Хехе, па има ли који кабао из слободарске Приштине у коме не цветају руже? Ја до сада по кабаоима углавном читам о мрским Србима и Вундеркинду, понешто о косовским потенцијалима да постану Лас Вегас за заљубљенике у лигнит и - то би било то.

  Quote

A read-out from a meeting between US secretary of state Hillary Clinton and Dutch foreign minister Maxime Verhagen reveals Dutch concerns that Serbia is still not cooperating fully in the hunt for war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic. The Dutch have never forgotten or forgiven Maldic's humiliation of their troops at Srebrenica in 1995. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Dutch sceptical about Serb cooperation on war crimes

meni je ovo najzanimljivijehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/82075ne verujem da su kostunici predlozili ovo

  Quote

Proposal 7. As part of the above investigation, those suspected of supporting Mladic or having information on Mladic's support network will immediately be brought in for questioning, and if appropriate, detained. This would include senior figures such as former head of military intelligence Aca Tomic, former Army Chief of Staff Krga, and Mladic son Darko Mladic. They should be held for questioning on the same basis, as appropriate, as those currently in detention (former lower level Mladic supporters wrapped up in the past several months).Status: This has not been done. Ljajic told us eight weeks ago it was planned, but it never happened. Tomic is believed to have been close to Kostunica, including during the period that Tomic was involved in protecting Mladic in Serbia.

  On 10. 12. 2010. at 1:04, Musharaf said:

Хехе, па има ли који кабао из слободарске Приштине у коме не цветају руже? Ја до сада по кабаоима углавном читам о мрским Србима и Вундеркинду, понешто о косовским потенцијалима да постану Лас Вегас за заљубљенике у лигнит и - то би било то.

Kablovi uglavnom potvrdjuju ono shto smo znali.

  On 10. 12. 2010. at 1:44, kojot said:

meni je ovo najzanimljivijehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/82075ne verujem da su kostunici predlozili ovo

Na stranu o kakvim likovima se radi ali ovo je potpuno strasno. Voleo bih da vidim da u SAD neko ovako otvoreno cima tuzilastva i sudove i ovako otvoreno zagovara krsenje jedan od najvaznijih principa demokratije - podelu vlasti na izvrsnu, zakonodavnu i sudsku. Mada, posle ovog pranja prljavih gaca u javnosti nista me vise ne bi iznenadilo.

pa bas zato i kazem da je ovo najzanimljivije. ovome moze i da se doda da sada imamo i dokaz da ne mozemo da udjemo u eu bez priznanja kosova.

Jbg, moram ponovo da progovorim na ovoj temi. U Australiji se događaju mejdžor hepeninzi na temu Wikileaksa, podrška Asanžu (kontra ovdašnjim vlastima) je masovna, u stvari nezapamćena. Otvoreno pismo koje je Asanž uputio premijerki Gilard, koje je preneto na (državnom mediju) abc.net.au dobilo je preko 4.500 objavljenih komentara, i mnogo više onih koja nisu mogla biti objavljena, ali su uspela da obore stranicu. Praktično sve je podrška Asanžu.Ovih dana su objavljene neki za Australiju vrlo bitni leakovi. Npr. jedan od čelnika trenutno vladajuće stranke je diskutovao sa Amerikancima o sklanjanju bivšeg premijera Rudd-a (tada i predsednika iste stranke) pre nego što je iko o tome znao u Australiji. Reakcije idu od onih, "pa šta, ćaskali su malo", do zahteva da mu se sudi za izdaju zemlje. Nema dana praktično da neko od sličnih svedočanstava preterane, nezdrave, vezanosti australijske politike za USA ne izađe na videlo. U to su upetljani i vodeći novinari. Prenosim u postu ispod članak koji upravo o tome govori, pokušaću da ga prenesem sa originalnim linkovima, pošto sadrži reference koje mogu biti manje poznate neaustralijancima. U sažetku, dosta jasno objašnjava ne samo vrlo kiselu (ako ne i agresivnu) reakciju praktično svih političara sveta na WL, već i dobrog dela medija: oni su u privilegovanom odnosu, novinari (vodećih medija) su embedded sa vladajućim političarima, a i onima iz senke koji u stvari vladaju (i ovo nije teorija zavere, to je dobro poznato - u Australiji su to The Australian-American Leadership Dialogue, kao i The Australia-Israel Leadership Dialogue). Ljudi iz vrhova većine medijskih kuća, stranaka i think-tankova (koji regularno bivaju pozivani na ovakva neskriveno tajnovita druženja) su prosto rečeno ljubomorni na to što je Asanž otvorio jedan deo informacija koje oni brižljivo kriju, uglavnom o trošku poreskih obveznika, od onih kojima bi trebalo da daju kompletne informacije, a ne npr. da "beru trešnje" sa informacijama o ratu u Avganistanu, kako ćete videti da Loewenstein piše ispod. A to takođe može da objasni i neke od disonantnih glasova ovde. Neko je platio članarinu za ekskluzivni klub, a sad se pojavio mangup koji je vrata kluba svima širom otvorio, barem privremeno. Nije čudo da ima ogorčenja.

Jbg za linkove morate da odete na originalnu stranicu, ne radi prenos.WikiLeaks challenges journalism-politics partnershipANTONY LOEWENSTEINWho can now say that the WikiLeaks cables detail no new information?It was only last week that ABC TV’s 7.30 Report featured a story with supposed foreign affairs experts, including the Lowy Institute’s Michael Fullilove, who largely dismissed the significance of the document dump. Within a few days these men were all proven wrong.Now we know Labor powerbroker Mark Arbib sends confidential information to the Americans. He’s not alone.Crucially, however, our media class aren’t asking the next obvious questions.The Australian’s Paul Maley argues that communication between politicians, journalists and diplomats is part of the daily job.“It is no surprise the Americans were talking to Arbib,” he writes, “They talk to everyone.”And yet the senior Murdoch journalist doesn’t understand that the general public are rarely told about such meetings. What is discussed? What are the agendas? Is there transparency in such dealings? And who is telling what information to whom? Who benefits and what stories are not being told to avoid embarrassing somebody?The cosiness between these players is exactly what WikiLeaks is aiming to challenge. Why shouldn’t the voting public be privy to whims and wishes of the American government and their relationships with key government ministers, individuals voted in by all of us? If Arbib was warning the Americans he thought Rudd may fall, why wasn’t he telling his constituents, the ones who put him in office?The fact that the US had followed the rise of Julia Gillard and approved her views on the American alliance, Afghanistan and Israeli aggression is worrying though unsurprising.It’s extremely rare that a leader rises who hasn’t received American approval or extensive years of obedience grooming. Former Labor leader Mark Latham was loathed by the US because he publicly expressed scepticism about the US alliance, the war in Iraq and then-president George W Bush.It’s worth recalling that Latham called former prime minister John Howard an “arselicker” of the Bush administration and described a delegation of Liberal party politicians going to Washington as "a conga line of suckholes".Latham would undoubtedly use equally colourful language to describe Arbib and Kevin Rudd. So why did ABC TV’s 7.30 Report feel the need to mitigate the damage to Rudd and Australia with the latest release of cables this week by featuring a soft-ball interview with assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell?Host Kerry O’Brien didn’t even blush when he acknowledged that, “he [Campbell] asked to come on the program to counter the damage from today's exposure in Fairfax newspapers of the US embassy cables”. Since when is the ABC designed to offer air-time to a senior US official with a clear agenda to kiss and make up with Canberra? Moreover, viewers were expected to believe that Rudd was one of Barack Obama’s “best mates”?The interview was symptomatic of the greater media malaise in this massive story; journalistic jealousy and closeness to state power.The latest leaks that show profound Australian Government doubts over the Afghan mission are damning. Ministers are complicit but what about the journalists who visit Afghanistan, embed with our troops and paint an overly rose picture of brave men and women in a winnable war? Scepticism is often in short supply when reporting from the front lines.When Hillary Clinton recently visited Australia, she was treated to a light interview with ABC’s Leigh Sales (who even Tweeted a grinning photo of the two). There were no challenging questions, just friendly banter and space for the Secretary of State to spin lines about loving Australia and its hospitality.To learn a few weeks later, via WikiLeaks, that Clinton directed US officials across the world to spy on unsuspecting governments and UN officials should elicit outrage from a media fraternity that recently offered little more than obsequiousness before American power. There’s been not a peep.Such obedience doesn’t come naturally; it takes years of practice. Annual events such as the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue - a secret gathering of politicians, journalists and opinion-makers - consolidate the unhealthy, uncritical relationship between Australia and America. Many corporate journalists have attended, including the Sydney Morning Herald’s Peter Hartcher and former Labor MP and ABC reporter Maxine McKew. It aims to consolidate American hegemony rather than challenging it.It’s largely a one-way street. Australians display loyalty to an agenda and the Americans are allegedly thankful. As US participant Steve Clemons wrote in 2007:

“Phil Scanlan, founder of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, is proud of the fact that in 15 years, no-one has leaked any of the internal conversations of the conference. I won't either... unless I get permission from one of the speakers or commentators to do so which is allowed by the rules.”

The Australia-Israel Leadership Dialogue, inspired by the American one, is once again about to head to Israel for a short burst of Zionist propaganda. Journalists and politicians invariably return with the required Israeli talking points (let me guess this year; Iran is the greatest threat to the Middle East and the world?).The Age’s Michelle Grattan tweeted this week of the post-WikiLeaks reality of the tour:“All those pollies travelling to the Aust-Israel dialogue might be a bit more inclined to zip their lips in private.”But why are such gatherings so secret? Why do journalists allow themselves to be romanced without revealing the kinds of agendas they’re pushing? It’s obvious why; being close to top officials and politicians makes them feel connected and important. Being an insider is many reporters’ ideal position. Independence is secondary to receiving sanctioned links and elevated status in a globalised world.The WikiLeaks documents challenge the entire corrupted relationship between media and political elites. Founder Julian Assange is an outsider and doesn’t attend exclusive and secret meetings where the furthering of US foreign policy goals are on the cards. He aims to disrupt that dynamic. Many in the media resent not being leaked the information themselves and are jealous. Others simply dislike a lone-wolf citizen with remarkable tech-savvy to challenge their viability.One can dismiss The Australian’s bragging of knowing virtually everything in the WikiLeaks cables before they were released - if only they more deeply scrutinised the effect of war policies they backed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and beyond - because the key point here isn’t merely covering disillusionment over Rudd or Gillard or anyone else. It’s something far bigger; a fundamental re-writing of the relationship between journalists and governments.The WikiLeaks cable dumps have revealed a chasm between establishment attitudes towards truth-telling and furious attempts to protect the embarrassed. The sign of any healthy democracy is the ways in which it deals with the most sensitive of information. Senior media figures and government authorities are often remarkably consistent in their messaging. They move in similar worlds and they often rely on each other for sourcing.It’s this kind of dangerous, mutual sycophancy that WikiLeaks could break.

Edited December 10, 201014 yr by Indy

Dokumenti koji se ticu Srbije 1. : N A S L O V Datum nastanka Datum "curenja" Nivo poverljivosti IzvorICTY ACTION PLAN SCORECARD, OCTOBER 2006 2006-10-17 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXYZ0006OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHBW #1681/01 2900620ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 170620Z OCT 06FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9541INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0263RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0499RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATERHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1206RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATERUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0616RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0250RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE Tuesday, 17 October 2006, 06:20C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001681 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/WCI DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE EO 12958 DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY TAGS ICTY, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KCRM, UNSC, SR SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN SCORECARD, OCTOBER 2006 Classified By: DCM Roderick Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,d)¶1. © SUMMARY: In July, the USG provided the GoS with eleven recommendations designed to advance the hunt for Ratko Mladic. Due primarily to the resistance of PM Kostunica himself, the GoS has not carried out in full a single one of our recommendations (two have been, arguably, partially initiated). In fact, Kostunica has literally brushed aside our recommendations, telling A/S Fried recently that Serbia “does not need two action plans.” With a constitutional referendum and follow-on elections likely to dominate the political calendar for the next several months, Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic has told us frankly that we should not expect any more public activity on the issue, though he says below-the-radar operational activities will continue.¶2. © Moreover, Carla del Ponte has sharply criticized the ineffectiveness of GoS implementation of the “Action Plan” Serbia negotiated this summer with ICTY and has told us that the PM has demonstrated no political will to take the steps necessary to bring about Mladic’s arrest. By contrast, the PM declared over the weekend that Serbia has done “absolutely everything” to cooperate with ICTY and criticized the EU’s “irrational” approach on Hague conditionality. Below is an assessment of the GOS’ response to our eleven recommendations. END SUMMARYProposal 1: Kostunica publicly calls for Mladic’s immediate arrest and instructs all Serbian government officials to do their utmost to accomplish this goal, stating that those that obstruct this goal will be immediately removed from their position. Kostunica asks for the public’s help in this effort and ensures that the government’s hotline number is widely publicized.Status: In the three months since the Action Plan was initiated, Kostunica has said twice in prepared written statements (one delivered orally) that Mladic should be “brought in and handed over” to ICTY (i.e., he shied away from using the word “arrest,” despite explicitly assuring the Ambassador that he would do so). Within those two statements, he tempered his calls by also criticizing Bosnia’s “mockery of justice” in not apprehending former BiH General Dudakovic for crimes committed against Serbs. Kostunica has made no appeal for public assistance in the Mladic hunt, has not publicly called upon his security services to find and arrest Mladic, nor publicly threatened to sanction individuals assisting in Mladic’s flight from justice. In our opinion, and that of Ljajic and Deputy PM Dulic-Markovic, neither the PM nor the government has made a sustained effort to address our first proposal. Ideally, we would want to see Kostunica launch a sustained effort with a nationally-televised, Oval Office-type address to the nation to make the points mentioned in our recommendation.Proposal 2. Kostunica, along with Interior Minister Jocic, issues PUBLIC instructions to all security units throughout Serbia to dedicate full resources to arresting Mladic.Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.Proposal 3. Serbian security forces initiate an effective manhunt along the lines of U.S. Marshal Service recommendations for such efforts.Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned. The U.S. Marshals provided a detailed briefing to Minister Jocic in 2005, including specific recommendations on the structure and hierarchy of an effective task force. It is our assessment, and that of ICTY, that the gaps in cooperation among the security services (BIA, VBA, and MUP) and the lack of more results are at least in significant measure due to the loose and ineffective operational structure the GOS has put in place. Operational efforts remain largely as they were prior to the announcement of the Action Plan.Proposal 4. Kostunica privately calls on the Serbian Orthodox Church to publicly support the arrest/transfer of Mladic. Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.Proposal 5. Headed by the PM and President Tadic, Serbian military intelligence (VBA) shares the classified briefing given recently at the country’s Supreme Defense Council with U.S. Ambassador and selected EU ambassadors. That briefing should include a comprehensive list of people known or suspected to have supported Mladic, as well as his whereabouts up until the present day and GoS efforts to apprehend him.Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.Proposal 6. Justice Minister Stojkovic announces the opening of a formal investigation into Mladic supporters based in part on the findings of the Republika Srpska Truth Commission report on Srebrenica, which includes a detailed list of people involved in or supporting the Srebrenica massacre, including Mladic and his support network. The focus of this investigation should be to identify current Mladic supporters.Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned. In fact, Stojkovic’s efforts on ICTY since July have been largely counterproductive. For instance, he opposed the War Crimes Prosecutor’s effort to introduce legislation that would give him jurisdiction over aiders and abettors of ICTY fugitives.Proposal 7. As part of the above investigation, those suspected of supporting Mladic or having information on Mladic’s support network will immediately be brought in for questioning, and if appropriate, detained. This would include senior figures such as former head of military intelligence Aca Tomic, former Army Chief of Staff Krga, and Mladic son Darko Mladic. They should be held for questioning on the same basis, as appropriate, as those currently in detention (former lower level Mladic supporters wrapped up in the past several months).Status: This has not been done. Ljajic told us eight weeks ago it was planned, but it never happened. Tomic is believed to have been close to Kostunica, including during the period that Tomic was involved in protecting Mladic in Serbia.Proposal 8. Kostunica proposes to parliament a new law that imposes additional criminal penalties on anyone found to be assisting PIFWCs in any way, including financially.Status: This has not been done. In fact, Kostunica’s government initially opposed this legislation when proposed by the War Crimes Prosecutor. Only following high-level interventions by USG and ICTY officials has Kostunica offered to introduce such legislation - an offer del Ponte dismissed as insignificant given that the Serbian parliament is not slated to meet anytime soon.Proposal 9. The Government of Serbia prepares and makes available to the general public a report on Mladic, containing especially information about war crimes he is accused of committing.Status: This has not been done. Kostunica’s government has done basically nothing to place Mladic’s crimes in context. Indeed, before the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in 2005, Kostunica’s party blocked a special parliamentary resolution that would have condemned the massacre; Kostunica argued that such a resolution would be inappropriate if it omitted an equal condemnation of crimes against Serbs. Ljajic told us he planned to “leak” information about Mladic’s alleged atrocities and his massive financial gains from the Bosnia war to local press to start “demythologizing” him, but this never happened and, according to Ljajic, is no longer being planned.Proposal 10. Kostunica forms an interagency task force within Serbia headed by the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes, which will be responsible for the location and apprehension of Mladic and other high-priority fugitive indictees. All personnel on the task force should be properly vetted to ensure that no investigations or the mission of the task force will be compromised.Status: This recommendation has been only incompletely fulfilled. The task force, put in place at the behest of ICTY in the course of negotiations over the “Action Plan” (i.e., not in response to the USG recommendation), lacks the sort of centralized, well-resourced structure that the U.S. Marshals recommended. War Crimes Prosecutor Vukcevic is broadly coordinating operational activities, but ICTY has assessed that this has not led to a substantial change in the form or the intensity of the effort.Proposal 11. Serbia helps establish and actively participates in a regional task force to coordinate efforts among the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies throughout the region to find and apprehend persons wanted for war crimes.Status: An initiative in this direction has been launched, and one meeting has been held. According to Ljajic, there is some evidence that Bosnian security agencies and BIA are cooperating on some surveillance activities.¶3. © CONCLUSION: In all, at most one or two of our eleven proposals have been partly addressed. The most critical element of the proposals - a consistent, concerted effort by Kostunica and the government to make the public aware that they are serious about tracking down and arresting Mladic - has not been initiated. Yet on October 14, Kostunica told local press that “Serbia has done absolutely everything to complete cooperation with the Hague tribunal.” Based on what we have seen to date, we cannot concur with that rosy assessment.POLT

SERBIAN GOVERNMENT HUNTING FOR MLADIC 2009-05-06 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO7886RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSRDE RUEHBW #0399/01 1261731ZNY CCCCC ZZHR 061731Z MAY 09FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1264INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRHEHNS/NSC WASHDCRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE Wednesday, 06 May 2009, 17:31C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000399 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS PREL, KWAC, SR SUBJECT: SERBIAN GOVERNMENT HUNTING FOR MLADIC REF: 08 BELGRADE 1097Classified By: Acting DCM Troy Pederson for reasons 1.4 (b/d).Summary------- ¶1. © The Serbian government continues to publicly emphasize its efforts to capture war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic, and Serbian officials responsible for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) privately tell us the current government is very supportive of their work. ICTY Belgrade,s chief, who sits in on operations discussions, agreed that Serbia was looking hard for Mladic and was also providing all document and witness assistance required, in contrast to the previous government,s efforts. Serbia also continued to prosecute domestic war crimes cases, and the war crimes court recently issued verdicts and sentences in two high-profile cases. The current government clearly wants to find Mladic, a prerequisite for moving ahead with EU accession and Serbia,s future. End Summary.Looking for Mladic------------------ ¶2. © With the upcoming visit of ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, the main question regarding Serbia,s ICTY cooperation -- and the key to the Dutch unblocking Serbia,s frozen Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU -- is whether Serbia is really doing all it can to find the remaining two ICTY indictees, particularly Bosnian Serb wartime military leader Ratko Mladic. Government officials continue to state publicly that Serbia is making every effort to find Mladic and fellow indictee Goran Hadzic. Chief of the War Crimes Investigation police Aleksandar Kostic told visiting S/WCI representative Julie Vibul-Jolles May 5 that the current government had the will to find the fugitives, but that so much time had passed that it was hard to track them down. He said there was no information to suggest Mladic was in Serbia but there was no information that he was anywhere else either. Police continued to search for leads, including surveilling known associates and family members. Regional intelligence sharing was helpful and had led to the arrests of Stojan Zupljanin and Radovan Karadzic, Kostic said.¶3. © ICTY Belgrade Office Head Deyan Mihov told us May 5 that he believed that the search for Mladic was very active. The current government was engaged with ICTY, a “big change compared to the past.” Mihov said the Security Information Agency (BIA) and Military Intelligence Agency (VBA) were now working well together and supporting each other,s efforts. Mihov said he attends weekly meetings of the Action Team as an observer and receives detailed operational information and plans concerning the search for both fugitives. Mihov told us that the meetings of the Action Team, which was officially co-headed by President of the National Council for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic, were really led by Presidential Chief of Staff and National Security Council Secretary Miki Rakic, which he viewed as a strong indication that the search for Mladic was a personal priority of President Tadic. Mihov said Rakic had provided the same information to Brammertz each time he visited and also requested Brammertz,s help obtaining specific intelligence assistance. Mihov emphasized that the government could use any additional intelligence assistance the U.S. could provide. Mihov said he was impressed that the Action Team was trying equally hard to find Hadzic, even though the political payoff for Serbia from his capture would be much less than for Mladic.Technical Cooperation with ICTY------------------------------- ¶4. (SBU) Serbia,s technical cooperation with the ICTY, while not as high-profile, is also essential. Director of the ICTY Cooperation Council Office Dusan Ignjatovic told us May 4 his office had granted all of ICTY,s and defense lawyers, archive access requests, delivered all subpoenas to witnesses, addressed all witness protection issues ICTY had identified, and complied with more than 98% of document requests. Mihov confirmed that technical cooperation was close to 100% with no outstanding problems over documents, another improvement over the past government.Domestic Trials---------------- BELGRADE 00000399 002 OF 002¶5. (SBU) Domestic war crimes trials also continue, with verdicts recently in two high-profile cases. War Crimes Prosecutor Vukcevic told us May 5 the current government was much more supportive of domestic war crimes trials. On April 23, the court convicted four former policemen for murdering 50 ethnic Albanian civilians in Suva Reka, Kosovo in March 1999. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years in prison, one to 15 years, and the fourth to 13 years. Three of the defendants, including the principal defendant, were acquitted. Vukcevic told us that he was pleased that the case had established that a crime had been committed but that he would appeal the acquittals. The War Crimes Court also completed on March 12 a retrial in the Ovcara (Vukovar) case, convicting 13 members of the Vukovar Territorial Defense for torturing and killing in November 1991 200 Croatian prisoners of war who had surrendered. Five individuals were acquitted, and one received a much lighter sentence in the retrial (6 years versus the original 15), and the War Crimes Prosecutor,s spokesman announced the prosecutor would appeal that sentence and the acquittals.Comment------- ¶6. © In contrast to the approach of the previous government, the current Serbian government is working hard on ICTY cooperation. The pressing domestic political need to unblock the SAA and move closer to European Union membership is clearly a major motivating factor, made all the more important by the worsening economic situation. While the term “fully cooperating” may be elusive, it is important to acknowledge the current government’s efforts and not allow the dead weight of the past to hinder Serbia,s future. End Comment. MUNTER

SERBIA IN THE WAKE OF VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN’S VISIT 2009-07-29 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO9271RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHBW #0765/01 2101350ZNY CCCCC ZZHR 291351Z JUL 09FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0109INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GERUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE Wednesday, 29 July 2009, 13:51C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000765 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG EO 12958 DECL: 2019/07/29 TAGS ECON, PREL, SR, MARR, PGOV SUBJECT: SERBIA IN THE WAKE OF VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN’S VISIT REF: A) BELGRADE 725 B) BELGRADE743CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, Charge, US Department of State, US Embassy Belgrade; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)Summary------- ¶1. © Vice President Biden’s May 20 visit to Belgrade, during which he met with President Tadic, Prime Minister Cvetkovic, and Defense Minister Sutanovac, marked a “new beginning” in the bilateral relationship thanks to the core message that the United States recognized Serbia as an important regional partner and potential contributor to global prosperity and stability. Two months later, we have seen constructive engagement from the Serbian government on a certain number of issues. Our challenge now is to maintain and build on the momentum generated by the Vice President’s visit to keep pushing Serbia forward on Euro-Atlantic integration, regional relations, economic development, and the bilateral relationship. During this several-month period between Ambassadors, post urges Washington policymakers to visit Belgrade and engage in international fora with their Serbian counterparts as frequently as possible on these key issues. End Summary.Euro-Atlantic Integration------------------------- ¶2. © The Vice President’s message that the United States wanted Serbia to consider joining NATO, but would not push it to do so given the lasting impact of the 1999 NATO intervention, was well-received by the Serbian government and public. Lively public debate about the pros and cons of joining NATO was triggered by the recent 10th anniversary of the bombings, and was given additional impetus by the VPOTUS visit. In addition, the Vice President’s decision to meet separately with Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac has given this reform-oriented advocate of cooperation with NATO additional credibility and weight in the policymaking process. Moving forward, we should continue to expand our vibrant military-to-military relationship with Serbia, work with partners to educate the public about the benefits of NATO membership, and encourage the Serbian government to cut through its interagency squabbles and open its long-awaited NATO mission in Brussels. We should also encourage Serbia to play an increasingly active role in global security issues, for example by sending police to Afghanistan within the ISAF framework.¶3. © It is also in our interest to find new ways to support Serbia’s aspirations to join the European Union, in that integration is the surest guarantee of increased prosperity and stability in the Balkans. Our existing assistance programs are already focused on the reforms needed for successful EU candidacy, from the economic sector to good governance and rule of law, and should be continued. While progress is slow and imperfect, the Serbian government is gradually working its way through the mountain of reform legislation that it must adopt and implement in these areas. Its main challenge now is to convince The Netherlands that its efforts to capture ICTY indictees Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic are sincere and effective, as the Dutch insist on Serbia’s full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal as a prerequisite to unfreezing the Interim Trade Agreement and ratifying the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Pursuant to Vice President Biden’s discussion of the issue with President Tadic, we are working with the FBI to bring a fugitive investigation expert to Belgrade to review the case file on Mladic and determine whether there are avenues of investigation or techniques that have not yet been applied. Continued engagement with the Dutch government to identify steps the Serbian government could take to demonstrate its best efforts to cooperate with the ICTY would enhance our leverage with the Serbian government.BELGRADE 00000765 002 OF 004Regional Relations------------------ ¶4. © The Vice President’s clear statement during his visit that the United States is not asking Serbia to recognize Kosovo helped defuse tension over this issue. Some in government, most notably Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and officials from the Kosovo Ministry, continue to take an obstinate and non-constructive public approach to relations with Kosovo, however. Although we are still seeking a modus operandi in which Serbian and Kosovo officials can engage in regional fora on essential areas of cooperation, including trade, and organized crime, some progress is happening behind the scenes. In the two months since the Vice President’s visit, the Serbian government has encouraged Kosovo Serbs to return to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS); worked with KEK to encourage Kosovo Serbs to sign electricity contracts; and fired Northern Kosovo hardliner Marko Jaksic from his GOS-paid job as head of the Mitrovica Health Center.¶5. © We are not seeing a sufficiently constructive approach from the Serbian government on decentralization and the ICO-led plan to create five new Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo through municipal elections in November, however; rather than recognizing it as the best opportunity for Kosovo Serbs to defend their interests, President Tadic and others have made unhelpful, preemptive statements saying that the Serbian government cannot approve any elections carried out under the Ahtisaari Plan by the “false state” of Kosovo. Another stumbling block is Serbia’s intent to hold elections in August in Kosovo for the Belgrade-controlled parallel structures in two municipalities. It is premature to conclude that the Serbian government’s position on the November elections is immutable, however. President Tadic’s statement that “the conditions do not exist for us to encourage Kosovo Serbs to participate in these elections” provides us an opening to initiate a dialogue with pragmatic elements in Belgrade -- namely Tadic and his advisors -- about the conditions under which the Serbian government could support Kosovo Serb participation. While it may not ultimately be possible to reach common ground, it is important to try.Economic Development-------------------- ¶6. © During his meeting with Prime Minister Cvetkovic, Vice President Biden praised the Serbian government’s efforts to minimize the impact of the global economic crisis on the country. He encouraged Serbia to deal with the issue of property restitution, as it was the only country in the region that had not done so, and the uncertainty surrounding land ownership was having a negative effect on the investment climate. Since the visit, a draft law on zoning and the use of construction land that has been in development for several years has moved forward from the Government to the Parliament. As currently written, the draft law will clarify the situation by granting title to land to those who currently have ownership or use rights of the buildings on it. The law will almost completely eliminate the possibility of restitution in kind to claimants, however, except in the case of vacant/undeveloped property. The draft law foresees the creation of a restitution fund that would be financed by the proceeds of the conversion of privatized public enterprise land to other uses. In order to ensure the equity of the process, which is of particular interest to the Serbian-American diaspora, we are engaging with the government and parliament to carefully consider the two issues - restitution and zoning - so as not to have the zoning law preempt legitimate claims for restitution (reftel A).BELGRADE 00000765 003 OF 004¶7. © Serbia continues to face a tough road toward economic development. While it continues to make progress toward WTO, accession is not expected before mid-2010 due to the need for significant amounts of additional legislation. Meanwhile, the economic crisis continues to bite into Serbia as foreign direct investment has nearly dried up and the government has become increasingly dependent on borrowing to meet budgetary demands this year. It will be important to encourage the government to continue making the necessary reforms to free the economy from the old state-centered model and to encourage greater market liberalization and entrepreneurship, so that it will be competitive once the global economy rebounds.Bilateral Relationship---------------------- ¶8. © President Obama’s election generated enormous goodwill in Serbia, and people here believe that the new Administration is taking a more even-handed approach to the Balkans than in the past. Vice President Biden’s visit confirmed and cemented this impression on the part of both the Serbian government and public, by demonstrating that one of the most vocal critics of the Milosevic regime now saw the leadership of Serbia as potential partners and forces for regional stability. We still have a great deal of work to do to uproot entrenched stereotypes of the U.S. Government as imperialistic, anti-Serb, and pro-Albanian, however. A recent Medium Gallup poll showed Serbia tied with Pakistan for first place - at 61% -- on the list of countries whose citizens hold negative views of the United States. Frequent statements from the Serbian government characterizing the United States as an international bully, combined with a pronounced aversion to acknowledging U.S. partnership and assistance and a penchant for exaggerating Russian contributions and the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement, contribute to this outdated public perception. We will push our Serbian interlocutors to take a more balanced and mature approach to their public statements about the United States, while continuing our intense public diplomacy efforts to highlight our work here.¶9. © Visas are a central issue in Serbia’s relations with its Western partners, and the United States is no exception. Serbian citizens long for the days when they could travel freely with Yugoslav passports and chafe under visa requirements, seeing them as a “sanction” held over from the 1990s. While the application process for U.S. visas is light-years more customer friendly and less onerous than that of most European countries, which frequently require applicants to queue for hours three or four times, it has become the subject of debate now that the European Union is moving forward with Schengen visa liberalization for Serbia. Given the stable situation in Serbia and the relatively low refusal rate, post believes that it would be justified to consider increasing the standard validity of non-immigrant visas from the current three years to five (reftel B). This would have a beneficial impact on our workload at a time of reduced consular staffing, while also allowing us to send a signal to the Serbian people that we recognize the progress that the country has made since its democratic transition and are eager for increased engagement.Comment------- ¶10. © Although the current Serbian government is democratic andBELGRADE 00000765 004 OF 004pro-European, it is also frequently unfocused and politically timid. Our challenge is to make it clear that Vice President Biden’s visit wasn’t merely a reward for good behavior, but rather the start of what needs to be a much more intensive dialogue on how we can work together more closely and productively on our shared objectives. End Comment.BRUSH BRUSH

SERBIA GRAPPLES WITH RUSSIA RELATIONS IN ADVANCE OF MEDVEDEV 2009-09-03 2010-12-09 SECRET Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO7882RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSLDE RUEHBW #0841 2461342ZNY SSSSS ZZHR 031341Z SEP 09FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDCINFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCRUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE Thursday, 03 September 2009, 13:41S E C R E T BELGRADE 000841 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG EO 12958 DECL: 2019/09/03 TAGS PGOV, PREL, EINT, MASS, RS, SR SUBJECT: SERBIA GRAPPLES WITH RUSSIA RELATIONS IN ADVANCE OF MEDVEDEV VISITREF: (A) 08 BELGRADE 98, (B) 08 BELGRADE 1333CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, Charge D’Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)Summary------- ¶1. © As Serbia seeks to overcome mounting economic difficulties and move forward toward its primary goal of European Union membership, the government is struggling to strike the right tone in the bilateral relationship with Russia: President Tadic and his close advisors appear intent on giving the Russians their due without irritating the Europeans, while others - including Foreign Minister Jeremic - seem to want to use close ties to Russia as a “bargaining chip” with Europe and the United States (ref A). A planned visit by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in October is already drawing additional attention to a bilateral relationship where warm, friendly rhetoric is often not matched by concrete, mutually-beneficial cooperation in the political, economic, or security realms. End Summary.October Medvedev Visit---------------------- ¶2. © The recent announcement that Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev will visit Serbia in October to mark the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade during World War II by Soviet forces has focused public attention on the Serbia-Russia relationship and triggered press headlines heralding the “return to a brotherly embrace” with Russia. Presidential advisor Aleksandar Knezevic told us on August 20 that the Russians had proposed “grandiose” plans for the visit (rumored to include a military parade); Knezevic said the presidency would tailor the events to show that Russia was one of several key partners. With regard to the World War II celebrations in particular, he acknowledged the challenge of balancing the commemoration of the Soviet role in liberating Belgrade with the role of other Allies in the broader war effort. Presidential chief of staff Miki Rakic confirmed on August 25 that plans were still in flux and that the date had not been set, despite widespread press reports that it would be October 20.¶3. (SBU) The primary deliverables for the Medvedev visit will reportedly be a $1.4 billion Russian loan for budget support and infrastructure projects and the creation of a joint venture between Gazpromneft and Srbijagas for the expansion of the Banatski Dvor underground natural gas storage facility. Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin has told the press that the two countries would sign a number of bilateral agreements but declined to reveal the topics. We expect that the two sides will highlight the visa-free travel arrangement that went into force on June 1, as well as the existing bilateral Free Trade Agreement.Political Relations: Balancing the Rhetoric------------------------------------------- ¶4. © The dilemma that Tadic and his associates in the Presidency face in calibrating the tone and lavishness of the Medvedev visit is symptomatic of Serbia’s overall bilateral relationship with Russia. They perceive a continued need for Russia’s UNSC veto and rhetorical support on Kosovo, particularly while the International Court of Justice case is ongoing. At the same time, this more pragmatic group of policymakers sees that Russia is not always a reliable partner - such as when the Russian government used Kosovo’s declaration of independence to justify its actions in Abkhazia and Ossetia. This group also realizes that Russian assistance pales in comparison to the tangible benefits of eventual European Union membership. They argue - correctly - that the two objectives of EU membership and good relations with Russia need not be mutually exclusive, pointing to numerous statements by the Russian government that it supports Serbia’s EU aspirations. Tadic and his closest foreign policy advisors therefore devote most of their energy to European integration, focusing on Russia only when necessary to maintain balance in outward appearances.¶5. © Vuk Jeremic and his team at the Foreign Ministry take a different approach, however. They appear unwilling to fully commit themselves rhetorically or on a policy level to the EU course, and cling to Russia, China, and the Non-Alignment Movement as counterweights or alternatives to the EU. Following from that logic, they see every positive interaction with Moscow as a blow to Washington, and even attempted to leverage the Medvedev visit to lobby for a meeting for FM Jeremic with the Secretary. Political Director Borko Stefanovic’s August 25 description to us of plans for an elaborate Medvedev visit was emblematic: he and possibly Jeremic would travel to Moscow in advance of the visit to coordinate messaging; Medvedev would address Parliament, becoming the first head of state to do so; and the anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade would be used to highlight Serbia’s proud anti-fascist history.Economic Relations: Skewed to Russia’s Benefit--------------------------------------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) Russia is Serbia’s second largest trading partner and eighth largest source of investment. Bilateral trade has grown significantly in recent years, reaching a high of just over $4 billion in 2008; Russian imports account for about 13% of Serbia’s total imports. Numbers have fallen off in 2009 due to the global economic crisis, but the balance has remained in Russia’s favor due to Serbia’s heavy reliance on energy imports; in the first six months of the year, total trade was $1.1 billion, with an $830 million trade deficit for Serbia. Nearly 75% of Russian exports to Serbia are energy-related, with crude oil accounting for 49% and natural gas 25%.¶7. (SBU) Since 2000, Russian firms have invested approximately $1 billion in Serbia -- $742 million in cash, and the rest in obligations for future investments. The 2009 purchase of Serbia’s state petroleum industry, NIS, by Gazpromneft for $555 million (ref B) accounts for more than half of total Russian investment. Other significant deals include Lukoil’s 2003 purchase of 80% of petrol distribution company Beopetrol for $187 million and auto parts producer Autodetal’s troubled 2008 purchase of a 39% stake in bus manufacturer Ikarbus for $10.7 million. Russia’s only greenfield investment in Serbia to date has been the Bank of Moscow, which began serving corporate and retail clients in June 2009 with $24 million in founding capital. The Bank of Moscow appears to be focusing on potential energy deals and acquisition of Serbian state-owned banks.Security Cooperation: All Talk, (Almost) No Action--------------------------------------------- ------ ¶8. (SBU) As in the political realm, Serbia’s security relations with Russia are more symbolic than concrete. Minister of Defense Sutanovac meets periodically with Russian counterparts and organizes photo opportunities with the handful of Serbian students who attend Russian military institutes each year. The Serbian military still relies heavily on Soviet-era equipment, including a dwindling fleet of MiGs, and therefore remains dependent on Russia for spare parts, service, and technical training; the amount Russia charges for this support is a frequent sore point. Serbia’s military relationship with Russia is largely void of content; there are no joint operational or planning exercises. A recent Russian-funded demining project at the Nis Airport attracted significant media coverage, despite being modest in scope. (Comment: In contrast to these relatively limited engagements with Russia, the Serbian military’s ties with the U.S. and NATO are growing dynamically. In the past year alone, over 60 members of the Serbian military attended U.S. NCO training, military academies, and war colleges; Serbia is restructuring its military on the Western/NATO model; it enjoys a dynamic relationship with the Ohio National Guard; and it is upping its involvement in Partnership for Peace, including hosting the ongoing MEDCEUR disaster response exercise with EUCOM. End Comment.)¶9. (S) Russia has not been forthcoming on Serbia’s requests for assistance in locating Hague indictee Ratko Mladic, presidential advisor Miki Rakic told us on August 25. Rakic said he believed based on Mladic’s profile that the former Bosnian Serb military commander was likely hiding in Serbia, possibly with assistance from foreign sources. Asking that the information “remain at this table,” Rakic told us that he had posed a series of questions about specific contacts between Mladic associates and Russian diplomats, as well as phone calls and trips to Russia by Mladic associates, to FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov in June, to Russian National Security Advisor Nikolay Patrushev in July, and most recently to Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov. If the Russians did not respond before Medvedev’s visit, Rakic said, Tadic would raise the issue himself.Comment: This Is Not a Competition----------------------------------- ¶10. © While the European Union is and should remain Serbia’s ultimate goal, the country is also inextricably linked by energy dependency, military relationships, and cultural affinity with Russia. The Serbian government’s struggle to find the proper balance between these two imperatives stems from conflict between policymakers - such as Jeremic -- who see foreign policy as a zero-sum game, and those who believe in mutually beneficial relationships. We can strengthen the hand of pragmatic forces in the Serbian government by recognizing in our public statements that Serbia needs to devote effort to having a healthy, balanced relationship with Russia. We can afford to be magnanimous on this point because we have the better story to tell: the foreign direct investment statistics and the results of our programs supporting economic, political, and security reform demonstrate that Serbia benefits far more from cooperation with the United States and the West than it does from Russian rhetoric. While the Serbian public has not yet fully accepted these facts, our constant public diplomacy efforts to highlight the results of U.S. engagement are having an impact. We should continue to let our actions speak louder than our words by engaging with Serbia on issues of mutual interest, avoiding any direct comparisons with Russia, and flatly rejecting the notion that in the 21st century any country must choose between East and West. End Comment. BRUSH

SERBIA: WAR CRIMES AMBASSADOR RAPP HIGHLIGHTS IMPORTANCE OF 2009-10-22 2010-12-09 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO8255RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLARUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVKRUEHYGDE RUEHBW #1222/01 2951513ZNR UUUUU ZZHR 221512Z OCT 09FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0308INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GERUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK Thursday, 22 October 2009, 15:12UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001222 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (P. PETERSON), S/WCI (JOLLES) EO 12958 N/A TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, KAWC, SR SUBJECT: SERBIA: WAR CRIMES AMBASSADOR RAPP HIGHLIGHTS IMPORTANCE OF CATCHING RATKO MLADIC/GORAN HADZICBELGRADE 00001222 001.2 OF 003¶1. (U) Ambassador Rapp has cleared this cable.Summary------- ¶2. (SBU) In meetings with President Tadic and other Serbian government officials on October 16, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues Stephen Rapp received updates on the search for International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) fugitives Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic and highlighted the importance of capturing them, offering U.S. assistance. He also discussed domestic Serbian war crimes trials and cooperation with regional neighbors. Serbian officials made it clear to Ambassador Rapp their commitment to finding the fugitives, but they avoided Ambassador Rapp’s suggestion that they take up the challenge of influencing public opinion about the need for war crimes trials. Both sides agreed on the clear need for increased regional war crimes cooperation. End Summary.U.S. Message: Capturing Fugitives Essential-------------------------------------------- ¶3. (U) Ambassador Rapp met with Serbian President Boris Tadic, Serbian National Council for Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Chairman Rasim Ljajic, War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic, War Crimes Special Court President Sinisa Vazic, and War Crimes Investigations Service Chief Aleksandar Kostic in Belgrade on October 16.¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp emphasized to all of his interlocutors that cooperation with the ICTY, in particular handing over the remaining two fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic remained essential. He added that while he would give his assessment of Serbia’s efforts to Brammertz, capturing Mladic was the ultimate solution to making progress on EU accession. The Ambassador also conveyed the USG’s willingness to help Serbia in any way possible, pointing to the recently completed FBI assessment as a sign of USG commitment. Ambassador Rapp suggested there might be other ways the United States could help, such as tracking financial support to Mladic.Tadic Meeting------------- ¶5. (SBU) President Tadic told Ambassador Rapp that those who likely were hiding Mladic had links to organized crime and wealth attributable to ‘90’s wartime profiteering. Tadic therefore was enthusiastic about his intelligence services’ cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in the recent capture of 2.8 tons of cocaine off the coast of Uruguay (http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.p hp?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd= 19&nav_id=62454). This seizure would open the door to arrests of a number of organized crime figures in Serbia, as well as in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said, and perhaps shake the trees of the organized crime elements involved with shielding Mladic. Tadic said he hoped to increase and expand U.S. intelligence and security links in order to bolster Serbia’s role as a pillar of stability in the region.¶6. (SBU) Referring to the recent FBI assessment, Tadic thanked Ambassador Rapp and the USG for offering the assistance and said Serbia very much welcomed the help. Tadic expressed his frustration with the Dutch position on blocking Serbian accession to the EU until Mladic and Hadzic were apprehended and turned overBELGRADE 00001222 002.2 OF 003to The Hague. “My people are starting to ask me what I have delivered in terms of EU accession and as long as the Dutch block us, they are adding to the ammunition of the opposition, i.e., the Serbian Progressive Party.” Tadic said he also was frustrated with the role his former Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) had played in hiding information about Mladic from Tadic. “I believe they have violated our law,” he said, “and when Mladic is caught, we will prove that.” Summing up, Tadic said, “we are counting on the United States to help us.”¶7. (SBU) In response Ambassador Rapp said he doubted the Dutch position would change without the capture of Mladic. He encouraged the president to emphasize the atmospherics in Serbia surrounding Mladic and the war crimes tribunal in general. “You need to get out the message that the court is good, and members of the government need to speak respectfully of the institution.”Fugitive Hunt------------- ¶8. (SBU) Other Serbian officials told Ambassador Rapp that it was the government’s priority to deliver the two remaining fugitives to The Hague Tribunal and thus close this painful chapter of Serbia’s history. ICTY Cooperation Chair Ljajic and others asked for USG assistance convincing the Dutch of Serbia’s efforts. Ljajic said that the government was in a difficult position, with no support for ICTY cooperation among a public which saw it as simply an extra condition for EU accession; what he described as “enormous international pressure” made it more difficult to explain the need for cooperation to the public. Ambassador Rapp told Ljajic it was important that government officials not speak out against the ICTY’s decisions, because doing so sent the wrong message. Ljajic said the ICTY was very unpopular and had issued many strange decisions, such as seemingly extra harsh sentences for Serbs such as Lukic, although he agreed the message had to be balanced. Ljajic added that on other issues of ICTY cooperation, Serbia was fulfilling all requests for witness subpoenas, witness protection, and archive access.¶9. (SBU) Despite many challenges, the Action Team responsible for capturing Mladic and Hadzic would be successful because of its efforts, officials told Ambassador Rapp. Difficulties included the years that had passed since the former government had had good information on the fugitives’ whereabouts in 2006, the likelihood that both had altered their appearance and were using false identities, the vast number of useless tips called into the police that had to be investigated, difficulties tracking how the fugitives communicated with family, and financial support, according to war crimes police head Kostic and war crimes prosecutor Vukcevic. Kostic noted that Radovan Karadzic had been supporting himself with only 450 Euros a month immediately prior to his apprehension in 2008. Ljajic said the Action Team had approached Russia for help on both fugitives, since there was evidence they had travelled to or contemplated travel to Russia.Domestic War Crimes Trials-------------------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp’s interlocutors also noted the successes of Serbia’s domestic war crimes trials in the Serbian War Crimes Special Court. They all expressed thanks for the USG’s strong and continuing support to the court and the police War Crimes Investigation Service. Ambassador Rapp noted the importance of having trials in national courts, which facilitated reconciliation. Kostic said the domestic trials had been important in helping the Serbian public understand that Serbs had committed war crimes and not just been victims of them. Ambassador Rapp told Judge Vazic he was concerned that the Supreme Court had overturned many of the Special Court’s convictions. Vazic noted that Supreme Court judgesBELGRADE 00001222 003.2 OF 003lacked the specialized training to understand war crimes cases. Under provisions of the judicial reform package (Ref A), the Appeals Courts would hear war crimes appeals and those judges would be required to obtain training, resulting in better appeals outcomes. Ambassador Rapp asked Vukcevic about the acquittals in the Bytyqi trial for killings of three American citizen brothers (Ref B). Vukcevic said his office would appeal the acquittals. Both he and Kostic noted the difficulties getting police with information on the case to talk.Regional Cooperation-------------------- ¶11. (SBU) Regional cooperation on war crimes was mixed, officials told Ambassador Rapp. While Kostic said cooperation with EULEX, the Croatian police, and Bosnian intelligence services had helped collect evidence on the ICTY fugitives, Ljajic said the monthly meetings with regional intelligence agencies were no longer useful, and he asked for USG support in emphasizing the need for cooperation in the fugitive search. On domestic cases, Vukcevic noted that evidence transfer agreements with Croatia and Montenegro had been successful, helping Serbia to try 28 cases with evidence transferred from Croatia; USG-aided efforts to establish a similar agreement with Bosnia had stalled, however. A key problem, Vukcevic said, was that Bosnia wanted to try those cases in which the crimes had occurred in Bosnia, whereas Serbia wanted to try individuals who were present in Serbia and could not be extradited because of the lack of extradition agreements. Serbia had just passed a law allowing extradition if a bilateral agreement existed, but Croatia and Bosnia still had constitutional prohibitions. In the meantime, evidence transfer was the only way to prosecute these cases, said Vukcevic. Ambassador Rapp pledged his office’s continuing support to the negotiations with Bosnia and to other regional cooperation efforts.Comment------- ¶12. (SBU) Conversations with Serbian officials confirmed that Serbia is making strong efforts to capture the fugitives, but officials involved in the fugitive search know that they need a lucky break that could come soon or not. Serbian officials were clearly hoping Ambassador Rapp would attempt to convince the Dutch to drop their objections to implementation of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement. With the exception of ICTY Cooperation Chair Ljajic, who frequently speaks publicly about the importance of ICTY cooperation, interlocutors did not respond to Ambassador Rapp’s message that public sentiment about ICTY cooperation would not change without strong messages from the leadership. The visit also highlighted the need to continue to work with governments in the region to improve cooperation on the fugitive search and on domestic trials. End Comment. BRUSH

Dokumenti koji se ticu Srbije 2. : N A S L O V Datum nastanka Datum "curenja" Nivo poverljivosti IzvorPost ICJ Opinion: Serbia to Continue Obstructing Kosovo 2010-01-12 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO5704RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHBW #0003/01 0121330ZNY CCCCC ZZHR 121330Z JAN 10FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0565INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GERUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0010 Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 13:30C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000003 NOFORN SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/12 TAGS PGOV, PREL, KV, SR SUBJECT: Post ICJ Opinion: Serbia to Continue Obstructing Kosovo IndependenceCLASSIFIED BY: Bradford J. Bell, Acting Economics Chief, US Department of State, Economics Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)Summary------- ¶1. © We expect Serbia will continue to obstruct and undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty in the lead up to and following the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, which most believe will be ambiguous. Regardless of the position taken by the ICJ, Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty are irrefutable. Serbia’s government is unified in its refusal to accept that fact but is internally divided regarding how to push its claim to Kosovo after the ICJ issues its opinion in spring 2010. President Boris Tadic and his office appear willing to follow our and the EU’s advice and to quietly accept any outcome while moving Serbia toward EU integration, but are lacking a coordinated plan to do so. In contrast, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, driven by personal interest in self promotion and a misperception of the domestic political landscape, is planning a new diplomatic offensive on Kosovo on the heels of any ICJ opinion. Absent an alternative approach by Tadic, we expect Jeremic’s more confrontational plan will win out. To temper Serbia’s post ICJ strategy and to limit its duration and impact, we will need to be well coordinated with our EU allies and encourage the EU to wisely use its significant remaining carrots and sticks with Serbia to elicit the cooperative resolution of this issue, while assuring Kosovo’s territorial integrity. We must also be prepared to fight Serbia in the UNGA if necessary. End Summary.Preparing for the Advisory Opinion---------------------------------- ¶2. © Over the next several months as the ICJ deliberates, we expect Foreign Minister Jeremic to maintain an offensive posture and continue his globe spanning travels, heralding the upcoming ICJ decision at each stop. He will try to prevent any further recognitions of Kosovo during this interim period and to shore up support from Serbia’s allies, particularly Russia, the EU non-recognizers (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Previewing his intentions, Serbian media reported on December 25 that Jeremic sent a letter to foreign ministers of countries which have not recognized Kosovo, expressing gratitude for upholding the UN Charter and the hope that they would continue to respect Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, Jeremic wrote that the ICJ opinion “must not be obstructed in any way,” suggesting that political meddling could influence the court’s opinion. Absent direct intervention from President Tadic, we expect Jeremic will continue his quixotic global campaign with vigor.ICJ Opinion Likely to be Ambiguous---------------------------------- ¶3. © The Serbian government expects the ICJ to deliver its opinion to the UN General Assembly by spring 2010. Media and analysts have speculated that the most likely scenario is for the ICJ to issue multiple opinions, with some supporting Kosovo and others Serbia. Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanovic told local media on December 25 that he expected there would be significant political pressure to make the ICJ’s decision “more neutral.” Serbia is thus preparing for an outcome that remains ambiguous, with both sides claiming victory. While the ruling’s expected ambiguity could provide Serbia an opportunity to end its campaign against Kosovo, Foreign Minister Jeremic has already said Serbia will take no action that implies Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo (reftel).¶4. © Serbian politicians, including influential Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Rasim Ljajic, have told us that Serbia cannot merely forget Kosovo out of fear that the vocal and numerous opposition will accuse Tadic of treason. Ljajic pointed to the recent Progressive (SNS) victory in the Belgrade municipality of Vozdevac as a clear sign that the opposition has the potential toBELGRADE 00000003 002 OF 004pose a real threat to the governing coalition. As a result, Serbian officials are now contemplating how vocal and obstructive the GoS should be after any final ICJ ruling in order to assure their political majority.Tadic’s Unclear Path-------------------- ¶5. © Over the past month several European interlocutors have stressed with President Tadic the need to move beyond Kosovo and to focus on Serbia’s European integration. We believe the message is beginning to sink in with Tadic, but he still lacks a coordinated strategy to implement. Tadic’s National Security Advisor, Miki Rakic, told Charge Brush on December 10that the government still had no plan for its post-ICJ policy and was only then beginning to consider alternatives. In separate meetings with Charge Brush on December 28 and 29, Defense Minister Sutanovac and informal presidential advisor Srdjan Saper both seemed confused when Charge Brush asked about Tadic’s post-ICJ strategy, with neither even willing to speculate on what the President might be thinking.¶6. © EU sources in Belgrade confirm that during his December 15 meeting with Tadic EU Director General for Foreign Affairs Robert Cooper encouraged Serbia to think carefully about how it would handle Kosovo issues after the ICJ opinion. According to our EU sources, Tadic and his foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic told Cooper that Serbia was currently analyzing four possible post ICJ scenarios, but had yet to “draw any firm conclusions.” Specifically Tadic mentioned consideration of the China-Taiwan model and the “two Germanies” scenario, recognizing that any outcome would need to be tailored to Kosovo’s “special situation.” Tadic reportedly told Cooper that after the ICJ advisory opinion Belgrade would be more than ready to talk to Pristina -even directly- as long as talks were not perceived or portrayed as Serbia directly or indirectly recognizing Kosovo.Thoughts of Partition still in their Heads------------------------------------------ ¶7. © Tadic reportedly told Cooper that he recognized that there needed to be a degree of clarity and finality to any outcome, cognizant that the EU would be unwilling to accept another “Cyprus-like” state as a member. Ratkovic more explicitly told Cooper that while Belgrade would need to accept that it would not govern Kosovo again, Kosovo would have to come to the realization that it would not effectively be able to extend its governance north of the Ibar river. Tadic reiterated to Cooper that ultimately Serbia’s post ICJ strategy was being developed to avoid Serbia being a problem to its international partners but where its “concerns were taken care of.”¶8. © Belgrade’s Quint (U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy) have frequently discussed the seriousness of Serbia’s plans. Although listening to FM Jeremic would lead one to believe that the Minister actually has a plan for new status talks, neither he nor any other GoS official has ever publicly fleshed out Serbian goals, much less the details for any such talks. In a January 6 conversation with ChargC) Brush, Ratkovic would say only that “Serbia did not send the Kosovo issue to the ICJ just to have it come back and blow everything up; we will use the ruling to increase regional stability.”Jeremic’s Preferred Path------------------------ ¶9. © Despite claims from MFA Political Director Borko StefanovicBELGRADE 00000003 003 OF 004to Charge Brush on December 21 that the MFA was seeking “a way out of its Kosovo strategy post ICJ” we believe FM Jeremic intends to continue to beat the Kosovo drum throughout 2010. Jeremic is reportedly championing an alternative scenario under which the GoS would seek to “legalize any ICJ opinion,” as MFA State Secretary Stefanovic told Cooper on December 14. Serbia’s goal could be to again use the UN to bolster the political legitimacy of its stance against Kosovo’s independence. We expect the MFA envisions a multi-month process during which Serbia would try to persuade the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution welcoming the ICJ ruling (or perhaps the portions favorable to Serbia’s position) and calling for new negotiations as a result. If the UN effort is unsuccessful, the GoS might energize the NAM to issue a statement calling for new talks.¶10. © Under Jeremic’s scenario we expect Serbia would aim to reopen negotiations on Kosovo’s status. The MFA would likely not seek direct talks with Pristina authorities but rather would insist upon a new, “impartial” international negotiator from a non-recognizing country. While Serbia’s goal would be to reopen talks, it would not be in any hurry to conclude them and instead would try to drag out any talks for years. The ruling Democratic Party (DS) would likely want to postpone any result until after parliamentary elections scheduled at the latest for May 2012.EU’s Carrots and Sticks----------------------- ¶11. © While no EU state expects Serbia to recognize Kosovo, Serbia’s EU path will remain muddled without recognizable and accepted borders between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU must lead the charge in making this clear to Serbia. The EU must be willing to offer Serbia carrots and sticks until there is a clearly accepted understanding of where Serbia ends and the Republic of Kosovo begins, while maintaining Kosovo’s current territorial integrity. Levers at the EU’s disposal include determining when to unblock the SAA with Serbia, the disbursement of IPA funds, and the speed with which the EU will consider Serbia’s recently submitted application for EU candidacy. We also must be wary of EU states offering Serbia the wrong carrots. The UK Ambassador to Belgrade recently suggested to us that we should no longer push for additional countries to recognize Kosovo, in an effort to dissuade Jeremic from his own globe-trotting efforts to dissuade recognitions.U.S. Approach------------ ¶12. © The arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador, coupled with two upcoming CODELS (Voinovich and Pomeroy), may provide the USG excellent opportunities to help President Tadic orient his rhetoric to European integration and the benefits thereof. During his December 15 meeting with Secretary Clinton, Jeremic invited her to visit Serbia in 2010. A visit in advance of the ICJ decision (the first since Powell visited in 2003 for PM Djindjic’s funeral) would highlight USG support for Tadic’s EU path and help steer him away from any pressure to consider new status negotiations.Comment------- ¶13. © If Belgrade follows the path that President Tadic appears to favor, Serbia will be able to move forward with EU integration while still not recognizing Kosovo. If however, when the ICJ opinion is issued, Jeremic is the only one with a plan, the GOS is likely to pursue the misguided idea of continuing to battle in the UNGA. This course will at least delay and at worse threatenBELGRADE 00000003 004 OF 004Serbia’s EU aspirations. In either case, we must snuff out any further roundabout talk on partition by both President Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic.¶14. © We must use the next few months before the ICJ issues its opinion to press Tadic to put the battle for Kosovo behind him once and for all and focus all of his government’s energy on EU accession. The initial step is to encourage our EU Quint members to clearly state to Jeremic and Tadic that Serbia risks complicating its EU path if it continues to push for new status negotiations after an ICJ opinion. EU Quint members in Belgrade have told us they intend to meet with Jeremic soon to stress this specific point, pending guidance from their capitals. This message, however, will need to be reinforced directly by EU capitals and from Brussels. If our strategy is to be effective, we need to encourage Brussels to have a clear, coordinated policy regarding the linkage between Serbia’s EU path and resolving practical issues with Kosovo. If Serbia fails to heed this message we and our like minded European partners will need to prepare to defeat any new Kosovo resolution in the UNGA next fall. This will require an aggressive strategy to counter Serbia’s lobbying.¶15. © Any strategy must include a coordinated statement from Washington and European capitals at the highest levels that Kosovo’s partition is not an option and that continued defacto partition through Serbian interference will also put Serbia’s EU membership on hold. This will require a coordinated effort with the European Union, which must be persuaded to use its leverage in tangible ways. A visit by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to Belgrade before the ICJ ruling would help solidify this message both in Belgrade and in EU capitals. End Comment. PEDERSON

Serbia: Ambassador's First Meeting with President Tadic 2010-01-29 2010-12-09 SECRET Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO1757RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSLDE RUEHBW #0019/01 0291750ZNY SSSSS ZZHR 291750Z JAN 10FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0678INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCRUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000019 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/29 TAGS: PREL PGOV SR KVSUBJECT: Serbia: Ambassador's First Meeting with President Tadic CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Warlick, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) Summary ------- ¶1. © In a January 28 meeting with Serbian President Tadic, the Ambassador emphasized her desire to expand bilateral cooperation on defense and economic issues, as well as to increase high-level contacts between our governments. Tadic welcomed the intent but expressed frustration that he had not been able to visit Washington for over four years. Echoing comments made in his public remarks during the Ambassador's credentialing ceremony (para. 12), Tadic warned that U.S. policy toward Kosovo threatened democracy in Serbia by strengthening the nationalist opposition. The Ambassador reiterated U.S. support for Serbia's EU aspirations and urged continued strong cooperation with the ICTY. Tadic expressed appreciation for U.S. support on EU integration and explained that Serbia was pursuing the remaining ICTY indictees because it was in its own interest to do so. Similarly, as a Dayton guarantor Serbia would continue to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tadic said. He told the Ambassador that he would work with Croatian President-elect Josipovic, an old acquaintance, to address the many difficult issues dividing Serbia and Croatia. On Kosovo, Tadic emphatically stated that Serbia would not change its position on its own territorial integrity. He expressed the desire to pursue a dialogue after the International Court of Justice renders its advisory opinion, as the current situation was untenable. The Ambassador responded that the dialogue should begin now in order to find the best way to manage reaction to the ICJ's opinion and move forward on the many pressing issues related to Kosovo. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) After presenting her credentials on January 28, the Ambassador had a 45 minute working meeting with President Boris Tadic. Tadic was accompanied by his foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic and MFA State Secretary Mirko Stefanovic. Bilateral --------- ¶3. © The Ambassador told Tadic that she was eager to work with him to build on the strong foundation created by her predecessors, noting that Vice President Biden's May 2009 visit to Belgrade had opened a new chapter in our bilateral relations. She said that the military-to-military relationship was strong, but it was time to take it to the next level through increased joint training and exchanges, Serbian contributions to peacekeeping missions, and participation in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities. The Ambassador also told Tadic that she would focus on expanding economic and business ties, including new investments, and supporting the completion of Serbia's WTO accession. She also emphasized her commitment to seek opportunities for additional high-level contacts between our governments. She noted President Tadic's visit to UNGA last fall, the recent visits of Defense Minister Sutanovac and Foreign Minister Jeremic to Washington, and Interior Minister Dacic's meetings this week. The Ambassador pointed to two upcoming congressional delegations to Serbia and the February 10 groundbreaking for the New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Belgrade as early opportunities to continue our engagement and further highlight the relationship publicly. ¶4. © Tadic said he was pleasantly surprised to hear about the scheduled groundbreaking event, as he had worked with four different U.S. ambassadors going back to his tenure as Minister of Defense to identify a suitable location for the new U.S. Embassy BELGRADE 00000019 002 OF 005 and facilitate the sale. He commented that he was encouraged to see countries such as the U.S. and China investing in modern diplomatic facilities in Belgrade. He also stated that it was time for the Serbian government to reconstruct its own buildings damaged during the 1999 NATO intervention. ¶5. © Shifting topics abruptly, Tadic voiced a complaint that despite all the talk of expanding the bilateral relations and the strong ties between Serbia and the U.S., he himself had not visited Washington in over four years. (Note: To our knowledge this is the first time that Tadic has expressed an interest in doing so in several years.) He commented that concrete results of high-level engagement were lacking, and cautioned that U.S. policy toward the Balkans, in particular on Kosovo, had implications for democracy in Serbia. Recalling his own early involvement in the democracy movement and the month he had spent in jail for his activism, Tadic said that his government was committed to continued democratic reform; it had to contend with a significant nationalist opposition, however. The Ambassador reiterated the USG's commitment, following on the Vice President's May 2009 visit, to sustained bilateral engagement with Serbia on all issues, including those areas where we do not agree. She offered to continue to explore possibilities for high-level visits on both sides to keep our bilateral channels open. European Integration and ICTY Cooperation ----------------------------------------- ¶6. © The Ambassador recalled Vice President Biden's expression of support for Serbia's European aspirations and congratulated Tadic on his government's recent achievements with the EU, including visa liberalization, implementation of the Interim Trade Agreement, and submission of its membership application. The U.S. saw the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union as a key priority and remained prepared, working with the EU, to support this process. She underscored the importance of continued engagement with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and U.S. readiness to support the hunt for Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. ¶7. (S) Tadic expressed appreciation for U.S. help with the EU accession process. On ICTY cooperation, he explained that Serbia was working intensively to capture Ratko Mladic "for our own reasons," not due to pressure from the international community or the ICTY, but to demonstrate its own resolve to capture war criminals. He emphasized Serbia's commitment to reconciliation in the region, pointing to its responsibilities as a guarantor of Dayton. He also underscored Serbia's commitment to cooperation with the U.S. on a range of threats, including organized crime, corruption, terrorism, and narcotics, pointing to the success of several recent joint counternarcotics operations. Tadic stated that undertaking such sensitive operations was politically risky and Serbia would continue to do the right thing; in return, however, Serbia hoped for similarly strong bilateral engagement in other areas and expected support from the U.S. on these efforts with other countries in the region. The Ambassador expressed U.S. appreciation for Serbia's strong cooperation in these important areas and said she would be glad to discuss any areas of specific concern. Regional Cooperation -------------------- BELGRADE 00000019 003 OF 005 ¶8. © The Ambassador noted the important role that Serbia can and needs to play on regional relations and stability, particularly with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. She conveyed appreciation for the Serbian government's constructive support of the Butmir process and urged Tadic to remain engaged with the parties, including RS leader Milorad Dodik, in particular. She expressed USG concern about the prospect of any referendum moving forward in the Republika Srpska. Tadic said that Serbia believed the preservation of BiH's territorial integrity was paramount; as a guarantor of the Dayton Accords, Serbia sought a peaceful solution on constitutional reform that would be consistent with Dayton principles and preserve the model of two entities, three constituent peoples. Tadic noted that he was seeking a parliamentary resolution on Srebrenica to recognize the gravity of the crimes committed there. ¶9. © With regard to Croatia, Tadic said that he had known President-elect Ivo Josipovic for a long time and wanted to work with him to address the many different open issues such as the "huge problem" of refugees and property rights. He said he expected the U.S. to support Serbian efforts to improve that relationship and address the outstanding issues. Tadic told the Ambassador that he would soon visit Albania and commented on the enormous organized crime problem facing Montenegro, where he also requested U.S. support. He emphasized that Serbia supported the independence and territorial integrity of its neighbors in the region, but many issues needed to be addressed. ¶10. © Turning to Kosovo, Tadic told the Ambassador "I must be as clear as possible with you - Serbia will not change its views on its territorial integrity. I want to be direct with you, as I have with your other colleagues. After the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issues its advisory opinion, we want to pursue dialogue and find a way to address the issues related to Kosovo, as the current situation is untenable." The Ambassador responded that despite our clear differences, the U.S. and Serbia needed to keep the channels of communication on Kosovo open. While the Vice President had conveyed our agreement to disagree on Kosovo, it was important for Serbia to focus on practical ways to improve the lives of Serbs in Kosovo and on resolving outstanding issues. She emphasized the need for Serbia to take a responsible and forward looking approach after the ICJ opinion, consistent with President Tadic's own forward looking approach toward European integration, that would not do harm to stability in the region nor to the other important work on our bilateral agenda. She recommended both sides begin a dialogue now about how to manage the way forward and said she hoped to continue discussions with Tadic's foreign policy advisor, Jovan Ratkovic, on this subject as early as next week. Comment ------- ¶11. (S) Comment: President Tadic made clear during the meeting and in his public statement that he does not intend to back down on Kosovo. At the same time, he demonstrated that he is open to dialogue and told us what he wants: a warm reception in Washington and continued high level engagement across the U.S. interagency, cooperation on sensitive security issues, public support for Serbia's efforts to improve regional relations, and sensitivity to the domestic political constraints he faces on Kosovo policy. Now is the opportune moment to lay out for Tadic and his key foreign policy advisors what we expect of him, namely a constructive and coordinated response to the ICJ's upcoming advisory opinion accompanied by increased pragmatism in establishing a modus vivendi BELGRADE 00000019 004 OF 005 with Kosovo, and continued forceful engagement with Milorad Dodik to preserve stability in BiH. In the coming months, high-level Washington engagement with Tadic will be essential to drive these messages home. The other sine qua non is a strong, consistent message from the European Union that continued antagonism and inflexibility on Kosovo after the ICJ opinion will hamper Serbia's progress toward membership. End Comment. ¶12. (U) Text of President Tadic's remarks (translation provided by the Presidency): ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. BORIS TADIC, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, ON THE OCCASSION OF THE PRESENT A TION OF THE LETTERS OF CREDENCE BY HER EXCELLENCY MRS. MARY WARLICK, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA Belgrade, 28 January 2010 Excellency, It is my great pleasure to receive the Letters by which the Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States of America is accrediting you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Serbia. May I ask you, Excellency, to convey to President Obama my cordial greetings and the assurances of my highest consideration. The relationship with the United States of America is one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia. Ever since the times when the interests of our country in the United States of America were represented by the diplomat and the well-known scientist of Serbian origin Mihailo Pupin, the bilateral relations between our two countries have been characterized by friendship and alliance at all turning points in the world's history of the twentieth century. Such relations and all-round cooperation were damaged at the time of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Following the democratic changed in Serbia, we have restored our close cooperation which entered a new quality phase after the visit of Vice-President Biden. Today, Serbia is a truly democratic country. In the past ten years of the democratic transition we have successfully implemented many reforms guaranteeing the respect of human rights, minority rights, media freedoms and free elections. We are very grateful for the assistance by the United States of America in this democratization process in Serbia. We are particularly satisfied with the successful cooperation that we established with the United States of America in combating international terrorism and organized crime. BELGRADE 00000019 005 OF 005 Excellency, Large Serbian community in America has for centuries provided a link between our two countries and contributed to the creation of American society. Serbia is a sister state with the State of Illinois and the main partner of the Army of Serbia is the National Guard of Ohio. We are particularly pleased with the fact that American companies are among the biggest foreign investors in Serbia. Madam Ambassador, Becoming a full member of the European Union is the strategic goal of the Republic of Serbia. We are convinced that the European Union will not be complete until Serbia and other Western Balkan countries are integrated into it. The support of the United States of America in that regard is of exceptional importance. Madam Ambassador, Serbia will continue to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in Kosovo by political and diplomatic means. We would like 2010 to be the year of peaceful, compromise and realistic solution of this issue, after the International Court of Justice renders its advisory opinion. Despite different positions that we have regarding the status of Kosovo, we hope that American policy will respect legitimate Serbian interests and that it will not jeopardize democracy in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia is very much concerned about the plans of Pristina to forcefully establish its rule over the majority-Serb northern Kosovo. If this strategy were to be implemented it would have unforeseen consequences for the stability of the region. Excellency, Serbia is strongly committed to strengthening the regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. Without a stable, democratic Serbia it is not possible to imagine the stable and prosperous Western Balkans. Serbia respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its internal arrangements defined by the Dayton Accords as well as the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Excellency, You begin your mission at the very important time for the Republic of Serbia but also for the further development of the relations between our two countries. I wish you every success in the discharge of your responsible duties. l am convinced that with your knowledge and experience you will make an important contribution to the development of the overall cooperation between our two countries. WARLICK

SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN 2010-02-05 2010-12-09 SECRET Embassy Belgrade

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO7590RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSLDE RUEHBW #0025/01 0361420ZNY SSSSS ZZHR 051420Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCRUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK Friday, 05 February 2010, 14:20S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000025 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/05 TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, SR, KV SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RATKOVICREF: BELGRADE 19; STATE 9661CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)Summary------- ¶1. © In a February 3 conversation with the Ambassador, presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic conveyed Serbia’s desire for intensified cooperation with the United States and detailed his plans to visit Washington February 10-12 to discuss possible ways forward on Kosovo, saying Serbia sought a “realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution” for Serbs and Albanians. He expressed concern that the International Civilian Office (ICO) plan to integrate northern Kosovo could destabilize the situation and threaten political stability in Serbia, and would not engage on the issue of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks. Ratkovic noted the important role that KFOR played in Kosovo and said that Serbia would formally open its NATO mission by mid-2010 and increase its participation in Partnership for Peace activities. Progress toward EU membership would likely be slowed by EU enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting new members until they were fully qualified, he predicted. Ratkovic expressed cautious optimism that a breakthrough in bilateral relations with Croatia would be possible, concern about Macedonia’s long-term stability, and disappointment with the poor state of relations with Montenegro. End Summary.¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador paid an introductory courtesy call on presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic on February 3. Ratkovic was accompanied by his deputy Aleksandar Knezevic.Bilateral Relations------------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador thanked Ratkovic for his help in arranging for her to present her credentials to President Tadic so soon after arrival (Ref B), which had allowed her to get off to a quick start in meeting Serbian government officials. She told Ratkovic that she would work to build on the already-strong momentum of the bilateral relationship by expanding our cooperation on economic and security issues, while addressing difficult issues in a constructive way. The visits of Codel Voinovich, Codel Pomeroy, and EUR DAS Jones in February would be important opportunities for dialogue, she noted. Ratkovic said that Senator Voinovich was an old friend who was always welcome in Serbia. The fact that he and Senator Shaheen would be arriving on February 17 after having visited Pristina on the anniversary of Kosovo’s declaration of independence was problematic, however; Ratkovic was unable to confirm whether President Tadic would meet with the congressional delegation pending resolution of these itinerary concerns.¶4. (S) Ratkovic expressed the hope that 2010 would be a “decisive” year for building bilateral relations in which the United States would treat Serbia as a true partner in all areas of cooperation, not just security. Serbia intended to continue its cooperation with the U.S. on sensitive intelligence matters and to increase defense cooperation by working on peacekeeping training with the Ohio National Guard. Multilaterally, Serbia had committed to sending up to 50 additional gendarmerie to UNMISTAH in Haiti under EU auspices and was in discussions with Spain about contributing troops to UNIFIL in Lebanon.BELGRADE 00000025 002 OF 005Brainstorming on Kosovo----------------------- ¶5. © Ratkovic informed the Ambassador that he would visit Washington from February 10-12, after attending Wehrkunde in Munich and a Conservative Party event in London. He hoped to meet with A/S Gordon, as well as contacts in Congress, for “discreet brainstorming” on ways forward on Kosovo. The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concerns (Ref B) about indications that Serbia would continue to take a confrontational approach on Kosovo after the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion. Dismissing the question of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks as a “mere tactical issue” for the MFA to decide, Ratkovic said the Presidency was focused on the bigger question of how to achieve a “realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution” for Serbs and Albanians. Ratkovic said that Serbia recognized and was trying to respect the “legitimate interests” of Kosovar Albanians; in return, Serbia expected the Kosovars to respect the legitimate interests of Serbia and Kosovo Serbs as well. He stressed that the Serbian government wanted the U.S. to be part of and support a solution that would lead to regional stability and reconciliation. For that reason, he hoped for high-level, free-thinking, and informal discussions in Washington; he had received explicit guidance from President Tadic on the specifics of his message, but was not at liberty to share it yet.¶6. © Ratkovic returned to the topic of Kosovo later in the conversation, stressing the sensitivity of how the north is handled. Ratkovic argued that the northern part of Kosovo had a history distinct from the rest of the province, claiming that the three districts north of the Ibar were only annexed to the province after World War II to counter-balance the rapid growth of the ethnic Albanian population. “These people have never lived with Albanians, have never felt themselves part of Kosovo, and won’t accept rule by Pristina,” Ratkovic said. “Belgrade is not trying to change the reality on the ground for Kosovar Albanians, but changing the reality for Kosovo Serbs would also be destabilizing,” he added. For that reason the ICO proposal to integrate the north put forward by Peter Feith and supported by the United States was “not helpful,” according to Ratkovic, who claimed that military intervention was being discussed. He said that this was the primary reason that Tadic decided to address the UN Security Council on January 22: the implementation of such a strategy could result in instability and thus become a national security concern for Serbia, threatening the country’s democratization and pro-Western orientation. (Comment: Serbia’s historical arguments are routinely countered by Albanian historical recollections to the contrary. Ratkovic’s claims of a separate historical “reality” for Northern Mitrovica, therefore, would find resistance from Kosovo Albanian historians. End Comment.)¶7. © The Ambassador responded that the ideas put forward by Feith were not new; the integration of northern Kosovo had always been on the table. She emphasized that there was no discussion of the use of force to impose the integration of the whole territory of Kosovo. Noting that we understand the Serbian government’s sensitivities, the Ambassador underscored the need to exchange views openly on the full range of unresolved issues and encouraged Ratkovic to share his thinking in detail while in Washington. Ratkovic said that Serbia had the EU’s assurances that the document produced by the ICO was not an EU plan. He added that given the situation on the ground and the attitude of Kosovo Serbs toward the ICO, the only way to implement the plan would be by use of force.BELGRADE 00000025 003 OF 005NATO Relations-------------- ¶8. (SBU) Asked about the President’s views on Serbia’s relations with NATO, Ratkovic said that as a former Minister of Defense, President Tadic knows the issue well. Tadic believes that Serbia cannot remain outside of NATO forever, but doesn’t say this often because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Ratkovic explained that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the citizens of Yugoslavia assumed that they would be among the first to enter both the European Union and NATO. It wasn’t until the wars of the Milosevic era and the 1999 NATO intervention that anti-NATO sentiment developed in Serbia. Ratkovic characterized current public support for PfP participation and NATO membership as “surprisingly high” given Serbia’s history.¶9. © Serbia is taking concrete steps to increase its engagement with NATO, Ratkovic said. It has appointed an ambassador to NATO and established a mission there; once the office is fully operational, President Tadic will travel to Brussels in June or July to open it formally and hopes to address the North Atlantic Council. Tadic had instructed the MFA and the MOD to increase Serbia’s participation in PfP “on the model of Austria.” These steps needed to precede any decision about membership, Ratkovic said. He added that President Tadic would meet with SACEUR/EUCOM CDR ADM James Stavridis in Belgrade on February 11. Ratkovic emphasized that NATO’s image in the Serbian public had a significant influence on the development of the relationship, mentioning the role of KFOR in protecting Kosovo Serbs and religious sites and concerns about its drawdown.European Integration--------------------- ¶10. © Ratkovic predicted that the Spanish EU presidency would push for movement on Serbia’s EU membership application in March but did not know whether the effort would be successful, due to member-states’ enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting any more new members that were not fully qualified. He charged that Germany’s misguided belief that enlargement was economically detrimental rather than beneficial had led it to introduce new hurdles for applicants, including making the forwarding of a membership application to the Commission for an avis a political rather than a technical question. He asserted that both Serbia and Croatia had the administrative capacity and political will to fulfill all EU criteria, noting that the upcoming tenth anniversary of the October 5, 2000, overthrow of Milosevic would provide an opportunity to remind the world of the results of Serbia’s “democratic revolution.”Regional Relations------------------ ¶11. © The Ambassador told Ratkovic that the United States was supportive of Serbia’s efforts to improve its relations with Croatia and informed him that PRM DAS David Robinson would visit Belgrade in early March to look at how the United States could contribute to resolving protracted refugee issues, particularlyBELGRADE 00000025 004 OF 005between Serbia and Croatia. Ratkovic said that the presidency was working discreetly with Croatia on a “roadmap” to resolve all of the outstanding bilateral issues, and that they understood the EU had sent a helpful message to Zagreb that Croatia needed to find solutions in order to close Chapter 23 of the acquis. He said he was cautiously optimistic that there would be a breakthrough with Croatia in 2010.¶12. © Ratkovic expressed pessimism about prospects for constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of upcoming elections. He said the Spanish EU presidency would make a last attempt to reach agreement before the election campaign began in earnest but would face difficult odds. Ratkovic reiterated that the Serbian government supported the territorial integrity of BiH and would not be swayed by what he claimed was the desire of the majority of Republika Srpska residents to secede and merge with Serbia. In this context, Serbia also supported BiH’s entry into EU and NATO as a way to stabilize the country and cement the current borders. Ratkovic said the USG had miscalculated in making constitutional reform a pre-condition for a NATO Membership Action Plan status for BiH, as most Bosnian Serbs were not for NATO. He expressed regret that the Butmir process had not produced agreement since many of the elements of the plan were acceptable to all three constituent peoples; it would have been better to avoid taking an “all or nothing” approach to the reforms and to have granted MAP status, he judged.¶13. © Serbia is more worried about Macedonia’s future than Bosnia’s, Ratkovic said. It is not clear how a country composed of two completely different ethnic groups with no common language or religion can hold together, he commented, particularly with the ethnic Albanian population growing at such as rate that it will equal the Slavic population in 20 years. Ratkovic said that President Tadic was talking to both Greece and Macedonia about the name issue in hopes of unblocking Macedonia’s path to both the EU and NATO.¶14. © Serbia’s relations with Montenegro were at a historic low, Ratkovic said, noting that as he and Tadic were both of Montenegrin origin they felt the situation keenly. He explained that the Montenegrin government had had to distance itself from Belgrade in order to win the independence referendum, but as there were no longer any divisive issues the ball was in Podgorica’s court. It remained to be seen if Montenegro would treat Serbia as “a strategic partner or a bogeyman,” Ratkovic commented. One important criterion will be how Montenegro addresses organized crime, which Ratkovic identified as a serious problem that Serbia believed must be tackled.Comment------- ¶15. (C ) As Tadic’s foreign policy advisor, Ratkovic’s comments come closest to reflecting the President’s views and vision on issues across the spectrum. His decision to visit Washington next week, under clear instruction, to outline Tadic’s thinking in a low-key manner on a post-ICJ way forward is a constructive step and may provide an important opportunity to influence Belgrade’s strategy. In a meeting with the UK ambassador (please protect) earlier this week, Ratkovic outlined the following ideas that likely reflect current thinking: Option A: some understanding of a bigger Serbian role in the north and over five monasteries in the south, in which case Belgrade would “accept” but not recognizeBELGRADE 00000025 005 OF 005Kosovo; Option B: Partition; Option C: Serbia chooses between Kosovo or the EU. Option A (i.e, finding a way to define Serbia’s special interests in the north and with the status of some churches in the south) most likely reflects the ideas that Belgrade is most interested in exploring. While Serbia’s lack of a commitment to recognize Kosovo will remain an EU stumbling in the long-term, Ratkovic’s overture next week may provide an initial first step toward defining a more realistic modus vivendi, which we have been encouraging the Serbs to explore.¶16. © Ratkovic understands that the ideas he outlines next week will only provide a basis for discussion, with the expectation, of course, of much more work to follow. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by what appears to be a growing recognition of both the strategic and tactical importance of opening channels for a post-ICJ dialogue sooner rather than later, and the need to manage next steps in a way that does not undermine other key Belgrade objectives, above all eventual EU accession. FM Jeremic’s visit to Washington the week of February 22 and DAS Jones’s travel to the region the same week will provide important follow-on opportunities for continued engagement on the way ahead. End Comment. WARLICK

Dokumenti koji se ticu Srbije 3. : N A S L O V Datum nastanka Datum "curenja" Nivo poverljivosti IzvorKOSOVO CELEBRATES SECOND ANNIVERSARY WITH SUCCESSES AND 2010-02-17 2010-12-09 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pristina

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO5933PP RUEHIKDE RUEHPS #0084/01 0481534ZNR UUUUU ZZHP 171534Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9735INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1362RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UKRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1924RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES ITRHMFISS/CDR TF FALCONRHEFDIA/DIA WASHDCRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCRUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BERHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDCRHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCRUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000084 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, INL, DRL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM EAID SR KVSUBJECT: KOSOVO CELEBRATES SECOND ANNIVERSARY WITH SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES PRISTINA 00000084 001.2 OF 005 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo celebrated the second anniversary of its independence on February 17. These two years have seen political stability that has allowed the country to create legitimate new institutions, including the Constitutional Court and the Kosovo Security Force, and to start fulfilling its Ahtisaari Plan obligations, such as decentralization. Challenges remain, and Pristina and the international community must focus on moving the country towards eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions that will act as a guarantor of Kosovo's viability and security. Progress towards European Union membership and a role within NATO will require a concerted focus on building institutions, strengthening the country's system of justice, protecting its multi-ethnicity, and developing its economy. In each of these fields, Kosovo has been active in laying foundations for progress. However, we cannot ignore that work remains. Political parties need to move beyond their regional bases for support and cooperate better in pursuit of national goals. The GOK, with more effective support from EULEX, needs to build on its initial reforms in the justice sector and intensify its anti-corruption efforts. Pristina, with the help of the international community, wants to replicate the success of decentralization in southern Kosovo that empowers Serb communities and extend the same hope to northern Kosovo, where Belgrade maintains an illegal stranglehold on municipal governance. The GOK must use its string of economic reforms and privatizations as a springboard to motivate private-sector growth. Eventual membership in the European Union and other Euro-Atlantic institutions will mitigate the challenge that Kosovo's small size poses. The largest threats to this agenda come both from Belgrade and the risk that Brussels will not use its influence there to compel Belgrade's greater cooperation in allowing Kosovo to develop and strengthen. END SUMMARY KOSOVO AT TWO YEARS ------------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Republic of Kosovo turned two years old on February 17. It has been two years marked by a number of successes. Most notably, we have seen peace and government stability. Kosovo has taken responsibility for ensuring its own democracy with elections that it ran on its own for the first time since the end of the conflict. Serbs in southern Kosovo participated in these elections and are starting to accept that their survival runs through Pristina rather than Belgrade. More Serbs, in fact, cast ballots in Kosovo's municipal elections in November 2009 than in the illegitimate parallel elections for local Serbian institutions that took place throughout the year. New institutions, like the Constitutional Court, are standing up and starting to earn respect as legitimate bodies. Internationally, Kosovo has secured membership in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and recognitions of Kosovo's independence now stand at 65 countries. At the International Court of Justice, Kosovo (supported by many in the international community, including the United States) presented a strong case to challenge Belgrade's contention that the country's independence fails to accord with international law, and we expect that even an ambiguous opinion from the Court will open the door for more states to recognize the country's independence. ¶3. (SBU) In short, Kosovo has much to celebrate on its independence day. We must not forget, however, that Kosovo is a nascent state that still confronts challenges. Its stability is laudable, but its political scene is fractious as inexperienced political parties tend to elevate narrow interests above national goals. The legacy of conflict and socialism has weakened its institutions, and its economy remains a work in progress. Kosovo continues to look to the international community for guidance, and it sees in this advice a path that will lead to eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations, an end-goal that will act as a guarantor of the country's independence, viability, and stability. In helping Kosovo ultimately realize both European Union and NATO membership, we need to focus our efforts in fostering the state's institutions, developing the rule of law, promoting its multi-ethnicity, and strengthening its economy. BUILDING INSTITUTIONS PRISTINA 00000084 002.2 OF 005 --------------------- ¶4. (SBU) Kosovo's two largest parties -- the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) -- have coexisted in stable government since national elections in November ¶2007. This stability has allowed the GOK to focus on several post-independence institution building projects: embarking on decentralization, standing up the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and creating the Constitutional Court, among others. The results have been positive. We have seen Serbs turnout in large numbers to elect Serb candidates for mayor and municipal assemblies in the new, Ahtisaari-mandated, Serb municipalities. The KSF has broken ties with the legacy of the Kosovo Liberation Army and is showing a commitment to becoming a multi-ethnic force with its new pan-Kosovo recruitment campaign. The Constitutional Court has earned legitimacy as the final arbiter of elections-related disputes. ¶5. (SBU) The stability allows us to focus on critical economic projects -- like the New Kosovo Power Plant and the privatization of the state telecom, Post and Telecom of Kosovo -- with a stable government partner focused on work rather than campaigning. It also gives us time to encourage Kosovo politics to move beyond its post-conflict paradigm, when all parties focused on independence to the exclusion of other considerations. Left-right policy dimensions do not yet exist here. The large political parties have not yet developed policy platforms that extend beyond reaffirming promises to their core supporters. The LDK still sees itself as the standard-bearer for late President Ibrahim Rugova. The PDK and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) are outgrowths of the KLA and continue to appeal to regional support bases. These lingering identities too often obfuscate priorities and encourage leaders, at times, to forget that national interests must take precedence. IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW ----------------------------- ¶6. (SBU) On February 16, President Sejdiu appointed new Supreme Court judges and prosecutors. This action builds on a years-long, continuing process of vetting for professional competence judges and prosecutors. The vetting process involves both Kosovo and international community arbiters, and the GOK's full acceptance of the results shows a commitment to developing an independent judiciary that will start to fill the gaps that exist in Kosovo's rule-of-law institutions. A similar process of interviews and testing went into the selection of the Constitutional Court justices last year, and we have seen this court grow in legitimacy over the past several months. It has already had its own minor Marbury v. Madison moment, exercising unchallenged authority over legislation that controls the funding of the state radio and television broadcaster. Although the ruling has invited critics and controversy, none of these critics has questioned the role that the Court has played. This is a significant step in shoring up the independence of the country's judicial institutions. ¶7. (SBU) There remains a need for more progress. In January of this year one of Kosovo's most widely read newspapers noted in an editorial that Kosovo's system of justice needs deep reform. The GOK, too, recognizes that it faces a challenge in developing its legal institutions, and the Prime Minister has adopted a legislative strategy for the year that prioritizes the rule of law. It is a strategy that will modernize and reform the court structure, invigorate the country's prosecutorial ranks, and create an institutional foundation where objectivity has an opportunity to flourish. Concurrent with this legislative strategy, the GOK -- with more active assistance from EULEX -- will need to strengthen its anti-corruption efforts, a difficult challenge in a country this small, where businesses often claim a political patron. Despite the inherent difficulties, our institution-building efforts must prioritize the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The public needs to feel confident that laws apply to everyone. EULEX needs to step up its activity and deliver long-promised arrests of high-ranking corrupt public officials, or we run a risk that our rule-of-law reforms will fall flat and leave the public with a perception that the government is little more than a kleptocracy. A MULTI-ETHNIC STATE PRISTINA 00000084 003.2 OF 005 -------------------- ¶8. (SBU) Kosovo has made a strong start in fulfilling its promises under the Ahtisaari plan to empower Serb communities. Serb mayors, following municipal elections in November 2009, now hold office in the new municipalities of Gracanica, Klokot, and Ranilug. In Strpce, a pre-existing municipality where the Serb majority refused to participate in the November 2007 elections, a new legitimate Serb mayor has taken significant steps to undo the influence of the illegal parallel municipal government that answers to Belgrade. In Pristina, the central government is devolving more authority to all municipalities, giving local residents a louder voice in shaping their communities' future. Most refreshing is that that the GOK continues to focus on these Serb communities, providing them with significant new resources in the 2010 budget that will allow them to strengthen the new municipal structures and develop their infrastructure. ¶9. (SBU) In northern Kosovo the challenges surrounding integration are greater. Belgrade's legitimacy outstrips Pristina's in the northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, but it may not be as unchallenged as Belgrade would like us to think. A municipal preparation team (MPT) is now working in the planned new municipality of North Mitrovica, which will hold a special election later this year to select its inaugural government. This MPT is the GOK's first step in building on the success of its decentralization efforts in the South. It has adopted a comprehensive approach to the North that entails an incremental "hearts and minds" campaign to win greater support from northern Serbs to work with Kosovo institutions. The illegal parallel institutions that control the North are little more than fronts for organized crime, and the region has become stagnant. The Serbs north of the Ibar River consistently point to the absence of the rule of law there, and this could prove to be the tool that begins their acceptance of Pristina -- if the GOK and EULEX, together, can make meaningful progress in shutting down the criminal networks that dominate throughout the North. Pristina can offer hope, but it cannot achieve success on its own. The Europeans need to contribute. EULEX needs to crack down on organized crime, and Brussels must use the lure of EU integration to compel Belgrade to play a helpful role in returning law and order to northern Kosovo. Pristina cannot return hope to the North if the international community will not stop Belgrade from interfering in the region's development. ECONOMIC REFORMS AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH ------------------------------------------ ¶10. (SBU) At the central level Kosovo has laid a strong foundation for economic reforms. In recent months the Assembly has adopted a debt law that sets rational limits on the amount of debt that the country can incur and should allow Kosovo to pursue a sovereign credit rating that will permit it to finance its development. The IMF has provided guidance on a Central Bank law that will both strengthen the institution and open opportunities for more development assistance. And, the GOK is demonstrating an ever improving control of its budgetary process, delivering a comprehensive and reasonable 2010 budget to the Assembly that prioritizes critical needs. Amid these steps, privatization continues. The GOK hosted a pre-bid conference for representatives from three pre-qualified consortia interested in entering into a public-private partnership for the Pristina Airport which we expect will attract a 100 hundred million Euro investment, with a contract awarded in April. Further cause for optimism is on the near horizon with the upcoming privatization of the Kosovo Energy Corporation and development of a new 500MW power plant that will put an end to the rolling blackouts that still affect the country. When this plant comes online, industry will find a more inviting environment for setting up business. ¶11. (SBU) These important steps do not mask Kosovo's current economic woes that leave many Kosovars without work. With an unemployment rate of greater than 40 percent, the economy is suffering. There is little industry, the private sector is underdeveloped, and the country's greatest natural resource -- lignite -- is underutilized due to a dilapidated power infrastructure. At present, the government remains the primary PRISTINA 00000084 004.2 OF 005 engine that drives the economy, a model that is not sustainable. Government contracts for road-building projects help to provide temporary employment, but they do not offer the longer term economic stability that the country requires. In the coming years, both the government and the international donor community need to redirect their efforts towards projects that will spark greater dynamism and diversity within the private sector. The central reforms that have occurred -- and will continue throughout the rest of the year -- provide hope that Kosovo will soon feature a strong economic framework where private sector growth will necessarily follow. EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS -------------------------- ¶12. (SBU) Kosovo's small size presents a challenge for its survival, a challenge that the international community can help surmount with its Euro-Atlantic institutions. The lure of these institutions -- in particular, the European Union and NATO -- are tantalizing opportunities that focus the attention of the GOK. With a small population where family and klan ties provide dominant affiliations, Kosovo is susceptible to corruption that will retard development. On the security front, Kosovo is currently a NATO protectorate, but those forces are beginning to withdraw, and Kosovo leaders are wondering whether or not the small (no more than 2500 active members according to the Ahtisaari Plan) and lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF) can fill the void that KFOR will leave. The antidote for both of these problems is membership within the European Union and NATO, and this Euro-Atlantic orientation is the primary issue that unifies the country's dueling political forces around a core national vision. ¶13. (SBU) Prime Minister Thaci, daily, expresses his commitment to readying Kosovo for EU consideration, and he regards the next European Union Progress Report on Kosovo, due in June, with a mix of anxiety and optimism. He wants to show the electorate that his leadership is bringing Kosovo closer to Brussels, and he wants to be the person who brings EU visa liberalization to Kosovo. Over the longer term, the country needs EU membership as an outlet for its young workforce and as a unified market for exports. It also needs to define its future relationship with NATO. Every Kosovar desires full membership in an institution second only to the United States in the hagiography of Kosovo's recent history. The limitations that the Ahtisaari Plan places on the Kosovo Security Force are going to prove contentious over time, especially once KFOR withdraws completely. Without an agreed and viable connection to NATO, we run the risk that unofficial militias will again develop out of fear that the country is unable to defend itself from aggression. COMMENT: -------- ¶14. (SBU) Kosovo's independence has been a success story. The worst fears -- large scale population movements and outbreaks of violence -- following February 17, 2008, never materialized. The political scene, while fractious, works together on the big issues, like decentralization and establishing new institutions. The international community and the Kosovars, themselves, can feel good about the positive steps that have occurred over the past two years, but we cannot ignore the challenges that remain. With each passing day we need to see the GOK take more responsibility for securing the country's future -- more activity on lobbying for recognitions, more temperate political debate, greater respect for the rule of law, and a concerted focus on national interests -- but there remains an ever present role for the international community. Pristina cannot yet extend its authority across its entire territory. The International Steering Group on February 8 gave its blessing to a comprehensive approach that will bolster Pristina's presence in the North, but this approach will also require international support. Indeed, each of the steps towards Kosovo's eventual membership in the European Union will require international attention, and we need to make sure that Brussels gives Pristina the same consideration that it pays to Belgrade. Above all, the progress that Kosovo makes in overcoming the challenges it confronts should play the determining role in the country's qualifications for European Union and NATO membership. We need to keep the GOK's focus squarely on its responsibilities while reminding our European partners that they too have a role to play. PRISTINA 00000084 005.2 OF 005 END COMMENT DELL

FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, 2010-02-22 2010-12-06 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Paris

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO2986PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHFR #0207/01 0531431ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 221431Z FEB 10 ZDKFM AMEMBASSY PARISTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8368INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000207NOFORNSIPDISE.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020TAGS: PGOV PREL RS GG SR BK AF IR AM FRSUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN,CAUCASUSPARIS 00000207 001.2 OF 004Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: During separate discussions with OSDAssistant Secretary for International Security AffairsAlexander Vershbow and EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary SpencerBoyer in early February, Roland Galharague, MFAA/S-equivalent for Continental Europe, adopted a defensiveposture about the potential sale of Mistral class ships toRussia; expressed skepticism about the depth and durabilityof Russia's support for sanctions against Iran; acknowledgedPutin's dominance in Russia while proposing, as a means tostrengthen Medvedev, that we respond positively to hisproposals for reforming European security and holding an OSCEsummit; asserted that Serbia cannot win back Kosovo and alsowin entry into the EU; expressed pessimism about the futureof Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations and about the impact ofinstability in Iran on Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia;and claimed that Bosnia and Afghanistan could becomedifficult issues for trans-Atlantic relations this yearbecause of the USG's alleged disengagement from Bosnia andits alleged failure to consult adequately with European NATOallies on strategy in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.-----------------------------------------MISTRAL: FRENCH ADOPT A DEFENSIVE POSTURE-----------------------------------------¶2. (C/NF) When asked about the potential sale of Mistralclass ships to Russia, Galharague inquired as to why the USGseems to be singling out France for criticism on this issue."I recently spoke to my Dutch counterpart," he reported, "andhe said you have not approached him on this subject" despiterecent Dutch (and Spanish) efforts to make similar sales.Furthermore, the Mistral is not "top end" military equipment,Galharague argued, describing it instead as a combinationbetween "a truck and an oil ship" with some helpfulnavigation tools. It will not contribute significantly toRussian military capabilities. Russian leaders have beenover-selling the military significance of the Mistral inorder to quell domestic opposition to its purchase fromabroad. Some Russians consider the sale a harbinger of theend of shipbuilding in their country, and claim the shipcould be built at home but would simply take longer. Theproduction and sale of armaments is a major industry inRussia, possibly second only to oil and gas. In his February10 press conference, the Chairman of Russia's NationalSecurity Council, Nikolai Patrushev, seemed "very reticent"about the possible sale, according to Galharague.¶4. (C/NF) Asked about Georgia's reaction to the possiblesale, Galharague insisted that France has maintained "verygood" relations with Tbilisi. The GOF "strategy" for Georgiato recover its lost territory is to persuade the Tblisigovernment to engage with the leaders of the secessionistterritories and to continue on their path toward EUaccession. The demands of accession -- such as internaldemocratic reforms and good relations with their neighbors --will serve Georgia and the region well. Nonetheless,Galharague acknowledged that Tbilisi has good reason to fearRussia, given their recent history. This ship will not,however, affect their strategic situation, Galharague argued:"The Russians have already invaded Georgia without the ship."¶5. (C/NF) While acknowledging that Georgia and the Balticcountries feel threatened by Russia -- with reason --Galharague concluded that Russia is not a threat to us andthere is no reason we should not sell equipment to them whichdoes not fall into the realm of restricted armaments. TheMistral class ship does not contain high end or sensitivetechnology, he insisted.-------------------------------------------RUSSIA'S COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN-------------------------------------------¶6. (C/NF) The Russians are currently benefiting from theirhelpful statements on Iran while realizing full well thatChina will water down any sanctions proposals, Galharagueasserted. When praising Russia's new stance, he argued, weshould be cognizant of their complicated relationship withIran. Russians have an interest in strong ties with Tehran,especially because Iran is still a primary market for Russianarms sales. On the other hand, were Iran to normalize itsrelations with western governments, it could develop into amajor Russian rival for gas sales to the European market. Tobalance various and competing elements of its relationshipwith Iran, Russia has an interest in serving as a"go-between" in the conflict between Iran and the west. Infact, Galharague claimed, Russian leaders were furious whenTurkey recently started to seize that mantel.PARIS 00000207 002.2 OF 004---------------------MEDVEDEV VERSUS PUTIN---------------------¶7. (C/NF) When discussing the comparative influence ofPresident Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, Galharagueclaimed that Medvedev, whose initial gut reactions to eventsclearly differ from those of Putin, is trying to assemble hisown power bases independent of the former President. In themeantime, "power still rests with Putin," Galharagueassessed. Putin, not Medvedev, constantly juggles andbalances competing domestic interests in Russia. As a casein point, Galharague cited the Russian government's reactionto the financial crisis. After the government painstakinglyestablished a mechanism for determining how to dividestimulus funds among various economic sectors and privateinterests, Putin simply decided unilaterally who wouldreceive state support. In general, Galharague observed,Putin much prefers to focus on domestic issues rather thanforeign policy. Putin prefers cutting deals in the murkyRussian business world to delving into the complexities ofinternational politics.--------------------------------------------- -------------STRENGTHEN MEDVEDEV BY RESPONDING TO HIS SECURITY PROPOSAL--------------------------------------------- -------------¶8. (C/NF) Galharague described the long-standing Frencheffort to strengthen Medvedev by respecting his official roleas president of Russia, regardless of Putin's competing powerand influence. "We treat Medvedev as president and addresspresidential issues with him." They also seek to validateMedvedev's initiatives, regardless of the substantivecontent, in order to reward his efforts to put new ideasforward. As an important example, Galharague mentionedMedvedev's proposal for revamping European securityarchitecture. Medvedev invested a lot of political capitalin this effort, Galharague argued, and we should provide apositive response, even if we do not accept the proposals.For this reason, President Sarkozy sent Medvedev a letter ofacknowledgment after receiving the proposal. Tying thisapproach to USG policy toward Russia, Galharague severaltimes asked how the USG plans to measure the success of the"reset" with Russia? The French, he said, would like to knowwhether the USG has established benchmarks for progress, andthey wonder how START negotiations might fit into thisequation.-------------------------------------------EUROPEAN SECURITY: GOF SUPPORTS OSCE SUMMIT-------------------------------------------¶9. (C/NF) Galharague stated that the French largely agreewith us about how to address questions of European security,except in one area: they support the idea of an OSCE summit.While Paris concurs with the USG analysis that the Russianproposals for reforming Europe's security institutionscontain a number of "unacceptable" elements, he argued thatwe must understand that "we're playing a game of judo -- wedo not want to give the Russians a pretext to claim they'rebeing ignored." He added that the Russians are adept atmanipulation. "We constantly feel like we have a better handbut they're playing a better game -- it's the same inbusiness and economic arenas." Claims of disrespect bywestern nations resonate in Russian domestic politics, to ourdetriment, he warned. Therefore, we must emphasize thepositive elements of the Russian proposal and communicate asincere willingness to engage. An OSCE summit can help withthese aims, Galharague argued, and at the same time supportthe Corfu process. A summit would need to involve at least aminimum number of substantive issues, such as regionalconflicts or the status of conventional forces in Europe, butby agreeing to move ahead with the summit we would put theonus back on Russia.--------------------------------------------- -----BALKANS: SERBS CAN'T WIN IN BOTH KOSOVO AND THE EU--------------------------------------------- -----¶10. (C/NF) Galharague asked that the USG work together withthe EU to discourage the Serbians from proposing a new U.N.resolution on Kosovo, stating that Serbian Foreign MinisterJeremic "seems to believe Serbia can win on Kosovo and win EUentry. We need to let him know this is not true." Rightnow, Galharague reported, "the Serbs are furious with us (theFrench)" in response to the demarche the GOF delivered inBelgrade in early February (reftel) about Serbia's possibleplans for a U.N. resolution. "We delivered the message invery forceful terms." In fact, the Serbs interpreted thedemarche as a major change in position, Galharague reported.PARIS 00000207 003.2 OF 004The EU had thus far maintained the position that the issuesof Kosovo and Serbian entry into the EU were not formallylinked. "There was no formal conditionality," Galharaguesaid, adding that the Serbs now understand that to be amember of the EU they must eventually recognize Kosovo. "Wetold them we do not want another Cyprus," he explained,referring to Cyprus' controversial EU accession in 2004 as adivided island where EU legislation remains partly"suspended" in the northern part of the island which isoutside of the government in Nicosia's control. Nonetheless,Galharague predicted the Serbs will likely go ahead with theU.N. resolution in any case, and the USG and the EU will beforced to oppose it.¶11. (C/NF) Furthermore, Galharague asserted, before theSerbs join the EU, they will need to resolve key issues withKosovo in the fields of justice, police, customs, transport,agriculture, and also any differences over names andterminology. The best way for Serbia to address issuesrelated to Kosovo is by working with the European Union Ruleof Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). "At the end of the day,though," he reiterated, "Serbia must recognize Kosovo if itwants to join the EU."------------------------------PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CAUCASUS------------------------------¶12. (C/NF) The Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations appear to be ata "dead end," Galharague averred, adding that "Minsk (TheMinsk Group) is going nowhere fast." He noted that theFrench government is not in a position to push the Armeniansat the moment because French citizens of Armenian origin"represent about 500,000 votes" and French regional electionswill take place in March. Other factors may soon impact theCaucasus region, he warned, such as instability in Iran.Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan all have importanttrade and energy ties with Iran and they could be immediatelyaffected by the Iran sanctions bill currently making its waythrough the U.S. Congress. At the same time, the effort toimpose harsher U.N. sanctions may offer us an opportunity tofurther engage with those three countries about theirapproach to Iran.--------------------------------------------- ----FUTURE USG-EU FLASHPOINTS: BOSNIA AND AFGHANISTAN--------------------------------------------- ----¶13. (C/NF) When assessing potential issue areas where theUSG and EU may differ during 2010, Galharague focused firston Bosnia. He said the French are disappointed that the USGappears to have put all plans and actions on hold pending theelections in October. Indeed, he implied that U.S. and EUofficials have differing assessments of the need forcontinual engagement with the conflicting parties in Bosnia.Bosnian parties will not make progress without unity betweenthe U.S. and the EU. When the Americans disengage, eventemporarily, Galharague claimed the Bosnians perceive itimmediately and react accordingly: "The Americans are givingup, so why should we do this (make compromises)?" The USG,the Spanish EU presidency, and High Representative Ashtonshould lead the charge in engaging this year -- "we need U.S.backing now," he urged. As a lever to press the Bosniansforward on constitutional issues, the EU may be able to usethe ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, whichdeclared that the Bosnian Constitution does not conform withEuropean human rights standards.¶14. (C/NF) Galharague described Afghanistan as the secondpotential trans-Atlantic flashpoint in 2010: "There is anemerging feeling the war is not jointly owned and managed."President Obama waited eight months to make a decision and,during that period, at no point did European opinion factorinto his deliberations, according to Galharague. DAS Boyerfirmly disagreed, citing USG consultations and discussionswith French officials in Paris and in Washington, DC.Galharague acknowledged these discussions took place, butclaimed the question Americans posed to their European NATOallies was not "What do you think?" but "How many troops canyou put on the ground?" More recently, he said, the USG hasbegun contemplating engagement with elements of the Talibanwithout consulting European NATO allies. The French wouldlike to know, for instance, what this engagement might meanfor our future relations with Pakistan and India.¶15. (C/NF) In purely political terms, Galharague explainedthat Afghanistan has developed into a difficult issue,especially in France. With the French death toll inAfghanistan having reached 40, he noted, local politicianshave found themselves increasingly faced with grievingfamilies, to whom they must explain the purpose of the war.PARIS 00000207 004.2 OF 004"The perception is that we're there because the Americans arethere," he said. "We're not sure where we're going and we'renot being asked or consulted." Initially, the majority ofEuropeans supported the war in Afghanistan, invoking ArticleFive of the NATO Charter and committing a "fairly high"amount of troops and resources. But now "no one knows thepurpose" of the war. "Perhaps the French government shouldhave made a better show of the consultations" that did takeplace, Galharague admitted, "but to display them you have tohave them."¶16. (C/NF) EMBASSY COMMENT: Galharague is not ultimatelyresponsible for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, which ishandled by a separate cell within the MFA, so his commentsmay not reflect the views of those who regularly engage withthe USG on this issue. Notably, when discussing public andofficial perceptions of the war in Afghanistan, he made nomention of SRAP Holbrooke's two visits to Paris in the lastthree months, or post's constant exchanges about Afghanistanwith French officials at the senior and working levels.Galharague focused on a perception of minimal consultation,which he admitted could persist regardless of reality. ENDCOMMENT.¶17. (U) ASD Vershbow and DAS Boyer have cleared this cable.RIVKIN

A/S FRIED AND FRENCH NSA-EQUIVALENT 2006-12-12 2010-12-01 SECRET Embassy Paris

Reveal hidden contents

VZCZCXRO2827OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROVDE RUEHFR #7755/01 3461305ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 121305Z DEC 06FM AMEMBASSY PARISTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3715INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0399 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007755 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, NATO, RS, UNO, SR, YI, TU, CY SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND FRENCH NSA-EQUIVALENT GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE DISCUSS RUSSIA-GEORGIA, RUSSIA-KOSOVO AND TURKEY-EUClassified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).¶1. (S) SUMMARY: EUR A/S Dan Fried’s December 7 meeting with presidential diplomatic advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) focused largely on Russia, with France in a defensive posture. MGM raised the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO Riga Summit, saying it had been instigated by Russia, and portrayed France as having attempted to steer in a way compatible with Latvian interests. In contrast to French Political Director Araud (septel), he showed reluctance to see the Kremlin’s hand in the Litvinenko poisoning, preferring to ascribe it to rogue elements. MGM claimed to support Georgian independence while suggesting that NATO Article 5 obligations precluded Georgian NATO membership. On Kosovo, he reviewed France’s plans to persuade the EU to agree to offer Serbia an SAA agreement not linked to fulfillment of its ICTY obligations but worried above all about Putin’s explicit threat to veto a UN Security Resolution mandating independence; there was a risk of instability and partition if the West did not exercise sufficient care in managing the Russians. Fried countered that the West needed to be prepared to proceed in extremis without the Russians, and warned against allowing the Russians to hold up a decision through the threat of a veto.¶2. © SUMMARY CONT: On other issues, MGM reviewed the Franco-German proposal for a review of Turkey’s implementation of its Ankara Protocol commitments between 2007 and 2009, assured Fried that France wanted to avoid a train wreck, but insisted it was incumbent on the Turks to make a gesture. Fried reminded MGM of the strategic importance of keeping Turkey tied to EU; MGM agreed in principle but insisted Turkey had to play by the EU’s rules and noted the difficulties of managing domestically public sentiment against Turkey. Fried and MGM agreed that France and the U.S. had worked well together at the NATO Riga Summit. END SUMMARY.¶3. © EUR A/S Daniel Fried, accompanied by the Ambassador and POL Deputy (notetaker), met December 7 with President Chirac’s diplomatic advisor (NSA-equivalent) Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) to discuss a number of European issues that revolved largely around Russia. MGM was joined by Presidency Middle East advisor Dominique Boche and strategic affairs advisor Laurent Bili.Putin-Chirac at Riga-------------------- ¶4. © Noting at the outset that he had been directly involved in the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO summit, MGM assured Fried that French actions had been above board. Kremlin advisor Pridhodko had originally proposed that Putin meet Chirac privately at a Paris airport November 29 in order to express his birthday wishes (MGM cited Putin’s meeting in Hannover with former Chancellor Schroeder as a precedent). France had agreed, while noting that the dates coincided with the Riga Summit. Pridhodko suggested Riga, which France dutifully vetted with the Latvians with the understanding that they would have to host such a dinner, and assuring the Latvians that France was prepared to say “no” to the Russians if a meeting would in any way cause them embarrassment. The Latvians were prepared to proceed, so long as the Russians also agreed to a bilateral meeting, which MGM conveyed to Pridhodko. Pridhodko had suggested that this could be “difficult” given negative Russian public opinion toward Latvia. The Latvians told MGM that the Russians had refused to meet at the official palace or residence, but were considering the Latvian cultural center. MGM said he had encouraged the Russians to accept the last offering, and they had proceeded as if it might be acceptable. Late Tuesday, however, they balked, apparently because the center was located about 200m from the Latvian museum of occupation.¶5. © MGM concluded his presentation with the argument that such a meeting would have been positive for Russian-Latvian relations and would have helped to blur dividing lines between NATO and Russia. He complained over Latvia’s going “public” with the cancellation by querying NATO SYG Hoop de Scheffer as to whether “we are allowed to receive” the Russian president. He commented that, had they remained silent, the cancellation would have been a non-event. Fried countered that the Latvians had been right to inform NATO and thus avoid a surprise. He contrasted the Russians’ clumsiness in managing the dinner with the Latvians’ transparency, suggesting that it was time for the Russians to accept the independence of the Baltic states. He added pointedly that the U.S. would no longer accept putative Russian concerns about Latvian treatment of their citizens at a time when they were still rounding up Georgians on thePARIS 00007755 002 OF 003basis of ethnicity. MGM commented meekly that the timing had not been right for the visit and agreed that the Latvian government no longer had a problem of non-citizen ethnic Russians.Litvinenko Case--------------- ¶6. (S) Fried commented that the short-term trend inside Russia was negative, noting increasing indications that the UK investigation into the murder of Litvinenko could well point to some sort of Russian involvement. MGM called attention to Chirac’s statement encouraging the Russians to cooperate in the investigation. He wondered aloud who might have given the order, but speculated the murder probably involved a settling of accounts between services rather than occurring under direct order from the Kremlin. Fried, noting Putin’s attention to detail, questioned whether rogue security elements could operate, in the UK no less, without Putin’s knowledge. Describing the current atmosphere as strange, he described the Russians as increasingly self-confident, to the point of arrogance.Georgia-Russia-------------- ¶7. © Fried, noting he had discussed Georgia the previous evening with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud (septel), said it was important to support Georgian sovereignty against Russian pressure for three reasons: the situation overall in Georgia was improving under Saakashvili’s leadership; violation of Georgian territorial integrity would set a dangerous precedent; and Germany and Central and Eastern Europe had a strong interest in ensuring that gas and oil pumped from Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not travel exclusively through pipelines owned or controlled by Russia. MGM responded that France supported Georgia’s independence but wondered how to accomplish this within existing structures. The heart of NATO was Article 5, and it was doubtful that NATO would declare war on Russia over Georgia; it was therefore important to bypass Article 5 and find a “specific way” that did not involve NATO membership. If Georgia joins, Armenia may follow. Even in the case of Turkey, was its Kurdish problem one for Europeans, MGM asked.¶8. © Fried assured MGM that the U.S. was not seeking membership for Georgia soon, but it was important not to close the door in order to continue to promote Georgian reform and development. It was incumbent on the West to support Georgian sovereignty and maintain a united front against Russia, he argued. He related that he had urged Saakashvili not to seek crises with Russia, since crisis worked only for Russia, and time was on Georgia’s side so long as it moved quietly. In five years, a burgeoning Georgian economy had the potential to dramatically change the politics of the region. MGM agreed in principle, but suggested one could differ on ways and means.Serbia and Kosovo----------------- ¶9. © Fried explained that the U.S. had decided to offer PFP to Serbia as a means of supporting democratic forces in the upcoming elections; President Tadic had made a strong case for Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic future. Similar considerations had prompted the U.S. to support Ahtisaari’s recommendation to postpone tabling his proposals on Kosovo status. But it was critical to move quickly after January 21. Additional delay would encourage the Serbs and others into thinking the West felt intimidated; it was time to push onward to supervised independence. Fried said that while Russia could be expected to cause difficulties, in the end he believed it would abstain on a UNSCR, although he could not be certain. What was certain was that the Russians must not be allowed to believe that the threat of a veto will work, because they would exploit any opening. The West therefore had to send the signal that it was prepared to move without them if necessary, because no signal would be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in Russia’s raising the bar. This was a terrible option, but paralysis was worse.¶10. © MGM reviewed the history of French-Serbian relations (back to the Salonika Front of WWI, on which MGM’s grandfather had served), judged PFP as a positive offer, and said Chirac had proposed to Merkel that the EU move to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, even in the event of insufficient ICTY cooperation. Merkel had initially responded negatively, citing Tadic’s failure to request it, but France continued to believe that offering SAA could make a difference in the January elections. If the Germans were not on board by early January, France would move on its own to propose SAA. As for the Ahtisaari proposals, MGM said Putin had told the French “Russia will not hesitatePARIS 00007755 003 OF 003to veto any solution that does not enjoy the agreement of all the stakeholders.” MGM urged great caution in moving forward, citing Putin’s purported concerns about the risks of a partition and a merging of the north with Serbia and the south with Albania, leading potentially to a radicalized Muslim state in the heart of Europe.¶11. © Fried responded that the Serbs and Albanians had been told that Kosovo would be independent, and that it would be a mistake to turn back. Perhaps the Russians were bluffing, but even if they were not, wavering would lead to disaster, beginning with riots by Kosovars that risked turning KFOR into an occupying force and could led to the very radicalization we had successfully avoided so far. MGM said France was not advocating further delay, but was nonetheless concerned that independence could have unintended consequences. Public opinion could change, and Russia might become yet more irrational in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections. Fried agreed on the desirability of negotiating a UN Security Council Resolution that would be acceptable to the Russians -- perhaps even leaving out the word “independence” -- but the West needed to be prepared in extremis to move forward without Russian support. Russia would seize on any paralysis to try to raise the bar. MGM agreed in principle, but urged again finding ways to “coddle” Russia.Turkey-EU--------- ¶12. © During a discussion cut short by a summons from President Chirac, Fried asked MGM how France planned to avoid a Turkey-EU train wreck. MGM said France supported Turkey, but Turkey needed to play by EU rules and fulfill its commitments. It was not the EU’s fault that the UN Cyprus plan had not been approved by referendum, but this could not be used as an excuse for not implementing the Ankara Protocol. It was critical that Turkey “start to implement” the protocol through a gesture. MGM said that Chirac and Merkel had agreed (on the basis of the Commission proposal) not to open eight chapters and not to close any other chapters; but they had also agreed to insist on a review of Turkish implementation -- to serve as the basis for a further EU decision -- in the time frame between a 2007 Commission report and 2009 European parliamentary elections. Although Erdogan had told Merkel not to expect any further Turkish gestures, MGM nonetheless hoped the Turks would find a way, as they had so often in the past, to do something at the last minute.¶13. © Fried described the U.S. approach of encouraging Turkey to respond constructively, expressed the hope that the EU would not be too one-sided in its judgment of the Ankara Protocol implementation, but reminded MGM that the EU also had not followed through on its promises (which MGM hotly denied). Fried continued that the U.S. wanted to be helpful but was avoiding taking a public stance. He reiterated that the stakes were high, given Turkey’s strategic value.¶14. © This message was cleared by A/S Fried.Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON

Od mene veliko plus za americku diplomatiju:Usudili su se, makar i u tajnim depesama, da pisu o sranjima farmaceutske mafije (pfizer).

  On 10. 12. 2010. at 3:02, Indy said:

...........Ljudi iz vrhova većine medijskih kuća, stranaka i think-tankova (koji regularno bivaju pozivani na ovakva neskriveno tajnovita druženja) su prosto rečeno ljubomorni na to što je Asanž otvorio jedan deo informacija koje oni brižljivo kriju, uglavnom o trošku poreskih obveznika, od onih kojima bi trebalo da daju kompletne informacije, a ne npr. da "beru trešnje" sa informacijama o ratu u Avganistanu, kako ćete videti da Loewenstein piše ispod. A to takođe može da objasni i neke od disonantnih glasova ovde. Neko je platio članarinu za ekskluzivni klub, a sad se pojavio mangup koji je vrata kluba svima širom otvorio, barem privremeno. Nije čudo da ima ogorčenja.

Ovo je veoma zanimljivo. Jos zanimljivije je da ce se objavljivanje nastaviti kroz celu 2011. godinu. sto znaci da ovo ima potencijal da promeni citav dosadasnji korumpiran sistem.

  On 10. 12. 2010. at 8:20, Aion said:

Od mene veliko plus za americku diplomatiju:Usudili su se, makar i u tajnim depesama, da pisu o sranjima farmaceutske mafije (pfizer).

To je ustvari jedan veliki minus i primer zasto mnogi od ovih leakova treba da budu javni - ko sprecava posle toga nekog diplomatu/birokratu da trazi reket? Slazem se da neke stvari mraju da budu tajne i to njaveci problem Wikiliksa da objavljuje sve, ali ovakve stvari se moraju objavljivati koje se itekako ticu generalne javnosti.

Ova dva kabla, vezano za posetu Bidena i dolazak Medvedeva deluju sasvim korektno.