kaže:

"Dao sam joj dosta saveta o postupanju u životu....., da za mene ništa ne brine, ja ću o sebi voditi računa, već samo da se posveti deci i kući. U isto vreme poslao sam i pismo koje je bilo kod mene, a koje su austrijski oficiri 1914. god, kada su zauzimali selo, majci se zahvalili na lepom dočeku. Neka im se to nađe"

 

Ja zbunjena, rat besni, neprijateljska vojska dolazi, piše u dnevniku ranije kako su im uzeli dosta i volove i hranu, a onda pismo u kome se zahvaljuju???? na dočeku????

Pitala sam rođaka koji je slušao i zna više porodičnu istoriju, kaže da se najverovatnije radi o izveštaju o plenidbi, u kome je popisano šta je uzeto iz kuće, i verovatno, u nekakvoj formi ima zabeleženo i to da su spavali i jeli u toj kući.  Žena (tj.njegova majka) koja se pominje je godinu dana pre toga u Cerskoj bici izgubila drugog sina, a drugog ispratila u rat, tako da o lepom dočeku ne može biti reči. Tajna je kako je to bilo sročeno da se o tome govori kao o "lepom dočeku".

 

Posle rata, na ime ratne odštete, a prema tom "reversu", izveštaju, dobijena su neka oruđa za rad na polju, kosilica, neki sekač trave i sl. što on misli da i dalje stoji negde tamo.

Njegova majka mu je to bila poslala u nekom trenutku (o kom on ne piše), a on joj drugom prilikom, koju opisuje, to pismo vraća.

 

Meni ovo bilo zanimljivo.

[Dr Arslanagić]

 

 

This satirical drawing depicts the heads of the Central Powers in World War One: Wilhelm II of Germany, Franz Joseph I of Austria, Ferdinand I of Bulgaria and Mohammad V of Turkey. They are heavily armed and glare menacingly at a man dressed in the national costume of Montenegro, who holds an olive branch in his hand. The image represents the aggression of the Central Powers towards Montenegro in the winter of 1915/1916. The size of the people in the drawing is representative of the power of the countries depicted.

 

The British Library

 

 

Samo da pomenem da je u početku u objašnjenju ovog plakata stajalo da se radi o prisiljavanju Rusije na primirje 1917. godine. Tekst je izmenjen pošto sam im poslao mejl u kojem sam im pojasnio o čemu se radi, a koji su oni bukvalno kopipejstovali. Malo je seljački što me onda nisu i potpisali.

[porucnik vasic]

 

 

The British Library

 

 

Samo da pomenem da je u početku u objašnjenju ovog plakata stajalo da se radi o prisiljavanju Rusije na primirje 1917. godine. Tekst je izmenjen pošto sam im poslao mejl u kojem sam im pojasnio o čemu se radi, a koji su oni bukvalno kopipejstovali. Malo je seljački što me onda nisu i potpisali.

Багра неваспитана. А успут неписмени.

[namenski]

I braca susjedi se trude da ne zaostanu:

 

...ni on ne daje sve razloge zbog kojih su se borili austrougarski vojnici hrvatskoga i uopće južnoslavenskoga podrijetla. Osim za goli život i iz građanske dužnosti, čemu u najmanju ruku treba dodati vojničku stegu, ali i osjećaj osobne časti, postupno modificiran sve izraženijom interesnom komponentom, među ostalim, možemo biti sasvim sigurni da se znatan dio njih doista borio za Habsburgovce i za njihove ratne ciljeve, koji su Srbiju vidjeli kao izvorište svake moguće subverzivne pa i terorističke djelatnosti, Rusiju kao samodržačkoga hegemona, a Italiju kao pohlepnoga izdajicu.

 

[Dr Arslanagić]

 

Da li je neko čitao knjigu?

[porucnik vasic]

 

Da li je neko čitao knjigu?

+1

[Anduril]

Zanimljiva drama na BBC-ju:

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/tv/posts/37-Days

 

Vizualizacija samo pojacava utisak koliko je besmisleno govoriti o krivici nacija ili cak homogenih vlada kad se govori o samom izbijanju rata. 

 

Truli sistem sa trulim igracima koji igraju trule seme sve do katastrofe.

[Prospero]

hvala za info, stavio sam prve 2 epizode na torrent :)