Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[Аврам Гојић]

Izgleda da je gradjanski rat u Libanu neminovan. I danas se puca u Bejrutu, a vojska neuspesno poziva milicije da se povuku sa ulica.

[Roger Sanchez]

Predugo traje ovo u Siriji a da se ne bi prelilo.

[Gandalf]

uvek vrhunski, Adam Curtis...http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/10/hes_behind_you.html

[Roger Sanchez]

uvek vrhunski, Adam Curtis...http://www.bbc.co.uk...behind_you.html

Legendo! Oldična iskopina.. imam zamjerke doduše, zaboravio je Čad, egipatsko-libijsku travestiju, stvari koje ge čine malo opasnijim od običnog klauna. opasni klaun.

[Bane5]

Slika od danas iz centra Bani WalidaKao sto se dalo za ocekivati, misracani su resili da ponize svoje 'neprijatelje'. Osim sto su danas usli u Bani Walid i rasterali lokalne grupe zeljne otpora i borbe, postavili su ove velike postere u centru grada.Na slici levo je "covek sa zlatnim pistoljem" Omran Shaaban, jedan od onih koji je medju prvima stigao do Gadafija kada su ga uhvatili - u julu je kidnapovan od strane naoruzanih ljudi iz Bani Walida kada se vracao u Misratu sa istoka Libije. U Bani Walidu su ga mucili, ali je posredstvom Mohammeda Magariefa (jednog od najprominentnijih libijskih politicara danas) pusten. Spasa mu nije bilo jer su povrede bile velike.Na slici desno je Ramadan al-Swehli, borac protiv italijanskog kolinijalizma, heroj Misrate. Ubijen je 1920. ali ne od strane italijana vec izdajom od strane plemena u Bani Walidu i obesen u centru ovog grada. To je bila jedna od istorijskih epizoda koju misracani nikad nisu zaboravili. Uzgred, jedan od glavnih komandanata/vodja iz Misrate je njegov direktni potomak.Tenzije ova dva regiona (olicenih u gradovima) su i na teritoijalnom planu, politickom, a nimalo nisu bez znacaja i socijalne razlike. Na kraju bi dodao i plemnske razlike - na kraju ih stavljam iz razloga sto Varfala zivi sirom Libije iako im je Bani Walid sediste. Varfale ima i u Misrati.

[Roger Sanchez]

Tawergha 2.0 ali opet, malo drukčija od 1.0. Hoće i ovima koji su bježali iz Bani Walida zabraniti da se vrate?U onom videu gdje vade Pukovnika™ iz kanala Omran je u kožnoj jakni, ali uglavnom okrenut leđima.

[Bane5]

nece biti tawerghe, bani walid je prevelik i varfala je jaka i dalje (najvece je pleme u libiji) iako ce uz sirt, bani walid biti najveci gubitnik celog ovog rata i dogadjaja nakon njega. deo stanovnistva je napustio grad, ali je realan scenario da u bani walidu neko vreme bude 'vanredno stanje' koje ce omoguciti da se uzduz i popreko pretrese i pohapsi koga treba.

[Gandalf]

imam zamjerke doduše, zaboravio je Čad, egipatsko-libijsku travestiju, stvari koje ge čine malo opasnijim od običnog klauna. opasni klaun.

rekao bih da se Kertis orijentisao na imidz koji je Gadafi uzivao u Zap. Evropi i SAD, i na predstavu o Gadafiju kao coveku opasnom za potonje. imidz konstruisan zahvaljujuci drzavnoj propagandi i bezazlenim medijima, i zahvaljujuci pukovnikovom egzibicionizmu."pravi" Gadafi, koji je bio stvarna i stalna pretnja samim Libijcima i komsijskim africkim drzavama, je neka druga prica.

[Roger Sanchez]

The California man behind an anti-Muslim film that roiled the Islamic world was sentenced Wednesday to a year in prison for violating his probation stemming from a 2010 bank fraud conviction by lying about his identity.U.S. District Court Judge Christina Snyder immediately sentenced Mark Basseley Youssef after he admitted to four of the eight alleged violations, including obtaining a fraudulent California driver’s license. Prosecutors agreed to drop the other four allegations under an agreement with Youssef’s attorneys, which also included more probation.

[Prospero]

malo wargaminga

War Game: The Hours following an Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructures - The Policies of the Actors and Principal Insights INSS Insight No. 382, November 4, 2012 Dekel, Udi and Lerner, Yonathan The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) held a war game (simulation) focusing on the first 48 hours after an Israeli aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructures.The ScenarioAfter midnight on November 9, al-Jazeera reports that Israeli airplanes have attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities in three waves of attack. As reports multiply, Israel officially announces it has attacked Iran’s nuclear sites because it had no other choice. According to the scenario, Israel did not coordinate the attack with the United States in advance, and only informed the US once the planes were already en route to the Iranian targets. Initial assessments estimate that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back by nearly three years.Following the successful attack, Iran decides to react with maximal force, launching missiles from within its borders and urging its proxies – Hizbollah, Hamas, and other radical elements – to attack Israel. Nonetheless, it is careful to avoid attacking American targets. Israelattempts to contain the attacks and works to attain a state of calm as rapidly as possible. The international community is paralyzed, largely because Russia tries to exploit the situation for its own strategic objectives. At the end of the first 48 hours, Iran continues to attackIsrael, as do their proxies, albeit to a lesser extent. At this point in the simulation, the crisis does not seem to be close to a resolution.Main Policies of the Various ActorsIsrael: After achieving its operational goals, Israel showed restraint in the face of provocations and reactions by the radical players spurred byIran. In parallel, Israel conducted an additional aerial attack to complete destruction of one of the major targets in Iran. Israel’s strategic objective focused on preventing regional escalation and achieving as fast as possible a level of events that was controllable and of low intensity.The United States: Although not informed before the event, the United States clearly stood by Israel’s side and did not expose its differences of opinion with Israel, in order to present a united front against any possible regional escalation. The United States demonstrated willingness to return to the negotiating table and even relax the sanctions, provided Iran showed restraint and in exchange for an Iranian declaration it was ending its military nuclear program. TheUnited States decided it would take military action against Iran only ifIran were to close to the Strait of Hormuz or attack American allies and assets in the Gulf. Similarly, the United States activated economic measures to control the rise in oil prices.Iran: In light of the outcome of the Israeli attack, Iran felt it had no choice but to react strongly and militarily against Israel, launching some 100 Shehab missiles right away (and another 100 in round two) at Tel Aviv, the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona, and various cities. Iran also pressured its proxies to act against Israel and launch rocket and missiles at Israeli targets, as well as engage in multi-front acts of terrorism. At the same time, Iran appealed to the international community to grant legitimacy to its enrichment program and revoke the sanctions against it. At first, Iran chose not to attack American targets and assets to keep the United States from joining the fight against it. But the more Iran felt it was cornered and its freedom of action was curtailed, it realized that its strongest card lay in acting against America’s allies in the Gulf and closing the Strait of Hormuz.Russia chose to promote its objectives in the Caucasus and Europe.Russia also viewed the attack as an opportunity to position itself as the leading actor in the international community because of its ability to communicate with all the actors involved. However, the gap between the US and the Russian positions led to a paralysis of the international community’s ability to act. In turn, and in the absence of American leadership, China, with access to all the relevant actors, became a key player on the international field.Syria preferred to focus on its domestic upheaval, maintain a low profile, and not be dragged into combat against Israel.Hizbollah found itself in a quandary. On the one hand, Hizbollah came under heavy Iranian pressure to begin a massive launch of missiles and rockets at Israel, this being the “day of reckoning” for which Iran had furnished Hizbollah with 50,000 missiles and rockets. On the other hand, Hizbollah was wary about causing heavy damage in Lebanon yet again. It therefore chose to respond to Iran’s demands selectively by launching rockets at Israeli military targets, especially airfields and active anti-missile defense systems. Israel’s restrained response intensified Hizbollah’s dilemma and supported its decision to attack to a relatively limited degree and focus on military targets.Hamas chose to walk a fine line by demonstrating some commitment towards Iran, while making sure not to provide Israel with an excuse for a large scale attack in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ limited ability to control rogue and radical elements in Gaza was evident, and Hamas was forced to ask the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for help in restraining the rogue elements it lacked the power to control.The other actors – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and the international community: Each chose to operate on the basis of its own particular interests, distance itself from the events, and prevent widespread regional escalation. Insights from the War Game

a. The war game staged the first 48 hours after the attack. The intention was not to predict developments, rather to examine the significance and implications of one possible scenario. The players acted very rationally, demonstrating preventive policies and motivated by crucial interests alone, and ignored domestic and external constraints.

b. The Israeli actor assessed that the Israeli public possesses the stamina and fortitude to absorb the blows because it was convinced that for Israel, this was a war of no choice that had achieved is operational goals. The policy of restraint was based primarily on this assumption.

c. Iran has only limited tools and a limited ability to hit Israeldirectly, and therefore must operate its proxies against it. Iranhas tools that are more relevant in the Persian Gulf sector, capable of hurting American interests and causing global oil prices to spike. Nonetheless, Iran clearly understood the cost it would have to pay should it ignite the Persian Gulf, especially the United States joining the fighting. This would only incur greater damage to its nuclear infrastructures and greater destruction to a wide array of quality targets in Iran.

d. A successful Israeli attack with clear cut results and the meeting of the operational objectives would lead to two contradictory trends: on the one hand, Iran would be obligated to respond militarily and via its proxies; on the other hand its dependence on proxies would allow deterrence of the relevant actors and insertion of a wedge between Iran and its regional allies, thereby preventing regional escalation and encouraging containment.

e. Two other important elements likely to help contain the events are America’s clear resolve to stand with Israel and a restrained policy on Israel’s part, especially if the strategic objectives of the attack were met in the initial attack.

f. The simulation again raised the disadvantage of having no access to Iran's Supreme Leader and the limited levers of influence. In general, it became clear that there are no reliable lines of communication with the Iranian leadership. WhileRussia cannot serve as a credible channel for dialogue, it emerged that China may be capable of serving as a mediator.

g. In planning the exit strategy and a mechanism to contain and mitigate negative developments, Israel cannot rely on the international community. It is highly probable that the deepening of the divide between the United States and Russiawould paralyze the international community. Some of the players on the international arena would like to see Israel"bleed" in order to pay for attacking Iran, regardless of the interests of others, and to restrain its actions in the future. If the crisis were prolonged, it could generate unintended consequences with the risk of regional escalation. Efforts by regional and international elements to end the event may involve a cost to Israel in the area of arms control.

ConclusionWhen the simulation was planned, it appeared that the fall of 2012 would be a critical period, and therefore it was decided to examine the possible developments subsequent to an Israeli attack. This sense of an imminent decision has since abated somewhat, but after the USand Israeli elections, the question of an attack will undoubtedly resurface. It is therefore critical to continue to examine the potential ramifications of an attack.The scenario of an Israeli attack immediately after the US elections does not reflect the position of the Institute for National Security Studies. The possibility of an Israeli attack at any time is complex and has been analyzed in many INSS publications. Overall, there are two opposing assessments of the implications of an Israeli attack. One anticipates the outbreak of World War III, while the other envisions containment and restraint, and presumes that in practice, Iran’s capabilities to ignite the Middle East are limited. The war game that took place developed in the direction of containment and restraint, with the actors motivated mainly by rational considerations and critical interests.

[Indy]

Saucy, indeed! To cu da bistrim sutra na tenane (umesto da radim nesto smisleno).

[radisa]

AFERA

[Gandalf]

hossam bahgat ‏@hossambahgat For those who just joined it's 2 am in cairo and const assembly is still in session writing Egypt's constitution in 1 day.

[CrniRok]

Oni pišu i da je šeik Al Arifi demantovao čitavu priču i preko svog fejsbuk naloga, a da je AlterNet vest preuzeo sa, kako su rekli, antiislamskog Clarion Fand sajta, kao i sa informativnog Jutjub kanala "Eretz Zen".Ovo je katastrofa da fejsbuk i jutjub postaju informativni izvori za ogroman broj ljudi, svako pise sta hoce, glasine se sire brzinom svetlosti, demanti, ko vise moze da tvrdi da je bilo sta istinito ili ne. Opsti haos, ne znam uopste ko moze bilo sta da tvrdi sa sigurnoscu sta se desava u Siriji, osim da je jos jedna zemlja potpuni unistena za najmanje sledecih 50 godina.Posle Iraka, Libije, unistena je i Sirija. Za razliku od Afganistana, sve tri drzave su bile relativno islamski umerene zemlje. Mozda je to i bio za nekoga problem.

[Roger Sanchez]

Opet taj anonimni velemoćni neko™, HAARPični manipulator tisućama, pokretač neba i zemlje.Afghanistan je bio na putu da postane još islamski umjerenija zemlja kad ga je preuzela komunistička partija, a kad je intervenirao SSSR, onda je zbilja postao umjeren. Bilo bi ti pametnije, Roče, da prestaneš tražiti sisteme u tekućim događajima, pogotovo zavere™ koje pašu tvom utvrđenom i simplificiranom pogledu na svijet, jer ako si nešto trebao naučiti do sada iz historje onda je to da su događanja™ mješavina butterfly efekta, kolanja novca i masovnih psihoza. Ukratko, kaos.