Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Sirius]

Jedna strana jeste uzrocnik ali se sada vidi trulez i druge strane.

[расејан]

Pa nije. Ali jedini krivac za to je samo sa jedne strane Atlantika.

Ајде. У Европи нема банкара?

[Tresko]

Ајде. У Европи нема банкара?

Vrlo malo. Ostali uglavnom hoće da oponašaju američke bankare, i gutaju sve što odande stiže. A stižu uglavnom govna.

[CPP]

Inace , celu ekonomsku krizu na Kipru je izazvala eksplozija oruzja koja se nalazila blizu najvece termoelektrane. Da stvar bude gora, oruzje nije bilo kiparsko vec je zaplenjeno na iranskom brodu. Niko nije hteo da ga prihvati pa je morao Kipar.

Hm, pa ne baš. Oružje (mahom municija) namenjeno Siriji je zaplenjeno u kiparskim vodama. Britanija i SAD su se više puta nudili da ga o svom trošku i iz humanitarnih pobuda uzmu & unište . Kipar međutim nije hteo da se zamera komšijama sa kojima ima tradicionalno dobre odnose (toliko dobre da im se ista pošiljka može prodati dvaput) te je, sve pozivajući se na odredbe kojekakvih UN i međunarodnih zakona koji kažu da čija carina, njegova i zaplena, eksplozivnu materiju profesionalno i u skladu s standardima gepekovao u vidu gomile kontejnera na livadi u sklopu pomorske baze koja je sticajem okolnosti odmah do najveće ostrvske elektrane.Postoji jasan paper trail koji pokazuje da je ceo niz miševa pri dnu lanca ishrane tražio da se burići sklone, unište ili poklone Anglosaksoncima, ampak je neko^TM pri vrhu cenio da je potencijal za dobar bizmis vredan rizika. Zato sada svi zvižde i glume ludilo. Dodatna olakotna okolnost je da se tih dana vatala godišnjica invazije -> Turci su krivi za sve.No, nemajte brige, i ovo ide pod tepih kao što je HCY522 pometen.

[Sirius]

Tacno ali se zaboravlja deo da su US pritiskale kiparsku Vladu da prihvati tovar iako su Kiprani pokusavali da to izbegnu.

It soon became clear that the Cypriots were in a real bind. A Cypriot diplomat suggested that Cyprus transfer the cargo to either the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFCYP) or Lebanon (UNIFIL), which operates out of a port in Cyprus. The US Ambassador made polite noises about his “creative thinking” which, in the Foreign Service, is not a compliment. (CYPRUS: GOVERNMENT SEEKING MUTUALLY-PALATABLE END STATE, January 29, 2009)The Cypriots continued to make clear that they did not want to keep the cargo, owing to “heavy pressure” from Syria and Iran. They were extraordinarily worried about the legality of the seizure and, in turn, the legality of simply turning the cargo over to a third party. The US explained that there was “no mechanism” to give the cargo to UNIFIL, but instead suggested giving the cargo to the British (who have bases on Cyprus, which is not something the government likes reminding Cypriots about) or even the French. The Cypriots didn’t like any proposal that didn’t involve the UN and suggested they might ask the UN Sanctions Panel how to proceed. The United States really did not like this idea, for fear of asking Russia’s advice without knowing the answer. (MONCHEGORSK: MFA SEEKING LEGAL OPINIONS, January 30, 2009.)

Saga of the Monchegorsk

[Sirius]

Elem, Evropa opet tone:

Barroso Basically Admits Defeat ... EC President admits investors not buying rescue planEuropean Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has admitted that last month’s plan to save the continent from a debt crisis following the second Greek bailout has failed to convince investors.However, he stopped short of admitting his intervention this week to push leaders to endorse changes to the new plan is related to Italy and Spain’s current situation with their cost of borrowing coming close to bailout levels.

Sada se sve vise prica o Nemackoj koja moze biti "zarazena" krizom i moguce podele EU:Could There Really Be A Recession Risk In Germany?Za to vreme Italija i Spanija su u ozbiljnim problemima:

Defence of Spain and Italy will decide eurozone futureAfter the eurozone’s small peripheral countries, market fear is enveloping Italy and Spain. The yields of their public debt have risen sharply; investors are losing faith in their banks. This is still a phoney war, but if a decisive battle is going to shape the future look of the eurozone it will be fought here.Both countries’ borrowing costs have moved nearer 7 per cent – which markets have latched on to as the yield at which a state’s debt dynamics become unsustainable. This is magical thinking. Which borrowing costs can be serviced sustainably depends on many other things: the size of the debt burden, growth and inflation rates, the government’s ability to run primary surpluses, and the maturity profile of the outstanding debt.For both Spain and Italy, those fundamentals need not scare markets into a panic. Spain has low debt and a sharply falling deficit. Italy, although its debt level is the eurozone’s second highest, runs a primary surplus, and its debt matures slowly. Both countries can, if they must, afford to pay yields well in excess of 7 per cent for an extended period. That it is feasible does not make it desirable. Italy and Spain cannot allow themselves any complacency about high yields. That would even be true were it just a matter of saving money on borrowing costs. But the greater danger is that high yields entrench a perception in the market that one or both countries have gone off track and will struggle ever more to refinance their obligations. Seeing 7 per cent yields as a trigger may be magical thinking, but it has real effects. It was also needlessly encouraged by eurozone officials who strong-armed Ireland and Portugal into financial rescues after their yields breached the 7 per cent mark.Italy and Spain must therefore redouble their efforts to improve the factors that determine sustainability. So far, Madrid has been a great deal more energetic than Rome. Spain’s deficit-cutting programme is going well, even if the autonomous regions need to demonstrate more budget discipline. The government has shown a willingness to reform the rules that paralyse Spain’s labour market. The question mark remaining is over the banking sector. A long-overdue consolidation is taking place, but the public finances are still vulnerable to unpleasant surprises in banks’ asset values. Madrid should cap the amount of any future bail-outs of banks once and for all.Italy needs to retrieve the fiscal tenaciousness it demonstrated in the 1990s. Its large debt burden makes it imperative to respond to yield rises with even greater budget discipline. The recently passed budget disappointed by scheduling most of the effort until after elections due by 2013. Rome should revisit this to frontload more deficit cuts. But the greatest failing of Italy under Silvio Berlusconi, prime minister, has been the lack of effort to restore Italy’s growth rate. Structural reforms to boost competition and reduce bureaucracy can wait no longer.The greatest responsibility for dispelling market fears lies with the two countries themselves. But even if they do everything necessary – and Spain has come close – this may still be insufficient. The market has its reasons that reason cannot know: if enough traders find Italian and Spanish bonds too risky, their selling of their holdings can make their fear a reality. Rome and Madrid cannot stop this. But the eurozone as a whole can. Its leaders agreed last month to unlock their toolbox by letting the European financial stability facility buy sovereign debt in secondary markets pre-emptively. But they have yet to implement their agreement; and they failed to boost the EFSF to a size commensurate with the problem. This is a dereliction of duty. We may yet be spared a full assault on the eurozone’s southern front. But if one comes, it would be better to be prepared.

U Spaniji je pala Vlada.

[Tresko]

Ne znam što se buni Barroso, došlo je na naplatu to što su više od 10 godina kućni ljubimac US, a iz US bulje im vire samo pertle.

[расејан]

Vrlo malo. Ostali uglavnom hoće da oponašaju američke bankare, i gutaju sve što odande stiže. A stižu uglavnom govna.

С тим што и у америчком замешатељству (ака Фед а и надувавање некретнина) има британских банака, а ни Дојче банк није ван игре.

[Sirius]

16:29 05Sep11 RTRS-GERMAN DEVELOPMENT BANK KFW CHIEF SCHROEDER- SITUATION OF BANKING INDUSTRY IS "MUCH MORE DRAMATIC THAN IN 2008

[Sirius]

Jedna od najvecih banaka na svetu, svajcarska UBS, prica o ratu u svom izvestaju :o

UBS Quantifies Costs Of Euro Break Up, Warns Of Collapse Of Banking System And Civil War Any time a major bank releases a report saying a given course of action is too costly, too prohibitive, too blonde, or simply too impossible, it is nearly guaranteed that that is precisely the course of action about to be undertaken. Which is why all non-euro skeptics are advised to shield their eyes and look away from the just released report by UBS (of surging 3 Month USD Libor rate fame) titled "Euro Break Up - The Consequences." UBS conveniently sets up the straw man as follows: "Under the current structure and with the current membership, the Euro does not work. Either the current structure will have to change, or the current membership will have to change." So far so good. Yet where it gets scary is when UBS quantifies the actual opportunity cost to one or more countries leaving the Euro. Notably Germany. "Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave the Euro, the consequences would include corporate default, recapitalisation of the banking system and collapse of international trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to be around EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year, and a range of EUR3,500 to EUR4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is the equivalent of 20% to 25% of GDP in the first year. " It also would mean the end of UBS, but we digress. Where it gets even more scary is when UBS, like many other banks to come, succumbs to the Mutual Assured Destruction trope made so popular by ole' Hank Paulson : "The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of the concerns investors should have about a break-up. Fragmentation of the Euro would incur political costs. Europe’s “soft power” influence internationally would cease (as the concept of “Europe” as an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth observing that almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have broken up without some form of authoritarian or military government, or civil war." So you see: save the euro for the children, so we can avoid all out war (and UBS can continue to exist). The scariest thing, however, by far, is that for this report to have been issued, it means that Germany is now actively considering dumping the euro.

Merkel:

*DJ Merkel Said Greek Euro Exit Could Trigger Domino Effect - Senior Lawmaker

Ovo po EU sve vise lici na ocajnicke pokusaje.

[Sirius]

Jos od petka se govori o bliskom bankrotu Grcke. Sada vec pocinju ozbiljne analize kako se zastiti od neminovnog:

German Finance Minister Prepares for Possible Greek BankruptcyWith doubts growing about Greece’s ability to implement important savings measures and reforms, there are concerns that insolvency may be inevitable. In Germany, officials in Wolfgang Schäuble’s Finance Ministry are exploring what Athens’ financial collapse would mean for the euro zoneGerman Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who is reportedly doubtful that the country can be saved from bankruptcy, is preparing for the possibility of Greek insolvency. Officials in his ministry are currently reviewing scenarios for handling such a situation, exploring what it might mean for the rest of the euro zone. Under the first scenario for a Greek bankruptcy, the country would remain in the euro zone. Under the other, Athens would abandon the common currency and reintroduce the drachma.

Pocinju pripreme da se spreci armagedon:

The International Monetary Fund will likely re-activate a $580 billion resource pool in coming weeks to ensure it has funds to help cover Europe’s worsening sovereign-debt crisis, according to several people close to the matter.

[hazard]

Izlazak iz evrozone za Grcku nije realna opcija:http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/601-the-euro-no-soft-landing-on-exit/

The euro: no soft landing on exitby Jean Pisani-Ferry on 12th September 2011A version of this column was also published on Le MondeIt may appear pointless to switch to summer time each year when it would be simpler for everyone to decide to come into work one hour earlier in the morning. Yet we all change the clocks because it is much easier to put back your watch than to change your habits.One hears this same rationale increasingly often for arguing that the countries whose competitiveness has nose-dived should leave the euro. Rather than hoping that, by the combined effect of tens of millions of independent decisions, firms and workers would force themselves painfully to absorb past price and wage inflation, it would, according to some, suffice to recoup competitiveness by reducing the exchange rate of the new national currency by the requisite percentage.Monetary experience in fact teaches that, for the same final result, an internal devaluation (by a change in prices and wages) is much harder to achieve than a devaluation of the exchange rate. But, even if one disregards the European political stakes of such a decision, this logic sins by omission on several counts.The first obstacle is legal. The EU Treaty provides for a voluntary exit clause from the Union, but not from the euro. Thus a state may leave the Union (and thereby forfeit regional aid, considerable for Greece and Portugal, and CAP transfers), but there is no provision for leaving the euro and remaining in the Union.The second obstacle is technical. It is straightforward to change currency in a financially underdeveloped country: just order a stock of brand new notes. But it is quite another matter in a modern economy. Years of preparation and adjustment of IT systems went into the switch to the euro, followed by a lengthy test phase. Leaving the euro abruptly would inevitably be costly and disruptive.The third obstacle is economic. The proponents of exit claim that a controlled devaluation of the new currency is to be anticipated. This is to overlook that the countries likely to go for this option are labouring under a credibility gap. If there are new national currencies, it is the market which will determine what they are worth. When Argentina severed its fixed link to the US dollar in January 2002, the government announced a new exchange rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar (instead of one peso). In July, there were four pesos to the dollar: the currency had lost three quarters of its value.A drop of three quarters in the exchange rate, surely, guarantees an ultracompetitive economy. But it would imply a quadrupling of the price of imported goods, which would not only impoverish consumers hugely but would prevent firms from acquiring equipment and semi-finished products.This is not the route to kick-starting exports again.The fourth, and toughest, obstacle is financial. Thinking in terms of competitiveness, inflation and purchasing power is to ignore the lending and borrowing of households, firms and the state, which are today denominated in euros. While commitments between residents of one and the same country could easily be redenominated in the new currency, this would not be the case between residents and non-residents. Bear in mind that, according to Claire Waysand and her colleagues at the IMF, lending and borrowing of the euro countries between each other currently amounts to 200 percent of GDP. Greek sovereign bonds held by French and German banks, the subject of much concern, are but part of a much wider web of potential problems. Firms, banks and insurance companies would see some parts of their balance sheet remaining in euros and others suffering a sharp drop in value. Some would gain from this, others would immediately go bankrupt. It would mean that fortune or ruin would be decided as if by the spin of a wheel.Moreover, as exit is not provided for in the treaty, it could not occur overnight. Depositors would have ample time to withdraw their money from banks, and banks would have time to borrow from their central bank in order to invest in countries remaining in the euro. This cautious behaviour would only deepen the disaster.Given the torment which Greece is facing at the moment, it will become ever more tempting to go for an alternative. But the option of an exit with a soft landing is a fiction. If by any chance this were to happen, there would be chaos. It would be economically destructive, financially ruinous and socially devastating.

[korindjar]

strašno su se slupale sve evropske berze. neke ljude koje znam su izgubili po 60% vrednosti svog portfeljadanas je angela rekla da grčka ne sme pasti

Edited September 13, 2011 by korindjar

[Sirius]

Austrija za sada ne moze kroz Skupstinu da provuce ekspanziju EFSF(European Financial Stability Facility). Ali veliki je pritisak na njih tako da verujem da ce proci ako se pak to ne desi bice haos sa Grckom a onda ko zna gde ce zavrsiti ekonomska zaraza.

[Gonzo]

Austrija za sada ne moze kroz Skupstinu da provuce ekspanziju EFSF(European Financial Stability Facility). Ali veliki je pritisak na njih tako da verujem da ce proci ako se pak to ne desi bice haos sa Grckom a onda ko zna gde ce zavrsiti ekonomska zaraza.

česi isto zatežu. bojim se da nisu svesni koliko malo vremena ima pre nego što sve ode u kurac. kud nisam poslušao dejtrejdera na vreme i kupovao tozla..