Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[Dr Arslanagić]

Jedan oštar centaršut sa levog krila koji je uskomešao babe i žabe u šesnaestercu: How to stop the commemoration of World War One becoming a justification for future wars

The more the dead and injured of the First World War are forgotten in a rush of chauvinistic nostalgia, the more likely it is that dead will pile up in future conflictsThe more the dead and injured of the First World War are forgotten in a rush of chauvinistic nostalgia, the more likely it is that dead will pile up in future conflicts. - See more at: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/219-world-war-one/16954-how-to-stop-the-commemoration-of-world-war-one-becoming-a-justification-for-future-wars#sthash.fsUGF9Yq.dpufThe effect of the Parliament’s decision not to attack Syria last year is still reverberating through the Western military establishment.Let’s not forget that the decision was forced on the political elite. In the days before the vote the BBC was openly speculating that any such decision would re-ignite Iraq war levels of protest. They cited opinion polling going back a decade to show that anti-war opinion had become entrenched in the UK.Many MPs in the lobbies did not hide the fact that they were embarrassed at the Iraq vote in 2003 and were unwilling to follow the government into another deeply unpopular conflict.More recently the Guardian has reported that the Ministry of Defence is worried that multi-culturalism in Britain has made the country systematically averse to war: ‘The MoD is still taking stock of the surprise decision of the House of Commons last summer to reject military intervention to punish President Assad of Syria for the use of chemical weapons against rebel forces’.In fact the situation is so serious that it is impacting on the defence review, ‘A growing reluctance in an increasingly multicultural Britain to see UK troops deployed on the ground in future operations abroad is influencing the next two strategic defence reviews, according to senior figures at the Ministry of Defence’.In the wake of the Syria vote, Robert Gates, US imperial Grandee and former Defense Secretary and director of the CIA who served under both Bush and Obama, has said the defence spending cuts in the UK mean that the ‘special relationship’ is over and that Britain ‘won't have full spectrum capabilities and the ability to be a full partner as they have been in the past’.This combination of a crisis in public support for military adventures and the usual push-back from the military over defence cuts is casting a new light over the debate about the 100 year commemoration of the First World War.David Cameron has long made it clear that huge set-piece public spectaculars are part of the government’s way of getting through the recession. The Queen’s Jubilee and the Olympics were part of this ‘no bread and circuses’ strategy.The First World War commemoration was initially thought of mainly in this register, although it was always also going to be about refurbishing the standing of the military as well.But now, as neo-con Michael Gove’s recent intervention into the debate has made clear, it’s become an ideological offensive bound up with the post-Syria vote crisis of interventionism. Remember Gove was incandescent at the loss of the Syria vote, publically and abusively bawling out Labour MPs in the House of Commons corridors because the vote, he said, had ‘got to him’.So make no mistake, this will be a full scale British establishment operation.The Queen will be at a special event at Glasgow Cathedral on 4th August because the city is hosting the Commonwealth Games which end the day before. The plan is that across the country, flags on public buildings will fly at half mast on the anniversary of the outbreak of war. The day will end with a vigil at Westminster Abbey to be ‘attended by scouts, cubs and brownies’ as well as members of the Armed Forces. This will be replicated around Britain in churches, town halls, and other venues.Ministers hope this will allow people to mark the conflict which ravaged the continent ‘with sorrow and with pride’ and have set aside £10 million just for funding art, drama and music projects linked to the war, from a total government funding for the commemoration of £50 million. According to the Daily Telegraph, a government source said ‘We are keen to ensure that this a centenary programme that the country can come together on’.The BBC are planning major, all year coverage. There will be 1,000 books published this year alone on the First World War.The anti-war movement must meet this ideological operation by the government just as it has met its previous pro-war propaganda efforts. The No Glory campaign, initiated by the Stop the War Coalition, has made a great start. Its initial letter is approaching 15,000 signatures, its website is drawing thousands of visitors every week, the No Glory pamphlet, The Real History of World War One, is a best seller and thousands of pounds were donated in the first few hours of its financial appeal to help fund its events and activities.But we need to do more. No pro-war article, speech or event should go unchallenged. We need to get into the colleges and schools where these commemorations are being planned. We need to sustain the cultural events that are critical of the war.The image of the First World War has been established in the popular mind as the most disastrous war ever. The Tories and the establishment hate that fact. And they are out to reverse it.We cannot let that happen. The more the dead and injured of the First World War are forgotten in a rush of chauvinistic nostalgia, the more likely it is that dead will pile up in future conflicts. This is not just a battle to remember the past correctly. It’s about political priorities in the present. It’s about keeping the peace in the future.

iz nekog razloga neće da linkuje na forum, web strana sa koje je preuzet tekst jewww.counterfire.org

[MancMellow]

Bah, vise-manje isto kao i vlast tj. Torijevci (i svi ostali), prebijanje politickih i drugih tj slicnih ciljeva danasnjice preko ledja WW1.

Edited February 4, 2014 by MancMellow

[namenski]

Bah, vise-manje isto kao i vlast tj. Torijevci (i svi ostali), prebijanje politickih i drugih tj slicnih ciljeva danasnjice preko ledja WW1.

Ne bih ja potcenjivao takozvanu dnevno politicku stranu cele stvari; koliko sam shvatio, to i jeste centralna tema rasprava povodom jubileja.Istorija je manje-vise rekla svoje.Ni bih, pogotovo kada je Srbija i ex-Yu u pitanju, s obzirom da cela prica ima i Yu stranu.Braniti se od Fergusona, MakMilanke i njima slicnih danas u Srbiji coveka stavlja u isti red sa krdom likova kakvi su Kusturice, Beckovici i slicna fela, da ne nabrajam, ko ce svih da se seti i svaki kamen da podigne.Paradoksalno i uzasno ilustrativno je da je Srbija u jednom svom nikako zanemarljivom delu, pored onih Danaca kojima oprastam zbog neznanja, jedina zemlja u kojoj ce da se nadju ljudi, politicke snage, koje ce Mladica da stave uz Principa.I to da ne trepnu.

[Prospero]

Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Ernest R. MayAn Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 335-387

...SERBIAThe events at Sarajevo sparked the First World War. Without those assassinations, the probability of war in 1914—despite Austro-German military chatter about preventive war—was remote. Because the deaths sparked the Austro-German response, including the draconian Habsburg ultimatum of July 23, historians have devoted considerable attention to Serbia’s involvement in the events at Sarajevo and its response to the Habsburg ultimatum.In their magisterial works of the interwar years, Fay, Schmitt, and Albertini evaluated Serbia’s role both in the murders and in subsequent events.57 They asked questions still relevant: were employees of the Serbian government involved in the plot; did senior Serbian officials know of it; did anyone attempt to warn Vienna; what knowledge, if any, did Russia have of the plot; why did the Serbian government make no effort to arrest the Serbs implicated in the attack; and did Russia encourage Nikola Pasˇic´ to reject the key Habsburg demands? Many of their answers proved remarkably prescient and durable.In the 1960s their views were further confirmed by Vladimir Dedijer in The Road to Sarajevo and in the 1980s by the publication of Serbian documents.58 A recent essay by Mark Cornwall summarizes the status of much of the recent research on Serbia and 1914.59 When juxtaposed with the earlier work, a series of conclusions seems well established. Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, the head of Serbian military intelligence in 1914 (nicknamed Apis), provided the weapons and the training in Belgrade to three of the assassins (Gavrilo Princip, Trifko Grabež, and Nedeljko Čabrinović who had earlier announced their intention to kill a senior Habsburg official. Apis was no simple military official, but rather a significant and dangerous military politician who had played a key role in the 1903 murders of the then Serbian king and queen. An organizer of the Crna Ruka (the Black Hand) to push the cause of Greater Serbia by any means, he worked relentlessly to oust the prime minister, Pašić, from power. In May 1914 he used his extensive Black Hand network to smuggle the three conspirators across the border into Bosnia. Thus Apis and some Serbian officials were involved in the plot, just as Vienna suspected at the time and charged. Indeed, the Austrians cited Major Vojin Tankosić, a close associate of Apis, as one of the plotters, thereby coming very close to the colonel himself.Whether Victor A. Artamonov, the Russian military attache´ and a close confidant of Apis, knew of the plot remains uncertain. In part from a personal interview with Artamonov, Albertini believed he did.60 David MacKenzie’s recent biography of Apis reaches the same conclusion.61 The relevant volume in Alekseev’s history of Russian military intelligence waffles. It quotes Artamonov as reporting in mid- June that “in cafes, Bosnian e´migre´ circles talk often and freely talk about” the approaching visit of the archduke, but it presents no evidence that he knew of or informed St. Petersburg about a possible assassination plot.62The published Serbian documents confirm what Fay and others suspected in the 1920s: that Pašić and Stojan Protić, his minister of interior, had learned of the conspiracy in mid-June and were frightened by what they discovered. The Serbian ministers sought to control the situation and to investigate Apis. But the colonel’s evasive and defiant response stalled any actual investigation before Sarajevo. After the murders, an internal Serbian investigation became a political impossibility.63Cornwall believes that the June information that reached Pašić put “official Serbia” at risk. Any investigation by a joint Austro-Serb commission would reveal that Belgrade had known of the plot. Thus the Serb leader, without any pressure from St. Petersburg, had a fundamental reason to reject any Habsburg demand for a joint investigation. Far less certain, from the Serbian documents, is whether Pašić or an associate tried to warn Vienna. If it happened, it was an informal warning from the Serbian minister in Vienna, Jovan Jovanovicć to Leon Bilinski, the Habsburg minister responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina. If this conversation occurred, prompted possibly by Jovanović’s own worries, it obviously caused no change in the archduke’s plans or in the security arrangements for the visit.64Pašić’s policies after Sarajevo also received attention from earlier historians. Fay surmised, correctly it now appears, that by July 19 the Serbian leader had resolved to make no compromise with Vienna, whatever it demanded. He did not think that Sazonov had influenced the Serbian response to the ultimatum. Schmitt ignored the issue, while Albertini insisted that the Russians had stiffened Pašić’s will to resist, thereby leading to a rejection of some of the Habsburg demands.65That view received further endorsement from Gale Stokes in the 1970s, when he reviewed the first extracts of the Serbian diplomatic documents. Stokes held that Miroslav Spalajković’s telegrams of July 24 from St. Petersburg, which reached Belgrade before noon on July 25, strengthened Serbian resolve. Williamson, in reviewing the Serbian documents in the 1980s with the help of Dragan Živojinović, saw a different pattern: a Pašić’s determined after Sarajevo to evade any Habsburg demand that might jeopardize his political position or expose his knowledge of the plot.66 Cornwall has also concluded that Pašić had no intention of yielding.Moreover, Cornwall challenges the traditional importance given the Russian envoy to Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig (who died at the Austrian ministry in Belgrade on July 10 of a heart attack), arguing that his influence upon Serbian politics had been much exaggerated. Far more important than the Russians in shaping Pašić’s reaction were indiscretions reaching Belgrade from the German ambassador in Rome about Habsburg intentions and Istvan Tisza’s bellicose comments to the Hungarian Parliament on July 15. Thus, as Fay speculated in the 1920s, by July 18 Pašić had informed all of his legations abroad (except Vienna) of his intention to resist some of the Habsburg demands, whatever they might be. The Serb leader did not alter this position, though certainly by July 23 his hopes for strong foreign support had not materialized. But, rejecting Albertini’s insistence that Russia bolstered the Serb leader, Cornwall writes: “In fact, the exact opposite seems to be the truth. Serbia was prepared to resist from the start, but in the following two days [July 24–25], faced with insufficient support from the Great Powers, was forced to be more accommodating in its reply.”67Cornwall buttresses his assessment of Serbia’s planned defiance by observing that Dušan Stefanović, the minister of war, had already—on the evening of July 23—ordered preparations for mobilization to begin, and preparations were expanded the very next day. From the start the Serbian draft replies to the ultimatum never conceded the crucial sixth demand for a joint Habsburg-Serb investigation inside Serbia.68 Even as the Serbian Cabinet finished its work on the response on July 24–25, telegrams from St. Petersburg were at once reassuring and also ambivalent. Speaking of possible Serbian resistance, Sazonov suggested that the Serbian army withdraw into inner Serbia and urged Belgrade to appeal to the other powers. At no point did he clearly promise Russian military support. In fact, he seemed to suggest a need for compromise. Cornwall concludes: “Russian advice had little effect on the framing of Serbia’s note.”69 The final Serbian reply accepted some of Vienna’s demands, wavered on others, and rejected the crucial sixth demand. After Russia on July 26 publicly declared its support for Serbia, there was never a possibility that Belgrade would concede any further.70In summary, a senior Serbian army official, Apis, and others conspired to kill the archduke. Very senior civilian members of the Serbian government knew of the plot but did not stop it. Caught in an intense confrontation with the military, these members of the government could not arrest Apis without exposing their own culpability. Given this situation, Pasˇic´ resolved to reject the most onerous of the Habsburg demands. This determination owed little to advice from St. Petersburg. The open question for future historians continues to be whether Russian officials knew of the conspiracy and consciously forfeited an opportunity to block it. Cornwall concludes, “By the end of July 1914 Pašić knew that if Greater Serbia materialized, it would be out of the fires of a full European war. Serbia itself had helped to create this war because during the July crisis it was not prepared to return to the status of an Austro-Hungarian satellite.”71...

57 See, e.g., Albertini, Origins of the War, 2:1–119.58 Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York, 1966). Also see Friedrich Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad: Die Hintergründe des Dramas von Sarajevo, 1914 (Vienna, 1975), and “Dokumente zum Sarajevoprozess,” in Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchiv, Erganzungsband 9 (Vienna, 1978).59 Mark Cornwall, “Serbia,” in Wilson, Decisions for War, 1914, 55–96.60 Albertini, Origins of the War, 2:82–86.61 David MacKenzie, Apis, the Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević (Boulder, CO, 1989). Also see the commentary by Stoyan Gavrilovic on the 1917 statement by Apis in “New Evidence on the Sarajevo Assassination,” Journal of Modern History 27 (1955): 410–13.62 Mikhail Alekseev, Voennaia razvedka Rossii, vol. 2, Ot Ryurka do Nikolaya II (Moscow, 1998), 323–24. Also see David Alan Rich, “Russia,” in Hamilton and Herwig, Origins of World War I, 221 n. 75. On the broader issue of Russo-Serbian relations, see Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914 (Cambridge, 1991), 248–65.63 Serbia, Documents sur la politique exterieure du Royaume de Serbie, 1903–1914 (Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, 1903–1914), tome 6, vol. 3, ed. Kliment Džambazovski (Belgrade, 1983), and tome 7, vol. 2, ed. Vladimir Dedijer and Života Anić (Belgrade, 1980).64 Cornwall, “Serbia,” 57–60; on the possible warning to Vienna, see ibid., n. 69.65 Fay, Origins of the World War, 2:335; Albertini, Origins of the War, 2:350–58.66 Gale Stokes, “The Serbian Documents from 1914: A Preview,” Journal of Modern History, 48 (on-demand supplement, 1976): 69–83; Williamson, Austria-Hungary, 201–2. Also see the chapter on Serbia in Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk, July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Brief Documentary History (Boston, 2003), 15–42.67 Cornwall, “Serbia,” 73.68 Ibid., 73–77.69 Ibid., 81. Also see Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 258–65.70 See, in addition to Cornwall, Richard C. Hall, “Serbia,” in Hamilton and Herwig, The Origins of World War I, 92–111.71 Cornwall, “Serbia,” 84.

ovo je prilično dobra kompilacija različitih istraživanja, moja zamerka je na kornvolov zaključak na kraju kod ovog "helped to create this war", što je uglavnom tačno iako nije nepoznato da je a-u upućena na hašku arbitražu tj. ostavljen je malecki prostor sa srpske strane za mirno rešenje. možda još na poneki detalj ali ništa krucijalno.

[namenski]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDFnzIzsv6MLego Vilhelm usred bare, pa se dere ko magare... :0.6: Edited February 5, 2014 by namenski_01

[namenski]

[MancMellow]

Paradoksalno i uzasno ilustrativno je da je Srbija u jednom svom nikako zanemarljivom delu, pored onih Danaca kojima oprastam zbog neznanja, jedina zemlja u kojoj ce da se nadju ljudi, politicke snage, koje ce Mladica da stave uz Principa.I to da ne trepnu.

Priznajem, ovo je nas posao. Ipak, opet, da ponovimo, Milanka™ je jedno, a Ferguson nesto deseto. Od Fergusona ne treba braniti "Srbiju" ili ne znam sta, od njega treba braniti istorijsku nauku. Ali, videli smo, ima ko to radi, mnogo uspesnije od nas™

[MancMellow]

Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Ernest R. MayAn Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 335-387ovo je prilično dobra kompilacija različitih istraživanja, moja zamerka je na kornvolov zaključak na kraju kod ovog "helped to create this war", što je uglavnom tačno iako nije nepoznato da je a-u upućena na hašku arbitražu tj. ostavljen je malecki prostor sa srpske strane za mirno rešenje. možda još na poneki detalj ali ništa krucijalno.

realno, nebitno. ako napises "was not prepared to return to the status of an Austro-Hungarian satellite", glagol pre toga je cisto stilska figura. Obzirom da je samo o atentatu i Julskoj krizi, ovo mi deluje vise-manje ok.

[Prospero]

pa da. suština je da eskalacija sukoba vodi ka sužavanju izbora, tj. dođeš u situaciju ili-ili rešenja (ili rat ili satelitstvo™). i to jeste ono što je atentat učinio - nagrizao je postojanje srednjih rešenja.

[MancMellow]

Doduše, čim malo podignem glavu od ušća Save u Dunav + pogledam kako su se stvari kretale već izvesno vreme do tada, počinje da mi biva sve mutnije koje je moglo da bude srednje rešenje i inače.

[Prospero]

mogli su neki anarho-revolucionarni rumuni/italijani napraviti neko sranje :D

[Prospero]

mekmikinov podcast

rusija i francuska su najgore od sve dece

NEW July 1914: Countdown to War recorded , Jan. 31, 2014 1 hr 36 min click here to listen Sean McMeekin Photo: Ching Wah Chin

[namenski]

A rare fungus discovered in Scotland for the first time may have been carried from Flanders Fields on the boots of First World War soldiers.

[namenski]

August Sander, fotograf

[namenski]