Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Sirius]

Progurace to oni ali samo se odlaze ono sto svi znaju da mora da se desi. Uostalom to i jeste plan, kontrolisati bankrot nekih zemalja EU do 2013. Kada ce ih i zvanicno izbaciti iz Evrozone. Ovo je optimisticki scenario.

[Gonzo]

ja po svim analizama koje sam čitao vidim da to s izbacivanjem ne ide baš tako lako, niti postoje neke ustaljene procedure u tritizima za ovakve situacije..

[hazard]

Kakva izbacivanja iz evrozone, o cemu pricate. Niko nece biti izbacen iz evrozone, osim ako se cela evrozona ne raspadne.To za 2013. je nesto drugo, jer od 2013. treba da funkcionise neki drugi mehanizam koji je dogovoren za resavanje ovakvih situacija.Inace, evo ga Barozo:

Commission president Barroso to put forward eurobondsEuropean Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso has said he will put forward moves to tackle the eurozone debt crisis, which he called "the most serious challenge of a generation".He said he would urge the 17 eurozone nations to issue joint bonds, allowing them to borrow money collectively.Eurobonds have been backed by Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti and investor George Soros.However, Germany has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the idea.His comments came ahead of an emergency conference call between German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou due later on Wednesday.He said Europe needed a "federalist moment" to rescue it."This is a fight for the economic and political future of Europe... this is a fight for integration itself," he said.Speaking to the European Parliament, Mr Barroso said that the political process in the eurozone - dominated as it is by the heads of the 17 member governments - was too slow for impatient markets.He argued that the solution to the crisis would have to involve the "Community method" - implying more centralised decision-making.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14913517Kriza ce na kraju biti iskoriscena da se poveca moc EU, i da se jos vise umanji prakticni suverenitet zemlja-clanica. Jer ce svi pogledati alternative, i smatrati ih za predrasticne (raspad EU, itd.).Dobrodosla evropska federalna superdrzavo. Edited September 14, 2011 by hazard

[Gonzo]

čito i ja to barozovo danas, al uz dodatak da je njemački ustavni sud rekao da su eurobonds nono.elem, složili smo se oko ovoga,

Kriza ce na kraju biti iskoriscena da se poveca moc EU, i da se jos vise umanji prakticni suverenitet zemlja-clanica. Jer ce svi pogledati alternative, i smatrati ih za predrasticne (raspad EU, itd.).Dobrodosla evropska federalna superdrzavo.

sotim da ti verovatno misliš da je to loše, dok ja mislim da je jedina realna i održiva zamena za ovu vreću punu rogova, gde svako malo može da ti se desi ovakva kriza i totalni raspad sistema.no, hajd da se nadamo da će ovako da se razvije, to bi bila superjuhu varijanta, naspram klizanja niz provaliju što je alternativa koja visi u vazduhu.

[hazard]

Da li je lose ili bolje je u ovom trenutku akademska rasprava. Za zemlje koje su clanice evrozone, u principu sve je bolje od njenog raspada.Da li je EU koja vise lici na federalnu drzavu dobra ili losa stvar je nesto sto o cemu mogu razmisljati zemlje koje tek treba da udju u EU i eventualno clanice EU koje nisu u evrozoni.Za evrozonu su stvari prilicno jasne. Njen opstanak je mnogo bolja varijanta od raspada. Mnogo bolja. A njen opstanak se na duze staze moze garantovati samo vecom integracijom. Ne mozes da imas monetarnu uniju zasnovanu na papirnom novcu (tj. bez zlatne ili neke slice podloge) a da nemas fiskalnu uniju.

[Gonzo]

pa da, slažemo se, isto to ponovih na topiku o sveckoj krizi.

[hazard]

http://www.economist.com/node/21528639

Germany’s euro questionNobody knows the answer, especially not the Germans themselvesSep 10th 2011 | from the print edition * *WHAT does Germany want? The question comes up in every discussion about the euro. What it does not want is clear enough: no “transfer union”, no pooling of national debts and no break-up of the single currency. But it is hard to know how it hopes to reconcile these aims, harder still to discern the ultimate goal of Germany’s European policy.All of a sudden, though, Berlin is abuzz with talk of remaking the European Union: issuing joint Eurobonds, renegotiating the EU’s treaties, even creating a federal Europe. Nobody knows if any of this will come about. The obstacles to fundamental change are so forbidding that leaders will always be tempted to try to muddle through. Yet the terms of Germany’s debate are shifting. German politicians seem to have decided that the time has come to start redesigning European institutions. Again.German Euro-federalists have woken up after a long slumber. It is no surprise that Joschka Fischer, the Greens’ elder statesman, should call for the “United States of Europe”. More striking is that Gerhard Schröder, a former Social Democratic chancellor, uttered the same words, as did Ursula von der Leyen, the labour minister and a leading Christian Democrat. This week Mr Schröder was in Brussels alongside other ex-leaders—Felipe Gonzáles of Spain, Guy Verhofstadt of Belgium and Matti Vanhanen of Finland—calling for Eurobonds, EU powers to raise taxes, “Europe-wide public goods” and a European “federation”.This might sound like the ravings of a has-been. Certainly, it flies in the face of rising Euroscepticism across the continent. Yet the German government itself is talking of reshaping the EU’s institutions. Angela Merkel, the chancellor, says that reopening the treaties is no taboo. Her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, talks of one day giving up some sovereignty over budgets.Germany’s change of mind is born of twin failures, of the financial measures so far taken in the euro zone and of political strategy in Germany. As the debt crisis has deepened, Germany has had to retreat from one red line after another. Last year’s bail-out of Greece was meant to be a one-off; since then Ireland and Portugal have been rescued and Greece has come back for more. A big European bail-out fund was supposed to be a temporary measure; now it is being made permanent.The debacle is weakening Germany’s ruling coalition. Surveys show that Germans are fed up with the euro. But neither the Christian Democrats’ opposition to Eurobonds nor the Free Democrats’ flirtation with more overt Euroscepticism are winning them votes. By contrast, the Social Democrats and the Greens are making gains even though they want Eurobonds that could merge ultra-safe German debt with Greek junk.“This is a strange country,” says Hans-Olaf Henkel, a former head of the German business federation, who once supported the euro but now advocates breaking it up into a northern and southern currency. “Public opinion does not like the euro, but does not want to hear of an alternative to it.” The strangeness is due, in no small part, to the disasters of history. Post-war Germany bound itself with rules and treaties in order to resist past temptations: a strong constitution to restrain politicians, fiscal rules to banish hyperinflation, the EU to tame nationalism.The euro zone’s crisis has tested the efficacy of these European rules and led Germans to ask why they should pay when others break them. But as the constitutional court showed this week, European integration is too much part of Germany’s post-war redemption to be abandoned easily, however many problems it may cause. So some Christian Democrats now want to reclaim the pro-Europe heritage of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl. The best way to confront Euroscepticism, they say, is to improve and deepen the EU.There is some difference between Mrs Merkel and the Europhile Mr Schäuble over how to do it. Both agree that the euro zone’s problems have been caused by the laxness of countries that piled up debt and lost competitiveness. Both want new ways to enforce budget rules. Both think that, issued now, Eurobonds would kill what little zeal for reform exists. Both hope stricter rules would not only resolve the crisis but ensure it does not recur. But they differ on the future and on Eurobonds. For Mrs Merkel, rules and rectitude would narrow bond spreads and make Eurobonds unnecessary. For Mr Schäuble, tougher rules are a necessary condition for Eurobonds and closer political union.We don’t know what we want but we’re happy to discuss itGermany, then, does not know what it wants—but is ready to talk anyway. Its politicians recognise that the current system cannot provide long-term stability in the euro zone. They also know that dangers lurk in any attempt to renegotiate that system.Resistance in the German Bundestag and elsewhere means that even the partial bail-out measures agreed in July are getting bogged down. What are the chances that the EU can agree on an even bigger leap towards fiscal integration? And what are the chances that citizens would vote for it? Perhaps the crisis might be a spur to the federalist impulse, but nobody can count on that. What is certain is that any treaty changing the EU’s institutions would be disruptive. The EU spent the best part of a decade writing a constitution, rejecting it and finally reviving it as the 2009 Lisbon treaty. Any further loss of sovereignty might require Germany to amend its constitution. Britain would seek to repatriate powers. Inevitably, a more integrated euro zone would raise questions about the ten countries, many in Germany’s hinterland, that remain outside. Without liberal economies like Britain to resist protectionism, the single market might be endangered. It would be a tragedy if the attempt to save the euro were to put the single market at risk. Germany would not want that either.

[Muwan]

Dobrodosla evropska federalna superdrzavo.

Nije valjda da veruješ u ovo?Jutros je Jeff Randall povukao dobru paralelu sa ovim Barosovim očajničkim pokušajem da umiri javnost. Rekao je da ga neobično podseća na ono što je Napoleon rekao nakon pušione kod Waterloo-a: "E, a sad idem da pokorim Britaniju".Zaista, što je veći ovaj finansijski fail Evrozone, to su veće i bombastičnije najave o federalizaciji i centralizaciji. Hoće to, ali malo sutra, da se preko noći napravi federalna država od 27 zemalja čiji poslanici u Evropskom parlamentu u najvećem broju slučajeva ne mogu da se slože oko toga koje je doba dana.Sve te megaizjave o tome kako niko neće biti pušten niz vodu, kako vlada jedinstvo, kako će biti uvedena centralna fiskalna politika, blablabla... već mesecima služe samo da na 4-5 dana umire tržišta. Nakon što tržišta skapiraju da iza tih izjava ne stoji bilo kakva ideja ili plan, sunovrat se nastavlja do sledeće kritične tačke, kada sledi nova megaizjava i tako do trenutka u kojem više nijedna izjava neće moći da pomogne ni kratkoročno ni dugoročno.Realnost je takva da Evropa nema nikakav plan, niti je u stanju da nešto učini. Hteli su da naprave svetsku valutu, zabrljali su epohalno, sad im ostaje da prstima zapušavaju rupe u koritu - dok bude bilo slobodnih prstiju. Posle toga će moći još jedino da saniraju posledice koje će biti strašne btw.

[hazard]

Ili je to, ili je raspad EU (totalni; jer ako se raspadne evrozona ode sve u kurac - i EU, i Sengen, i zajednicko trziste - vrlo brzo, to ce biti domino efekat, izgubice se potpuno bilo kakvo poverenje bilo kog tipa u bilo koju evropsku instituciju).A verujem, kada bude doslo do stani-pani momenta, da ce svi pogledati u provaliju (raspad EU) i zakljuciti da to tako ne moze i da se sa tim stvarima ne moze igrati. I onda ce jedino resenje biti - dublja integracija, tj. dodatna (kon)federalizacija.Prvo, nema tu 27 zemalja da se pita. Ne moraju svi da se integrisu dublje nego sto jesu sad, vec samo ovih 17 sto su clanice evrozone. Ovih drugih 10 lako ce dati podrsku na nivou EU za tu dublju integraciju, jer se njih ne dotice, a raspad EU i svega sto uz to ide jednostavno ne zele. Jedina caka sto su se nove clanice 2004. obavezale da ce uvesti evro, ali to se da promeniti - das im "opt-out" klauzulu jer evro vise nije (nece biti) ono sto je bio 2004. I onda imas druge drzave koje nisu pod obavezom da udju u evrozonu i ako su o tome razmisljale - Danska i Svedska, i one koje na to ni ne pomisljaju (Britanija). Uz malo pritiska od same evrozone (alo, puci cemo, dajte glas) i spolja (Ameri, MMF) eto 10 glasova za tu dublju integraciju evrozone.A ovih 17...opet, realno, tu nema njih 17 koji nesto odlucuju. Odlucuju Francuska i Nemacka uz podrsku Italije i Spanije. Drzave koje su vec na life-support-u (Grcka, Irska, Portugalija) mogu samo da cute i da prihvate sta im se nudi, jer realno znaju da je tek za njih izlazak iz evrozone katastrofa ogromnih razmera. A onda ce na scenu stupiti i SAD. Oni ne zele raspad EU, jer ne zele haos u Evropi. Ni ekonomski, ni politicki, ni drustveni. Nije u njihovom interesu nikako. Evo ga vec Gajtner dolece drugi put u nedelju dana da urgira Evropljane da se sastave. Dakle kljuc je da se oko toga dogovore ove 4 velike clanice EU koje ce svakako imati podrsku Amera. Da se ublazi otpor preostalih 13 clanica, tj. onih koji budu davali otpor (tri navedena polumrtvaca verovatno nece, dakle ostajemo na 10), definisace se nacin izlaska iz evrozone i te vece integracije, ali to ce moci "tek kad kriza prodje" i svakako ne "u sledecih 5 godina". (S namerom da ce do tada vec "proci voz" i niko nece pomisljati o izlasku.) Ako to ne odobrovolji one koji pruzaju otpor dubljoj integraciji, bice im pripreceno silom. Vojnom ako treba. Americkom ako treba. Leci ce na rudu.Dakle kljuc je u Nemackoj i Francuskoj, pa onda podrsci Spanije i Italije. Sve ostalo se da ispeglati. Nazalost, Sarkozi i Merkel imaju sve u svojim rukama.Inace, javio se i Soros:http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/07/11/true-europeans-now-need-a-plan-b/?Authorised=false#ixzz1RvZWy6iN

The European Union was brought into existence by what Karl Popper called “piecemeal social engineering”. A group of far-sighted statesmen, inspired by the vision of a United States of Europe, recognised that this ideal could be approached only gradually, by setting limited objectives, mobilising the political will needed to achieve them and concluding treaties that required states to surrender only as much sovereignty as they could bear politically. That is how the postwar Coal and Steel Community was transformed into the EU – one step at a time, understanding that each step was incomplete and would require further steps in due course. The EU’s architects generated the necessary political will by drawing on the memory of the second world war, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the economic benefits of greater integration. The process fed on its own success and, as the Soviet Union crumbled, it received a powerful boost from the prospect of German reunification. Germany recognised that it could be reunified only in the context of greater European unification, and it was willing to pay the price. With the Germans helping to reconcile conflicting national interests by putting a little extra on the table, the process of European integration reached its apogee with the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of the euro. But the euro was an incomplete currency: it had a central bank but no treasury. Its architects were fully aware of this deficiency, but believed that when the need arose, the political will could be summoned to take the next step forward. That is not what happened, because the euro had other deficiencies of which its architects were unaware. They laboured under the misconception that financial markets can correct their own excesses, so the rules were designed to rein in only public-sector excesses. Even there, they relied too heavily on self-policing by sovereign states. The excesses, however, were mainly in the private sector, as interest-rate convergence generated economic divergence. Lower interest rates in the weaker countries fuelled housing bubbles, while the strongest country, Germany, had to tighten its belt in order to cope with the burden of reunification. Meanwhile, the financial sector was thoroughly compromised by the spread of unsound financial instruments and poor lending practices. With Germany reunified, the main impetus behind the integration process was removed. Then, the financial crisis unleashed a process of disintegration. The decisive moment came after Lehman Brothers collapsed, and authorities had to guarantee that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail. The German chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that there should be no joint EU guarantee; each country would have to take care of its own institutions. That was the root cause of today’s euro crisis. The financial crisis forced sovereign states to substitute their own credit for the credit that had collapsed, and in Europe each state had to do so on its own, calling into question the creditworthiness of European government bonds. Risk premiums widened, and the eurozone was divided into creditor and debtor countries. Germany changed course 180 degrees from being the main driver of integration to the main opponent of a “transfer union”. This created a two-speed Europe, with debtor countries sinking under the weight of their liabilities, and surplus countries forging ahead. As the largest creditor, Germany could dictate the terms of assistance, which were punitive and pushed debtor countries towards insolvency. Meanwhile, Germany benefited from the euro crisis, which depressed the exchange rate and boosted its competitiveness further. As integration has turned into disintegration, the role of the European political establishment was also reversed, from spearheading further unification to defending the status quo. As a result, anyone who considers the status quo undesirable, unacceptable or unsustainable has had to take an anti-European stance. And, as heavily indebted countries are pushed towards insolvency, the number of the disaffected continues to grow, together with support for anti-European parties such as True Finns in Finland. Yet Europe’s political establishment continues to argue that there is no alternative to the status quo. Financial authorities resort to increasingly desperate measures in order to buy time. But time is working against them: the two-speed Europe is driving member countries further apart. Greece is heading towards disorderly default and/or devaluation, with incalculable consequences. If this seemingly inexorable process is to be arrested and reversed, both Greece and the eurozone must urgently adopt a plan B. A Greek default may be inevitable, but it need not be disorderly. And, while some contagion will be unavoidable – whatever happens to Greece is likely to spread to Portugal, and Ireland’s financial position, too, could become unsustainable – the rest of the eurozone needs to be ringfenced. That means strengthening the eurozone, which would probably require wider use of Eurobonds and a eurozone-wide deposit-insurance scheme of some kind. Generating the political will would require a plan B for the EU itself. The European elite needs to revert to the principles that guided the union’s creation, recognising that our understanding of reality is inherently imperfect, and that perceptions are bound to be biased and institutions flawed. An open society does not treat prevailing arrangements as sacrosanct; it allows for alternatives when those arrangements fail. It should be possible to mobilise a pro-European silent majority behind the idea that when the status quo becomes untenable, we should look for a European solution rather than national ones. “True Europeans” ought to outnumber true Finns and other anti-Europeans in Germany and elsewhere.

[Filipenko]

Gospodinu Sorošu neko treba da objasni da će svaki vid True Europeans, i True bilo ko sajlent madžoritija biti za ono rešenje koje će mu doneti više leba na stola, drugim rečima da će ih preko noći zapasti kurcobolja za Evropom i evropejstvom bude li mu se reklo da će narednih 10 godina zbog toga imati manje keša.

[Gonzo]

hazard objasnio sve, fakat je da je evropska birokratija neodgovorna, bezidejna i sve ostalo, ali ovo su jednostavno život ili smrt situacije, sa vrlo suženim opcijama gde nema mnogo mesta za palamuđenje. ovo što kaže hazard je vrlo indikativno, a što i ja pomenuh, da su ameri, kinezi i ostali veliki igrači veoma zainteresovani jer znaju da bi puštanje ovih kola niz brdo završilo bolno po sve njih. neko je pominjao hiljadu evra troška po glavi stanovnika za bailoutovanje grčke, e pa to je sića naspram scenarija istupanja/isterivanja iz evrozone, i sve što nakon toga sledi, gde projekcije idu po par hiljada evara u prvom momentu, i još X godina trocifrenih iznosa koje bi plaćali građani jakih eu ekonomija, prvenstveno nemačke. danas baš čitah i sjajnu analizu koja poredi grčku sa liman bradersima, iz iste perspektive, limani su pušteni niz vodu zbog neodlučnosti i nevoljnosti administracije da krca budžetske pare u njihovo spašavanje, da bi nakon njihove propasti došli do toga da moraju da sipaju za redove veličina više milijardi javnih novaca za zaustavljanje haosa koji je nastao. slično bi se desilo i s grčkom, tako da mislim da su sve eu glavonje vrlo dobro svesne cost-benefit analize, i da će uraditi sve da održe glavu eu zoni izvan vode. ne zbog nekih ideala ili slično, već zato što znaju da bi ih sve druge opcije mnooooogo skuplje koštale.

Edited September 15, 2011 by Gonzo

[Anduril]

Da ne ponavljam - Grcka nije iz iste price kao i ostatak EU.

[Gonzo]

Da ne ponavljam - Grcka nije iz iste price kao i ostatak EU.

pa nije, i sve stoji što si rekao, i ostatak eu je svestan šta je grčka radila, al problem je uvezanosti ekonomija i toga što bi isterivanje/izlazak grčke sjebao i njih. otprilike ko kad uđeš u ortakluk s tipom za kojeg se posle ispostavi da je najveća muvara i prevarant, i da te zavrće i stalno traži pare na zajam, al posle skontaš da ne možeš tek tako da izađeš iz ortakluka bez da izgubiš još i mnogo više. to reče rompej juče, pa nije euro bar pa da ulaziš i izlaziš kako ti se ćefne. velik je tu zajednički ceh u pitanju koji mora da se plati bez obzira što je neko pio kiselu vodu a neko viski. paradoksalno, jedini izlaz im je ne rasuturanje, isterivanje, dekompozicija i dezintegrisanje, već suštinska integracija koja bi omogućila bolju kontrolu.

[hazard]

Grcka nije iz iste price kao ostatak EU (mada i druge mediteranske drzave imaju sistemske probleme slicno Grckoj) ali problem je sto ovde vise nije problem samo Grcka. Od pocetka se polazilo u EU od toga da je jedino Grcka problem, da su oni drugaciji od ostatka EU, i da ih valja zakrpiti samo dok kriza ne prodje, da se smanji exposure evropskih banaka prema Grckoj, pa onda za koju godinu i mogu da bankrotiraju bez vecih posledica po ostatak evrozone.Ali ovde se vise ne prica samo o Grckoj. Cak ni samo o Portugaliji i Irskoj...vec i o Italiji i Spaniji. To je vec nesto sasvim drugo.

Edited September 15, 2011 by hazard

[Sirius]

hazard objasnio sve, fakat je da je evropska birokratija neodgovorna, bezidejna i sve ostalo, ali ovo su jednostavno život ili smrt situacije, sa vrlo suženim opcijama gde nema mnogo mesta za palamuđenje. ovo što kaže hazard je vrlo indikativno, a što i ja pomenuh, da su ameri, kinezi i ostali veliki igrači veoma zainteresovani jer znaju da bi puštanje ovih kola niz brdo završilo bolno po sve njih. neko je pominjao hiljadu evra troška po glavi stanovnika za bailoutovanje grčke, e pa to je sića naspram scenarija istupanja/isterivanja iz evrozone, i sve što nakon toga sledi, gde projekcije idu po par hiljada evara u prvom momentu, i još X godina trocifrenih iznosa koje bi plaćali građani jakih eu ekonomija, prvenstveno nemačke. danas baš čitah i sjajnu analizu koja poredi grčku sa liman bradersima, iz iste perspektive, limani su pušteni niz vodu zbog neodlučnosti i nevoljnosti administracije da krca budžetske pare u njihovo spašavanje, da bi nakon njihove propasti došli do toga da moraju da sipaju za redove veličina više milijardi javnih novaca za zaustavljanje haosa koji je nastao. slično bi se desilo i s grčkom, tako da mislim da su sve eu glavonje vrlo dobro svesne cost-benefit analize, i da će uraditi sve da održe glavu eu zoni izvan vode. ne zbog nekih ideala ili slično, već zato što znaju da bi ih sve druge opcije mnooooogo skuplje koštale.

Da je pusteno da propadnu losi tada bi situacija bila jos gora ali bi danas Svet bio u mnogo boljem ekonomskom stanju. Kapitalizam tako funkcionise. Ako su americke(evropske) banke, osiguranja i delovi administracije lagali i krsili propise zbog sto vece zarade onda moraju da puknu i da dodju oni koji to nisu radili.Na kraju ce banke opet ici pod led-Bank of America je na pragu bankrota-Is Bank of America on the brink of bankruptcy? Federalizacijom Evrozone se nece resiti problem dugova svih clanova Evrozone. Ako si prihvatio kapitalizam onda postuj njegove principe ili ce te on unistiti ako si neodgovoran. Bili su neodgovorni.