Amerika, zemlja velika

[Budja]

Zvuci pomalo kao nekadasnji Volfovicov plan (2,4). 

 

Sto se tice Arapskog proleca, tesko je bilo dati podrsku jer je situacija na tereu bila haoticna i nije seznalo ko sta hoce i za sta se bori.  Demosntarnti su znali sta nece (autoritarne vladajuce rezime) ali nije postojao konsensus oko toga sta hoce, tj. kakav ekonomski i politicki sistem zele.  Spektrum zelja bio je ogroman, od uspotavljanja striktnih islamskih normi, pa do liberalnog kapitalizma.  To je delom razlog sto je u mnogim zemljama u kojima se dogodiolo Arapsko prolece nastao haos, politicka nestabilnost i gradjanski rat.

 

Govorimo o dve zemlje: Tunisu i Egiptu. U Libiji je zavrsetak prosao kroz gradjanski rat, u Siriji jos traje.

 

U obe zemlje je bilo nestabilnosti, sasvim normalno, no u obe zemlje umereni islamisti su uzeli vlast izborima. Ta cinjenica u Egiptu nije prihvacena, a puc je de fakto podrzan iz USA. Sto se konsensusa tice, nije tu bilo dijaloga oko novog drustva vec cuvanja ili obaranja privilegija iz perioda polu-vojne Naserove, Sadatove i Mubarakove diktature.

 

Pozeljniji a moguci scenario, kao onaj u Tunisu, izgleda da nije bio razmatran.

[mandingo]

dok hilari drvi o siriji i ISIS-u, nije na odmet da se malo podsetimo....

 

six (three) degrees of separation - US foreign policy style. 

 

http://original.antiwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/isis-justin-graphic2.jpg

 

a danas su mccrazy i lindsey upozorili da ISIS vec operira na americkom tlu, but... in the year of our lord 2013

 

http://wonkette.com/552931/heres-a-picture-of-john-mccain-hanging-out-with-isis-freedom-fighters-in-2013

 

Edited August 10, 2014 by mandingo

[Prospero]

Dok bi Hilari skakala sa litice i nadala se dobrom padobranu...
 

Do No (More) Harm
Every time the U.S. touches the Middle East, it makes things worse. It's time to walk away and not look back.
BY STEPHEN M. WALT
AUGUST 7, 2014



In case you hadn't noticed, the Middle East is going from bad to worse these days. 

The Syrian civil war grinds on. Israel and the Palestinians spent the last month in another pointless bloodletting (most of the blood being Palestinian). ISIS keeps expanding its control[/size] in parts of Iraq, placing thousands of members of the Yazidi religious sect in peril and leading the Obama administration to consider airstrikes or some form of airborne humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, officials back in Baghdad snipe mostly at each other. Libya continues to unravel, belying the high-fives that liberal hawks gave themselves back when Qaddafi fell. A U.S. general was shot and killed in Afghanistan, and another disputed election threatens democracy there and may give the Taliban new opportunities to make gains at Kabul's expense. Turkey's Prime Minister Recip Erdogan has been calling Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi a "tyrant," an irony given Erdogan's own authoritarian tendencies. A diplomatic spat between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar remains unsettled. Nature even seems to be against us: the MERS virus on the Arabian Peninsula may be transmissible by airborne contact. I'm sure you could find some good news if you tried, but you'd have to squint pretty hard.

A string of events like this attracts critics and Cassandras like yellow jackets to a backyard picnic. In the Washington Post, neoconservative Eliot Cohen laments the "wreckage" of U.S. Middle East policy, blaming everything on Barack Obama's failure to recognize "war is war" and his reluctance to rally the nation to wage more of them. (Never mind that the last war Cohen helped get the United States into -- the invasion of Iraq in 2003 -- did far more damage than anything Obama has done.) A far more convincing perspective comes from former Ambassador Chas Freeman who surveys several decades of America's meddling in the region and comes to a depressing conclusion: "It's hard to think of any American project in the Middle East that is not now at or near a dead end."

Is there a silver lining in this disheartening tableaux? Perhaps. After all, when things are this bad, the need to rethink the entire U.S. approach to the region is hard to escape. If we cast aside familiar shibboleths and taboos and took a fresh look, what might we see?

Since World War II, the meddling that Freeman recounts has been conducted in partnership with various regional allies. These alignments may have been a strategic necessity during the Cold War (though even that could be debated), but the sad fact is that the United States has no appealing partners left today. Egypt is a corrupt military dictatorship with grim prospects, and Erdogan's AKP regime in Turkey is trending toward one-party rule, while its ambitious "zero problems" foreign policy has gone badly off the rails. Working with the Assad regime in Syria is out of the question -- for good reason -- but most of Bashar al-Assad's opponents are no prize either. Saudi Arabia is a geriatric, theocratic monarchy that treats half its population -- i.e., its women -- like second-class citizens (at best). Iran is a different sort of theocratic state: it has some quasi-democratic features, but also an abysmal human rights record and worrisome regional ambitions.

The view doesn't get much better no matter where one looks. The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has been an ally for decades, but it remains heavily dependent on outside support and is too weak and fragile to be the linchpin of U.S. engagement. The same is true for Lebanon. Libya doesn't even have a government, let alone one the United States would want to be close to. Israel is wrapping up its latest outrage against the Palestinians - to no lasting strategic purpose -- and its march to the right now includes open advocacy of eliminationist policies by prominent political figures. The "special relationship" with Israel also fuels anti-Americanism and makes Washington look both hypocritical and ineffectual in the eyes of much of the world. But Palestinian political groups are no more appealing: the Palestinian Authority is corrupt and ineffectual and elements of Hamas still proclaim the worst sort of toxic anti-Semitism. States like Qatar and Bahrain do provide valuable real estate for U.S. bases, and many of these governments cooperate with the United States out of their own self-interest, but it's hard to find anyone in the region that looks like a genuine strategic or moral asset these days.

Faced with this unpromising environment, what would be the sensible -- or dare I say realistic -- thing for the United States to do? The familiar answer is to say that it's an imperfect world and that we have no choice but to work with what we've got. We hold our noses, and cut deals with the least objectionable parties in the region. As Michael Corleone would say, it's not personal; it's strictly business.

But this view assumes that deep engagement with this troubled area is still critical to U.S. national interests, and further assumes the United States reaps net benefits from its recurrent meddling on behalf of its less-than-loyal partners. In other words, it assumes that these partnerships and deep U.S. engagement make Americans safer and more prosperous here at home. But given the current state of the region and the condition of most of our putative allies, that assumption is increasingly questionable.

In fact, most of the disputes and divisions that are currently roiling the region do not pose direct and mortal threats to vital U.S. interests. It is admittedly wrenching to watch what is happening in Syria or Gaza, or to Israel's democracy, but these events affect the lives of very few Americans directly. Unless, of course, we are foolish enough to throw ourselves back into the middle of the maelstrom.

Moreover, the Middle East today is riven by a series of overlapping conflicts along multiple fault lines, driven in good part by protracted government failures and exacerbated by misguided outside meddling. There's the division between Sunni and Shiite, of course, and between Islamists (of many different stripes) and traditional authoritarians (also of several different types). Add to that mix the conflicts along sectarian lines (as in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere), and the recurring suspicions between Arabs and Persians. And don't forget the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, which still reverberates throughout the Arab and Islamic world.

Here's where Americans need to remember the United States may have permanent interests in the Middle East, but not necessarily permanent friends. In terms of its strategic interests, the central U.S. goal since World War II has been to prevent any single power from dominating the oil rich Persian Gulf. However troubled we may be by all the divisions and quarrels in the region, those conflicts also make the possibility that one power will dominate the region more remote than ever. Does anyone seriously think Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS), the Kurds, Russia, Turkey, China or anyone else is going to take over and manage this vast and turbulent area, and smooth out all these rifts and feuds? Of course not. And if that is the case, then America's primary strategic goal will be met whether Washington lifts a finger or not.

Some will argue that we have a moral responsibility to try to end the obvious suffering in different places, and a strategic imperative to eradicate terrorists and prevent the spread of WMD. These are laudable goals, but if the history of the past twenty years teaches us anything, it is that forceful American interference of this sort just makes these problems worse. The Islamic State wouldn't exist if the neocons hadn't led us blindly into Iraq, and Iran would have less reason to contemplate getting nuclear weapons if it hadn't watched the United States throw its weight around in the region and threaten it directly with regime change.

So instead of acting like a hyperactive juggler dashing between a dozen spinning plates, maybe the best course is to step back even more than we have already. No, I don't mean isolationism: What I mean is taking seriously the idea of strategic disengagement and putting the whole region further down on America's list of foreign policy priorities. Instead of constantly cajoling these states to do what we think is best -- and mostly getting ignored or rebuked by them -- maybe we should let them sort out these problems themselves for awhile. And if any of them eventually want American help, it should come at a steep price.

Among other things, the policy I'm suggesting would mean the United States would stop its futile efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I've argued against such a course in the past, but it is now obvious to me that no president is willing to challenge Israel's backers here in the United States and make U.S. support for Israel conditional on an end to the occupation. Until that happens, even well-intentioned efforts to broker a peace will keep failing. Instead of continuing to squander valuable time and prestige on a fruitless endeavor, the U.S. government should disengage from this thankless task until it is ready to do more than just palaver and plead. If Israel's leaders want to risk their own future by creating a "greater Israel," so be it. It would be regrettable if Israel ended up an apartheid state and an international pariah, but preventing that tragedy is not a vital U.S. interest. (If it really were, U.S. policy since Oslo might have been rather different.)

To be consistent, of course, the United States would also end its military and economic aid to Egypt, Israel, and perhaps a few others. I don't expect Congress to suddenly grow a backbone and do the right thing here, but even a realist can dream, can't he? But even if the "special relationship" remains more-or-less intact, at least U.S. diplomats wouldn't be wasting more time and energy trying to do the impossible.

To be sure, the course of action I'm sketching here is likely to leave the Middle East in a pretty messy condition for some time to come. But that is going to be the case no matter what Washington decides to do. So the question is: should the United States squander more blood and treasure on a series of futile tasks, and in ways that will make plenty of people in the region angry and encourage a few of them look for ways to deliver some payback? Or should the United States distance itself from everyone in the region, and prepare to intervene only when a substantial number of American lives are at risk or in the unlikely event that there is a genuine and imminent threat of regional domination?

The latter course would be a real departure for U.S. policy, and I can see the potential downside risks. Some local governments might be less willing to share intelligence with us, or to collaborate on counter-terrorism. That would be unfortunate, but on the other hand, because anti-American terrorism emanating from the region is mostly a violent reaction to past U.S. policies, a less engaged policy would almost certainly make that problem less severe.

In any case, the results of a different approach could hardly be worse than what the United States has managed to achieve over the past twenty-plus years. Unless Americans have a masochistic addiction to disappointment, this seems like an ideal time for a more fundamental rethink.

One final thought: this argument would not preclude limited U.S. action for purely humanitarian purposes -- such as humanitarian airdrops for the beleaguered religious minorities now threatened with starvation in Iraq. That's not "deep engagement"; that's merely trying to help people threatened with imminent death. But I would not send U.S. forces -- including drones or aircraft -- out to win a battle that the Iraqi government or the Kurds cannot win for themselves. The United States spent the better part of a decade chasing that elusive Grail, and the end result was precisely the sort of chaos and sectarian rivalry that has produced this latest crisis. We may be able to do some limited good for the endangered minorities, but above all, let's do no further harm: not to the region, and not to ourselves.

... Stiven Volt bi se malo sklonio od litice.

 

 

 

@mandingo

 

Jbt, čovek je stvarno Grim Reaper.

[MancMellow]

Hilari o spoljnoj politici:

 

U, pa ovo će da bude opštenarodno veselje ako ona postane predsednica. 

[Gandalf]

http://wonkette.com/552931/heres-a-picture-of-john-mccain-hanging-out-with-isis-freedom-fighters-in-2013

Only one small problem with the little photo-op: In addition to Idris, some of the other guys in the pic are apparently members of a slightly less “moderate” group: ISIS, the guys who are currently bringing down Iraq, and the photo is reportedly being circulated by ISIS as proof of their legitimacy. Oops.

 

izgleda da je autor u tripu da ISIS svoj legimitet dokazuje vezama sa Amerima.    

 

nije mi poznata niti jedna MENA islamisticka struja, u celom spektrumu od politickih pa do nihilistickih dzihadi islamista, koja bi svoj legitimitet dokazivala vezama sa SAD. ISIS bi ovu sliku mozda i mogao da koristi za dokazivanje legitimiteta: da pokazu da je konkurencija (FSA) povezana sa Amerima.

Edited August 10, 2014 by Gandalf

[Eraserhead]

When I asked her about the intense international focus on Gaza, she was quick to identify anti-Semitism as an important motivating factor in criticism of Israel. “It is striking … that you have more than 170,000 people dead in Syria. … You have Russia massing battalions—Russia, that actually annexed and is occupying part of a UN member-state—and I fear that it will do even more to prevent the incremental success of the Ukrainian government to take back its own territory, other than Crimea. More than 1,000 people have been killed in Ukraine on both sides, not counting the [Malaysia Airlines] plane, and yet we do see this enormous international reaction against Israel, and Israel’s right to defend itself, and the way Israel has to defend itself. This reaction is uncalled for and unfair.”

 

Chewbacca defense at its best.

[mandingo]

izgleda da je autor u tripu da ISIS svoj legimitet dokazuje vezama sa Amerima.    

 

nije mi poznata niti jedna MENA islamisticka struja, u celom spektrumu od politickih pa do nihilistickih dzihadi islamista, koja bi svoj legitimitet dokazivala vezama sa SAD. ISIS bi ovu sliku mozda i mogao da koristi za dokazivanje legitimiteta: da pokazu da je konkurencija (FSA) povezana sa Amerima.

nemoj da zameris, ameterski sam googlao "john mccain ISIS" a mrzelo me da proveravam linkove. 

 

stoji da je text, manje - vise, oportunisticki senzacionalan i politicki obojen. istina je, medjutim, da je mccain otisao u siriji - da dokaze kako amerika uvek podrzava freedom fighters (jbg, to je national DNA ) i da on nije obama, jbt. usput se slikao sa nekim tipovima, itd... 

 

@ prospero  

 

ja sam ubedjen da je covek tesko bolestan (PTSD) i (uz rizik da ispadnem ageist) senilan. lindsey je, sa druge strane, morbidni oportunista koji zivi u 2002 godini, otprilike.

[Budja]

Dok bi Hilari skakala sa litice i nadala se dobrom padobranu...

 

... Stiven Volt bi se malo sklonio od litice.

 

 

 

@mandingo

 

Jbt, čovek je stvarno Grim Reaper.

 

Dobar clanak.

 

Stavise, neproporcionalna angazovanost SAD na jednoj strani, ohraburje te strane da vrse dalje nasilje sto naravno provocira drugu stranu.

 

Ja uopste nisam siguran da bi se odmah svi zavadjeni Arapi udruzili sa Iranom i napali Izrael.

 

Ali bi deanagazovanje SAD doprinelo demokratizaciji Egipta i, sasvim moguce, Saudijske Arabije. Da, bili bi to islamisti ali svesni svojih ogranicenja, slicno kao i Izrael. Ravnoteza straha bi doprinela miru.

[Eraserhead]

Ali bi deanagazovanje SAD doprinelo demokratizaciji Egipta i, sasvim moguce, Saudijske Arabije. Da, bili bi to islamisti ali svesni svojih ogranicenja, slicno kao i Izrael. Ravnoteza straha bi doprinela miru.

 

Sto mislis da bi bas ovo bio rezultat?

[WTF]

Kakvo je raspoloženje među biračima koji su naklonjeni konzervativcima u pogledu Klintonove vladavine? Generalno gledano me zanima. Da li ga hejtuju više ili manje od drugih demokratskih predsednika, da li mu sa ove vremenske distance priznaju neke zasluge, da li postoji nešto što ne mogu da mu oproste?

 

I da li sve ovo što pišem, pa kakav god odgovor da date, može imati uticaja na Hilarinu kandidaturu? 

 

Ovako, mislim da postoji odredjeni broj ljudi koji su za vreme Clintona vazili za konzervativce i koji ga nisu preterano voleli i cenili pogotovu na pocetku njegovog prvog mandata, ali ti ljudi danas ni u ludilu ne bi glasali za GOP, ovakav kakav je, prociscen od centrista i pragmaticara, skrenut na skoro ekstremnu desnicu.  Naravno za polarizovane i zadrte GOP glasace, on je omrazen skoro isto kao i Obama, jedino ga vadi boja koze.  Ljubav ili mrznja prema Clintonu je slicna onoj prema Reganu, a to je osecaj postovanja ili prezira prema ljudima koji su bili majstori politike i uspeli da sastave 2 mandata uz izgradjivanje siroke koalicije, uglavnom centristicku politiku, i za cijih se mandata odlicno zivelo iako su i jedan i drugi svoje prve mandate zapoceli u doba ekonomske krize.

 

Sto se tice stvari koje Clintonu "ne mogu da se oproste", tu sam jedino svestan da moralisticki puritanci ne mogu da mu oproste aferu Lewinski, a srpska dijaspora (bar veci deo nje) NATO bombardovanje iz '99.

 

Bill Clinton, njegov lik i delo i nasledje mogu da budu samo pozitivna stvar sto se tice Hillarine candidature.  Tu naravno mislim na DEM i nezavisne glasace.  Tvrdokorni Republikanci i ljudi koji patoloski mrze Clintona ionako ne bi nikad glasali za Hillary, no matter what.

[Prospero]

Kakvu će spoljnu politiku da jure GOP kandidati sada kada se Hilari pomerila desno i postavila negde između Buša i Obame? Preporučila se Izraelcima, pa je pitanje može li se uopšte GOP tu istaći?

 

Da li će otići još više u desno (kuda?) ili će se zajebati sa nekim libertarijanskijim™ pozicijama bližim familiji Pol?

[расејан]

Preporučila se Izraelcima, pa je pitanje može li se uopšte GOP tu istaći?

 

Практично небитно, јер сваки кандидат, чим се укажу шансе да прође кроз унутарпартијске изборе (ака примарне) мора да иде у АИПАК да га, хм, виде. Оне 2008. су кроз ту смотру прошли и Мекејн, и Обама и Хилари и пуштени даље. Не сећам се за Палинку.

[WTF]

Kakvu će spoljnu politiku da jure GOP kandidati sada kada se Hilari pomerila desno i postavila negde između Buša i Obame? Preporučila se Izraelcima, pa je pitanje može li se uopšte GOP tu istaći?

 

Da li će otići još više u desno (kuda?) ili će se zajebati sa nekim libertarijanskijim™ pozicijama bližim familiji Pol?

 

Bice ista politika, ali ce da zvuci jace i snaznije jer ce je objasnjavati i artikulisati 1 muskarac.  Kao otprilike one predsednicke debate 2012 kad Obama izlozi nesto, a onda Romney kao rebuttal na to ponovi sasvim isto misljenje uz onaj smesak na kraju koji kaze "but I'm a white guy".

 

Libertarijanske™ pozicije familije Paul su osudjene na propast, samo slusaj zvizduke i negodovanje koje ce Rand Paul da dobije na prvoj primary debate gde izlozi svoju spoljnopoliticku viziju.

[akibono]

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-teen-shooting/index.html?hpt=us_c1

 

Taman na vreme da se iskoriste onolika MRAP oklopna vozila što su doterali iz Iraka, a treba i Nacionalna garda da započne selektivno bombardovanje određenih predgrađa!

Pobunjeni mogu očas posla da postanu teroristi i da krenu sa balvanima i secesijom, a i Jug je blizu...

[Dimitrije]

Sto se tice spoljne politike, Hilari Klinton je manje-vise na neocon liniji.  Sto se mene licno tice, sledece izbore definitivno preskacem jer ni jedna ni druga stranka nemaju kandidata za koga bih glasao kao za manje zlo.

Edited August 11, 2014 by Dimitrije