Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Anduril]

I kalifat moze da ima vodju - kalif personifikuje univerzalnog islamskog vodju dok je emir samo princ/vojni komandant nasledne teritorije.

 

ISIS ima globalne pretenzije sa sve borcima iz Evrope tako da je cilj svakako kalifat.

 

Inace, ove slike i strimovi streljanja irackih zarobljenika su neverovatni. Sistani bi trebalo da se pobrine i ukloni Malikija koji je najveci krivac za ovu situaciju. Sahvu koju su Amerikanci uspostavili je trebalo integrisati.

Irak ocigledno moze da funkcionise samo kao federacija izmejdu kurdskog, siitskog i sunitskog dela sa mehanizmom podele vlasti a ne kroz vladavinu siitske vecine. Slicno vazi i za Siriju.

[Bane5]

MIslim da oni (ISIS konkretno) sa razlogom vode svoju (nazovimo je tako) politicku platformu ka stvaranju emirata tj. oni svoje vodje nazivaju emirima. Iz verovatno nekoliko razloga zasto to cine, moguce je da je jedan od odgovora u tome sto na taj nacin ne objedinjavaju i neku drzavnu (nazovimo je tako) i versku titulu u isto vreme vec se stvaraju vladari i vodje iz vojnih formacija koji nuzno ne nose versku funkciju, ali svim silama uteruju rigidno (i izopaceno) tumacenje iste.

Edited June 15, 2014 by Bane5

[Roger Sanchez]

Koliko ja čuem, Abu Bakra su počeli svi nazivati Amir al-Muminin, dakle, ne emir nekog određenog emirata, nego vođa vjernika. To je kalifska titula, a svojedobno se tako prozvao i Muhammad Omar.

[Anduril]

Da, to je to. Emir polazi od starog znacenja titule komandanta/Amir koja se koristi od drugog kalifa Umara. Zanimljivost je da upravo Umara Sija vise ne priznaje za kalifa i tu pocinje razvod od Sunita.

[Filipenko]

Tal Afar u rukama Isisa. Sada stvarno imaju kontinualnu teritoriju Iraka i Sirije.

[Paul]

amerikanci razmisljaju o saradnji sa iranom...bokte, jos ce se okrenut i asadu :D

[WTF]

amerikanci razmisljaju o saradnji sa iranom...bokte, jos ce se okrenut i asadu :D

 

Avijacija I dronovi ovde ne pomazu.  Tu su potrebne "boots on the ground", a USA se tek skoro izvukla odatle.

[Anduril]

Avijacija I dronovi ovde ne pomazu.  Tu su potrebne "boots on the ground", a USA se tek skoro izvukla odatle.

Nisam tako siguran. One ISIS pickup kolone vozila po pustinji su najlaksa meta na svetu.

[WTF]

Nisam tako siguran. One ISIS pickup kolone vozila po pustinji su najlaksa meta na svetu.

Jesu lake mete, ali problem je sto se ne vozikaju oni samo po pustinji okolo naokolo.  Koliko ja vidim, oni drze citave gradove i podrucja.

[Budja]

Jesu lake mete, ali problem je sto se ne vozikaju oni samo po pustinji okolo naokolo.  Koliko ja vidim, oni drze citave gradove i podrucja.

 

Ali brojevi su prilicno mali, za Mosul se govorilo o 800 vojnika ili tako nesto.

 

Koliko efektivno oni mogu da drze teritorije ako im se presertnu konvoj ili dva i ubiju 100-200 vojnika?

[borris_]

Ne drze oni sami te teritorije. Kako sam shvatio lokalci u Mosulu i tim krajevima vise vole njih nego Iracku armiju i zahvljujuci tome su i uspjeli osvojiti drugi Iracki grad.

Bagdad je prevelik zalogaj za njih.

[Lord Protector]

Josh Rogin

www.thedailybeast.com

America's Allies Are Funding ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), now threatening Baghdad, was funded for years by wealthy donors in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, three U.S. allies that have dual agendas in the war on terror.

The extremist group that is threatening the existence of the Iraqi state was built and grown for years with the help of elite donors from American supposed allies in the Persian Gulf region. There, the threat of Iran, Assad, and the Sunni-Shiite sectarian war trumps the U.S. goal of stability and moderation in the region.

It’s an ironic twist, especially for donors in Kuwait (who, to be fair, back a wide variety of militias). ISIS has aligned itself with remnants of the Baathist regime once led by Saddam Hussein. Back in 1990, the U.S. attacked Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait from Hussein’s clutches. Now Kuwait is helping the rise of his successors.

As ISIS takes over town after town in Iraq, they are acquiring money and supplies including American made vehicles, arms, and ammunition. The group reportedly scored $430 million this week when they looted the main bank in Mosul. They reportedly now have a stream of steady income sources, including from selling oil in the Northern Syrian regions they control, sometimes directly to the Assad regime.

But in the years they were getting started, a key component of ISIS’s support came from wealthy individuals in the Arab Gulf States of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Sometimes the support came with the tacit nod of approval from those regimes; often, it took advantage of poor money laundering protections in those states, according to officials, experts, and leaders of the Syrian opposition, which is fighting ISIS as well as the regime.

“Everybody knows the money is going through Kuwait and that it’s coming from the Arab Gulf,” said Andrew Tabler, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. “Kuwait’s banking system and its money changers have long been a huge problem because they are a major conduit for money to extremist groups in Syria and now Iraq.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been publicly accusing Saudi Arabia and Qatar of funding ISIS for months. Several reports have detailed how private Gulf funding to various Syrian rebel groups has splintered the Syrian opposition and paved the way for the rise of groups like ISIS and others.“The U.S. has made the case as strongly as they can to regional countries, including Kuwait. But ultimately when you take a hands off, leading from behind approach to things, people don’t take you seriously and they take matters into their own hands.”

Gulf donors support ISIS, the Syrian branch of al Qaeda called the al Nusrah Front, and other Islamic groups fighting on the ground in Syria because they feel an obligation to protect Sunnis suffering under the atrocities of the Assad regime. Many of these backers don’t trust or like the American backed moderate opposition, which the West has refused to provide significant arms to.

Under significant U.S. pressure, the Arab Gulf governments have belatedly been cracking down on funding to Sunni extremist groups, but Gulf regimes are also under domestic pressure to fight in what many Sunnis see as an unavoidable Shiite-Sunni regional war that is only getting worse by the day.

“ISIS is part of the Sunni forces that are fighting Shia forces in this regional sectarian conflict. They are in an existential battle with both the (Iranian aligned) Maliki government and the Assad regime,” said Tabler. “The U.S. has made the case as strongly as they can to regional countries, including Kuwait. But ultimately when you take a hands off, leading from behind approach to things, people don’t take you seriously and they take matters into their own hands.”

Donors in Kuwait, the Sunni majority Kingdom on Iraq’s border, have taken advantage of Kuwait’s weak financial rules to channel hundreds of millions of dollars to a host of Syrian rebel brigades, according to a December 2013 report by The Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank that receives some funding from the Qatari government.

“Over the last two and a half years, Kuwait has emerged as a financing and organizational hub for charities and individuals supporting Syria’s myriad rebel groups,” the report said. “Today, there is evidence that Kuwaiti donors have backed rebels who have committed atrocities and who are either directly linked to al-Qa’ida or cooperate with its affiliated brigades on the ground.”

Kuwaiti donors collect funds from donors in other Arab Gulf countries and the money often travels through Turkey or Jordan before reaching its Syrian destination, the report said. The governments of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have passed laws to curb the flow of illicit funds, but many donors still operate out in the open. The Brookings paper argues the U.S. government needs to do more.

“The U.S. Treasury is aware of this activity and has expressed concern about this flow of private financing. But Western diplomats’ and officials’ general response has been a collective shrug,” the report states.

When confronted with the problem, Gulf leaders often justify allowing their Salafi constituents to fund Syrian extremist groups by pointing back to what they see as a failed U.S. policy in Syria and a loss of credibility after President Obama reneged on his pledge to strike Assad after the regime used chemical weapons.

That’s what Prince Bandar bin Sultan, head of Saudi intelligence since 2012 and former Saudi ambassador in Washington, reportedly told Secretary of State John Kerry when Kerry pressed him on Saudi financing of extremist groups earlier this year. Saudi Arabia has retaken a leadership role in past months guiding help to the Syrian armed rebels, displacing Qatar, which was seen as supporting some of the worst of the worst organizations on the ground.

The rise of ISIS, a group that officially broke with al Qaeda core last year, is devastating for the moderate Syrian opposition, which is now fighting a war on two fronts, severely outmanned and outgunned by both extremist groups and the regime. There is increasing evidence that Assad is working with ISIS to squash the Free Syrian Army.

But the Syrian moderate opposition is also wary of confronting the Arab Gulf states about their support for extremist groups. The rebels are still competing for those governments’ favor and they are dependent on other types of support from Arab Gulf countries. So instead, they blame others—the regimes in Tehran and Damascus, for examples—for ISIS’ rise.


“The Iraqi State of Iraq and the [sham] received support from Iran and the Syrian intelligence,” said Hassan Hachimi, Head of Political Affairs for the United States and Canada for Syrian National Coalition, at the Brookings U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha this week.

“There are private individuals in the Gulf that do support extremist groups there,” along with other funding sources, countered Mouaz Moustafa, executive director of the Syrian Emergency Task Force, a Syrian-American organization that supports the opposition “[The extremist groups] are the most well-resourced on the ground… If the United States and the international community better resourced [moderate] battalions… then many of the people will take that option instead of the other one.”

 

[Anduril]

Nista novo. Mada, pravo pitanje je sta bi KSA a posebno Katar (gde je americka baza koja ih stiti od KSA) radili kada ne bi bili saveznici SAD. Poslednjih godina imamo zahladjenje na toj relaciji pa je finansiranje ISIS-a i slicnih grupa mozda i simptom toga sa sve precutnom podrskom Izraela. Pravi problem za KSA i Izrael ostaje Iran. SAD ce verovatno vise slediti politiku balansiranja izmedju zavadjenih lokalnih igraca sa ciljem da se spreci neki veliki rat ali bez dovoljno snage i volje da spreci ove manje, hronicne sukobe.

[Bane5]

Charles Lister u svom tekstu o poslednjim dogadjajima u Iraku:

 

The Iraq-Syria border is therefore increasingly immaterial -- conflict on both sides of the border has become inherently interconnected. As the only group genuinely operating on both sides of it, ISIS maintains an overarching strategy (aimed toward establishing a unitary Islamic State and the Levant), whereby operations in Syria and Iraq feed off one another. Considering recent events and its march to Baghdad, this objective might not be so inconceivable.

But beware of coming to too simplistic a conclusion. ISIS' self-interested pursuit of its absolutist ideals has made it countless enemies in Syria, and it will face huge challenges to avoid a similar fate in Iraq. Nonetheless, whatever its fate, ISIS represents a formidable force with an ever growing membership.

This latest offensive is arguably the most significant event in Sunni jihadism since 9/11. Having already challenged al Qaeda's ideological legitimacy, ISIS has now underlined its perceived military superiority to a receptive younger and more fanatical generation of potential recruits around the world.

While al Qaeda and its affiliates are embracing a more patient locally focused strategy, ISIS manifests a determination for rapid, dramatic results. It's certainly just shown these in Iraq. But whether this will prove a more effective long-term strategy remains to be seen.

 

[Paul]

Avijacija I dronovi ovde ne pomazu.  Tu su potrebne "boots on the ground", a USA se tek skoro izvukla odatle.