Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Indy]

Ne mogu da verujem u šta se ovaj (nekad fenomenalan) topik pretvorio.

Otprilike prati sudbinu samog "5-og oktobra u arapskom svetu".

[dillinger]

Sta je to "hizbali".

[Zaz_pi]

A zasto Americi smeta Iran? Da ga nema morali bi ga izmisliti.

Zato sto Iran ima zelju da dominira u islamskom svetu a time da kontrolise naftu. Hoce da potisnu KSA iz igre kao glavnog igraca(nemoj zaboraviti da Iran ima velike rezerve nafte i gasa, sa sitskim Irakom najvece u OPEC rezerve nafte i sa Rusijom najvece rezerve gasa u svetu). Kada je pao Breton-Vuds sistem pocetkom '70ih, kada je Nikson, odbacio vezivanje $ za zlato, i kada su SAD 1970 su dozivele vrhunac proizvodnje nafte na svojoj teritoriji, tacno kako je Hibert predvideo, KSA je uskocila kao neko ko je nametnuo za SAD $ kao sredstvo placanje za naftu, zato se i $ jos zove petro-$. Na taj nacin SAD drze $ kao svetsku rezervnu valutu. Prica je mnogo veca od same price o uvozu/izvozu nafte. Zasniva se na bogatstvu SAD, a dobrim delom, celog Zapada. Zato Amerikanci imaju gomilu baza u Zalivu i citavu flotu. Cak i da SAD pocnu da proizvode kompletno naftu za svoje potrebe, a nece, opet bi morali da kontrolisu taj region zbog $.Iran sredinom '80ih nije bio isklucivo protiv SAD. Postojala je afera Iran-Contra Reganove adminsitracije, ne i samog Regana. Mislim da nesto slicno vazi za Bengazi i Obamu. Elem, tada je CIA imala Crnu operaciju da prodaje oruzje Iranu pod americkim sankcijama, mislim da nisu bili ni zarobljeni u ambasadi u Teheranu pusteni, barem ne svi, da bi se od novca zaradjenog od prodaje oruzja Iranu, pazi sada, korisitio za pomoc paravojnim Contras u Nikaragvi protiv vlade Sandinista. Ovo nije nikakva zavera, bilo je nekoliko istraga Kongresa itd.-Iran–Contra affair. Cesto je pominje Jon Stewart u svojim humoristickim emisijama, barem u poslednje vreme, kada zeli da ismeje GOP zbog svoje poltiike.

It was planned that Israel would ship weapons to Iran, and then the United States would resupply Israel and receive the Israeli payment. The Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages. The plan deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, in which members of the executive branch sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the American hostages. Large modifications to the plan were devised by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council in late 1985, in which a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales was diverted to fund anti-Sandinista and anti-communist rebels, or Contras, in Nicaragua

PS Neki ljudi iz afere Iran-Contra su imali zanimljive uloge u Rusiji '90ih, ali to je delimicno druga prica iako se svodi na pokusaj kontrole resursa. Edited June 18, 2013 by Zaz_pi

[borris_]

Ovo je reportaza koju je napravila France 2 u Alepu. Na kraju je i voditelj morao da doda da je ovo situacija samo u alepu i da ne znaci da je svugdje tako (skoroo pa se izvinjavao). Na francuskom je.http://www.francetvinfo.fr/video-la-radicalisation-islamique-dans-la-ville-d-alep-conquise-par-les-rebelles_334972.html

[Roger Sanchez]

Ovo je reportaza koju je napravila France 2 u Alepu. Na kraju je i voditelj morao da doda da je ovo situacija samo u alepu i da ne znaci da je svugdje tako (skoroo pa se izvinjavao). Na francuskom je.http://www.francetvi...les_334972.html

Hizballah drži takav režim u suradnji sa Assadovcima već 20 godina. U čemu je problem? Ili ono što je Assadu loše u Alepu dobro mu je bilo u Sidonu ili dolini Bekaa?

[Roger Sanchez]

A zasto Americi smeta Iran? Da ga nema morali bi ga izmisliti.

Onog trenutka kada Iran dobije deployable nukelarno oružje, Bliski Istok se korijenito mijenja, Izraelov neobjavljeni deterrent ne vrijedi više kao prije, a možda će ga morati i konačno javno objaviti. Sve Sunni države koje si mogu priuštiti tražiti će bombu bezuvjetno, na čelu s KSA. I dobili smo opasni miks naftnih polja o kojima ovisi USA i nuklearne trke u naoružanju s potencijalom da neko nekome zaista spiči bombu nad grad ili rafineriju, 1000 km od Europe.

[borris_]

Problem je sto ogromna vecina ljudi (ovo je subjektivna procjena iz razgovora i citanja foruma) ovdje u francuskoj ne zele da francuska drzava saradjuje sa takvim pobunjenicima. I to usprkos svim medijima i vladi koji mjesecima pokusavaju da nam prodaju pricu o demokratskim nastrojenim pobunjenicima.Ovdje smo se jedanput opekli sa Libijom, pa je fr vojska morala da intervenise u Maliju.

Edited June 18, 2013 by borris_

[Roger Sanchez]

Taj dio ja shvaćam potpuno. Mislim da bi svi radije da uđu u ring i da se pokrljaju lokalni sufleri i treneri boksača u ringu, ali oni vole ostati izvan žice.Jedino što ne želim prihvatiti je opravdavanje režima sirijskog ogranka Baath-a ovime ili onime - sve ovo ludilo, nasilje, ponižavanje i smaknuća oni su već davno patentirali, isprobali i izrabili, islamisti ih samo imitiraju.

[Indy]

Onog trenutka kada Iran dobije deployable nukelarno oružje, Bliski Istok se korijenito mijenja...

Ne misle svi tako. (Niti mislim da je izvesno da oni uopste rade na tome).

[dillinger]

Ne postoji bomba, niti diktatura* niti bilo kakva druga pošast koja je veća pretnja po bezbednost ljudi i na Bliskom istoku i u Evropi, od salafijskog džihada.Ko tvrdi suprotno nije baš pri sebi ili ima neku skrivenu računicu.*izuzev one u Rijadu, naravno.

Edited June 18, 2013 by dillinger

[Roger Sanchez]

Za Izrael salafijski đihad ne predstavlja veću prijetnju za sigurnost nego npr intifada. A na granici Izraela interes SAD za sigurnošću ljudi na Bliskom istoku prestaje. Ostaje još briga za sigurnost energecke infrastrukture, koje čini mi se i dalje kvalitetno čuva vahabijska monarhija. Među ostalim i izvozeći đihadije i rat izvan i dalje od svojih granica.

Edited June 18, 2013 by Roger Sanchez

[dillinger]

Za interes države Izrael na okupiranim teritorijama, kao i naftnih magnate me, da prostiš, zabole. I ne samo mene već verujem i mnoge obične građane Francuske, Nemačke, BiH, Libana, Iraka...

[Budja]

Za Izrael salafijski đihad ne predstavlja veću prijetnju za sigurnost nego npr intifada. A na granici Izraela interes SAD za sigurnošću ljudi na Bliskom istoku prestaje. Ostaje još briga za sigurnost energecke infrastrukture, koje čini mi se i dalje kvalitetno čuva vahabijska monarhija. Među ostalim i izvozeći đihadije i rat izvan i dalje od svojih granica.

Malo je to kratkovido, koliko se videlo po Avganistanu i 9/11. Nije taj izvoz dzihada van granica cost-free za Ujka Sema.

[Lord Protector]

Malo je to kratkovido, koliko se videlo po Avganistanu i 9/11. Nije taj izvoz dzihada van granica cost-free za Ujka Sema.

Kad se otme kontroli postaće godzila. Edited June 18, 2013 by slow

[Prospero]

Jihadis in SyriaA Salafi shindigJun 18th 2013, 11:14 by S.B. CAIRO AND TUNISAMERICA is apparently not alone in thinking the Syrian opposition to President Bashar Assad could do with a helping hand. On June 13th, as the White House announced its decision to send military aid to Syrian rebels, Sunni clerics at a Salafi get-together in Cairo called on their co-religionists to send “money and arms” to Syria and “pursue all forms of jihad” against the regime. Days earlier, Yussef Qaradawi, a firebrand Egyptian preacher, based in Doha, the Qatari capital, urged Sunnis to go to Syria to fight not only Mr Assad, but his Shia allies Iran and Hizbullah, Lebanon’s party-cum-militia, too.The rate at which foreign fighters, both seasoned jihadis and inexperienced young men, have headed for Syria eclipses that of recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen; and rivals the pull of the battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and that against American-led forces in Iraq in the last decade. Exact numbers are not available, but they have been growing steadily since the start of the conflict, and some say there has been a big jump since the latter half of last year. Turkish flights from Istanbul to Antakya, the entry point to Syria, are something of a jihadi express—though men now travel with women to avoid arousing suspicion from the authorities. Salafi networks from Chechnya to Jordan, Brussels to Tunis arrange the logistics for fighters to transit into the country. Most, but not all, fight with Jabhat al-Nusra, an extremist group with links to al-Qaeda. There are brigades led by Chechens and Libyans.European authorities, worried by increasing numbers of home-grown jihadis joining the cause, have picked up those who return from fighting in Syria. But other governments are doing little to deter their citizens. In Egypt, President Muhammad Morsi’s administration appeared to give the green light to would-be fighters on June 13th when Khaled al-Qazzaz, a presidential adviser, said they would not be prosecuted on returning home. Egyptians are the fourth most numerous foreign contingent in Syria, according to a sample study of 280 fighters co-authored by Aaron Zelin, a Washington-based jihadi-watcher. Libyans and Saudi Arabians are in abundance, as they were in Iraq. Tunisians, having overthrown their own dictator, are flocking in large numbers.A newer phenomenon is the pull Mr Assad is exerting on foreign Shia fighters, although they hail from fewer countries. Hizbullah battled openly alongside Syrian troops for the first time to take back the town of Qusayr on June 5th. Iraqi Shias are reported to be increasingly flocking to Mr Assad’s side. A handful of fighters are revolutionaries, but most preachers across the region rally fighters by referring explicitly to their apparent oppression by the other Muslim sect, rather than appealing to a political cause. The sectarian aspect of the conflict, which remains, at base, a disgruntled people’s struggle against a dictatorial regime, is growing ever more entrenched, and exacerbating sectarian tensions in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq.This all adds to President Barack Obama's unease at the prospect of sending military aid to rebels. He hopes to arm moderate groups to empower them at the expense of the extremists. But the difficulty of ensuring weapons do not fall into the wrong hands could mean risking inadvertently supporting fighters considered enemies. The growing jihadi presence in Syria makes the question of helping moderate rebels ever more pressing, and ever more difficult, too. In the meantime, fighters on both sides are successfully whittling down their numbers without the need for drone strikes of the type America carries out against al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. Hizbullah is reckoned to have lost scores of men in Syria; and Abdulaziz al-Jughayman, a Saudi former professor who had fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kashmir, is one of dozens of jihadis to have died in the conflict.