Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[namenski]

Inace, jedan od glavnijih srpskih (dobro, ne samo srpskih) doprinosa 1. svetskom je malo rabljen: radi se o jednoj zabludi u koju su Srbi sa svojim balkanskim komsijama bacili generalstabove velikih.Bilo je, naime, svima jasno da se vodjenje rata menja: Rusko-japanski rat je zakucao vaznost poljske fortifikacije, onog cuvenog ukopavanja, mitraljezi su se vec dobrano dokazali, a recimo Slifen kao nacelnik Generalstaba uveliko opisivao buduce bojiste kao pusto, sa tek po nekim oblacicem dima, polje po kome se povremeno pojavi tanka paucinasta linija, pretrci storinak metara i ponovo nestane.Mislio je, naravno, na streljacki stroj pesadije.I, pomalo razocarani nestajanjem sansi za velike manevre i slavu, veliki su poceli da se pripremaju upravo za to, kada su pomno pracena desavanja u Balkanskim ratovima, narocito prvom, promenila sliku i odvela sve na stranputicu.Odjednom je svima izgledalo da su se vratili brzi manevri koji se zavrsavaju takozvanom resavajucom bitkom i opet su svi brze-bolje pozurili da se vrate starim oprobanim metodima.Dugotrajni rat koji su mnogi najavljivali je zamenjen kratkim, ispunjenim brzim manevrima i pobedama posle kojih bi se pobednik vratio kuci, a politicari seli da izdiktiraju uslove pobedjenom.I interesantno je da su svi posle Balkanskih ratova, menjali svoje ratne sluzbe/pravila i da su 1. svetski rat zapoceli upravo vodjeni doktrinom koja je revidirana pod uticajem iskustava iz Balkanskih ratova.

[Prospero]

Britain entering first world war was 'biggest error in modern history'Historian Niall Ferguson says Britain could have lived with German victory and should have stayed out of warNiall Ferguson said arguments about honour resonated now as in 1914, 'but you canpay too high a price for upholding the notion of honour'. Photograph: Christian Sinibaldi for the GuardianBritain could have lived with a German victory in the first world war, and should have stayed out of the conflict in 1914, according to the historian Niall Ferguson, who described the intervention as "the biggest error in modern history".In an interview with BBC History Magazine, Ferguson said there had been no immediate threat to Britain, which could have faced a Germany-dominated Europe at a later date on its own terms, instead of rushing in unprepared, which led to catastrophic costs."Britain could indeed have lived with a German victory. What's more, it would have been in Britain's interests to stay out in 1914," he said before a documentary based on his book The Pity of War, which will be screened by BBC2 as part of the broadcaster's centenary season.The Laurence A Tisch professor of history at Harvard University rejected the idea that Britain was forced to act in 1914 to secure its borders and the Channel ports. "This argument, which is very seductive, has one massive flaw in it, which is that Britain tolerated exactly that situation happening when Napoleon overran the European continent, and did not immediately send land forces to Europe. It wasn't until the peninsular war that Britain actually deployed ground forces against Napoleon. So strategically, if Britain had not gone to war in 1914, it would still have had the option to intervene later, just as it had the option to intervene after the revolutionary wars had been under way for some time."It was remarkable, he said, that Britain intervened on land so early in 1914, when quite unprepared."Creating an army more or less from scratch and then sending it into combat against the Germans was a recipe for disastrous losses. And if one asks whether this was the best way for Britain to deal with the challenge posed by imperial Germany, my answer is no."Even if Germany had defeated France and Russia, it would have had a pretty massive challenge on its hands trying to run the new German-dominated Europe and would have remained significantly weaker than the British empire in naval and financial terms. Given the resources that Britain had available in 1914, a better strategy would have been to wait and deal with the German challenge later when Britain could respond on its own terms, taking advantage of its much greater naval and financial capability."The comments are certain to fan the flames of the debate sparked by the education secretary, Michael Gove, about whether Britain's role in the war should be seen as heroic courage or monumental error.Gove, in an article in the Daily Mail, attacked "leftwing academics all too happy to feed those myths by attacking Britain's role in the conflict", and decried the Blackadder portrayal of the war as "a series of catastrophic mistakes perpetrated by an out-of-touch elite".Ferguson is unequivocal: "We should not think of this as some great victory or dreadful crime, but more as the biggest error in modern history."He continued: "The cost, let me emphasise, of the first world war to Britain was catastrophic, and it left the British empire at the end of it all in a much weakened state … It had accumulated a vast debt, the cost of which really limited Britain's military capability throughout the interwar period. Then there was the manpower loss – not just all those aristocratic officers, but the many, many, many skilled workers who died or were permanently incapacitated in the war."We need of course to feel sympathy for the men like my grandfather who fought in the first world war, because their sufferings were scarcely imaginable. The death toll, which was greater than the second world war, was the most painful thing that Britain has ever experienced in war."But, he added, we should also feel dismay that the leaders, not just of Britain but of the European states, could have taken decisions that led to such an appalling slaughter."Arguments about honour of course resonate today as they resonated in 1914, but you can pay too high a price for upholding the notion of honour, and I think in the end Britain did."He concedes that if Britain had stood back in 1914, it would have reneged on commitments to uphold Belgian neutrality. "But guess what? Realism in foreign policy has a long and distinguished tradition, not least in Britain – otherwise the French would never complain about 'perfidious Albion'. For Britain it would ultimately have been far better to have thought in terms of the national interest rather than in terms of a dated treaty."Ferguson, no stranger to controversy, is unlikely to worry about coming under fire for his views. Last year he managed to stir up a massive row over a long-dead economist when he suggested that John Maynard Keynes had no stake in the future because he was gay and childless – although he did later apologise, calling his remarks "stupid and tactless".

doba napoleona kao uzor za strateško promišljanje 1SR, imperija (kao najbolja stvar ikada, igde) ostala zadužena i na granici propasti.ne znam zašto misli da nisu reagovali u sklopu sa nacionalnim interesom, osim što iznosi šbbkbb tvrdnju baziranu na strateškom razmišljanju starom 100 godina.

[namenski]

Ako ti nije tesko da nam objasnis sta je to 'stratesko razmisljanje staro 100 godina'?

[Prospero]

Poziva se na logiku iz doba napoleona u razmatranju toga sta su vlasti trebale da rade 1914.1914-18xx ～100 godina.

[namenski]

Poziva se na logiku iz doba napoleona u razmatranju toga sta su vlasti trebale da rade 1914.1914-18xx ～100 godina.

:) Nisam mislio na matematiku: zasto 'logika' iz doba Napoleona nije/ne bi vazila i za 1914?Zar nije vazila u smislu aksioma britanske spoljne/kontinentalne politike da se ne sme dopustiti hegemonija jedne kontinentalne sile?I zar nije i objektivno i subjektivno uticala na odlucivanje britanske vlade i to u tolikoj meri da je svejedno ko se u tom trenutku nalazio na vlasti?Toliko o 'strateskim' pretpostavkama.Plus nezavisnost Belgije, kada je posebno britanski interes u pitanju.Strategije (mada je ovde strategija poprilicno neodgovarajuci izraz) imaju neke svoje nepromenjene pretpostavke.Klasicna, uslovno receno, strategija je 'vazila' do - otprilike - kraja 2. svetskog rata, pocetka Hladnog i globalizacije strategije i sve strateske pretpostavke su se temeljile na njenim nacelima kao datim, zadatim.Zato i pitam ono sto sam te pitao.

[MancMellow]

Možda ću uveče ili narednih dana imati vremena da napišem zašto mislim da Niall nije u pravu sa stanovišta Britanije, ali gledajući "širu sliku" i on ovde, možda pomalo paradoksalno, potvrđuje na kome leži generalna odgovornost za samo izbijanje sukoba.

[Prospero]

:)Nisam mislio na matematiku: zasto 'logika' iz doba Napoleona nije/ne bi vazila i za 1914?Zar nije vazila u smislu aksioma britanske spoljne/kontinentalne politike da se ne sme dopustiti hegemonija jedne kontinentalne sile?I zar nije i objektivno i subjektivno uticala na odlucivanje britanske vlade i to u tolikoj meri da je svejedno ko se u tom trenutku nalazio na vlasti?Toliko o 'strateskim' pretpostavkama.Plus nezavisnost Belgije, kada je posebno britanski interes u pitanju.Strategije (mada je ovde strategija poprilicno neodgovarajuci izraz) imaju neke svoje nepromenjene pretpostavke.Klasicna, uslovno receno, strategija je 'vazila' do - otprilike - kraja 2. svetskog rata, pocetka Hladnog i globalizacije strategije i sve strateske pretpostavke su se temeljile na njenim nacelima kao datim, zadatim.Zato i pitam ono sto sam te pitao.

pa njegova strategija je da se sačeka sa obračunom sa nemačkom a ne da se u taj sukob uopšte ne ulazi:

"Even if Germany had defeated France and Russia, it would have had a pretty massive challenge on its hands trying to run the new German-dominated Europe and would have remained significantly weaker than the British empire in naval and financial terms. Given the resources that Britain had available in 1914, a better strategy would have been to wait and deal with the German challenge later when Britain could respond on its own terms, taking advantage of its much greater naval and financial capability."

a napoleona je pomenuo u tom kontekstu, tj u tajmingu sukoba sa kontinentalnim hegemonom.otuda i moj komentar - rat začinjen drednotima, maksimima, motorizacijom i višemetnim "ostragušama" je drugačiji od onog sa crnim barutom i jedrenjacima. uostalom,ključne poraze je napoleon doživeo na istoku i u centru evrope, kod borodina i lajpciga, od kontinentalnih protivnika a ne na španskim visoravnima od britanaca. vaterlo je bio samo šlag na torti.

[namenski]

pa njegova strategija je da se sačeka sa obračunom sa nemačkom a ne da se u taj sukob uopšte ne ulazi:a napoleona je pomenuo u tom kontekstu, tj u tajmingu sukoba sa kontinentalnim hegemonom.

Nije mi bila namera da komentarisem Fergusona; njegov tekst vrvi od preslobodnih konstrukcija, obaska sto je na nekim mestima na ivici otvorene zlonamernosti.Hteo sam samo da ga iskoristimo kao slagvort za pomen nekih znacajnijih momenata vezanih za britanske politicke odluke i njihovu uslovljenost onim sto sam nazvao 'klasicna' strategija.

otuda i moj komentar - rat začinjen drednotima, maksimima, motorizacijom i višemetnim "ostragušama" je drugačiji od onog sa crnim barutom i jedrenjacima. uostalom,

Ovde sam te 'napao': isti je.Isti je utoliko sto se ljudi ne tuku na mestima koja su se slucajno 'namestila' bas kao sto rat putuje istim putevima; svejedno je sa tacke gledista strategije da li se rat vodi rimskim legijama, jedrenjacima, Velikom armijom, motorizacijom i drednotima ili tenkovima i grupama armija. Menjale su se razmere, sto je sa tacke gledista strategije opet svejedno: Napoleon i Cezar bi se razumeli u par recenica, bas kao i, recimo, Slifen i Hanibal :) , Cercil i Aleksandar, ali se zato Maknamara ili neki od kasnih Sovjeta ne bi nikako ili vrlo tesko uspeli da razumeju sa bilo kojim od pomenutih.Tako da je bilo svejedno do, otprilike, pocetka Hladnog rata, a to ovde nije tema, mada su neki elementi 'klasicne' strategije ostali na snazi, otprilike onako kao sto Euklidova geometrija nije izbrisana novim matematikama.

ključne poraze je napoleon doživeo na istoku i u centru evrope, kod borodina i lajpciga, od kontinentalnih protivnika a ne na španskim visoravnima od britanaca. vaterlo je bio samo šlag na torti.

Ovde lezi jedna od rasirenih zabluda: nikad mi nije bilo jasno potcenjivanje dogadjanja na Iberijskom poluostrvu u doba Napoleona. Odgovor verovatno lezi u nastojanju sila pobednica nad Napoleonom da sve zasluge pripisu sebi.Tacno je da je Napoleon kljucne poraze doziveo tamo gde kazes, ali efekti dugotrajnog iscrpljivanja na Poluostrvu su itekakvi, i politicki, i vojni i ekonomski i psiholoski.I mnogo vise nego sto se misli su naceli francuske potencijale za vodjenje rata.A pre svega, su dobra ilustracija britanskog nacina razmisljanja u ratovodstvu, nacina razmisljanja koji je u neka kasnija vremena rodio i pojmove kakav je recimo 'strategija posrednog nastupanja' i koji je, sa britanske tacke gledista, naravno, dao odlicne rezultate.

[MancMellow]

Dobro, ali GB je bila član i Prve koalicije. Ne vidim neku nekonzistentnost. S druge strane, s kim bi pravili novi Bečki kongres, sa Vilsonom/Ruzveltom i Lenjinom/Staljinom? Pa pravili su 1943 i 1945. Nije da se baš nešto sjajno završilo po V.Britaniju.Edit: e da, a šta bi bilo da su pobedili Rusi i Francuzi? Razmišljali su u 1 kabinetu i o tome...

Edited January 30, 2014 by MancMellow

[namenski]

Onda se nismo razumeli, ili ja nisam bio dovoljno jasan: nikakva nekonzistentnost, btw ne znam ni gde si je video, opomeni me :) .Naprotiv, odlika britanske politike, narocito u pogledu zbivanja na Kontinentu, uvek je bila izrazito konzistentna u smislu prepoznavanja i odbrane sopstvenih interesa, naravno i kao sto svaka uspesna politika i treba da bude.Jedan od vaznih cinilaca koji su doprineli da to bude tako bila je - u odnosu na druge evropske drzave - izrazena politicka stabilnost, jer su Britaniju iz ovih ili onih razloga zaobisla sva kontinentalna previranja i drustveni lomovi.Na stranu i malo geografije.Na nesto drugo sam pokusao da skrenem paznju, zato sam pomenuo Euklida i njegovu geometriju: Prvi svetski rat je bio prvi oruzani sukob u istoriji covecanstva u kome su nauka i tehnologija pretekle takozvani drustveni razvoj.Lomovi su bili, a to se danas slabo ili nikako uzima u obzir, prave pravcate drustvene kataklizme: rodjena je psihoanaliza, pojavio se Ajnstajn sa opstom teorijom relativnosti, umetnost da ne pominjem, od slikarstva do modernog romana. Milioni su se opismenili, presli iz grada u selo, pojavila se ozbiljna i pokazalo se primamljiva alternativa isprobana u Rusiji 1905, koja je na premijeri 1917, itekako uzdrmala svet, itd, itd...U svetu koji se tako menjao, obreli su se politicari, svi do jednog ljudi jucerasnjeg sveta, sa nacinom razmisljanja, mentalitetom koji nikako nije mogao da prati to sto se desava: Klemanso je mozda prvi moderni politicar, covek koga je moderni tehnologizirani rat prakticno naterao da preotme uzde iz ruku vojnika i da politici primat nad vojskom. Naime, propusteno je da se zapazi jedna bitna cinjenica: takozvano ratovodstvo vise nije bilo stvar koju ce da resava vladar koji je istovremeno i vojskovodja. Doslo je vreme da moderna kapitalisticka demokratska drzava proklamuje i primeni apsolutni i nuzno potreban primat politike nad vojnom strategijom.Kako ono bese: rat je isuvise ozbiljna stvar da bi se prepustio vojnicima...Odgovor uslovno klasicnog mentaliteta bila je - klanica, pokusaj da se tehnologija nadvlada ljudskim telima, a bankroti takozvanih elita su bili monumentalni, narocito u slucaju Nemacke. Do juce neprikosnovena vojnicka kasta je sramno pobegla i prepustila politicarima da potpisuju primirja ili sto bi se reklo da vade trnje iz one stvari.Rat je, na neki nacin, bio paradigma klasicne demokratije: dok je u 19. veku, da se ne vracam u nazad, zahvatao pravce kretanja vojski i mozda pojas od 10-ak kilometara levo i desno dotle je u Prvom svetskom ratu demokratizovan na gotovo celu musku populaciju, da bi opsti postao sa Drugim svetskim ratom kada su - da karikiram - svi dobili pravo glasa. Nestala je ona cuvena granica izmedju fronta i pozadine. Istovremeno, pokazalo se da moderna industrijska drzava ima da se prema ratu odnosi na sasvim drugaciji narod nego drzave koje su rat usle: ekonomija i ratna proizvodnja su pokazale gde leze pravi izvori moci drzave, a ljudi kao Rathenau, danasnjim jezikom receno prvoklasni menadzeri, postali su vazniji od nekih tamo generala.

[Radoye]

Sto se tice britanskog interesa on je veoma jasan: zele i uvek su zeleli da nasuprot sebe na drugoj strani Lamansa imaju prijateljski nastrojenu silu. Kroz svoju istoriju su proveli isuvise vremena i raspickali previse resursa tukuci se oko toga da bi sebi dozvolili da se ponovo dovedu u istu situaciju. To im je neophodno iz dva razloga - jedan je plasiranje proizvoda svoje imperije na kontinentalno trziste pod sto povoljnijim uslovima (ako prijatelj kontrolise kontinentalne luke nasuprot mene nece mi udarati blokadu i tarifama me lupati po usima) a drugi je olaksana kontrola globalne imperije (ako ne moram da drzim velike vojne efektive kuci, jer imam poverenja u prvog komsiju, mogu da ih koristim drugde za prosirenje / kontrolu imperije).Francuska je 1914. bila jedna takva Britaniji prijateljska sila. Nemacka nije, nego je cak i otvoreno izazivala (pomorska trka u naoruzanju itd). Britanija je imala sve razloge da podupire Francusku protiv Nemacke bez obzira na cenu, sto je i ucinila.Belgija je tu posluzila samo kao povod i legalisticko pokrice za britanski ulazak u rat, isto kao i Gavrilo malko ranije sto je bio povod a ne uzrok za opstu klanicu.

[Prospero]

fergi dobio i rebutall:

Gary Sheffield on First World War debate: 'A German victory would have been a disaster for Britain'Thursday 30th January 2014Submitted by Emma McFarnonGary Sheffield, professor of war studies at Wolverhampton University, has contested Niall Ferguson's suggestion that Britain made a terrible mistake in taking up arms in 1914. Writing for History Extra, Prof Sheffield said Britain entered the war because people "recognised that there was something worse than the war – a German victory".If Britain had stayed out of the First World War in August 1914, or even delayed its entry, it could well have resulted in Germany defeating France and Russia. This would have been a disaster for Britain and Europe. The Kaiser’s Germany was not Hitler’s, but it was bad enough: an aggressive, militarist, expansionist, near-autocracy. While the Reichstag was democratically-elected, it was largely toothless.The choice to wage war, and the key decisions thereafter, were made by a tiny unelected clique of politicians and military answerable only to the Kaiser. Indeed, from August 1916 onwards the German government became even less democratic when the military duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff established what has been called a ‘silent dictatorship’. Any idea that in a victorious Germany democracy would have emerged is pure fantasy.German policies in occupied territory fell short of the genocidal approach of their Nazi successors, but were brutal enough. In occupied France and Belgium there was a ‘reign of terror’, to quote two modern French historians, involving deportations, forced labour, and harsh living conditions. Democracy and liberalism would have been extinguished in most of continental Europe. No wonder the Allied troops advancing in 1918 were greeted rapturously as liberators by French and Belgian civilians in the occupied zone. For Britain to have stayed out of the war would have been to condemn the peoples of occupied Europe to a very dark existence. British faced an existential threat in 1914. A German victory would have imperilled the security of the British state and Empire, and left it in the position it actually found itself in a generation later, in 1940 – isolated, without allies, and facing a bleak future. That is why Britain entered the war and continued to fight it, in spite of the appalling cost. The British people were prepared to bear that cost: the evidence is clear that they recognised that there was something worse than the war – a German victory.Professor Ferguson’s attempts to draw parallels with British strategy in the wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France are puzzling. Pace his assertions, Britain sent ground troops to the continent as soon as they entered the war in 1793. They were small in number, but that was a reflection of the small size of the army and global commitments. The 1793-95 campaign was where the future Duke of Wellington saw his first action. There were also sizeable commitments to campaigns in the Netherlands, Egypt and the Mediterranean before the Peninsular War began.Should Britain have gone to war in 1914? Share your view by taking part in our poll.The full story can be found in the February issue of BBC History Magazine. To access the magazine digitally, click here.

čak je i u korišćenju napoleonske paralele dobio odgovor - "ti ne znaš da je koristiš kako treba"

[MancMellow]

Pa hvala Sheffildu sto je potvrdio moje misljenje gore :D koje je vise bilo odgovor na ono sto je Ferguson napisao, nego Namenskom. Dakle, promasene paralele. Ferguson se sve vise i vise bruka...ne znam stvarno sta ce mu to. Ali za ovaj duumvirate je majstorski napisao. Tu je zapravo zakopao tu totalno promasenu tezu o EU pre EU koju neki tako vole da forsiraju...

[Otto Katz]

Germany, I apologise for this sickening avalanche of first world war worshipThe causes of the war have analysed in their intense complexity by authors such as MacMillan, Hastings, Stone and Clark. A recent debate in London between the latter two turned into a swirl of cause and counter-cause, accident and counter-accident, until they came close to concluding the cause was indeed Princip's Sarajevo bullet of 1914.To je bio zaključak?

[vodebele]

cause? da li se to prevodi kao uzrok ili povod?