Peti oktobar na bliskom istoku i arapskom svetu

[duma]

Mešaš stvari. Rat dve etničke grupe, ili kada kapetan skine pukovnika da bi se dokopao vlasti su velika razlika u odnosu na sva ovogodišnja dešavanja u arapskom svetu. Pisao sam da je velika šansa sve to što se zbiva u Egiptu, jer je ta zemlja u mnogo čemu lider arapskog sveta, iako nema naftu. Neko reče da je ovo 1989.godina za ceo taj prostor.

Sitna razlika je što se 1989. znalo u kom će se pravcu stvari razvijati.

Ne možemo unapred oceniti da li će doći MB ili Baradej, ko će u Libiji, ali je svakako ceo proces izuzetno ozbiljan, za mnoooge neočekivan, ali veoma važan za budućnost. Svakako se završava ciklus jedne vrste diktatura. Da li će ih naslediti islamisti, neki sekularni demokratski, još bolje libdem orjentisani ljudi, videćemo. U raznim podsaharskim zemljama promene nisu suštinske, već samo u promeni Kurte.

Svakako je značajan i bio bi neizbežan(svi su itekako zašli u godine). Katastrofalno bi bilo da na vlast uzjašu islamski ekstremisti, a nije isključeno ni da umesto Kurte dođe Murta (neki novi generali).

I najvažnije danas jesu ta dnevna dešavanja. Previše je već mrtvih i treba naći rešenje da se gad što pre svrgne. Petak je, pa da vidimo da li će nastaviti tradiciju

Ono što si citirao se odnosilo upravo na ovaj deo. Ovde jeste previše mrtvih, ali je znatno manje nego na nekim drugim mestima, tako da nisam ubeđen da se bilo koja vlada potresla baš zbog toga. Svejedno, bilo bi poželjno da se sve što pre okonča, a ne da dođe do građanskog rata. Nek i dođe do neke spoljne intervencije, ali da ona po mogućstvu donese mir, a ne da poput one u Iraku u njoj strada X puta više ljudi nego što je dosad u Libiji. Nisam baš upoznat sa međuetničkim odnosima, ali ako ne postoji netrpeljivost između Libijaca i drugih Arapa, mislim da bi intervencija Arapske lige bila još najbolje rešenje. U Libiji je klackalica, uz Gadafija ne stoji ozbiljna vojska, pa bi ulazak organizovane vojske iz Egipta brzo doneo prevagu.P.S.Poseban je fenomen što su sad, za razliku od Ruande kada je web bio u začetku, informacije dostupnije svim zainteresovanim građanima. Sad, pouzdanost tih informacija nije baš na nekom nivou, ali šta je tu je. Edited February 25, 2011 by duma

[Miralem]

Amnesty ukazuje na neadekvatnu reakciju UN-a na Gadaffijeve prijetnje o "generalnom čišćenju". Traže, utemeljeno, embargo na uvoz oružja i pojačavanje nadzora nad pomahnitalim diktatorom. http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/security-council-and-african-union-failing-libyan-people-2011-02-23

jeste, sutra ce ostati bez municije ako mu se uvede embargo na uvoz oruzja. a i ovo sa zamrzavanjem imovine u inostranstvu bi imalo smisla u slucaju da se ne radi o grandioznom ludaku. ukratko, amnesty se osetio pozvanim da reaguje. pa su, eto, napisali 1 saopstenje.

[Nicol]

jeste, sutra ce ostati bez municije ako mu se uvede embargo na uvoz oruzja. a i ovo sa zamrzavanjem imovine u inostranstvu bi imalo smisla u slucaju da se ne radi o grandioznom ludaku. ukratko, amnesty se osetio pozvanim da reaguje. pa su, eto, napisali 1 saopstenje.

pa dobro, rade ono što mogu.

[cedo]

Libya: Past and future?

After alienating powerful tribes, Gaddafi's regime seems to be falling, but it is unclear who could fill vacuum. Many believed that Colonel Gaddafi's regime in Libya would withstand the gale of change sweeping the Arab world because of its reputation for brutality which had fragmented the six million-strong population over the past 42 years. Its likely disappearance now, after a few days of protest by unarmed demonstrators is all-the-more surprising because it has systematically destroyed even the slightest pretence of dissidence and has atomised Libyan society to ensure that no organisation – formal or spontaneous – could ever consolidate sufficiently to oppose it. Political Islam, whether radical or moderate, has been the principle victim, especially after an Islamist rebellion in Cyrenaica, the country's eastern region, in the latter 1990s. Other political currents have been exiled since 1973, when "direct popular democracy" was declared and the jamahiriyah, the "state of the masses", came into existence. Even the Libyan army was treated with suspicion, with its officer corps controlled and monitored for potential disloyalty. No wonder that major units now seems to have broken away from the regime and made the liberation of Eastern Libya possible.Causes for collapseThe only structures that the regime tolerated, outside the formal structure of the "state of the masses" Colonel Gaddafi's idiosyncratic vision of direct popular democracy in Libya’s stateless state in which all Libyans were theoretically obliged to participate – came from Libya’s tribal base and the Revolutionary Committee Movement, itself tied to the regime by tribal affiliation and ideological commitment and used to discipline and terrify the population through "revolutionary justice". Apart from that, there was only the colonel's family and the rijal al-khima, the "men of the tent" – the colonel's old revolutionary comrades from the Union of Free Officers which had organised the 1969 revolution against the Sanussi monarchy which had brought the colonel to power. And even the tribes did not necessarily support the regime, although they were constrained by the "social popular leadership", a committee bringing together thirty-two of the major tribal leaders under the watchful eye of the regime.Yet, in reality, the Sa’adi tribes of Cyrenaica, for example, had little love for the regime, for they had been the cradle of the Sanussi movement which had controlled much of modern Libya and Chad in the nineteen century. In partnership with the Ottoman Empire, the Sa'adi led resistance to Italian occupation between 1911 and 1927. They had been disadvantaged by the revolution, not least because the revolutionaries came from three tribes – the Qadhadhfa, the Maghraha and the Warfalla – which had originally been subservient to them. It could be argued, in short, that the revolution was, at its heart, a reversal of tribal politics, despite its ostensible commitment to Arab nationalism. Geographic issuesIndeed, the regime has been consciously constructed on the back of these three tribes which populated the security services and the Revolutionary Committee Movement. Yet even they had their own grievances; the Warfalla had been implicated in the unsuccessful 1993 Bani Ulid coup and its leaders had refused to execute those guilty as a demonstration of their loyalty to the regime. Colonel Gaddafi's henchmen organised the executions instead, earning tribal enmity and probably explaining why tribal leaders so quickly sided with the opposition when the regime began to collapse.Then there is also a geographic imperative for the rapidity of the collapse of the regime. Libya is essentially a desert, with the only areas that can support intensive residence located in the Jefara Plain, around Tripoli in Tripolitania, and the Jabal al-Akhdar behind Benghazi in Cyrenaica. The result has been that Libya’s six million-strong population, as a result of oil-fired economic development in the rentier state that emerged at the end of the 1960s, is now highly urbanised and largely concentrated in these two cities and the satellite towns around them. CorruptionThis means that any regime which loses control of them has lost control of the country, even if it controls all outlying areas, such as the oil fields in the Gulf of Sirt between them, which is also the home base of the Qadhadhfa, or the Fezzan that still seems to be loyal to the Gaddafi regime. It is this that explains how, once the army in Benghazi changed sides, the regime lost control of Eastern Libya and why its hold on Tripoli, the capital, has been so rapidly contested.Nor should the nature of the regime or the Gaddafi family be ignored as a factor for the collapse. The regime has, in recent years, benefited from growing foreign investment in Libya, alongside its massive oil revenues, after sanctions in connection with the Lockerbie affairs were removed in 1999. As foreign economic interest grew, so did corruption and, although Colonel Gaddafi himself may not have been corrupt, his seven sons and one daughter certainly were, drawing their fortunes from commissions and income streams siphoned off from the oil-and-gas sector. Libyans themselves have been excluded from the benefits of oil wealth for decades, so the blatant corruption inflamed their resentment in recent years. 'Foreign mercenaries'In addition, the Libyan leader, who had no formal role inside the jamahiriyah but made sure that the Revolutionary Committee Movement answered only to him, has played on the aspirations of his sons to succeed him, pitting one against the other to ensure that none of them could amass sufficient power to threaten his position.In such an atmosphere of eternal mistrust and suspicion, it is hardly surprising that the ultimate bastion of the regime has been the "foreign mercenaries" that have terrified Libyans with their indiscriminate violence during the country’s latest revolution. Yet, they too form part of the leader’s conception of the state. In the 1980s, Libya opened its borders to all who were Muslim, as part of its vision of Arab nationalism and Islamic radicalism. The regime also recruited an "Islamic Legion" to aid it in its foreign adventures, particularly in Africa, as Chad, Uganda and Tanzania were to discover. In 1997, Libya also renounced its self-image as an Arab state, prioritising its African destiny instead, opening its borders to sub-Saharan Africa, despite the intense domestic tensions that the inflow of migrants generated, which resulted in riots and deaths in September 2000. Now, apart from using African migrants as a tool to coerce European states such as Italy with the threat of uncontrolled migration, it has also recruited them into its elite forces around the "Deterrent Battalion" (the 32nd Brigade) which are used solely for internal repression. They have no loyalty to Libyans who hate them and they are the forces on which Colonel Gaddafi relies to ensure that his regime ends in a bloodbath to punish Libyans for their disloyalty to his political vision.The futureWhatever the Colonel thinks – and it is what he thinks that determines the struggle inside Libya today – there are objective factors that will determine the outcome. Unrest in Western Libya has already led to towns in the Jefara Plain falling to the widening anti-regime movement. Zuwara is said to have been taken over by them and major struggles are taking place between armed forces loyal to the Gaddafi regime and the inchoate movement opposed to it in Misurata and Zawiya, where helicopter gunships seem to have been used. Even if Tripoli is still under regime control, the towns surrounding it seem to be slipping away. Eventually, the leader will control only the capital and nothing else. There is no doubt that the struggle is becoming increasingly bloody, with estimates of losses being set at between 600 and 2,000 dead.The outcome will be determined by the loyalty of the armed forces and the institutions of the state towards the Libyan leader. Yet this is increasingly in doubt; two ministers, from the justice and the interior, have resigned and Libya’s diplomatic missions around the world are gradually falling way, including key missions at the United Nations in New York and in Washington. Diplomats say the are sickened by what they regard as genocide as Libya’s armed forces fire on unarmed demonstrators. Even the armed forces are becoming increasingly unreliable – a belated revenge, no doubt, for the way in which they have been chronically mistrusted and misused. Few, in the armed forces or within the population, have forgotten the abuse heaped upon them by the regime after Libya was forced out of Chad with heavy losses in the late 1980s.Who follows?The problem is that it is extremely unclear what could emerge to replace the colonel’s unlamented regime. One consequence of its unrestrained repression has been to ensure that no movement or individual has emerged as a natural alternative. Inside Libya, only the Muslim Brotherhood and some extremist Islamist groups have any formal presence. Outside Libya there are myriad opposition groups, it is true, but there is no evidence that they have any real purchase inside the country. There are also growing fears in European states along the northern shores of the Mediterranean of a flood of migrants and asylum-seekers fleeing the violence. And then there are the one million sub-Saharan African migrants marooned in Libya in the hope of crossing into Europe.

What's in a flag? Protesters have adopted flag used after Libya won independence from Italy as symbol of their revolt.The flag then, appears to symbolise both independence and unity

Anti-government protesters in cities across Libya have been hoisting national flags as a sign of their revolt against Muammar Gaddafi, the man who has led the country for 41 years.Abroad, where diplomats in several embassies have also renounced Gaddafi's leadership, the flag is also being used as a sign to show where loyalties lie.The flag being raised, however, is not the current national flag, but one from over 40 years ago, when Libya was still ruled by a constitutional monarchy under the el-Senussi family.It depicts three bands of green, black and red, with a white crescent and star in the centre, and was the banner under which the Kingdom of Libya won its independence from Italy on December 24, 1951.The flag was used until 1969, when it was replaced by the pan-Arab red-white-and-black tricolour.The red band on the 1951 flag symbolises the blood of those killed during the struggle for independence from Italy, and the green band symbolises prosperity.The central black band appears to be a reference from the el-Senussi flag, under which King Idris I gathered Libyans together during the fight for independence.The crescent and star are traditional symbols of Islam, the religion of most Libyans. A variation of the flag that has been used by anti-government protesters has vertical bands, and no star and crescent.'Stolen by Gaddafi'Libya's current flag is a monochromatic green rectangle, and is the only national flag currently in use that does not feature some form of icon, symbol or design.It is strongly associated with Gaddafi's rule, and has been in use since 1977, when the country was declared the "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya".Speaking to Al Jazeera, Youcef Bouandel, a Libyan professor of international affairs at Qatar University, explained the significance of the protesters' choice of flag."This flag is the flag of Libya when it achieved its independence from the Italians ... and I think that people are saying that Libya is going to achieve its independence that was stolen by Gaddafi," he said.Bouandel said the choice of flag did not indicate a particular predilection towards returning to a monarchical structure - as the original flag was used by the country when it was ruled by the el-Senussi family - rather it was a reaction against Gaddafi, and an expression of a desire for independence."[it is] to tell him that there was a Libya before Gaddafi came to power," said Bouandel. "He seemed to imply in his speech that he was Libya, that he made Libya ... [but they wish to say] there was a Libya that fought for its independence and that was the flag of Libya before you took power in what you called a revolution."Analysts say that while there is the possibility of the Libyan monarchy coming back to some form of power if Gaddafi were overthrown, it remains unclear at this point how strong a possibility that is.Awad Elfeituri, from the Libyan Information Centre, a Doha-based organisation that has been using contacts in the country to get information regarding the revolt out to the wider world, spoke to Al Jazeera about the significance of the flag.He said that it was unlikely that protesters had chosen the flag with its ties to the monarchy in mind, as most protesters are younger than 30 years old - Gaddafi seized power in a coup d'etat 41 years ago.Elfeituri said the choice of the older flag as a symbol of the revolution came from a sense of "nostalgia", of a longing for the "good old days", where, in particular, law and order were maintained.He said the protesters "do not want anything to do with Gaddafi", and the green flag is closely associated with the Libyan leader.Divisions and unityIn a speech televised on national television on February 21, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Muammar Gaddafi's son, warned: "Libya is not like Egypt [referring to the revolution in that country], it is tribes and clans. It is not a society with parties. Everyone knows their duties and this may cause civil wars."The deep tribal divisions do continue to predict loyalties in Libya, and during recent unrest several tribes have turned against Gaddafi [notably the Warfala tribe, the country's largest].The 1951-69 flag, however, is a symbol of tribal unity, as all of the country's clans agreed to be ruled under the el-Senussi family [and an elected parliament], said Bouandel.The flag then, appears to symbolise both independence and unity.Interestingly, the plain green flag that Gaddafi made the national pennant in 1977 is also supposed to symbolise unity, Bouandel and Elfeituri said.The colour green, which is closely associated with Gaddafi's government in Libya, is in the Arab world considered a colour of peace, equality and the colour of heaven, Bouandel added.Gaddafi has also displayed a particular devotion to the colour. His manifesto, which he quotes often, is called the Green Book and features a green cover, and during recent violence he urged his supporters to wear green armbands as a sign of where their loyalties lay.During his address to the nation on February 22, he urged his supporters to don their green armbands and "cleanse" Libya of anti-government protesters.ElFeituri says the colour is somewhat of an obsession with Gaddafi. In the city of Benghazi, which in recent days has become a stronghold for protesters, he had earlier reportedly "forced people to paint their walls and doors green".The colour appears to have a deeper importance to Gaddafi than simply being a means of identification.Bouandel narrated an anecdote to Al Jazeera, describing a function at the University of Benghazi some years ago when Gaddafi wanted to take notes of what speakers were saying.Students present at the university offered Gaddafi a pen that wrote in red ink. He was offended by the offer, Bouandel said, asking "Since when do I use that?"Gaddafi then demanded that a green pen be provided for him to write with.

Edited February 25, 2011 by cedo

[Tutankamon]

Riots break out during Libya state TV Friday sermon

When the imam sat for a break the people started screaming him down and the camera panned away

[Miralem]

pa dobro, rade ono što mogu.

generalno imam problem sa tim "radjenjem sta se moze" u slucajevima kada to vodi nicemu. sto i sam trudbenik zna, no eto, valja besmislenim saopstenjima opravdavati sopstveno postojanje. niti libijci imaju nesto od tih zahteva, niti ce ih un uvaziti, niti bi, uvazeni, delovali.

[Аврам Гојић]

grijesis, sinko, ne prave se tako aeroplani.misljenje Amnestija se poprilicno uzima u obzir kod otvaranja medjunarodnih istraga. Amnesti je watchdog cija rec se slusa u medjunarodnim centrima moci™.inace za vodjenje rata ti treba oruzje i treba ti puno njega. mere nadzora granica Libije u cilju sprecavanja uvoza oruzja nemaju smisla ako sukob potraje 2 nedelje, ali ce i te kako imati smisla ako bude trajao 2 godine.

Edited February 25, 2011 by Marko M. Dabovic

[hazard]

Sitna razlika je što se 1989. znalo u kom će se pravcu stvari razvijati.

A jel se bas znalo? Raspad komunizma doneo je svasta, to se zaboravlja. Jeste, imali smo relativno mirne tranzicije "poznatom" pravcu, ali imali smo i pogorsanja, kao u SFRJ ili na Kavkazu u SSSR. Eno i Cehoslovacka se raspala - mirno jer nisu imali oko cega da ratuju - ali u Slovackoj su prilicno militantni nacionalisti dosta dugo bili na vlasti.

[Аврам Гојић]

Ma gde se znalo, vojni penzioneri u blokovima bili su uvereni da će ujedinjena Nemačka ponovo navaliti na Evropu. Sada nam se razvoj sveta posle 1989 čini kao logična evolucija, ali to tada nije izgledalo tako.

Edited February 25, 2011 by Marko M. Dabovic

[Miralem]

grijesis, sinko, ne prave se tako aeroplani.misljenje Amnestija se poprilicno uzima u obzir kod otvaranja medjunarodnih istraga. Amnesti je watchdog cija rec se slusa u medjunarodnim centrima moci™.inace za vodjenje rata ti treba oruzje i treba ti puno njega. mere nadzora granica Libije u cilju sprecavanja uvoza oruzja nemaju smisla ako sukob potraje 2 nedelje, ali ce i te kako imati smisla ako bude trajao 2 godine.

dozvoli da vizija visegodisnjeg gradjanskog rata nije preovladjujuca, a to na osnovu slicnih dosadasnjih primera u okruzenju. mnogo su vece sanse da se situacija razresi vrlo brzo. no, ukoliko se to ne desi, ima se vremena za uvodjenje dugorocnih mera. nece gradjanski rat da pobegne. o uticaju ai na un cemo saznati uskoro, tj videcemo da kli je gadafijevoj libiji uveden embargo. (a tu dolazimo do sledeceg pitanja- ima li uopste smisla uvoditi embargo na uvoz oruzja zemlji koja ima naftu, tj da li ce on imati ikakvog efekta).

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

o uticaju ai na un cemo saznati uskoro, tj videcemo da kli je gadafijevoj libiji uveden embargo. (a tu dolazimo do sledeceg pitanja- ima li uopste smisla uvoditi embargo na uvoz oruzja zemlji koja ima naftu, tj da li ce on imati ikakvog efekta).

Ima, sve i da nema velikog, ili ikakvog efekta. Ako se embargo uvede - on ne škodi ama baš ničemu, sve i da je 100% neefektivan, on ne može biti kontraproduktivan. S druge strane, naravno da će imati kakvog-takvog efekta. Ko god od Gadafijevih boraca bude želeo da kupi oružje, naravno da će moći, ali će uz embargo to biti makar otežano na ovakav ili onakav način. Kao i zaplena imovine u inostranstvu. Naravno da to neće ič naterati Gadafija da razmisli o eventualnom povlačenju. Ali je bolje da se to uradi nego ne uradi, zar ne? Makar kao gest međunarodne zajednice "ok, ako ste diktator koji šalje bombardere na protestante, očekujte makar ovo".U svakom slučaju, bolji je ovakav korak nego planiranje bilo kakve USA vojne akcije. To bi samo osnažilo podršku Gadafiju, možda ne u samoj Libiji, ali gde se Amerika u arpaskom svetu umeša vojno...

[luba]

Kadhafi forces open fire on protesters in several areas of capital: witnesses

[Eraserhead]

Embargo bi bio prelaz sa verbalne osude na teren konkretnog delovanja. To bi samo po sebi bio pozitivan pomak kako se situacija komplikuje i pogoršava. Gadafiju se šalje poruka da se sve ne završava na priči i da je svet prilično jednoglasno spreman da deluje. Situacija je takva da Gadafi može da odstupi samo ukoliko nađe mesto koje će ga udomiti. Možda bi to mogao biti nenameran pozitivan doprinos Čaveza celoj situaciji.

[braca]

U svakom slučaju, bolji je ovakav korak nego planiranje bilo kakve USA vojne akcije. To bi samo osnažilo podršku Gadafiju, možda ne u samoj Libiji, ali gde se Amerika u arpaskom svetu umeša vojno...

o Americkoj intervenciji : imaju li oni uopste para za to planinarenje? meni se cini da je situacija vise nego kriticna sa vec postojecim zaristima, tesko da bi mogli sa skupe dovoljno ljudi, opreme, itd za bilo sta ozbiljnije Edited February 25, 2011 by braca

[Miralem]

Ima, sve i da nema velikog, ili ikakvog efekta. Ako se embargo uvede - on ne škodi ama baš ničemu, sve i da je 100% neefektivan, on ne može biti kontraproduktivan.

sto hje, da prostis, najobicnije pranje ruku- eto, uradili smo to "nesto", jer je nesto bolje nego nista, molim. missim, neam ja nista protiv dugorocnih mera, samo bi mogli da sacekamo da vidimo da li su one uopste potrebne. posebno jer taj embargo valja i implementirati, dovuci brodove, avione, helikoptere, ljudstvo, napraviti infrastrukturu, obezbediti sredstva...