whistleblowers: wikileaks, snowden i...

[najgori]

Saturday, 12 December 1998, 16:13S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000368NOFORNSIPDISDOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCKEO 12958 DECL: 12/12/2018TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS">RS, NISUBJECT: ENGLAND: RELIABILITY AND LONGEVITY OF UK-US RELATIONSHIP CONFIRMEDREF: A. LONDON 365 B. LONDON 366Classified By: Consul General Robbie Honerkamp for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )

1. (S/NF) Summary: We're no strangers to love. You know the rules and so do I.A full commitment's what I'm thinking of. You wouldn't get this from any other guy.I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling. Gotta make you understand.2. (C/NF) Chorus: Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you.3. (S/NF) We've known each other for so long Your heart's been aching but You're too shy to say it Inside we both know what's been going on We know the game and we're gonna play itAnd if you ask me how I'm feeling Don't tell me you're too blind to see4. (C/NF) Chorus: Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you.5. (C/NF) Chorus: Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you.6. (C/NF) Background Singers: (Ooh, give you up) (Ooh, give you up) (Ooh) Never gonna give, never gonna give(Give you up) (Ooh) Never gonna give, never gonna give (Give you up)7. (S/NF) We've know each other for so long Your heart's been aching but You're too shy to say itInside we both know what's been going on We know the game and we're gonna play itI just wanna tell you how I'm feeling Gotta make you understand8. (C/NF) Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you.9. (C/NF) Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you.10. (C/NF) Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down, never gonna run around and desert you.Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye, never gonna tell a lie and hurt you. ASTLEY

[Hella]

Срамим се признати, али већ сам овде знао о чему је реч. :(

We're no strangers to love. You know the rules and so do I.

Edited December 12, 2010 by Hella

[Roger Sanchez]

U tom stilu... Wednesday, 23 May 2007, 02:45C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001576 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 11/26/2026 TAGS PREL, PREF, PGOV, KS, KN SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SHARES IDEAS ON DPRK INTERACTIONClassified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY1. ©XXXXXXXXXXXX Arranging an Eric Clapton concert in Pyongyang could also be useful, he said, given Kim Jong-il's second son's devotion to the rock legend. END SUMMARY. .... BOOK ERIC CLAPTON-----------------9. © XXXXXXXXXXXX passed on the suggestion from his North Korean interlocutors that the USG arrange for Eric Clapton to perform a concert in Pyongyang. As Kim Jong-il's second son, Kim Jong-chol, is reported to be a great fan, the performance could be an opportunity to build good will. VERSHBOW

[zorglub]

[Musharaf]

Јопет пао Мастеркард. Пејпал су оборили пар пута. Амазон нису у стању, премало их је за то.Едит: холандска полиција ухапсила двојицу, један 16, други 19 година.

[badenac]

Depese poslate iz Zagreba :N A S L O V Datum nastanka Datum "curenja" Nivo poverljivosti Izvor09ZAGREB644 PM KOSOR STRENGTHENING POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT 2009-10-30 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb

VZCZCXRO4901PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHVB #0644/01 3031538ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 301538Z OCT 09FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREBTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9617INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY Friday, 30 October 2009, 15:38C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000644 SIPDIS STATE PASS EUR/SCE EO 12958 DECL: 10/27/2019 TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR SUBJECT: PM KOSOR STRENGTHENING POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT CORRUPTION; DEPUTY PM POLANCEC RESIGNSREF: ZAGREB 633Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).¶1. © SUMMARY: Since Jadranka Kosor took over as Prime Minister in July following Ivo Sanader’s sudden resignation, she has brought to her office what appears to be a new attitude toward allegedly corrupt party members that is strengthening the political will to fight corruption at all levels in the Croatian government and economy. While no convictions have occurred since she took office, a steady stream of investigations and indictments has been coming out of the Ministry of Interior and the State Prosecutor’s Offices. Senior government officials have told us that Kosor has said she will not protect corrupt members of the party out of loyalty or to maintain influence, as Sanader did. On October 30, Deputy PM and Economics Minister Damir Polancec resigned over allegations of involvement in a scandal at a large agri-business firm. END SUMMARY.¶2. © For the past three years, the Croatian State Prosecutor’s Office for the Suppression of Organized Crime and Corruption (USKOK) has been ratcheting up its activity in corruption cases. Until this year, however, its cases had involved mid-level bureaucrats in services such as the land registry, or health and education systems. Few indictees could be described as being politically-well connected. Since this summer, however, a series of cases have been playing out in both the media and the police and prosecutors’ offices. These cases have begun to reach politically-connected individuals. Cases under investigation have already led to significant changes in management, and detention of some key players, at the state-owned electric company HEP, and the 25-percent state-owned food producer Podravka. In another case, a long-awaited investigation of a military procurement from 2004 in involving former Defense (and later Interior) Minister Berislav Roncevic was launched following Sanader’s July resignation, with indictments issued against Roncevic and a close aide on October 28 (reftel). State Prosecutors have confided to us that they have a number of other cases either under indictment or active investigation that could also implicate high-level political figures. XXXXXXXXXXXX¶3. © All of these cases have reportedly created strains within the ruling HDZ party, with senior party members arguing that the government should not rush to judgment, and that Kosor was being too quick to seek dismissal of those tainted by various allegations. The Prodravka case presents the latest challenge in this regard. Minister of Economy (and Deputy Prime Minister) Damir Polancec is a former Podravka executive and is suspected of participation in the alleged scheme by which the management board was using embezzled funds to buy a controlling interest in the company. Six managers were arrested last week for their roles in the scheme, but Polancec has not been publicly named by investigators as a suspect. Opposition parties and the media called vociferously for Polancec’s resignation, and the leader of a junior partner in the ruling coalition publicly stated that his party, the Independent Serb Democratic Party (SDSS), would not support Polancec if parliament voted on a motion for his dismissal. Polancec suddenly resigned his position today (October 30).¶4. © Many well-informed sources have commented in particular on the shift in attitudes toward corruption between Kosor and her predecessor, Ivo Sanader. MFA State Secretary Davor Bozinovic told the Ambassador on October 26 that Kosor potentially is commencing an historic shift in governance in Croatia. He and others have noted that President Mesic is quietly supporting Kosor, his erstwhile presidential opponent, against the HDZ old guard. Bozinovic regretted that the opposition is not supporting her anti-corruption efforts, which could spare them a difficult task when they return to power.¶5. © Chamber of Commerce President Nadan Vidosevic, a long-time HDZ member and now independent candidate for president of Croatia, told the Ambassador on October 27 that he also saw a change in approach. He claimed Sanader and Kosor had recently argued over Kosor’s approach to the corruption investigations. Kosor insisted that Chief State Prosecutor Bajic be allowed to pursue all leads, while Sanader saw this as a threat to him and other party cronies.ZAGREB 00000644 002 OF 002(NOTE: Bajic himself has told the Ambassador that he has the authority to investigate anybody as evidence dictates, and that he would pursue an investigation against Polancec in the Podravka case. END NOTE.) A media source recently alleged to us that Kosor had directly threatened Sanader with potential legal action. Vidosovic claimed Polancec told him he would finger Sanader if he were indicted.¶6. © Luka Madjeric, Head of the Government’s Office for Human Rights and a former assistant to Kosor, told Poloff that Kosor rose quietly through the ranks of the HDZ. Therefore, he said, she does not have as many political IOUs, nor is she complicit in the scandals now plaguing other party members. This allows her to address corruption issues in a more straightforward manner than her predecessor. Since she does not have to worry about being personally implicated in the scandals, she is more willing than Sanader was to allow prosecutors and police to pursue leads that may implicate top party officials.¶7. (SBU) The new political will to target corruption coincides with improved procedures for investigating and prosecuting cases, many of which have been designed and advocated for under US and other donors’ assistance programs. In September, the national police officially opened their own Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (PN-USKOK), which serves as a partner to the prosecutor’s USKOK division. Both the police and prosecutor USKOKs have offices in the four largest cities, Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek, and jurisdiction for investigating organized crime and corruption cases. Courts in these four cities also have specialized USKOK courts, created in early 2009, with cleared panels of experienced judges specially trained to hear these complex criminal cases. And, as of July 1, Croatia’s new Law on Criminal Procedure granted USKOK prosecutors many of the functions previously held by investigative judges. Prosecutors can now question suspects and witnesses without going through lengthy procedures in the courts. Bajic has told us that these changes have greatly increased the pace of investigations and helped minimize leaks and the potential for witness tampering.¶8. © COMMENT: Kosor’s willingness to confront corruption appears genuine. But it almost certainly includes some elements of political calculation. First, the strategy of simply denying, ignoring or stiff-arming corruption investigations was growing increasingly hard to sustain, especially given USKOK’s increasing effectiveness. Trying to de-fang USKOK, as some HDZ hard-liners have reportedly suggested, would have met with strong international condemnation and damaged Croatia’s EU aspirations. Second, Kosor, who rose to the top of the party without a mandate from the voters and with less long-standing ties than many of the party’s barons, may well be quite happy to see intra-party rivals weakened by more aggressive and free-ranging investigations into corruption. Finally, given the HDZ’s current unpopularity, Kosor may simply have calculated that she had little to lose, and that it was best to start right away in hopes of changing the HDZ’s public image before the next elections, which must be held by fall 2011 but could come as early as spring 2010 if the governing coalition fractured. So, while the developments of the past few months signal progress, it is premature to declare victory in the fight against corruption in Croatia. No “big fish” convictions have yet been secured. And Kosor may yet find that the strains created by anti-corruption cases may complicate dealing with challenges such as the economic crisis and completing the requirements for EU accession. Nonetheless, this is potentially the beginning of a watershed moment in Croatia, made possible by an unexpected leader whose party cannot at the moment afford to disperse with her. END COMMENT. FOLEY

09ZAGREB694 PUSHING CROATIA FORWARD ON ICTY COOPERATION AND EU 2009-11-30 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb

VZCZCXRO2756OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRODE RUEHVB #0694/01 3341402ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 301402Z NOV 09FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREBTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9683INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATERUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATERUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0122 Monday, 30 November 2009, 14:02C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000694 SIPDIS SENSITIVE EMBASSY SARAJEVO FOR DAS JONES EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2019 TAGS PREL, PGOV, ICTY, EUC, HR SUBJECT: PUSHING CROATIA FORWARD ON ICTY COOPERATION AND EU ACCESSIONClassified By: Amb. James Foley, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).¶1. © SUMMARY: After making difficult concessions in order to conclude an Arbitration Agreement with Slovenia, Prime Minister Kosor now confronts an ongoing UK and Netherlands blockage of Croatia’s EU accession path, inspired by ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz. This impasse has the potential to endure as the GOC likely cannot produce documents demanded by the prosecutor, and Brammertz seems unwilling to settle for anything besides the documents. Brammertz also refuses to assist the GOC in its investigation. Importantly, the impasse could undermine the U.S. stake both in the Kosor-led reform process in Croatia and the region’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Accordingly, post recommends that we register our differences with Brammertz’s assessment at the December 3 UNSC discussion of ICTY and consider high-level approaches to the UK and Netherlands urging that the EU make Croatia’s ICTY cooperation a closing rather than an opening benchmark for Chapter 23 accession negotiations. END SUMMARY.CROATIA’S EFFORTS TO SATISFY ICTY¶2. (U) Prime Minister Kosor, Justice Minister Simonovic, Interior Minister Karamarko and Chief State Prosecutor Bajic all met with visiting Special Envoy for War Crimes Issues Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Ambassador Foley on November 27, to describe Croatia’s continuing efforts to cooperate with the ICTY and Prosecutor Serge Brammertz in the search for missing artillery documents in connection with the 1995 Operation Storm and the Gotovina case. The discussions focused on the results of Croatia’s recent police-led Task Force formed specifically to address objections Brammertz had raised with earlier efforts by Croatia to locate the documents. The Task Force’s status report, sent to ICTY on November 9, states that Croatia provided ICTY with three of the 23 documents sought (as well as a partial draft of a fourth), four others were never created, seven were destroyed, and eight have not been located.¶3. © All GOC officials insisted that Croatia is engaged in a good faith effort to locate whatever documents, if any, that can be found, and pledged that the investigation would continue. Prime Minister Kosor declared to Ambassador Rapp that the GOC had an “absolute political will” to find the documents or establish their chain of custody and said she had issued orders for the investigation to continue. She commented that it would be “absolutely stupid” for Croatia to jeopardize its otherwise imminent EU accession “over a few documents,” noting that General Gotovina’s rendition to The Hague was the work of the GOC. Karamarko predicted that if Brammertz gave a good grade to Serbia despite its failure to render Mladic and Hadzic while giving a negative grade to Croatia over missing documents “that may or may not exist,” it could have “dangerous” internal repercussions. Bajic echoed this, stating that an EU decision not to open Chapter 23 would be a “major setback to Croatia in terms of the reform process and those who have been involved in it.” (NOTE: Bajic was apparently alluding to his own anti-corruption efforts backed by Kosor. END NOTE)¶4. © Ambassador Rapp told Kosor and others the Task Force’s work was a “good faith” and “impressive” effort. Post shares this assessment of the Task Force’s work as credible and indicative of a significant effort by the GOC to cooperate with the ICTY. The investigation is far from perfect, relying too heavily on interviews with individuals connected to the documents. In our Nov. 27 meetings, we suggested ways that the continuing investigation could be made more aggressive. However, we have no reason to believe that the GOC lacks the will to find the documents or is seeking to thwart the ICTY. The artillery documents have likely been destroyed or sequestered over the years by Gotovina and his associates.ICTY CANNOT BE SATISFIED¶5. © Brammertz for his part remains unwilling to acknowledge the full degree of Croatia’s cooperation. In his written report to the UNSC he notes only that “results are limited”. While proclaiming himself “satisfied” with Serbian efforts that have nonetheless failed to produce the fugitive indictees, Brammertz seems unwilling to accept Croatian efforts as satisfactory unless they actually produce the missing papers.RESULT: IMPASSEZAGREB 00000694 002 OF 003¶6. (U) The immediate problem is that several EU member states (in particular the UK and the Netherlands) have refused to allow Croatia to open accession negotiations on Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) pending a clean bill of health on ICTY cooperation. Brammertz has indicated that he will continue to demand that Croatia produce the missing documents throughout the entirety of the appeals process. Thus Croatia could be facing a prolonged and indefinite blockage of its EU accession.¶7. © UK Ambassador Blunt (protect) told Ambassador Foley last week that some key officials in London regard Croatia as virtually unchanged since the Tudjman era and are inclined to assume GOC bad faith in its dealings with the ICTY. UK Ministers were unlikely to budge on Chapter 23 in the face of a negative assessment from Brammertz. However, Blunt personally agreed that the missing artillery documents likely could not be found by the GOC, and that Brammertz had no interest in either assisting the GOC investigation or accepting as adequate any Croatian effort that does not produce the documents. Blunt suggested that a visit by Ambassador Rapp to London to acquaint senior officials with these realities might offer the only hope for a reassessment of the entrenched UK position.¶8. © French Ambassador Pasquier told Ambassador Foley on November 28 that Paris was deeply concerned about Brammertz’s expected contrasting assessments of Serbian and Croatian cooperation. He stressed that France supports and does not wish to jeopardize Serbia’s progress, but fears that a simultaneous rejection of Croatia’s efforts and the continued blockage of Chapter 23 would badly damage public support for EU membership and Kosor herself. He expected that France would be prepared to back Croatia and implicitly dissent from Brammertz’s assessment in the Security Council on December 3. But he stressed that hope for unblocking Chapter 23 depended on Brammertz adjusting his language and finding a way on December 3 to acknowledge progress and cooperation on the part of the GOC. That might be enough, he thought, to persuade the UK and Netherlands to allow the opening of Chapter 23.A NEW U.S. APPROACH¶9. © The stakes for the U.S. of an enduring impasse on this issue are high -- not only a prolonged blockage of Croatia’s EU accession with implications for internal stability, but a closed EU door to the rest of Southeastern Europe. We therefore propose a U.S. effort aimed at unblocking Croatia’s Chapter 23 negotiations and encouraging intensified Croatian efforts to cooperate with the ICTY. One aspect of this strategy would be to urge the EU to bring more factors into its assessment of cooperation than simply the Prosecutor’s judgment. In this regard, we note that the ICTY Trial Chamber will hold a hearing on the document issue on December 16, although it is unlikely to issue a ruling until after the new year. Another aspect would be to press Brammertz to show more readiness to accept a credible investigation by the Croatians as adequate cooperation, and to provide assistance to Croatian efforts. Ultimately, we should urge the EU to allow Chapter 23 to open, with a closing benchmark being the implementation of further steps to bolster the credibility of the continuing GOC investigation or the delivery of the requested documentation.¶10. © To set the stage for this approach, post supports Ambassador Rapp’s efforts vis a vis Mr. Brammertz in advance of the December 3 UNSC session, and recommends the following points be addressed in the U.S. statement at that session if our assessment of Croatian cooperation remains at variance with his:-- Cooperation with the ICTY remains a fundamental obligation for all states in the region, and a sine qua non of Euro-Atlantic integration; -- We note that Croatia has engaged in extensive efforts to respond to the Trial Chamber’s order of September 2008 to deliver or engage in a credible investigation into the fate of the requested artillery documentation from Operation Storm; -- In our judgment those efforts have been conducted in good faith, and we believe that the Government of Croatia’s latest investigation, which is continuing, is credible and represents a significant step forward in Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY; -- At the same time, we believe the Croatian efforts should be improved and would encourage the Croatian authorities toZAGREB 00000694 003 OF 003explore additional measures such as using outside expertise and engaging in more aggressive investigative techniques; -- For that reason, we are concerned with the Prosecutor’s apparent reluctance to engage directly with the Croatian investigators in providing advice on investigative measures, and we would encourage him to reconsider that approach.¶11. © Post expects Minister of Justice Simonovic to represent Croatia in the December 3 Security Council session. Simonovic told us that at present Croatia anticipates statements of support in the Security Council from France, Austria, Turkey and potentially additional members. FOLEY

10ZAGREB53 CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND 2010-01-26 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb

VZCZCXRO8278PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHVB #0053/01 0261340ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 261340Z JAN 10FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREBTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9847INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY Tuesday, 26 January 2010, 13:40C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000053 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, AND INL/AAE EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020 TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR SUBJECT: CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND OTHER “UNTOUCHABLES” FOR CORRUPTIONREF: 09 ZAGREB 644Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).¶1. © SUMMARY: Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic has outlined to us several ongoing corruption cases targeting former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and other top government officials. Prosecutors are developing at least one case against the former PM which could result in his indictment, and they are continuing to uncover evidence in several other cases which could also implicate Sanader. PM Kosor has strengthened anti-corruption efforts by creating interagency teams to investigate the most serious cases of corruption in state-owned enterprises, while the Ministers of Interior and Justice have warned that there are no “untouchables” in the corruption clampdown. END SUMMARY.¶2. © In a series of meetings in early to mid-January, Croatian Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic described several ongoing corruption probes to Poloff which target former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, current and former ministers, and nearly all major state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bajic said that Sanader has possible involvement in several cases, but the one in which prosecutors have gathered the most evidence involves illegal mediation between his friends and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank Group of Austria. The Hypo Bank case indicates that Sanader allegedly arranged a DM 4 million loan for his neighbor, Miroslav Kutle, in the 1990’s and received a DM 800,000 kickback from Kutle in return. XXXXXXXXXXXX is cooperating with the anti-corruption prosecutors (USKOK), and XXXXXXXXXXXX story has been corroborated by XXXXXXXXXXXX with knowledge of the transactions. The illegal mediation charge for receiving gifts and benefits while abusing an official position to secure business transactions carries a prison term of one to five years. Bajic said that Hypo Bank is cooperating with the investigation.¶3. © Sanader is also implicated in several corruption cases involving the Transportation Ministry. Transport Minister Bozidar Kalmeta has been under fire for several months due to corruption cases XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said that Sanader often bypassed Kalmeta and gave instructions about how to handle certain cases directly to . Bajic did note, however, that XXXXXXXXXXXX should have at least been aware of what was happening within XXXXXXXXXXXX.¶4. © Bajic said his office is leading interagency teams established under orders from PM Kosor to deal with five priority cases involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs): XXXXXXXXXXXX. The teams, led by the prosecutor’s Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), meet daily and include the Police, Tax Administration, Finance Police, and other experts. Bajic said he believes that all major Croatian SOEs are now under investigation. Chief of Police Oliver Grbic told reporters in mid-January that police were running twelve investigations during the past six months intoXXXXXXXXXXXX management officials of public companies.¶5. © A sixth company under investigation, Podravka, has 26 percent government ownership, and parliament approves the supervisory board. At least seven members of the board, all affiliated with the ruling coalition, were arrested, and Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister of Economy and former Podravka executive) Damir Polancec resigned in October 2009. Dinko Cvitan, head of USKOK, confirmed to poloff on January 21 that USKOK has now opened a formal investigation of Polancec for illegal mediation. The scandal involves embezzlement and fraudulent loans by several Podravka-linked firms in an attempt by managers to buy controlling interest in the company. Bajic said he needed several documents from XXXXXXXXXXXX in Hungary to move forward with charges in the case, and initially described efforts to secure them from Hungary as “catastrophic.” XXXXXXXXXXXX and several Hungarian officials were uncooperative, he said, XXXXXXXXXXXX. During a January 18 meeting between PM Kosor and Hungarian PM Bajnai, PM Bajnai told press that documents relating to Podravka’s XXXXXXXXXXXX were sent on to Croatia on January 15; Bajic said he received a Hungarian prosecutor’sZAGREB 00000053 002 OF 002report on XXXXXXXXXXXX’s dealings with Podravka on January 22.¶6. (U) Minister of Interior Tomislav Karamarko and Minister of Justice Ivan Simonovic have also been spearheading a public relations campaign to publicize the “war on corruption” in Croatia. Simonovic said on Croatian Radio that “no one can be above the law -- either former or present or future presidents or prime ministers.” He went on to add that “there have always been untouchables, but this is the first time in the history of Croatia that there won’t be untouchables anymore.”¶7. © COMMENT: An important test of Croatia’s anti-corruption efforts will be the ability to go after the biggest fish. For several years, Bajic has been extremely hesitant to open even a formal investigation, let alone seek an indictment against high-ranking officials, unless he felt he had a watertight case. The opening of the formal investigation against Polancec, and Bajic’s assessment that the Hypo Bank case currently has solid evidence against Sanader, are strong signs that some “big fish” may soon face formal charges, joining former Defense and Interior Minister Berislav Roncevic, who is currently under indictment for a truck procurement scandal during his time at the MoD (reftel). While the illegal mediation charges being considered against Sanader and Polancec may seem rather minor, Bajic suggests that there is likely much more to be uncovered involving the former PM. In any case, as Bajic likes to point out, Al Capone was brought down for tax evasion rather than for his more notorious activities. FOLEY

10ZAGREB97 PODRAVKA CORRUPTION CASE TIED TO XXXXXXXXXXXX AND 2010-02-12 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb

VZCZCXRO2456PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHVB #0097/01 0431151ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 121151Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREBTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9904INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHMFISS/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY Friday, 12 February 2010, 11:51C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000097 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE AND INL/AAE, VIENNA FOR FBI/CALDWELL EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020 TAGS PREL;PGOV;KCOR;HU;HR SUBJECT: PODRAVKA CORRUPTION CASE TIED TO XXXXXXXXXXXX AND XXXXXXXXXXXX DEALREF: A. ZAGREB 0053 B. ZIMMER-CALDWELL E-MAILSClassified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for Reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)¶1. © SUMMARY: The investigation of former Deputy Prime Minister Damir Polancec and the Podravka food company (which is 26 percent state-owned) is uncovering a growing scandal and has now tied Podravka’s financing schemes to the XXXXXXXXXXXX. The majority of Podravka’s board are under arrest. Prosecutors are seeking information from XXXXXXXXXXXX, who provided XXXXXXXXXXXX to the Podravka management board. Prosecutors believeXXXXXXXXXXXX was then used in the board’s scheme to take over the company, which led to subsequent illegal actions to cover up their activities and financial losses. Media are beginning to speculate on the role of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in the affair. End Summary.¶2. © Croatia’s Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic met with RSO and Poloff on February 2 to outline the prosecutor’s “Operation Spice” investigation into Podravka and former Deputy Prime Minister Polancec. Bajic presented two documents. The first was an unsigned financing agreement between XXXXXXXXXXXX and Podravka from November 2006. The second was a completed financing agreement between a company called XXXXXXXXXXXX and from XXXXXXXXXXXX which was secured by Podravka shares. Bajic said that under the equity acquisition financing agreement, XXXXXXXXXXXX approximately 34 million euro (with an additional 39 million euro available in a second tranche) for purchase of nearly 600,000 ordinary shares of Podravka. XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said Podravka’s management, under a plan spearheaded by Polancec, had arranged the deal in order to use the proceeds to purchase a controlling interest in the company. (NOTE: Four members of Podravka’s former management board are currently in detention. The board, which is appointed by parliament, was composed of members supported by various parties within the ruling coalition. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX replaced an unnamed “Podravka Management Approved Holding Company” as the borrower of record.¶3. © Prosecutors from the Office of Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) are interested in learning the details of XXXXXXXXXXXX, including who approached XXXXXXXXXXXX (NOTE: Post forwarded copies of the XXXXXXXXXXXXagreements to the FBI office in Vienna on February 8. End Note.) Bajic told EmbOffs that the XXXXXXXXXXXX agreement is legal -- his interest is in learning who was involved on the Croatian side. According to prosecutors, the criminal aspects of the deal involveXXXXXXXXXXXX and actions taken by Polancec and others in order to XXXXXXXXXXXX.¶4. © Due to the economic crisis, the value of Podravka shares fell more than 50 percent, from approximately 600 kuna (120 USD) per share XXXXXXXXXXXX. According to prosecutors, as the value decreased, Podravka management, XXXXXXXXXXXX had to meet margin calls for the shortfall. In one scheme to increase Podravka’s revenues, at least on paper, Bajic said the management engaged in money laundering by funneling Podravka money XXXXXXXXXXXX in order to pay fraudulent contracts with Podravka.¶5. © While Polancec’s scheme at Podravka was unraveling, he was simultaneously involved in negotiations with XXXXXXXXXXXX END NOTE.) Hungarian prosecutors forwarded to Bajic their report on an investigation of XXXXXXXXXXXX in the Podravka deal. According to the report, when the XXXXXXXXXXXX of the equity agreement dropped to 35 percent in December 2008, it triggered an early termination agreement. Hungarian prosecutors say that at this point, Deputy Prime Minister Polancec, who was also Minister of Economy and deeply involved in the XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations, approached XXXXXXXXXXXX and asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to be a consultant to Podravka. As a result of these consultations, XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX for his failed schemes at Podravka.¶6. © Press reports on the XXXXXXXXXXXX connection to the Podravka case within the past week have also speculated on the possible involvement of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. Sanader was closely involved in XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations and it would have been difficult for Polancec to have taken some of the actions prosecutors are alleging he did in the XXXXXXXXXXXX talks without Sanader’s knowledge. Bajic declined to tell us on February 2 whether Sanader is a target of this investigation, but he has told us on previous occasions that his office is investigating the former PM in several cases.¶7. © Bajic has said privately that Podravka could be Croatia’s Enron, a game-changing case in the GoC’s efforts to tackle corruption, particularly if he can obtain sufficient evidence that Polancec intentionally undersold XXXXXXXXXXXX. Cooperation with Hungarian prosecutors continues to improve. Bajic said he was very impressed with the evidence and analysis the Hungarians provided on the XXXXXXXXXXXX connection.¶8. © COMMENT: The Podravka case is one of the major cases that the EU is watching to determine Croatia’s commitment to fighting corruption. The results to date are positive. The willingness and ability of USKOK to investigate an incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, almost immediately after suspicions were raised, shows that, as Prime Minister Kosor has contended, there may no longer be “untouchables” in Croatia. Post will continue to work with the FBI in order to facilitate USKOK’s contact with XXXXXXXXXXXX. END COMMENT. FOLEY

Edited December 12, 2010 by badenac

[Takeshi]

Ubedljivo najbolji tekst na temu WL... teze za razmisljanje:Eurozine

Thesis 0 "What do I think of WikiLeaks? I think it would be a good idea!" (after Mahatma Gandhi's famous quip on "Western Civilization") Thesis 1 Disclosures and leaks have been a feature of all eras, however never before has a non-state or non- corporate affiliated group done anything on the scale of what WikiLeaks has managed to do, first with the "collateral murder" video, then the "Afghan War Logs", and now "Cablegate". It looks like we have now reached the moment that the quantitative leap is morphing into a qualitative one. When WikiLeaks hit the mainstream early in 2010, this was not yet the case. In a sense, the "colossal" WikiLeaks disclosures can be explained as the consequence of the dramatic spread of IT use, together with the dramatic drop in its costs, including for the storage of millions of documents. Another contributing factor is the fact that safekeeping state and corporate secrets – never mind private ones – has become difficult in an age of instant reproducibility and dissemination. WikiLeaks becomes symbolic for a transformation in the "information society" at large, holding up a mirror of things to come. So while one can look at WikiLeaks as a (political) project and criticize it for its modus operandi, it can also be seen as the "pilot" phase in an evolution towards a far more generalized culture of anarchic exposure, beyond the traditional politics of openness and transparency. Thesis 2 For better or for worse, WikiLeaks has skyrocketed itself into the realm of high-level international politics. Out of the blue, WikiLeaks has become a full-blown player both on the world scene as well as in the national spheres of some countries. Small player as it is, WikiLeaks, by virtue of its disclosures, appears to be on a par with governments or big corporations (its next target) – at least in the domain of information gathering and publication. At same time, it is unclear whether this is a permanent feature or a temporary, hype-induced phenomenon – WikiLeaks appears to believe the former, and that looks more and more likely to be the case. Despite being a puny non-state and non-corporate actor, in its fight against the US government WikiLeaks does not believe it is punching above its weight – and is starting to behave accordingly. One might call this the "Talibanization" stage of the postmodern "Flat World" theory, where scales, times and places are declared largely irrelevant. What counts is celebrity momentum and the intense accumulation of media attention. WikiLeaks manages to capture that attention by way of spectacular information hacks, where other parties, especially civil society groups and human rights organizations, are desperately struggling to get their message across. While the latter tend to play by the rules and seek legitimacy from dominant institutions, WikiLeaks' strategy is populist insofar that it taps into public disaffection with mainstream politics. Political legitimacy, for WikiLeaks, is no longer something graciously bestowed by the powers that be. WikiLeaks bypasses this Old World structure of power and instead goes to the source of political legitimacy in today's info-society: the rapturous banality of the spectacle. WikiLeaks brilliantly puts to use the "escape velocity" of IT, using IT to leave IT behind and rudely irrupt the realm of real-world politics. Thesis 3 In the ongoing saga called "The Decline of the US Empire", WikiLeaks enters the stage as the slayer of a soft target. It would be difficult to imagine it being able to inflict quite same damage to the Russian or Chinese governments, or even to the Singaporean – not to mention their "corporate" affiliates. In Russia or China, huge cultural and linguistic barriers are at work, not to speak of purely power-related ones, which would need to be surmounted. Vastly different constituencies are also factors there, even if we are speaking about the narrower (and allegedly more global) cultures and agendas of hackers, info-activists and investigative journalists. In that sense, WikiLeaks in its present manifestation remains a typically "western" product and cannot claim to be a truly universal or global undertaking. Thesis 4 One of the main difficulties with explaining WikiLeaks arises from the fact that it is unclear (also to the WikiLeaks people themselves) whether it sees itself and operates as a content provider or as a simple conduit for leaked data (the impression is that it sees itself as either/or, depending on context and circumstances). This, by the way, has been a common problem ever since media went online en masse and publishing and communications became a service rather than a product. Julian Assange cringes every time he is portrayed as the editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks; yet WikiLeaks says it edits material before publication and claims it checks documents for authenticity with the help of hundreds of volunteer analysts. Content vs. carrier debates of this kind have been going on for decades among media activists, with no clear outcome. Instead of trying to resolve the inconsistency, it might be better to look for fresh approaches and develop new critical concepts for what has become a hybrid publishing practice involving actors far beyond the traditional domain of the professional news media. This might be why Assange and his collaborators refuse to be labelled in terms of "old categories" (journalists, hackers, etc.) and claim to represent a new Gestalt on the world information stage. Thesis 5 The steady decline of investigative journalism caused by diminishing funding is an undeniable fact. Journalism these days amounts to little more than outsourced PR remixing. The continuous acceleration and over-crowding of the so-called attention economy ensures there is no longer enough room for complicated stories. The corporate owners of mass circulation media are increasingly disinclined to see the workings and the politics of the global neoliberal economy discussed at length. The shift from information to infotainment has been embraced by journalists themselves, making it difficult to publish complex stories. WikiLeaks enters this state of affairs as an outsider, enveloped by the steamy ambiance of "citizen journalism", DIY news reporting in the blogosphere and even faster social media like Twitter. What WikiLeaks anticipates, but so far has been unable to organize, is the "crowd sourcing" of the interpretation of its leaked documents. That work, oddly, is left to the few remaining staff journalists of selected "quality" news media. Later, academics pick up the scraps and spin the stories behind the closed gates of publishing stables. But where is networked critical commentariat? Certainly, we are all busy with our minor critiques; but it remains the case that WikiLeaks generates its capacity to inspire irritation at the big end of town precisely because of the transversal and symbiotic relation it holds with establishment media institutions. There's a lesson here for the multitudes – get out of the ghetto and connect with the Oedipal other. Therein lies the conflictual terrain of the political. Traditional investigative journalism used to consist of three phases: unearthing facts, crosschecking these and backgrounding them into an understandable discourse. WikiLeaks does the first, claims to do the second, but omits the third completely. This is symptomatic of a particular brand of open access ideology, where content production itself is externalized to unknown entities "out there". The crisis in investigative journalism is neither understood nor recognized. How productive entities are supposed to sustain themselves materially is left in the dark: it is simply presumed that analysis and interpretation will be taken up by the traditional news media. But this is not happening automatically. The saga of the Afghan War Logs and Cablegate demonstrate that WikiLeaks has to approach and negotiate with well-established traditional media to secure sufficient credibility. At the same time, these media outlets prove unable to fully process the material, inevitably filtering the documents according to their own editorial policies. Thesis 6 WikiLeaks is a typical SPO (Single Person Organization, or "UPO": Unique Personality Organization). This means that the initiative taking, decision-making and execution is largely concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Like small and medium-sized businesses, the founder cannot be voted out, and, unlike many collectives, leadership does not rotate. This is not an uncommon feature within organizations, irrespective of whether they operate in the realm of politics, culture or the "civil society" sector. SPOs are recognizable, exciting, inspiring, and easy to feature in the media. Their sustainability, however, is largely dependent on the actions of their charismatic leader, and their functioning is difficult to reconcile with democratic values. This is also why they are difficult to replicate and do not scale up easily. Sovereign hacker Julian Assange is the identifying figurehead of WikiLeaks, the organization's notoriety and reputation merging with Assange's own. What WikiLeaks does and stands for becomes difficult to distinguish from Assange's rather agitated private life and his somewhat unpolished political opinions. Thesis 7 WikiLeaks raises the question as to what hackers have in common with secret services, since an elective affinity between the two is unmistakable. The love-hate relationship goes back to the very beginning of computing. One does not have to be a fan of German media theorist Friedrich Kittler or, for that matter, conspiracy theories, to acknowledge that the computer was born out of the military-industrial complex. From Alan Turing's deciphering of the Nazi Enigma code up to the role played by the first computers in the invention of the atomic bomb, from the cybernetics movement up to the Pentagon's involvement in the creation of the Internet – the articulation between computational information and the military-industrial complex is well established. Computer scientists and programmers have shaped the information revolution and the culture of openness; but at the same time they have also developed encryption ("crypto"), closing access to data for the non-initiated. What some see as "citizen journalism" others call "info war".WikiLeaks is also an organization deeply shaped by 1980s hacker culture, combined with the political values of techno-libertarianism that emerged in the 1990s. The fact that WikiLeaks was founded – and to a large extent is still run – by hard-core geeks is essential to understanding its values and moves. Unfortunately, this comes together with a good dose of the less savoury aspects of hacker culture. Not that idealism, the desire to contribute to making the world a better place, could be denied to WikiLeaks: on the contrary. But this brand of idealism (or, if you prefer, anarchism) is paired with a preference for conspiracies, an elitist attitude and a cult of secrecy (never mind condescension). This is not conducive to collaboration with like-minded people and groups, who are relegated to being the simple consumers of WikiLeaks output. The missionary zeal to enlighten the idiotic masses and "expose" the lies of government, the military and corporations is reminiscent of the well-known (or infamous) media-culture paradigm from the 1950s. Thesis 8 Lack of commonality with congenial, "another world is possible" movements drives WikiLeaks to seek public attention by way of increasingly spectacular and risky disclosures, thereby gathering a constituency of often wildly enthusiastic, but generally passive supporters. Assange himself has stated that WikiLeaks has deliberately moved away from the "egocentric" blogosphere and assorted social media and nowadays collaborates only with professional journalists and human rights activists. Yet following the nature and quantity of WikiLeaks exposures from its inception up to the present day is eerily reminiscent of watching a firework display, and that includes a "grand finale" in the form of the doomsday-machine pitched, yet-to-be-unleashed "insurance" document (".aes256"). This raises serious doubts about the long-term sustainability of WikiLeaks itself, and possibly also of the WikiLeaks model. WikiLeaks operates with ridiculously small staff – probably no more than a dozen of people form the core of its operation. While the extent and savviness of WikiLeaks' tech support is proved by its very existence, WikiLeaks' claim to several hundreds of volunteer analysts and experts is unverifiable and, to be frank, barely credible. This is clearly WikiLeaks Achilles' heel, not only from a risk and/or sustainability standpoint, but politically as well – which is what matters to us here. Thesis 9 WikiLeaks displays a stunning lack of transparency in its internal organization. Its excuse that "WikiLeaks needs to be completely opaque in order to force others to be totally transparent" amounts, in our opinion, to little more than Mad magazine's famous Spy vs. Spy cartoons. You beat the opposition but in a way that makes you indistinguishable from it. Claiming the moral high ground afterwards is not helpful – Tony Blair too excelled in that exercise. As WikiLeaks is neither a political collective nor an NGO in the legal sense, and nor, for that matter, a company or part of social movement, we need to discuss what type of organization it is that we are dealing with. Is WikiLeaks a virtual project? After all, it does exist as a (hosted) website with a domain name, which is the bottom line. But does it have a goal beyond the personal ambition of its founder(s)? Is WikiLeaks reproducible? Will we see the rise of national or local chapters that keep the name? What rules of the game will they observe? Should we rather see it as a concept that travels from context to context and that, like a meme, transforms itself in time and space? Thesis 10 Maybe WikiLeaks will organize itself around its own version of the Internet Engineering Task Force's slogan "rough consensus and running code"? Projects like Wikipedia and Indymedia have both resolved this issue in their own ways, but not without crises, conflicts and splits. A critique such as the one voiced here is not intended to force WikiLeaks into a traditional format; on the contrary, it is to explore whether WikiLeaks (and its future clones, associates, avatars and congenial family members) might stand as a model for new forms of organization and collaboration. The term "organized network" has been coined as a possible term for these formats. Another term has been "tactical media". Still others have used the generic term "internet activism". Perhaps WikiLeaks has other ideas about the direction it wants to take. But where? It is up to WikiLeaks to decide for itself. Up to now, however, we have seen very little by way of an answer, leaving others to raise questions, for example about the legality of WikiLeaks' financial arrangements (Wall Street Journal).We cannot flee the challenge of experimenting with post-representational networks. As ur-blogger Dave Winer wrote about the Apple developers, "it's not that they're ill-intentioned, they're just ill-prepared. More than their users, they live in a Reality Distortion Field, and the people who make the Computer For the Rest of Us have no clue who the rest of us are and what we are doing. But that's okay, there's a solution. Do some research, ask some questions, and listen." Thesis 11 The widely shared critique of the self-inflicted celebrity cult of Julian Assange invites the formulation of alternatives. Wouldn't it be better to run WikiLeaks as an anonymous collective or "organized network"? Some have expressed the wish to see many websites doing the same work. One group around Daniel Domscheit-Berg, who parted company with Assange in September, is already known to be working on a WikiLeaks clone. What is overlooked in this call for a proliferation of WikiLeaks is the amount of expert knowledge required to run a leak site successfully. Where is the ABC tool-kit of WikiLeaks? There is, perhaps paradoxically, much secrecy involved in this way of making-things-public. Simply downloading a WikiLeaks software kit and getting going is not a realistic option. WikiLeaks is not a plug 'n' play blog application like Wordpress, and the word "Wiki" in its name is really misleading, as Wikipedia's Jimmy Wales has been at pains to stress. Contrary to the collaboration philosophy of Wikipedia, WikiLeaks is a closed shop run with the help of an unknown number of faceless volunteers. One is forced to acknowledge that the know-how necessary to run a facility like WikiLeaks is pretty arcane. Documents not only need to be received anonymously, but also to be further anonymized before they are released online. They also need to be "edited" before being dispatched to the servers of international news organizations and trusted, influential "papers of record".WikiLeaks has built up a lot of trust and confidence over the years. Newcomers will need to go through that same, time-consuming process. The principle of WikiLeaks is not to "hack" (into state or corporate networks) but to facilitate insiders based in these large organisations to copy sensitive, confidential data and pass it on to the public domain – while remaining anonymous. If you are aspiring to become a leak node, you'd better start to get acquainted with processes like OPSEC or operations security, a step-by-step plan which "identifies critical information to determine if friendly actions can be observed by adversary intelligence systems, determines if information obtained by adversaries could be interpreted to be useful to them, and then executes selected measures that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly critical information" (Wikipedia). The WikiLeaks slogan says: "courage is contagious". According to experts, people who intend to run a WikiLeaks-type operation need nerves of steel. So before we call for one, ten, many WikiLeaks, let's be clear that those involved run risks. Whistleblower protection is paramount. Another issue is the protection of people mentioned in the leaks. The Afghan Warlogs showed that leaks can also cause "collateral damage". Editing (and eliding) is crucial. Not only OPSEC, also OPETHICS. If publishing is not carried out in a way that is absolutely secure for all concerned, there is a definite risk that the "revolution in journalism" – and politics – unleashed by WikiLeaks will be stopped in its tracks. Thesis 12 We do not think that taking a stand for or against WikiLeaks is what matters most. WikiLeaks is here to stay, until it either scuttles itself or is destroyed by opposing forces. Our point is rather to (try to) assess and ascertain what WikiLeaks can, could – and maybe even should – do, and to help formulate how "we" could relate to and interact with WikiLeaks. Despite all its drawbacks, and against all odds, WikiLeaks has rendered a sterling service to the cause of transparency, democracy and openness. As the French would say, if something like it did not exist, it would have to be invented. The quantitative – and what looks soon to become the qualitative – turn of information overload is a fact of contemporary life. The glut of disclosable information can only be expected to continue grow – and exponentially so. To organize and interpret this Himalaya of data is a collective challenge that is clearly out there, whether we give it the name "WikiLeaks" or not.

Edited December 13, 2010 by Takeshi

[Indy]

Uh, nista nema dok ne dodju intelektualci da nam objasne sta smo gledali u bioskopu. <_<

[Filipenko]

Vaistinu. Posebno me fascinira potreba za organizovanjem i višedecenijskim analizama, kako bi se ustanovilo da je nebo plavo, a kiseonik nevidljiv.

To organize and interpret this Himalaya of data is a collective challenge that is clearly out there, whether we give it the name "WikiLeaks" or not.

Kao, organizovanje i interpretacija kroz dugačke analize će doprineti da se promeni nešto za šta svi već znamo da se promeniti neće, ili pomoći onima kojima je jasno o čemu se tu radi da shvate o čemu se tu radi <_<

[Mostly harmless]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fLcUVNee_UI

[mioba]

crowd-journalism

If we all get involved with reading, researching, giving feedback and interacting, we will be able to improve journalism through the internet. Together we can make the difference!

dal je ovo next step?@luba. kad sam propustila prvih par sati da odgovorim na odgovor, poplava mi odnela dobru volju, ne zameri

[Indy]

Is it more important to suck up to the Yanks than to look after your own people?

[JozoMujica]

Moderno.

[Musharaf]

A major story brewing is the cruel, inhumane treatment - torture - to which Bradley Manning is being subjected: more to come shortly. about 1 hour ago via web Retweeted by 100+ peopleggreenwaldGlenn Greenwald

[notenoughreasonsforclaire]

Pušten/odobrena kaucija. Sledeće saslušanje 11. januara.