The euro-zone crisis

[fonTelefon]

Nista se ne poklanja u slucaju Bankie. Ta banka se delimicno nacionalizuje, nesto ispod 50 posto banke uzima drzave. Upumpan novac pretvara se u deonice u vlasnistvu drzave.Banke kao sto je ta su posebno problematicne jer sede na onome sto se zove toxic assets: mrtvoj, "otrovnoj" svojini koja ispumpava novac, kao sto su oduzete nekretnine cija je vrednost manja od duga koji je isplacen na ime njihove kupovine. Primer: banka ti da kredit za stan koji kosta 50.000 evra. Pet godina kasnije, banka ti uzme stan nazad jer ne placas ratu. Taj stan sada vredi 30.000 evra, i banka ne moze da ga proda. Nije tu dovoljno da se banci pozajmi novac: od banaka zavisi stabilnost celokupnog finansijskog sistema. Ako nema zivog novca u opticaju, nema ni pozajmljivanja, tj. cena pozajmica je jako visoka i sve staje. Tu se onda upumpava novac u sistem kao krv u transfuziji. Manje je bitno sta ce biti sa tim novcem: kada nekome spasavas zivot defibrilatorom (u ovom slucaju finansijskom sistemu, dakle celoj zemlji), ne gledas koliki ti je racun za struju.

to je cist rizik banke sto bi pokrivali ostali. vec deset godina pokusavaju da dignu limite za banke i osiguravajuca drustva znaju oni da je to sve na klimavim nogama odavno.Ti nisi citao sta je napisao Tresko gde su zavrsile te pare. Nema ih u opticaju a u Merici gde su kukali na tuu big tu fejl su napravili jos vece i eno im opet kuca recesija na vrata a nezaposlenost medju mladima galopira. Nego ima li neke opklade kad pada grcka i spanija? Odlazi evro iz naseg malog grada.

[Dagmar]

Ja ne mislim da banke treba da puste niz vodu, ali mi nije jasna ni situacija u kojoj se državne pare upumpavaju u banke da ne bi sve kolapsiralo, a gomile nekih menadžerčića i menadžera izvlače pare u vidu ogromnih plata i bonusa. Gde je ta štednja kad se o bankama radi? Sad opet, moguće da sam pala na occupy propagandu, možda su te sume ustvari potpuno zanemarljive u odnosu na masu novca koja se tu okreće (potpuni sam ekonomski laik, očigledno). Ali opet, zar nije bolje da se banke uslove nekim ograničenjima, tipa ako ih država poseduje onda je plata svima zaposlenima u rangu plata u drugim državnim službama, nema bonusa i sl? Ovako mi to liči na burazersku ekonomiju kakvu vidim u Srbiji, a kako takav pristup može da reši bilo kakav problem?edit: E da, a zašto ne bi solventna država delovala umesto banki koje puknu, sa parama koje imaju u rezervi mogu da organizuju javne radove, otvaraju radna mesta i sl. To je ipak pomoglo USA kad je bila kriza tridesetih, i potpuno ih je izvuklo za 4-5 godina, a ova kriza je tu već 4 godine i svi kažu da nije ni počela i niko nema pojma kad će da se završi.Naravno, jasno mi je da te stvari nisu iste, ali neki delovi sigurno jesu. Ovako će izgleda pare da poklone bankarima, a ulazi se svejedno u krizu.

Edited May 11, 2012 by Evi_

[dekss]

zašto? a javno se svi ubiše od širenja pozitivnih misli...

[Tresko]

Pa šta će da rade? Da kažu ljudima: Jebiga spasavaj se ko može, odosmo u tri pm?

[dekss]

Pa šta će da rade? Da kažu ljudima: Jebiga spasavaj se ko može, odosmo u tri pm?

ma naravno da ne. to bi bilo još gore. a možda i ne??nije u tome poenta. ovo na slici je rezultat googlove statistike - to je ono što ljudi najčešće traže a vezano (u ovom slučaju) za evrozonu. to je ono što ljudi misle kad su sami (sa sobom, tj. sa svojim vernim računarom). javno retko ko jadikuje.

[Prospero]

Reinventing Europe: Ivan Krastev on Soviet lessonsDate: 25th May 2012 | Author: Ivan Krastev , Categories: Reinventing Europe, Tags: None As part of ECFR's Reinvention project, we are running a series of blog posts looking at particular thematic issues facing Europe as it attempts to deal with the financial crisis. In the fourth in this series, Ivan Krastev looks to the collapse of the Soviet empire for lessons.- In 1992 the world woke up without the Soviet Union on the map. One of the world’s two superpowers had collapsed in absence of war or an alien invasion or any other catastrophic development. Although the Soviets were in irreversible decline starting with the 1970s nothing has pre-determined their collapse at the end of the 20th century. In 1985, 1986 and even in 1989 the disintegration Soviet Union was so much unconceivable for the analysts of the day as the prospect for the EU disintegration is for the experts today. It is this leap from the “unthinkable” to the “inevitable” that makes Soviet disintegration experience a useful footnote in the current discussions on the future of the European crisis and the choices that European leaders face. After all, the EU’s present crisis has powerfully demonstrated that the risk of the disintegration of the EU is not just a rhetorical device, a paper tiger used by scared politicians to enforce austerity on their unhappy voters. It is not only Europe's economies but European politics that is in turmoil. The public mood is best described as a combination of pessimism and anger: the latest Future of Europe survey suggests that while the majority of Europeans agree that the EU is a good place to live in their confidence in the economic performance of the Union and its capacity to play a major role in global politics has declined. More than six in any ten Europeans are convinced that the lives of those who are children today will be more difficult than the lives of people from their own generation. What is more troubling almost 90 percent of Europeans see a big gap between what the public wants and what the governments do. Only third of Europeans feel their vote counts in the EU and only 18 percent of Italians and 15 percent of Greeks feel that their vote counts even in their own country. So, how unthinkable is disintegration? The Soviet order "collapsed like a house of cards"- wrote the eminent historian Martin Malia " because it has always been a house of cards". The EU is not a house of cards. While the EU was never seduced by the temptations of communism and central planning, it is not immune to the vices of complexity. The EU it is the most sophisticated political puzzle that history has known yet. The EU is unintelligible government that the mass of Europeans cannot understand. They cannot grasp how the Union function and it is even more difficult to grasp what the collapse of the Union means. In the case of the Soviet Union, collapse meant that a state disappeared from the maps and a dozen of new states came into being and it meant the end of the communist system. But the EU is not a state. If the project fails nothing would change on maps. And even if the EU disintegrates if not all at least most of the member states will remain market democracies. So, how can we define disintegration? Could we speak of disintegration if a country or two left the Eurozone or the Union itself? Is the end of the euro the end of the EU? The Soviet experience suggests some useful hints in answering such questions. Soviet collapse teaches us that the fact that the economic costs of disintegration would be very high is not a reason for it not to happen. The perception of the disintegration as "unthinkable" could encourage policy makers to try to push dangerous policy led by the belief that “nothing really bad can happen” in the long term while hoping that some anti-EU policies or rhetoric can be helpful in short term. The Soviet collapse is the most powerful demonstration that the disintegration of the EU does not need to be the result of the victory of the anti-EU forces over the pro-EU forces. If it happens most likely it will be the unintended consequence of the growing dysfunctionality of the system and elites’ misreading of the political dynamics in their own societies. Soviet experience is also a powerful demonstration that misguided reforms even more than the lack of reforms can lead to disintegration. In a time of crisis politicians search for a “silver bullet” and quite often it is this bullet that causes the death. It was Gorbachev's failure to make sense of the nature of the Soviet system (it can be preserved but not reformed) and his misguided belief in the superiority of the socialist system that were at the root of the Soviet collapse. The idea of the referenda on the European Constitution that backfired so spectacularly in France and Netherland shows the danger in such a course of action. The second lesson that comes from the analysis of the Soviet disintegration experience is that in the absence of war or other extreme circumstances, the major risk of the project is not the de-stabilisation of the periphery but the revolt of the centre. It was Russia’s decision to get rid of the Union and not the ever-present desire of the Baltic republics to run away from it that decided the fate of the Soviet state. And it is Germany’s view of what is happening in the Union that will more dramatically affect the future of the European project than the troubles of the Greek or Spanish economies. When the winners of integration start to view themselves as its major victims then politicians should be sure that the big trouble is around the corner. For the moment Europeans do not have reasons to doubt Germany’s devotion to the EU but at the same time we witness horrifying inability of the Southern debt-ridden countries to “translate” their concerns in German and a growing failure of Germany to “translate” her proposed solutions on the local languages of most of the other member states. And it is not the divergence of interests but the lack of empathy that should bother us most. The third lesson is that if the dynamics of disintegration prevail, the collapse of the Union would look more like a "bank run" than a revolution. Paradoxically, the very fact that the EU was and to a great extent remains an elite project that determines the fact that the real risk for the survival of the EU comes not so much from the anger of the publics but from the calculations of the elites. At the very moment when national elites start questioning the future prospects of the Union, they will start acting in a way that contributes to its collapse. It is not people’s disappointment but elites’ trust in the capacity of the Union to deal with the problems that is the most important factor affecting the chances of the Union to survive. The last and most disturbing lesson coming out of the study of Soviet collapse is that in times of threats of disintegration political actors should bet on flexibility and constrain their natural urge for rigidity and long lasting solutions. Unfortunately what we witness in Europe today is a drive for rigidity. In order to get out of the current status quo of policies without politics on the Brussels level and politics without policies on the national level, Germany among others favours a political constellation that can be best describe as “democracy without choices”. European decision makers are trying to save the Union by opting for policy solutions that tie the hands of national governments and radically constrain the choices of the public. Voters in countries like Italy and Greece can change governments but they cannot change policies: economic decision-making is de facto taken out of the electoral politics. The expectations are that the new politics of fiscal discipline will reduce political pressure on the EU. But while experts can agree or disagree with the pros and cons of the austerity policy package, what is more important is that the failure of rigidity will automatically accelerate the crisis, making the survival of the Union more difficult. Ten years ago, European decision makers decided not to introduce any mechanism for leaving the common currency. The goal was to make the break up of the Eurozone impossible, but now we know that it was this decision that makes it more vulnerable. The German poet and dissident Wolf Biermann once wrote "I can only love, what I am also free to leave". The strategy of the European policy makers at the moment to favour policies that make the price of exit unbearably high instead of limiting risk can end up increasing them because what the Soviet collapse teaches us is that in the time of major crisis, the popular response to "there is no alternative" is that any alternative seems better. Paradoxically, flexibility is the best chance for survival.

Edited May 28, 2012 by buffalo bill

[fonTelefon]

U ropotarnicu povijesti sa tom tamnicom naroda.

[MancMellow]

@ BBill - odličan tekstmeni se ovo od Joške Fišera donekle nadovezuje:

Situacija u Evropi je ozbiljna. Krajnje ozbiljna. Ko bi pomislio da će britanski premijer Dejvid Kameron pozvati vlade evrozone da skupe hrabrost i stvore fiskalnu uniju (sa jedinstvenom budžetskom i poreskom politikom i zajedničkim garantovanim javnim dugom)? Kameron, takođe, tvrdi da je dublja politička integracija jedini način da se zaustavi krah evra.Evropska kuća je u plamenu, a Dauning strit poziva vatrogasnu brigadu na racionalan i razuman odgovor. Nažalost, vatrogasce predvodi Nemačka, a njen šef je kancelarka Angela Merkel. Posledica je da Evropa i dalje pokušava da ugasi vatru benzinom - nemačkim merama štednje - sa takvim posledicama, da je za pune tri godine, finansijska kriza evrozone postala evropska egzistencijalna kriza.Hajde da se ne obmanjujemo: propadne li evro, EU (najveća ekonomija sveta) će izazvati ekonomsku krizu do nivoa koji većina današnjih ljudi nikada nije iskusila. Evropa je na ivici ambisa i nesumnjivo će se kotrljati sve dok Nemačka i Francuska ne promene pravac.Nedavni izbori u Francuskoj i Grčkoj, kao i lokalni izbori u Italiji, te učestali nemiri u Španiji i Irskoj pokazali su da su ljudi izgubili veru u strogu štednju na koju ih prisiljava Nemačka. Lek Merkelove, koji prvo ubije pa leči, protiv je realnosti, ali i demokratije.Još jednom preživljavamo muku ovakve štednje koja vodi jedino ka depresiji kada se primenjuje u jeku finansijske krize. To bi trebalo da bude svima poznato; to je, na kraju krajeva glavna lekcija politike štednje američkog predsednika Herberta Huvera i kancelara Vajmarske Republike Hajnriha Bruninga s početka tridesetih godina prošlog veka. Nažalost, baš je Nemačka, izgleda, to zaboravila.Kao posledica svega, haos se nazire u Grčkoj, krah bankarskog sektora u Španiji, Italiji i Francuskoj a potom i finansijska lavina koja će zatrpati Evropu. I onda? Treba li otpisati ono što su više od dve generacije Evropljana stvarale masivno investirajući u izgradnju institucija koje su dovele do najdužeg perioda mira i prosperiteta u istoriji kontinenta?Jedno je sigurno: krah evra i EU povlači za sobom i silazak Evrope sa svetske pozornice. Trenutna politika Nemačke je sve apsurdnija imajući u vidu oštre političke i ekonomske posledice sa kojima će se suočiti.Budućnost našeg kontinenta je u rukama Nemačke i Francuske, Merkelove i predsednika Olanda. Spas Evrope sada zavisi od fundamentalnih promena u nemačkoj ekonomskoj politici i u francuskoj poziciji prema političkoj integraciji i strukturalnim reformama.Francuska će reći „da“ političkom savezu: zajedničkoj vladi sa zajedničkom parlamentarnom kontrolom evrozone. Nacionalne vlade zemalja članica evrozone već deluju jednoglasno prema krizi kao de facto vlada. Ono što u praksi sve više postaje istina trebalo bi da bude podržano i formalizovano.Nemačka će morati da prihvati fiskalnu uniju. Konačno, to znači garantovanje opstanka evrozone sa nemačkom ekonomskom moći i imovinom: da Evropska centralna banka neograničeno preuzima državne obveznice krizom zahvaćenih zemalja; da se evropeizuju nacionalni dugovi preko evroobveznica i razviju programi za izbegavanje depresija evrozone i podsticaj oporavka.Nije teško zamisliti na kakvo će buncanje u Nemačkoj naići ovakva vrsta programa: Još više dugova! Gubitak kontrole nad našom imovinom! To prosto ne može biti!Ali, to funkcioniše: nemački rast zasnovan na izvozu podržan je upravo takvim programima u zemljama u usponu i SAD. Da Kina i Amerika nisu pumpale novac za finansiranje dugova u svoje ekonomije početkom 2009, nemačka ekonomija bi doživela težak udarac. Nemci sada moraju da se zapitaju da li su oni, koji su profitirali uglavnom od evropskih integracija, spremni da plate cenu za to ili će dozvoliti da sve propadne.Osim političkog i fiskalnog ujedinjenja i politika kratkoročnog rasta, Evropljanima su hitno potrebne strukturalne reforme u cilju obnove evropske konkurentnosti. Svaki od ovih stubova je potreban ukoliko Evropa želi da prevaziđe svoju egzistencijalnu krizu.Da li mi Nemci razumemo našu sveevropsku odgovornost? Ne bi se reklo. Zaista, retko je Nemačka bila usamljena kao sada. Teško da iko razume nemačku dogmatsku politiku štednje, koja se kosi sa svim našim iskustvima, a smatra se da smo uveliko ispali iz koloseka, pa i da idemo u suprotnom smeru. Još nije kasno da se smer promeni, iako imamo na raspolaganju samo nekoliko dana i nedelja, možda meseci umesto godina.Nemačka je samu sebe uništila - i evropski poredak - dva puta u dvadesetom veku, i potom ubedila Zapad da je izvukla pouke. Samo na gore opisan način, koji se najjasnije ogledao u snažnom prihvatanju evropskog projekta, Nemačka je dobila dozvolu da se ponovo ujedini. Bilo bi i tragično i ironično, ako bi obnovljena Nemačka, mirnim putem i u najboljoj nameri, po treći put dovela do uništenja evropskog projekta.

http://www.b92.net/info/moj_ugao/index.php?yyyy=2012&nav_category=166&nav_id=613984

[Prospero]

Ceo dan nailazim na parčiće čika Soroševih stavova & predviđanja, pa onda nađoh straight from the horse's mouth:Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento ItalySve je nekako fuzzy, puno nade & skepse, racionalnih izbora i Karla Popera, itd. Samo par citata:

Financial institutions are increasingly reordering their European exposure along national lines just in case the region splits apart. Banks give preference to shedding assets outside their national borders and risk managers try to match assets and liabilities within national borders rather than within the eurozone as a whole. The indirect effect of this asset-liability matching is to reinforce the deleveraging process and to reduce the availability of credit, particularly to the small and medium enterprises which are the main source of employment.

The real economy of the eurozone is declining while Germany is still booming. This means that the divergence is getting wider. The political and social dynamics are also working toward disintegration. Public opinion as expressed in recent election results is increasingly opposed to austerity and this trend is likely to grow until the policy is reversed. So something has to give.

In my judgment the authorities have a three months’ window during which they could still correct their mistakes and reverse the current trends. By the authorities I mean mainly the German government and the Bundesbank because in a crisis the creditors are in the driver’s seat and nothing can be done without German support.

But the likelihood is that the euro will survive because a breakup would be devastating not only for the periphery but also for Germany. It would leave Germany with large unenforceable claims against the periphery countries. The Bundesbank alone will have over a trillion euros of claims arising out of Target2 by the end of this year, in addition to all the intergovernmental obligations. And a return to the Deutschemark would likely price Germany out of its export markets – not to mention the political consequences. So Germany is likely to do what is necessary to preserve the euro – but nothing more. That would result in a eurozone dominated by Germany in which the divergence between the creditor and debtor countries would continue to widen and the periphery would turn into permanently depressed areas in need of constant transfer of payments. That would turn the European Union into something very different from what it was when it was a “fantastic object” that fired peoples imagination. It would be a German empire with the periphery as the hinterland.

Edited June 5, 2012 by buffalo bill

[MancMellow]

Meh...

[Prospero]

Već sam kačio sjajnu analizu Ivana Krasteva koji je pokazao da to što će nešto da košta ne predstavlja nepremostivu prepreku političkim elitama.

[MancMellow]

Već sam kačio sjajnu analizu Ivana Krasteva koji je pokazao da to što će nešto da košta ne predstavlja nepremostivu prepreku političkim elitama.

Ne, taj tekst je super, (očekivano) mnogo bolji od ovoga. "Meh" je na "nemačku imperiju" :)

[bergasa19]

Paul Krugman

[brusli]

Nikako da ukapiram sta hoce ovaj Krugman i ostali "Nobelovci".Kako da drzava stimulise kada su sve od reda na granici pucanja javnog duga?Sto covek lepo ne napise da hoce inflaciju i stampanje love, a ne ovako umiveno, valjda da izgleda veci expert...

[Prospero]

Misli čovek da se još nije došlo u stadijum u kom se kaže "ili inflacija ili rat". <_<