Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Bane5]

pricali smo pre godinu-dve na onom topiku o ponasanju izraela. jedan stav je bio upravo ovaj da je izrael direktno umesan u rusenje asada i da mu to odgovara uz obrazlozenje da je on njegov istorijski neprijatelj (prijatelj irana). ovaj stav pretpostavlja da je izrael imao unapred spremnu strategiju za vecinu ovog sto se desava u siriji, a ko to tvrdi tj. ko tvrdi da je bilo ko na ovom svetu imao takvu strategiju to zaista debelo mora da dokazuje jer jer svaki dan rata u siriji dokazuje suprotno.

sa druge strane ono sto sam ja tvrdio vreme jos uvek nije uspelo da preokrene. nijedan razlog za rusenje asada (ranije i sada) izrael nije imao, golanska visoravan je bila najmirniji deo sirije za vreme vladavine dinastije u pokusaju 'asad'. takvog 'neprijatelja' izrael bi samo pozeleti mogao. sada mu na vrata kucaju desetine nekontrolisanih i polukontrolisanih naoruzanih grupacija (mahom sunistskih) za koju (za svaku) treba naci posebnu strategiju i za koje se ne zna da li ce i ko ce biti konacni pobednik kad dodje (ako dodje) do medjusobne borbe za prevlast. uz njih sada mu na golanu operisu zajedno hezbolah, razne siitske bulumente skupljene sa koca i konopca i sve ih koordinisu oficiri iranske republikanske garde. ako je to bio cilj izraela onda je geoploticka strategija rezonovanja 'malog perice' uspela u svojoj nameri.

da bi se kompletno sagledala slika umesanosti izraela, napisah to u prethodnom postu, za pocetak je sasvim dovoljno analizirati sve vojne napade izraela u siriji u prptekle tri godine. takodje, ako se ima vremena onda analizirati i politicke stavove.

Edited January 20, 2015 by Bane5

[Prospero]

dobro, u smislu da nije bilo bitnijih problema, ali ne tako dobro kao sa egiptom ili posle libijom npr,

 

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mn_4IuNf1jE

[barrcode]

Yemen President held captive by shiite rebels, AP reports.

 

Sve zalivske zemlje zatvoriše ambasade. Verovatno će Saud da interveniše.

[Prospero]

da očekujemo sankcije na saudi naftne kompanije ako to urade?

[Кровавый Пастор]

Saudi imaju ugovor sa zalivskim zemljama na osnovu kog mogu da stite vitalna postrojenja u istim. 

 

Slusajte princa Turkija el Fajsala. 

 

[Muwan]

Sutra u Turskoj dan žalosti

[x500]

Zanimljiva vest, deo opozicije i Asadov rezim ce sesti za sto u Moskvi da pregovaraju.

 

http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/sirijska-oporba-sastaje-se-u-moskvi-prije-pregovora-s-rezimom/797396.aspx

 

Sve lici na veliku farsu :(

[nautilus]

imaju zajednickog, vrlo opasnog neprijatelja. bice tu jos bizarnijih koalicija, promena strana i sve cudnijih medjusobnih mini ratova. i jednima i drugima odgovara neko medjusobno primirje, a kada ISIS bude ugažen ili implodira, opet će se oni mlatiti. nažalost, potrajaće ovo, najviše zato što je preraslo demokratsku pobunu protiv asadovog režima i postalo etnoreligijski rat.

[Bane5]

iako sam pisao stosta u stilu ovoga o cemu govori nautilus i slazem se sa mogucnoscu da se tu svasta izdesava i da se izmesaju karte ipak bih dodao da je vest u naslovu u odnosu na realnost isuvise u raskoraku. ovi sto pricaju sa asadovom delegacijom iza sebe nemaju nijednog borca na terenu, a oni koji ne pricaju sa njim iza sebe imaju ~150000 (mahom sunita) i zbog toga je sama vest i ceo taj razgovor prakticno besmislen.

Edited January 26, 2015 by Bane5

[hazard]

Један оф, какав је био однос Тита и шиита? Зна ли ко? Како је стајала Југа са Ираном до Исламске револуције, а како после?

Пошто смо са Арапима, па и оним екстремнијим тог доба, били у јако добрим односима. 

 

Prodavali oruzije opusteno i jednima i drugima, i tok dok su medjusobno ratovali (Iran - Irak)

[Anduril]

Zanimljiv tekst o trendovima u Saudi-iranskim odnosima:

 

 

 

By Yoel Guzansky and Sigurd Neubauer

January 28, 2015

 

This might be the year that changes everything in the Middle East. The reason: a possible thaw in Saudi Arabian–Iranian relations.

 

Several factors led to this moment. First is the election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran in August 2013. Since elected, Rouhani has initiated a charm offensive aimed at reducing tensions between Tehran and several of its Arab Gulf neighbors. Iran's foreign minister even arrived in the kingdom for a rare visit to the regional rival, bringing condolences after the death of King Abdullah.

 

Then there this the interim nuclear agreement, which undermined the kingdom’s standing as the region’s de facto powerhouse and raised Iran’s stature as a rising international power. Next came the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) tromping through Iraq and Syria, a threat to both Iran and Saudi Arabia and its conservative Wahhabi clerical establishment. Meanwhile, apparent U.S. fatigue with the Middle East left the Gulf countries without much U.S. support. And, recognizing Iran’s superior position, they had no choice but to start making nice with Iran.

 

And, finally, there is the successsion of a new Saudi King to the throne.

 

However, despite the emergence of shared interests, including defeating ISIS, it is unrealistic to expect that all this will translate into an immediate thaw in Saudi-Iranian relations, given the hostility that has accumulated since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the strategic considerations that will still guide the two countries.

 

BAD HISTORY

 

For a long time, Saudi-Iranian relations had been worsening by the year. For the Sunni Arab monarchies, the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran was galling; with his poisonous rhetoric, he constantly reminded his neighbors of Iran’s hegemonic goals. The Arab Spring, which seemed to undermine the old Middle Eastern political and sectarian balance, heightened tensions. Not helping matters was Tehran’s support for Syria’s embattled Bashar al-Assad regime and for the former Nouri al-Maliki regime in Iraq. By late last year, Iran and its allies seemed to have the upper hand in both countries, as well as in Lebanon and Yemen.

 

While officially maintaining cordial relations with Tehran, Saudi Arabia worked behind the scenes to rein in Iran’s influence. Saudi Arabia used soft power and hard currency as part of this effort while deploying its military against real or perceived Iranian involvement in Bahrain and Yemen. For its part, Tehran preferred to maintain cordial relations with Riyadh, too, while trying to undermine its rival through covert attacks, including allegedly attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 2011 and launching targeted cyberattacks against Aramco facilities and Saudi government websites. The two countries also took advantage of the many weak post–Arab Spring governments by fomenting unrest among sectarian minorities.

 

Things began to change immediately following the election of Rouhani. The new leader began a campaign to end Iran’s regional and international isolation­­ and, especially, the economic sanctions on the country. He did so by trying to drive a wedge between the country’s enemies and reduce tensions between Iran and several of the Gulf states.

 

First, he exploited existing differences between some of the smaller Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to prevent them from forming a united front against Iran by attempting to convince them that times are changing and they are better off having good relations with Iran. The main goal was to isolate Saudi Arabia, which is Iran’s most significant ideological and religious competitor, the main sponsor of Iran’s enemies across the world, and the only country in the Gulf region with the economic and military wherewithal to take on the Islamic Republic.

 

At the same time, it was important for Iran to change its negative image, and for that, the country had to grow closer, albeit in a restrained way, to the Arab Gulf countries. The Iranian charm offensive included several visits abroad by the Iranian president and foreign minister, interviews and articles placed in Gulf media outlets, statements about the need for unity and cooperation in the Muslim world, and even a series of trade and tourism agreements with several countries in the region.

 

To be sure, these efforts were somewhat undermined by the ongoing nuclear negotiations, which struck fears of a nuclear Iran throughout the region. Just before Iran and the P5+1 negotiators signed the interim nuclear agreement in late 2013, which was extended again in late 2014, Tehran attempted to ease the tension. In an article in a pan-Arab newspaper, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called on his neighbors to build a new regional order free from external intervention. “The presence of foreign forces has historically resulted in domestic instability within the countries hosting them,” he wrote, “and exacerbated the existing tensions between these countries and other regional states.” Since U.S. bases in the Gulf are seen as the main barrier to Iranian hegemony in the region, his words didn’t go over quite as well as he might have hoped. Of course, the Arab monarchies did not deviate from their strategy of taking a moderate and restrained official position.

 

STRIKE A DEAL

 

The Sunni and Arab states were thrown together once more thanks to developments in Syria and Iraq. By now, many in the Gulf are worried that the rebels will not be able to defeat Assad, which might lead Riyadh to strike a deal with Iran (and Assad’s other patron, Russia) on Syria’s political future. Rapprochement between the leader of the Sunni front and the leader of the Shiite front may also affect the situation in Iraq. Meanwhile, quiet coordination between Saudi Arabia and Iran has already led to the election of a new prime minister in Iraq and could also help in the fight against ISIS.

 

The Gulf monarchies are anxiously following ISIS’ land grab. As long as the organization was just menacing Iraq, and Iran was stretching its resources thin in order to fight it, Gulf countries were happy. But now that the organization is increasingly threatening Arab states’ own interests, including Saudi Arabia’s own territory, and Iran is coordinating with the United States in the battle, the picture has changed. The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, might want to tacitly (and tactically) cooperate with Iran to make sure that the radical ISIS crosses no further borders. The two countries have proven in the past that they are pragmatic and willing to adjust their positions when required by the circumstances.

 

Accordingly, at the meeting between Zarif and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the sidelines of the September 2014 UN Security Council session, Zarif heralded “a new page in relations between the two countries.” Faisal was more cautious, focusing his remarks on the need to join forces against ISIS, noting, “We believe we must avoid the errors of the past to successfully confront the current crisis.”

 

At high-level talks about ISIS, however, discussions of oil prices seem to have interfered. A two-day meeting hosted by Oman in December 2014 reportedly broke up in acrimony, with Saudi and Iranian delegates at odds over the slump in oil prices. The current price plunge has been driven by Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s dominant power. Although it is true that Riyadh’s energy policy partially responds to the fracking revolution in North America, the greater motivation is, perhaps, breaking Iran’s will and, with it, putting a brake on its regional ambitions. A number of Saudi decision-makers seem to believe that the oil price drop is therefore serving the kingdom’s interests by hurting the already battered Iranian economy.

 

TENTATIVE PEACE

 

Iran and Saudi Arabia have adopted mixed foreign policies that include elements of both cooperation and conflict. With this approach, they can slowly improve relations across the Gulf while also maintaining their regional might. The two new-old partners have a long road to travel before they reach a historic reconciliation. For now, the Arab Gulf states fear that Iran has the upper hand, which is pushing them to tread carefully. That sentiment could last for the long term, especially if Iran’s star continues to rise. Although chances do not seem high at the present time, even the half cooperation that such fear would engender could help resolve some of the region’s most tangled conflicts.

[iDemo]

Vizionar

 

 

 

"Kada je vođen rat za Irak, rečeno je, kada se Irak demokratizuje, on će biti podeljen na tri demokratske provincije, od kojih će se jedna zvati "Dizel", druga "Bezolovni", a treća "Regular", rekao je Simić. 

On je procenio da će verovatno i "demokratska Libija na sličan način biti ustrojena".

 

 

http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/svet.php?yyyy=2011&mm=08&dd=23&nav_id=536852

[Eraserhead]

Je li moze neko od znalaca da mi kaze zasto u Maroku nije doslo do desavanja naroda?

[MancMellow]

Je li moze neko od znalaca da mi kaze zasto u Maroku nije doslo do desavanja naroda?

 

pa zasto bi doslo do arapskog proleca u ne-arapskoj zemlji?  -_-  ^_^

 

nisam neki znalac, ali...stabilna monarhija, pri tom lukavpametan vladar/vladari koji povremeno vrse nekakve politicke reforme, jedno od "najkvalitetnijih" kolonijalnih nasledja (ne skacite sad :D), realno vekovima vec nemaju veze sa bliskim istokom, bitan, i sad vec istorijski, americki saveznik, relativno diverzifikovana ekonomija sa naglaskom na usluge...lepa zemlja :D

[bigvlada]

Oni će imati problem ako Polisario front dobije podršku od bilo koga. U pitanju je pokret otpora za oslobođenje Zapadne Sahare. Marokanski zid se ne razlikuje od izraelskog. Inače, mi priznajemo Zapadnu Saharu. :)