Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Sirius]

Grcka nije iz iste price kao ostatak EU (mada i druge mediteranske drzave imaju sistemske probleme slicno Grckoj) ali problem je sto ovde vise nije problem samo Grcka. Od pocetka se polazilo u EU od toga da je jedino Grcka problem, da su oni drugaciji od ostatka EU, i da ih valja zakrpiti samo dok kriza ne prodje, da se smanji exposure evropskih banaka prema Grckoj, pa onda za koju godinu i mogu da bankrotiraju bez vecih posledica po ostatak evrozone.Ali ovde se vise ne prica samo o Grckoj. Cak ni samo o Portugaliji i Irskoj...vec i o Italiji i Spaniji. To je vec nesto sasvim drugo.

Koje ce to resenje biti za dugove ako se Evrozona i federalizuje a da je drugacije od danasnjih? Koliko sam video u USoA, vrsili/vrse pozjamice(bailout) saveznih drzava koje imaju probleme poput Kalifornije. A to se isto radi po Evrozoni. Mozda bi federalizacija sprecila da se dodje u danasnju situaciju, mada licno ne verujem u to jer da su hteli to su mogli i bez federalizacije. Dobro su oni znali da Grci namestaju knjige pa su opet njihove banke davale zajmove.Nije resenje u federalizaciji vec u odgovornosti i da se pusti da kapitalizam uradi ono sto mora.

[Anduril]

pa nije, i sve stoji što si rekao, i ostatak eu je svestan šta je grčka radila, al problem je uvezanosti ekonomija i toga što bi isterivanje/izlazak grčke sjebao i njih. otprilike ko kad uđeš u ortakluk s tipom za kojeg se posle ispostavi da je najveća muvara i prevarant, i da te zavrće i stalno traži pare na zajam, al posle skontaš da ne možeš tek tako da izađeš iz ortakluka bez da izgubiš još i mnogo više. to reče rompej juče, pa nije euro bar pa da ulaziš i izlaziš kako ti se ćefne. velik je tu zajednički ceh u pitanju koji mora da se plati bez obzira što je neko pio kiselu vodu a neko viski. paradoksalno, jedini izlaz im je ne rasuturanje, isterivanje, dekompozicija i dezintegrisanje, već suštinska integracija koja bi omogućila bolju kontrolu.

Ne bi izbacivanje Grcke uopste toliko pogodilo EU nego bi pogodilo pre svega francuske banke (koje su vec sada pod ogromnim pritiskom) i zato cela ova sarada i insistiranje na tome da Grcka mora da ostane. Oni su jos pre 2 godine a mogu to i sada trebali napraviti jedan sporazum koji bi uslovio dalje kredite Grckoj ili bilo kome drugom. Taj sporazum bi se primenjivao po automatizmu i Grcka bi tako u odredjenom periodu morala na tacno definisan nacin da napusti Euro-zonu ako ne bi bila u stanju da ispuni odredjene kriterijume. To bi recimo moglo da se definise za period od recimo 3 godine i onda bi Grci znali na cemu su kao i trziste. Na taj nacin bi odjednom svima bio jasan rizik, bilo bi jasno koliko kredita maksimalno bi placao/garantovao ostatak EU i u slucaju problema u drugim drzavama koje zapravo svoje budzete imaju pod mnogo boljom kontrolom od Grcke. Sadasnji problem je u tome sto niko nista ne zna - ne zna se do koje granice su Nemci spremni da placaju, ne zna se gde ce tacno da povuku crvenu liniju jer se sve resava na nekakvim polutajnim EU mitinzima bez jasnih pravila ili zakona a vec vidim predizbornu kampanju u Nemackoj gde ce SPD biti za Eurobonds a Merkel ce udariti populisticki protiv toga i to ce na kraju da izazove haos na trzistu kao i u Evropi. Ovo sada je tek zagrevanje jer do sada je vladao ekonomski bum u Nemackoj koji sada posustaje i sledeca godina ce biti jos puna ovakvih turbulencija sa sve americkim izborima, promenom vodjstva u Kini i svetskom ekonomijom koja se drasticno menja.P.S. Neka cvrsca unija ili federalizacija ne resava puno ako ne postoje instrumenti da se uvede fiskalna disciplina. SAD su dobar primer - sve federalizovano a finansije na drzavnom i federalnom nivou su u haosu. Prednost konfederacije iu kojoj clanice imaju veliku autonomiju ali mogu biti i izbacene ako ne igraju po nekim utvrdjenim pravilima je mnogo veca. Edited September 15, 2011 by Anduril

[hazard]

Ne bi izbacivanje Grcke uopste toliko pogodilo EU nego bi pogodilo pre svega francuske banke (koje su vec sada pod ogromnim pritiskom) i zato cela ova sarada i insistiranje na tome da Grcka mora da ostane. Oni su jos pre 2 godine a mogu to i sada trebali napraviti jedan sporazum koji bi uslovio dalje kredite Grckoj ili bilo kome drugom. Taj sporazum bi se primenjivao po automatizmu i Grcka bi tako u odredjenom periodu morala na tacno definisan nacin da napusti Euro-zonu ako ne bi bila u stanju da ispuni odredjene kriterijume. To bi recimo moglo da se definise za period od recimo 3 godine i onda bi Grci znali na cemu su kao i trziste. Na taj nacin bi odjednom svima bio jasan rizik, bilo bi jasno koliko kredita maksimalno bi placao/garantovao ostatak EU i u slucaju problema u drugim drzavama koje zapravo svoje budzete imaju pod mnogo boljom kontrolom od Grcke. Sadasnji problem je u tome sto niko nista ne zna - ne zna se do koje granice su Nemci spremni da placaju, ne zna se gde ce tacno da povuku crvenu liniju jer se sve resava na nekakvim polutajnim EU mitinzima bez jasnih pravila ili zakona a vec vidim predizbornu kampanju u Nemackoj gde ce SPD biti za Eurobonds a Merkel ce udariti populisticki protiv toga i to ce na kraju da izazove haos na trzistu kao i u Evropi. Ovo sada je tek zagrevanje jer do sada je vladao ekonomski bum u Nemackoj koji sada posustaje i sledeca godina ce biti jos puna ovakvih turbulencija sa sve americkim izborima, promenom vodjstva u Kini i svetskom ekonomijom koja se drasticno menja.P.S. Neka cvrsca unija ili federalizacija ne resava puno ako ne postoje instrumenti da se uvede fiskalna disciplina. SAD su dobar primer - sve federalizovano a finansije na drzavnom i federalnom nivou su u haosu. Prednost konfederacije iu kojoj clanice imaju veliku autonomiju ali mogu biti i izbacene ako ne igraju po nekim utvrdjenim pravilima je mnogo veca.

Ono sto si preskocio je efekat tog izbacivanja Grcke na opste trzisno poverenje u evro. Grcka je po nekim parametrima "specijalni slucaj" ali probleme koje ima Grcka imaju i druge clanice evrozone, vrlo slicno. Drugo sto si preskocio je da se trzista u ovakvim slucajevima uglavnom ne ponasaju racionalno (ideja o trzisnim akterima kao potpuno racionalnim ciniocima je jedan od mozda najglupljih mitova u ravni sa raznoraznim komunistickim idejama) vec krece panika i coporativno ponasanje. Dakle ako izbace Grcku, krenuce spekulacije ko je sledeci. Oce li izbaciti Portugaliju? Irsku? Mozda cak i Italiju? Podeliti evro na dve valute? itd. itd.

[Anduril]

Ono sto si preskocio je efekat tog izbacivanja Grcke na opste trzisno poverenje u evro. Grcka je po nekim parametrima "specijalni slucaj" ali probleme koje ima Grcka imaju i druge clanice evrozone, vrlo slicno. Drugo sto si preskocio je da se trzista u ovakvim slucajevima uglavnom ne ponasaju racionalno (ideja o trzisnim akterima kao potpuno racionalnim ciniocima je jedan od mozda najglupljih mitova u ravni sa raznoraznim komunistickim idejama) vec krece panika i coporativno ponasanje. Dakle ako izbace Grcku, krenuce spekulacije ko je sledeci. Oce li izbaciti Portugaliju? Irsku? Mozda cak i Italiju? Podeliti evro na dve valute? itd. itd.

1. Da li ti tvrdis da ostajanje Grcke u Evru zapravo povecava poverenje u njega? Evro moze biti samo stabilna valuta ako se igra po jasnim pravilima i odrzavaju dogovoreni kriterijumi sto ukljucuje i proceduru za izlazak iz njega. Naravno da bi nekakvo izbacivanje nabrzaka tokom neke nocne sednice izazvalo haos ali jasan trogodisnji plan sa procedurom i kriterijumima bi zapravo umirio trziste jer bi vazio za sve clanice i odklonio nesigurnost.2. Trziste se ponasa neracionalno i panicno uglavnom tada kad nema jasnih informacija, kada vladaju glasine i strahovi a investitori ne veruju u izjave politicara i arbitrarne odluke netransparentnih EU institucija sto je sasvim opravdano. Trziste u uslovima jasne procedure, zakona i vladavine prava jeste veoma racionalno jer investitori mogu lakse da planiraju i odmere svoje rizike. Trenutna situacija sa ad hoc resenjima oko spasavanja Grcke i drugih zemalja na kasicisu nisu nista od toga i zato je u potpunosti ocekivan haos na trzistu a i treba tako da se nastavi sve dok se gospoda ne nauce reda. Edited September 15, 2011 by Anduril

[hazard]

1. Trenutno, bilo kakvo izbacivanje bilo koga iz evra smanjuje poverenje u evro. Zato sto mnogo clanica evrozone imaju probleme. Da u 16 clanica ekonomija cveta, a da je Grcka jedina crna ovca u kojoj nista ne valja, bilo bi naravno obrnuto.2. Pogresno.Ljudi su ponekada ponasaju potpuno neracionalno jer ih vode instinkti, emocije, coporativno ponasanje. Narocito kada su veliki ulozi u pitanju. To je psihologija.Potpunu i tacnu informaciju je cesto nemoguce imati. Cak i kada su pravila jasna. Jer svetska ekonomija je previse kompleksan sistem.Planiranje i merenje rizika su, kako da kazem, rizicne rabote. Narocito merenje rizika i predvidjanje. Ljudi generalno misle da mogu da predvide vise nego sto stvarno mogu da predvide. Nisu svesni koliko njihove mere rizika mogu biti pogresne, i onda imaju lazan osecaj sigurnosti.Generalno, ljudi nisu svesni mogucnosti ogromnih nepredvidljivih oscilacija koje mogu u trenutku uzdrmati ceo sistem i okrenuti naopacke sve postavke i predpostavke. I onda kada se to desi, nastaje panika. Jer odjedanput, nije onako kako se godinama ili decenijama mislilo da jeste i mora biti.

[aram]

Izjednacavas ovde Grcku i ostale drzave sto nije dobro. Grcki problem nisu toliko visoki dugovi (Japan ima recimo mnogo vece dugove pa su kamate ultra niske) vec nedostatak poverenja u njihov sistem uopste. To nije slucaj ni sa jednom drzavom u EU u tom obimu. To je jednostavno jedna disfunkcionalna, parazitska drzava koja laze i krade (vode ju vec 40 godina tri porodice, jedna obicna kriminalna oligarhija), a sada je to postalo problem jer su to poceli da rade i sa EU i sa trzistem a oni ne prastaju kao sto prastaju grcki gradjani. Trziste ne mozes da slazes tako lako na izborima ili da ih potplatis nekom novom beneficijom a drugi evropski politicari su poceli da se brinu jer im glasaci uskracuju poverenje - posebno Merkelovoj u Nemackoj.Ono sto bi EU najvise pomoglo i u mnogome umirilo situaciju je uvodjenje mehanizma za izbacivanje iz Evra koji bi se zatim primenio na Grcku i bilo koju drugu drzavu koja bi na slican nacin pravila probleme. Dakle, lazes koji ti je deficit, godinama prebacujes 3%, 6% ili cak 12% deficita i nisi u stanju da se drzis dogovorenih i ustavom zagarantovanih pravila/zakona - letis napolje u tacno odredjenom roku, transparatno, sistematski i sa jasnim pravilima. Dogovori iza zatvorenih vrata, degenske i manipulativne izjave zvanicnika u jeku kampanje (poput Obame recimo) i arbitrarne odluke politicara kojima se ne moze verovati su oduvek bili nesto najgore sto moze zadesiti bilo koje trziste pa zato i ne cudi nervoza jer trziste bez jasnih i transparetnih pravila uvek ide u ekstrem i kaznjava takvo ponasanje.

Prvi bold nije daleko od istine, ali je zato drugi potpuo pogresan, sto se tice EU. Kad bi bilo tako kao sto kazes, odavno bi bio jasan pritisak na Papaandreue i ostale da se povuku. Veoma bi bilo lako grckom narodu objasniti da su te tri porodice najveci krivci za sve sto ih je snaslo, a toga ni u naznakama. A o jednom Berluskoniju npr. i da ne pricam. Ukratko, ista su to govna svuda.

[Sirius]

Evo ga i QE 3:

The Global Liquidity Bailout Arrives: World Central Banks Announce Global Dollar Shortfall Funding ResolutionRemember that dollar liquidity crunch Zero Hedge has been covering for the past month? Here is the denouement, in the form of the first global liquidity bailout of the world for 2011, on the 3 year anniversary of the Lehman collapse.5 September 2011 - ECB announces additional US dollar liquidity-providing operations over year-endThe Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided, in coordination with the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank, to conduct three US dollar liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of approximately three months covering the end of the year.

Sta su ti politicari!? Posle dva propadanja ovakvih akcija u USoA sada sire sve na globalni nivo Nafto, eve me ;)

[zorglub]

Neka Tresko potvrdi - Italija povećava VAT sa 20 na 21%.

[Lo Zingaro]

Neka Tresko potvrdi - Italija povećava VAT sa 20 na 21%.

Da, juce proslo u parlamentu.

[zorglub]

Da, juce proslo u parlamentu.

Dakle u godinu dana: Portugal (20-21), Španija (16-18), Grčka (21-23 i 15-16)Rumunija (19-24). Meni se ipak čini da se čeka kraj izbora, pa i naši da opletu...

[hazard]

http://www.economist.com/node/21528629

Europe’s debt crisisFudge, the final frontierEuropean leaders are at a fork in the road. They’ll probably go straight on.Sep 10th 2011 | from the print editionSEPTEMBER is a cruel month in international monetary history, when regimes that once seemed inviolate have shattered. In 1931 it was the month when Britain went off the gold standard. In September 1992 the same country was booted out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. This month will not see the end of the euro, but could go a long way to deciding its fate.The brief period of calm brought about by the European Central Bank (ECB) wading into the bond markets from early August to buy Italian and Spanish government debt is over. That intervention at first lowered Italian ten-year bond yields down from over 6% to around 5%. But yields have been creeping up since late August, and jumped above 5.5% on September 5th (see chart 1).Equity markets, which had taken a battering over the summer, have been clobbered again this week. Germany’s Dax 30 index fell by over 5% on September 5th alone. Since the start of July it has declined by 27%. Italy’s benchmark index is down by 29%, France’s by 23%. Such falls have outplunged America, where the S&P 500 has lost 11% over the same period.European banks have suffered still steeper drops. German banks are down by 36% since early July, Italian ones by 38% and French banks by 43%. Plenty of spectres stalk the sector, among them the naming on September 2nd of some big European lenders in lawsuits filed by the US Federal Housing Finance Agency for mis-selling mortgage-backed debt. But the biggest by far is the potential loss that European banks face on their holdings of sovereign debt. Credit-default swaps on European banks are above even the levels they reached in late 2008.In running from some markets, investors have overwhelmed others. The inexorable rise of the Swiss franc, in demand as a haven in troubled times, is threatening the health of Swiss exporters. The Swiss National Bank this week announced that it would cap its value against the single currency (see article). That will mean even greater demand for German Bunds, whose ten-year yields fell to a record low of 1.85%.The market volatility reflects three sources of uncertainty. The first surrounds the ability of Europe’s political classes to carry out their promises. Euro-zone bigwigs agreed in July to put together a new rescue package for Greece and to ramp up the scale and remit of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the euro area’s bail-out fund. One hurdle was negotiated on September 7th when the German constitutional court endorsed the legality of bailing out European countries. But the plan still needs to be ratified by all 17 euro-zone parliaments.The willingness of pressurised countries to get their houses in order is also in doubt. The flip-flopping of Silvio Berlusconi’s government in pushing through the austerity measures it pledged for Italy during the summer has perturbed investors. Officials from the IMF and Europe reviewing Greece’s bail-out programme suspended talks and pulled out of Athens on September 2nd because of reform slippage.The second source of uncertainty centres on Europe’s capacity to grow even as euro-zone countries rush to pass national laws that bind them to the mast of budgetary restraint: Spain, for example, is enshrining a budget-deficit cap in its constitution. The euro area grew by a paltry 0.2% in the second quarter, suffering both from the global slowdown and weakness in domestic sources of demand, with consumer spending falling by 0.2%, the first decline for two years.Sentimental journeyThe economic-sentiment index published by the European Commission, which tends to track GDP growth, fell in August by 4.7 points to 98.3, taking it below its long-run average over the past two decades. This composite measure of confidence took a particular tumble in Germany, hitting hopes that the euro area’s biggest economy could help pull southern Europe out of the mire. The premature tightening in monetary policy this year has done nothing to help, although the ECB was expected to keep its main interest rate unchanged at 1.5% on September 8th (after The Economist had gone to press).The third and biggest source of uncertainty is the inadequacy of the euro zone’s bail-out arsenal. A beefier EFSF—with an effective lending capacity of €440 billion ($620 billion), some of it already committed—can cope with small economies like Ireland and Portugal and provide help for Spain. But the moment markets started to fret about Italy in July, the strategy looked broken-backed. The third-biggest economy in the euro area, with total debt of €1.9 trillion, is simply too big for the EFSF to rescue. Charles Wyplosz, an economist at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, says that this was the critical moment when the scale of a potential rescue overwhelmed the resources available to mount one.Since the EFSF is too puny to do the job it has been given, the solution might appear obvious: to bulk it up still further. But the EFSF’s borrowing is backed by guarantees from euro-area states, each of which vouches for an amount roughly in line with its share of the euro-area economy. The bigger these commitments get the more they add to worries about countries’ overstretched public finances. Ratings downgrades would reduce the EFSF’s resources or force it to operate as a less highly rated, and more expensive, borrower.Relying upon the ECB to hold the fort is tricky, too. The central bank made its latest bond purchases with ill-disguised reluctance and, importantly, they were opposed by Jens Weidmann, the president of the German Bundesbank. Whatever its legal independence and ability to finance the purchases by creating money, the ECB depends implicitly upon support from the German public. An extended programme of bond purchases could forfeit that—indeed, trust in the institution is already waning (see chart 2).A more fundamental step towards a fiscal union may be needed. One way forward is to introduce Eurobonds, which would pledge “joint and several” liability. In theory that could mean that a small state is on the line for such debt; in practice it would mean Germany. Advocates of Eurobonds point out that the public finances of the euro area, taken as a whole, compare favourably with other big economies such as America and Britain, whose governments are currently able to borrow at record low yields. If the euro area were able to borrow as a whole, it too should benefit from low borrowing costs, helped by the liquidity advantage of creating what could become a vast government-bond market.But critics of Eurobonds say that creating them within the current framework would actually weaken budgetary discipline, reducing the incentives for weaker states to get their finances in order. The legal obstacles are daunting: unlike the EFSF, they would require changes to European treaties. The political barriers are higher still: their introduction would push up Germany’s borrowing costs quite steeply. The German and French governments have ruled them out, at least for now.If a big leap towards fiscal union is unlikely, what of the opposite outcome, a break-up of the single currency? Until recently the idea of the euro area fragmenting seemed far-fetched. It says something about the pass to which Europe has come that this is now a possibility being seriously discussed.There are two ways in which a break-up could occur. First, weaker countries like Greece could decide that life outside the single currency might be more tolerable than life inside it. If output continues to slide not just this year but next and unemployment continues to rise, political pressures may mount within Greece to leave the club.The second break-up scenario would be for Germany and some small creditworthy economies like the Netherlands to set up a new currency. The dilemma for Germany, says David Marsh, an historian of the euro, is that there is now an agonising trade-off between being European and achieving the country’s cherished goal of economic and monetary stability. Even so, he does not expect Germany to break away. Its political class remains resolutely pro-European. The ruling CDU party is proud of its heritage as a European party; the opposition parties favour solutions like Eurobonds. More to the point, policymakers who have repeatedly bailed out Greece (2.5% of euro-zone GDP) for fear of the consequences of default will surely be petrified of the impact of a wider break-up.Barry Eichengreen, a monetary historian at the University of California, Berkeley, says that the economic costs of disintegration would be catastrophic for Europe and beyond. In the case of Greece, he fears the result would be a 1930s-style Depression brought about in particular by the collapse of the financial system. If Germany were to leave, its export-based manufacturing economy would take a body blow as the new currency soared. Other costs are incalculable because much would depend on responses that cannot readily be modelled: a Greek exit, say, could spark bank runs in other peripheral countries.Fragment analysisNot everyone accepts these dire warnings. Daniel Gros of CEPS, a think-tank in Belgium, thinks that the impact on other vulnerable countries of a Greek exit could be contained as long as European leaders made clear that they would be protected. Charles Calomiris of Columbia Business School argues that Greece could ultimately benefit by leaving because it would bring about both the harsh default needed to restore debt sustainability and the big devaluation needed to restore the country’s competitiveness. As for Germany, it has a knack of coping with a high exchange rate.Fear of the consequences of break-up is the strongest reason why fiscal union seems a more probable outcome than a fragmentation of the euro. But Europe’s institutional and political capacity to take bold decisions in a crisis is feeble. That is why the immediate focus of debate is on how to gear up the EFSF so that even with its limited resources it could do more.The facility should be turned into a bank, say Mr Gros and Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank. It could then do a lot more by borrowing from the ECB to finance its activities. An alternative suggestion, from Mr Wyplosz, is that the ECB issues guarantees for sovereign bondholders. These warranties would be partial, but they would put a floor on potential losses. Another option is for the EFSF to offer investors protection against a first loss on bonds, and for the ECB to provide those investors with cheap, non-recourse loans. Euro-zone leaders decry the financial engineering that sparked the banking crisis. They are coming to appreciate its merits.

[hazard]

Ekonomist upozarava...uradite nesto sad i odmahttp://www.economist.com/node/21529049

Europe's currency crisisHow to save the euroIt requires urgent action on a huge scale. Unless Germany rises to the challenge, disaster loomsSep 17th 2011 | from the print editionSO GRAVE, so menacing, so unstoppable has the euro crisis become that even rescue talk only fuels ever-rising panic. Investors have sniffed out that Europe’s leaders seem unwilling ever to do enough. Yet unless politicians act fast to persuade the world that their desire to preserve the euro is greater than the markets’ ability to bet against it, the single currency faces ruin. As credit lines gum up and outsiders plead for action, it is not just the euro that is at risk, but the future of the European Union and the health of the world economy.It is a sobering thought that so much depends on the leadership of squabbling European politicians who still consistently underestimate what confronts them (see article). But the only way to stop the downward spiral now is an act of supreme collective will by euro-zone governments to erect a barrage of financial measures to stave off the crisis and put the governance of the euro on a sounder footing.The costs will be large. Few people, least of all this newspaper, want either vast intervention in financial markets or a big shift of national sovereignty to Europe. Nor do many welcome a bigger divide between the 17 countries of the euro zone and the EU’s remaining ten. It is just that the alternatives are far worse. That is the blunt truth that Germany’s Angela Merkel, in particular, urgently needs to explain to her people.The failure of austerity and pretenceA rescue must do four things fast. First, it must make clear which of Europe’s governments are deemed illiquid and which are insolvent, giving unlimited backing to the solvent governments but restructuring the debt of those that can never repay it. Second, it has to shore up Europe’s banks to ensure they can withstand a sovereign default. Third, it needs to shift the euro zone’s macroeconomic policy from its obsession with budget-cutting towards an agenda for growth. And finally, it must start the process of designing a new system to stop such a mess ever being created again.The fourth part will take a long time to complete: it will involve new treaties and approval by parliaments and voters. The others need to be decided on speedily (say over a weekend, when the markets are shut) with the clear aim that European governments and the European Central Bank (ECB) act together to end today’s vicious circle of panic, in which the weakness of government finances, the fragility of banks and worries about low growth all feed on each other.So far the euro zone’s response has relied too much on two things: austerity and pretence. Sharply cutting budget deficits has been the priority—hence the tax rises and spending cuts. But this collectively huge fiscal contraction is self-defeating. By driving enfeebled economies into recession it only increases worries about both government debts and European banks (see article). And mere budget-cutting does not deal with the real cause of the mess, which is a loss of credibility.Italy and Spain are under attack not because their finances have suddenly deteriorated, but because investors fret that they may be forced to default. For this loss of confidence, blame the pretence. Europe’s leaders have repeatedly denied that Greece is insolvent (when everyone knows it is), failing to draw a line between it and the likes of Spain and Italy, which are solvent but short of liquidity. The excuse is that a Greek restructuring may cause contagion. In fact denying the inevitable has undermined pledges about solvent governments.Instead of austerity and pretence, a credible rescue should start with growth and, where it is unavoidable, a serious restructuring of debt. Europe must make an honest judgment about which side of the line countries are on. Greece, which is unambiguously insolvent, ought to have a hard but orderly write-down. The latest, inadequate plan for a second Greek bail-out, agreed at a summit in July, should be thrown away and rewritten. But all the other euro members (and on present numbers Portugal is just about in the solvent camp) should be defended with overwhelming financial firepower. All the troubled economies, solvent or insolvent, need a renewed programme of structural reform and liberalisation. Freeing up services and professions, privatising companies, cutting bureaucracy and delaying retirement will create conditions for renewed growth—and that is the best way to reduce debts.How to prevent contagion? A Greek default would threaten many banks, not just in Greece: this week the markets took aim at French banks that hold southern European debt. Moreover, solvent countries need a breathing-space to push through reforms. That points to agreeing to two measures at the same time: a scheme to shore up the banks, which may take months to put into practice, and a rock-solid promise to support solvent governments, which has to be immediate.The recapitalisation of Europe’s banks must be based on proper stress tests (which should this time include possible default on Greek sovereign debts). Some banks may be able to raise money in the equity markets, but the most vulnerable will need government help. Core countries like Germany and the Netherlands have enough cash to look after their own banks, but peripheral governments may need euro-zone money. Ideally that would come from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), whose overhaul was the most useful thing to emerge from the July summit. But it also makes sense to set up a euro-zone bank fund, together with a euro-zone bank-resolution authority. That is part of the longer-term institution building. However, the ECB could help the banks by giving a commitment to provide unlimited liquidity for as long as it is required, rather than a rolling six months, as now.The great firewall of EuropeNone of this will work unless the Europeans create a firewall around the solvent governments. That means shoring up euro-zone sovereign debt. Spain and Italy owe €2.5 trillion. What if the markets suddenly took fright over Belgium or France? Some have argued for a system of Eurobonds in which every country’s debt is backed by all. But the political oversight to ensure that high-spending countries do not fritter away other people’s money would take years to sort out—and one thing the euro zone does not have is time. The answer is to turn to the only institution that can credibly counter a collective loss of confidence on such a scale.The ECB must declare that it stands behind all solvent countries’ sovereign debts and that it is ready to use unlimited resources to ward off market panic. That is consistent with the ECB’s goal to ensure price and financial stability for the euro zone as a whole. So long as governments are solvent and the bank sells the bonds back to the market after the crisis, this does not amount to monetising government debt. In today’s recessionary world, the ECB could buy several trillion euros-worth of bonds without unleashing inflation.Even so, this is a huge step. The ECB’s German officials have taken to resigning in protest at the limited bond-buying undertaken so far. They fear not only that so young an institution is vulnerable to a loss of credibility, but also that the ECB, which is independent but unelected, could become embroiled in political decisions—especially by declaring a state insolvent and cutting it off. Both these longer-term risks are real, but they are far outweighed by the need to stop the rot. It would be a nonsense if the ECB’s dogged defence of monetary rigour led, say, to an Italian default and a global depression.A bad deal, or a much worse one?Put our plan to many Europeans—creditor Germans, debtor Greeks or Eurosceptic Britons—and they may moan that this is not what they were promised when the euro was set up. Completely true, and sadly irrelevant. The issue now is not whether the euro was mis-sold or whether it was a terrible idea in the first place; it is whether it is worth saving. Would it be cheaper to break it up now? And are the longer-term political costs of redesigning Europe to save the euro too great?The sobering truth about the single currency is that getting in is a lot easier than getting out again. Legally, the euro has no exit clause. If Greece stormed out, and damn the law, as it might yet have to do, it would suffer a run on its banks, as depositors withdrew euros before they were forcibly converted into devalued new drachma. It would have to impose capital controls. Greek companies with international bills would risk bankruptcy, as they would suddenly be without the cash to cover them; and the pressure on other wobbly countries would increase. That is why we favour restructuring Greece, but letting it stay in the euro.If, on the other hand, a strong country like Germany walked out of the euro, probably taking other strong countries with it, the result would be just as terrible. The new hard currency would soar, hitting German exporters. Turmoil in the rump of the euro zone would batter export markets just as the north’s firms became less competitive. German banks and companies, in a mirror image of what would happen in Greece, would suffer from the sudden devaluation of euro assets outside the new hard-currency zone. And the rump might still break apart, as Italy or Spain would not want anything to do with Greece. Amid the debris of broken treaties, wild currency swings and bitter recriminations, Europe’s single market could collapse and the EU itself—the rock of the continent’s post-war stability—could start to crumble.Attaching hard numbers to any of this is difficult. Analysts at UBS, a bank, reckon that euro break-up could cost a peripheral country 40-50% of GDP in the first year, and a core country 20-25% (see article). Yes, that is a guess (as are the various estimates for the ongoing costs of break-up and those of a bail-out in future years). But the immediate bill for a break-up of the single currency would surely be in the trillions of euros. By contrast, a successful rescue would seem a bargain. Add together the money already spent on rescues, to what is needed to recapitalise European banks and any potential losses to the ECB, and the total will still only be in the hundreds of billions of euros. If the ECB’s intervention is bold and credible it might not even have to buy that much debt, because investors would step in. In short, the euro zone would be reckless to flirt with collapse when an affordable rescue is possible.German taxpayers might accept that the immediate costs of our rescue plan are smaller than break-up. But what they detest is the idea that it might let feckless Italians and Portuguese off the hook. Safe in the knowledge that the ECB stands behind their bonds, they may shy away from reform and rectitude.Two risks flow from this. The immediate (and real) one is that furious Germans will demand that Greece is thrown out (or bullied out) of the euro to frighten the others. Such a horrific event would indeed scare Portugal and Ireland, but a threat to expel Italy or Spain is empty: they are too big and too tightly tied into the EU. Simply chucking out Greece because it was convenient would permanently undermine the security of small members of the EU. Besides, once Greece defaults and restructures, its economy stands a good chance of making a credible start on its long journey to economic health.The longer-term risk has to do with “more Europe”. Fans of political integration say that the only way to enforce discipline is to create a United States of Europe (see Charlemagne). Perhaps a fiscal union that would supervise the issuance of common Eurobonds? Or a new supervisory role for euro-zone governments, or, heaven forbid, the useless European Parliament? Somewhere behind this also looms the idea that the ins will now be able to boss around the outs. The ten countries, including Sweden, Poland and Britain, that kept their own currencies may face a choice: to join the euro or be excluded from a new “core Europe”, which in effect starts setting policies. And, this being Europe, there is every chance that the politicians will try to avoid discussing a lot of this with their electorates.The Economist concedes that our rescue plan begins with a democratic deficit that needs to be fixed if steps towards closer fiscal union are to work. But there must be ways for good governments to force bad ones to keep in line that do not require the building of a huge new federal superstate. The Dutch have suggested a commissioner in Brussels with power to veto countries’ fiscal excesses, and to impose his judgments by law. Mrs Merkel has talked of giving the European Court of Justice the right to impose good behaviour. These are big steps—make no mistake—and because they involve treaty changes they would have to be sold to voters. But they are a long way short of a United States of Europe.Mrs Merkel, it’s time to explain the choicesThe outs, in particular, may still be nervous about all this. So frankly is this newspaper. But the alternative may be the collapse of not just the single currency but the single market and the whole European project. The euro has reached the point where nobody is going to get what they want—something that needs to be spelled out to the Germans more than anybody. Over the past 18 months they have grudgingly supported half-rescue after half-rescue—and the bill has gone up. In the end confidence and credibility are all. For the ECB to stand behind less prudent countries may be unwelcome to Germans; but letting the euro fall to bits is much, much worse. Spell that out clearly to your voters, Mrs Merkel.

[Anduril]

Problem sa ovom analizom Ekonomista je da apsolutni nivo grckog duga nije neodrziv (pa nema ni tolike potrebe ga odmah otpisivati) jer neke razvijene drzave imaju i veci dug nego je problem u grckoj vladi i uopste drustvu koja mora da se reformise da ne bi trosili konstantno 10% vise poslednjih godina, da prestanu da lazu sa brojkama, utajivanjem poreza itd. Slican je i problem u Spaniji gde je ukupan dug prilicno nizak ali je zato deficit i nezaposlenost usled ludackih regulacija na trzistu rada neodrziva.Kresanje ukupnog duga je dobra ideja samo u kombinaciji sa uvodjenjem nekog mehanizma koji bi naterao vlade na fiskalnu disciplinu. Ako drzava poput Spanije ili cak Italije ne moze proceduralno da izadje iz Evra jer recimo konstantno krsi dogovorena pravila onda je to slicna situacija kao i sa "to big to fail" bankama - jednostavno ce nastaviti sa politikom trosenja nezaradjenog uz kozmeticke promene i smesak za publiku dok se ceo sistem ne raspadne u haosu.

[hazard]

Realno, Grckoj treba 1 stecajni upravnik.

[Gonzo]

odličan bbc-jev flowchart sa mogućim opcijama za grčku i evropu. izbor je sjajan, od pirove pobede do globalnog meltdowna i vojnog udara. najrealnija mi je opcija moralnog hazarda, gde bi nemačka i ostali glavni bailout finansijeri u određenoj meri istolerisali umereno kršenje štednje, a zarad izbegavanja građanskog rata, nereda i totalnog raspada grčke usled socijalnog nezadovoljstva.http://www.bbc.co.uk...siness-14977728kao posledice tog scenarija analiza predviđa sledeće posledice, po meni, veoma spekulativno.

But Italy and other high-debt countries may copy Greek tactics. Germany - which is now seen as on the hook for bailing out the entire eurozone - may find it much more expensive to borrow, and may consider leaving the euro.

grčkoj će se jednostavno morati dozvoliti da troši nešto više nego što je teoretski predviđeno, da bi se održao minimum stabilnosti. to ne implicira direktno isti scenario za italiju i ostale rizične zemlje, a još manje to da bi nemačka uzela u obzir napuštanje evra. dakle, greeks will get away with it. Edited September 23, 2011 by Gonzo