Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Lord Protector]

Ovo u Siriji kao španski građanski rat 36-te. Internacionalne brigade sunita protiv šiitskog Franka i njegovih falangi. Kao što je i tad bilo dobrovoljaca sa ovih prostora ima ih i sada.

Edited May 18, 2013 by slow

[nautilus]

nidje veze

[Lord Protector]

kako za koga

[Filipenko]

Za one koji u panici svuda vide komuniste, moguće.

[Indy]

Mozda ce i slow u dobrovoljce.

[Zaz_pi]

Tacno, kako za koga. Oko 70% SAA cine Suniti. Asma al-Asad, zena Basarova, je sunit. Mada je ona mnogo zanimljivija po svom obrazovanju i gde je radila pre nego sto je postala zena Basarova, a i lepoti. ;)Financial Times je pre dva dana imao tekst na temu ko gura pricu oko Sirije, kao i razlozi za unutrasnje sukobe na strani opozicije:

Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and armsThe gas-rich state of Qatar has spent as much as $3bn over the past two years supporting the rebellion in Syria, far exceeding any other government, but is now being nudged aside by Saudi Arabia as the prime source of arms to rebels.The cost of Qatar’s intervention, its latest push to back an Arab revolt, amounts to a fraction of its international investment portfolio. But its financial support for the revolution that has turned into a vicious civil war dramatically overshadows western backing for the opposition.In dozens of interviews with the Financial Times conducted in recent weeks, rebel leaders both abroad and within Syria as well as regional and western officials detailed Qatar’s role in the Syrian conflict, a source of mounting controversy.The small state with a gargantuan appetite is the biggest donor to the political opposition, providing generous refugee packages to defectors (one estimate puts it at $50,000 a year for a defector and his family) and has provided vast amounts of humanitarian support.In September, many rebels in Syria’s Aleppo province received a one-off payment of $150 courtesy of Qatar. Sources close to the Qatari government say total spending has reached as much as $3bn, while rebel and diplomatic sources put the figure at $1bn at most.For Qatar, owner of the world’s third-largest gas reserves, its intervention in Syria is part of an aggressive quest for global recognition and is merely the latest chapter in its attempt to establish itself as a major player in the region, following its backing of Libya’s rebels who overthrew Muammer Gaddafi in 2011.According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks arms transfers, Qatar has sent the most weapons deliveries to Syria, with more than 70 military cargo flights into neighbouring Turkey between April 2012 and March this year.But though its approach is driven more by pragmatism and opportunism, than ideology, Qatar has become entangled in the polarised politics of the region, setting off scathing criticism. “You can’t buy a revolution,” says an opposition businessman.Qatar’s support for Islamist groups in the Arab world, which puts it at odds with its peers in the Gulf states, has fuelled rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar’s ruling emir, “wants to be the Arab world’s Islamist (Gamal) Abdelnasser”, said an Arab politician, referring to Egypt’s fiery late president and devoted pan-Arab leader.Qatar’s intervention is coming under mounting scrutiny. Regional rivals contend it is using its financial firepower simply to buy future influence and that it has ended up splintering Syria’s opposition. Against this backdrop Saudi Arabia, which until now has been a more deliberate backer of Syria’s rebels, has stepped up its involvement.Recent tensions over the opposition’s election of an interim prime minister who won the support of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood has also driven Saudi Arabia to tighten its relationship to the political opposition, a job it had largely left in the hands of Qatar.The relegation of Qatar to second place in providing weapons follows concern in the West and among other Arab states that weapons it supplies could fall into the hands of an al-Qaeda-linked group, Jabhat al-Nusrah.Diplomats also say the Qataris have had trouble securing a steady supply of arms, something the Saudis have been able to do via their more developed networks.A supply route across Jordan’s border to southern Syria has opened up in recent months. The Jordanian government, which is terrified of jihadis getting the upper hand in its neighbour, has been reluctantly allowing Saudi deliveries.The west’s reluctance to intervene more forcefully in Syria has all but left Bashar al-Assad’s opponents reliant for support on Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey though since late last year, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan have joined the rebels’ backers as junior partners.Khalid al-Attiyah, Qatar’s state minister for foreign affairs, who handles its Syrian policy, dismissed talk of rivalry with the Saudis and denied allegations that Qatar’s support for the rebels has splintered Syria’s opposition and weakened nascent institutions.In an interview with the Financial Times, he said every move Qatar has made has been in conjunction with the Friends of Syria group of Arab and western nations, not alone. “Our problem in Qatar is that we don’t have a hidden agenda so people start fixing you one,” he said

Pepe Eskobar je u Asia Times pisao da sukob Katar-KSA, u stvari, ima veze sa transportom prirodnog gasa.

[Lord Protector]

Mozda ce i slow u dobrovoljce.

Bilo bi cool da postanem šiitski José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Edited May 18, 2013 by slow

[Zaz_pi]

Eto, na taj nacin i suniti sa Balkana odlaze u Siriju. Uz pomoc Katara, S. Arabije i mreza njihovih NVO i raznih drugih sponzorstava koje su napravili medju Muslimanima na Balkanu. Ljudi placaju dobrovoljce, plus radikalni islam. To je to. Preko novca se kupuje i podrska u odredjenim zemljama na Zapadu. Narocito pogodjenim krizom i koje zavise od spekulativnog kapitala. ;) I, da, dobrim delom se slazem sa Topolom, to je potencijalna bomba na ovom prostoru.Basar treba da demokratizuje zemlju i ode. Problem je sto pricu, iza scene. vuku najgori od najgorih. Apsolutisticke monarhije koje imaju manje demokratije od Sirije. A, po svemu sudeci, to ima veze, najvise, sa zaradom. :)

[Bane5]

"internacionalne" ratnike skupljaju uglavnom radikalne islamske milicije i oni dolaze iz naralzičitijih drzava sveta.sada ne mogu da nađem tvit jednog stranog novinara (inače bi ga linkovao) koji je na ulazu u jednu osvojenu bazu kod alepa video somalijce koji se bore na strani jabhat al nusre, ali deluje baš kao upečatljiv primer.to je uglavnom priča radikalnog dela pobunjenika. niko u ovom trenutku nema ni približnu procenu koliko ih je (stranaca).sa druge strane, asada je napustio najveci broj sunita. njegova vojna sila se brzo srozala na taj nivo da on i pored superiornosti u naoružanju nema dovoljno vojske da uradi bio šta konkretnije na terenu - ne samo da skrši pobunu već on mesecima ima problem da obezbedi ključne komunikacije od damaska ka obali npr.tu na scenu stupaju "saveznici". jos prošlog leta bila je aktuelna tema o "turističkom" putovanju pripadnika iranske republikanske garde u okolini damaska (kad su bili zarobljeni).najdirektniju pomoć asadu pruza hezbolah sa više hiljada boraca što je dovelo izrael u stanje velike nervoze. izjava vođe hezbolaha o oružiju koje će dobiti od sirije i koje će promeniti situaciju na bliskom istoku spram izrealskog mešanja je samo deo slike koja prevazilazi priču ovog rata.značajnu pomoć asadu u poslednje vreme stiže i od i šiita iz iraka. nigde nema zvanične objave, ali onda se sve to vidi po sahranama poginulih sa bilo koje strane granicekao reakcija na učešće hezbolaha u sirijskom ratu, suniti iz libana regrutuju svoje borce da se u siriji bore protiv hezbolaha. na ključnom mestu sukoba između pobunjenika i asadovih snaga i njegovih saveznika u homsu prema nekoj labavoj proceni je par stotina sunita iz libana na strani pobunjenika.sve to je samo jedan mali krug unutar velikog koji gura ovaj rat. tu su i kurdi, palestinci, turska koja i direktno i indirektno trpi puno, jordan koji je zatrpan izbeglicama...sukob koji je počeo gušenjem demonstracija, prešao u rat kroz borbu dezertera iz nekadašnje vojske sirije (mahom sunita) protiv asadovih snaga, sada se pretvorio u poligon gde se vodi bar još nekoliko sukoba (ratova) na račun sirije.

Edited May 18, 2013 by Bane5

[Lord Protector]

Military situation in Syria (as of 28 April 2013). sa wiki

roze-Controlled by Syrian governmentjebemliga koja boja(oker)-Controlled by Kurdish forceszeleno-Controlled by oppositionugrubo:

Edited May 18, 2013 by slow

[Topola]

...tu na scenu stupaju "saveznici". jos prošlog leta bila je aktuelna tema o "turističkom" putovanju pripadnika iranske republikanske garde u okolini damaska (kad su bili zarobljeni).najdirektniju pomoć asadu pruza hezbolah sa više hiljada boraca što je dovelo izrael u stanje velike nervoze. izjava vođe hezbolaha o oružiju koje će dobiti od sirije i koje će promeniti situaciju na bliskom istoku spram izrealskog mešanja je samo deo slike koja prevazilazi priču ovog rata.značajnu pomoć asadu u poslednje vreme stiže i od i šiita iz iraka....

Dok smo mi na Balkanu, rekao bih, izabrali drugu stranu... Malo ova studentarija iz javnih preduzeca, malo drzavna pomoc (hrvatski transporti oruzja, npr) (Srbija? ne, ne, to rade Hrvati, mi nemamo pojma o cemu je tamo rec...).

[Bane5]

da. zaboravih oruzje, ali vise sam se koncentrisao na 'zivu silu'.pesadijskog oruzja tamo ima ko pleve. manjak je sofisticiranog, ali kako ce se to ludilo tamo nastaviti, ne bi me cudilo da se obe strane dodatno naoruzaju.

[Topola]

A fale i lekari...

[Gandalf]

Dakle, u tekstu koji si kritikovao se nije govorilo samo o Al Kaidi sto si izvadio iz konteksta nego uopste o dzihadistima a Al Kaida je verovatno navedena kao globalno najpoznatiji primer.Prema tome, bombaski napadi i sve drugo sto je navedeno jesu indikacije da su prisutni dzihadisti (i izvan Sirije) a da li je Al Kaida medju njima je manje vazno posto su metodologija i ciljevi slicni.

prvo... opet, dzihadi i Al Kaida nisu isto, a ciljevi im mogu biti i potpuno razliciti.ta distinkicija moze biti jako vazna, jer se u Iraku pokazalo da postoje znacajne razlike izmedju dzihadi i Al Kaide. konkretno - sunitski dzihadi u Iraku su imali sustinski lokalne teznje i potrebe. sto ce reci, vodili su etnicki/verski rat protiv irackih siita i pretpostavljene siitske dominacije u Iraku. AQI (Al Kaida Irak) je pukla kao zvecka onog trenutka kada je sunitskim lokalcima dokurcilo to sto je AQI imala globalne ciljeve i strategiju umerenu prema "dalekom neprijatelju" (aka USA).drugo, gerilci su po definiciji militantni. sirijski drugaciji ne mogu ni biti nakon 2 godine brutalnog gradjanskog rata - to znaci da ce im i metode cesto biti brutalne i/ili ocajnicke. dal' su u pitanju lokalne milicije, nekakvi islamisti, dzihadi, ili Al Kaida... brutalnost je ocekivana u datim okolnostima.a ta konstrukcija o samoubilackim napadima i pobunjenickoj brutalnosti kao nekakvim indikatorima prisustva Al Kaide je obicna kruzna logika = samoubilacki napadi su indikator prisustva Al Kaide, na osnovu toga sto znamo da je Al Kaida aktivna u Siriji. Edited May 21, 2013 by Gandalf

[Gandalf]

Pepe Eskobar je u Asia Times pisao da sukob Katar-KSA, u stvari, ima veze sa transportom prirodnog gasa.

ko o cemu, Eskobar o naftovodima i gasovodima.