Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[hazard]

[Anduril]

Па шпекуланти су сви они заједно - банке, банкари, играчи на берзи, политичари код којих наручују да им направе или укину понеки закон......А уосталом, и те централне банке су прича за себе, нарочито америчка, која је конзорцијум приватних банака (and as federal as FedEx)....Оног тренутка кад је дозвољено да се дају у зајам паре које се немају, читав систем вредности је отишао у очин. Ти и ја и баба на пијаци морамо да имамо неко покриће за своје паре - рад, парадајз, некретнине, нема џабе; тај шпекулантски слој прави паре из ничега.

Nisu svi spekulanti isti (vidi ovo dole). Neki hedz fondovi su povezani sa bankama koje su opet slizane sa drzavom a neki nisu i uglavnom posluju sa novcem privatnih investitora sto je sasvim OK. Problem su ovi primarni dileri preko kojih Fed plasira stimuluse i uopste banke koje preko sistema frakcijske rezerve visak novca koriste za spekulaciju bez punog rizika. To je jednostavno monopol banaka na free money od centralne banke po 0-1% kamate. Ko tu ne napravi ogroman profit i pobere sve zive bonuse ta je zaista budala.

hmm, hedž fondovi imaju drastično bolju finansijsku disciplinu od banaka. Prosto, jer nemaju državu i novac poreskih obveznika koji će da ih vade iz bule. Samo sopstvene i pare klijenata. Nema nikakve zaštitne mreže. Plus što im se reputacija i broj klijenata drastično srozavaju sa svakim lošim poslom. Fondovi koji rade kao deo neke banke se ponašaju kao Luj XIV, često donoseći poteze koji su u suprotnosti sa politikom razvoja u ostalim sektorima banke. ....

[расејан]

Nisu svi spekulanti isti (vidi ovo dole). Neki hedz fondovi su povezani sa bankama koje su opet slizane sa drzavom a neki nisu i uglavnom posluju sa novcem privatnih investitora sto je sasvim OK. Problem su ovi primarni dileri preko kojih Fed plasira stimuluse i uopste banke koje preko sistema frakcijske rezerve visak novca koriste za spekulaciju bez punog rizika. To je jednostavno monopol banaka na free money od centralne banke po 0-1% kamate. Ko tu ne napravi ogroman profit i pobere sve zive bonuse ta je zaista budala.

Наравно да нису сви исти, неки су гори од просека. Свећом тражити неког који неће трепнути кад изведе нешто на чему ће да добро заради а остави ен људи без хлеба.

[Tresko]

Inace. nacin na koji EU komunicira sa Grckom je jeziv i najgora negacija demokratskog ustrojstva. Gledao sam pre neki dan inserte sa KZS Olija Rena i jos jednog tipa (zaboravim mu ime), ono je bilo jezivo, k'o da slusam Milosevica iz gazimestanske faze.Pored ekonomskih reperkusija, politicke posledice po EU ce takodje biti znacajne.

Gledao istu KZŠ, i mene je najviše pogodio način komuniciranja sa Grčkom, korišćen brutalni rečnik i ostalo.Sad kad spomenu Miloševića na Gazimestanu, jasno mi je našta me podsetilo.

[Sirius]

Dva teksta iz Financial Timesa koji puno govore o trenutnom stanju.-Prvi je vezan za Grcku tragediju i korupciju u raznim institucijama Evrope, uljucujuci i nemacki Bundestag

The Greek rollover pact is like a toxic CDOIt was always clear that European politicians would ultimately end up trying a complex debt product to solve the crisis. If you want to “kick the can down the road”, as the wearily favourite metaphor of the crisis goes, if you want to obfuscate facts and circumvent rules, then a variant of a collateralised debt obligation seems the perfect choice. I wonder what took them so long.I have no space for a large drawing with lots of boxes and arrows to explain the complexity of the vehicle, through which eurozone governments want to involve the private-sector banks in its next loan package. So here is my best attempt in words: if you own a Greek bond that matures by June 2014, you keep 30 per cent of the redemption as cash, and roll over 70 per cent into a 30-year Greek government bond. The Greeks will have to pay an annual coupon, or interest rate, of between 5.5 per cent and 8 per cent. The precise rate will depend on future economic growth. Of the money received, Greece will lend on 30 per cent to a special purpose vehicle, another well-known construction from the subprime mortgage crisis. The SPV invests into AAA-rated government or agency bonds, and issues a 30-year zero coupon bond. The purpose of this is to guarantee the principal of the 30-year Greek government bond that you just bought. With this construction, the downside to your losses is limited. Depending on how some of the parameters of this agreement evolve, you will probably make a small loss, relative to the par value of your holding. If you are lucky, you might come out positive. You will probably not be lucky. But you will still be better off than if you sold today, or if Greece were to default. More important, the accounting rules allow you to pretend that you are not making any losses at all. If this was any other field of human activity, you would go to jail if you accepted, let alone made such an indecent offer. This structure is still not quite so complex as some of the more elaborate CDOs we have encountered in the global financial crisis. If you take some time to work through the arrows and boxes, you see relatively quickly that this complex structure is not a private sector participation at all. Rather it is a private sector bail-out. It is also inevitable that Greece will default on its coupon payment at some point. The interest will be 8 per cent under a benign growth scenario, and 5.5 per cent under a not so benign one. Either way, Greece cannot pay such a high level of interest. As Jeffrey Sachs pointed out last week in the Financial Times, if you really wanted to achieve Greek debt sustainability, you would need to reduce the interest rate to about 3 per cent. This is what Germany pays for 10-year bonds. And even then would you have to extend the maturity of those bonds as well. Neither is, unfortunately, on offer. All there is, is this dirty little con-trick. The complexity of the scheme is due to the need to persuade the rating agencies not to attach a default rating to Greek bonds. The rollover agreement represents, from an economic point of view, nothing but a collateralised bond. It subordinates all other bondholders. The rating agencies would normally not hesitate to attach a default rating to Greek government debt. So the solution is to create a complex structure, and claim that it is technically not a collateralised bond, but something that defies definition. Just why the Greeks would want to accept such a ruinous deal is not clear to me. They did their duty last week when they voted for the austerity programme and its implementation law. The acceptance of the terms of this private sector participation agreement was never part of the agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. They could therefore simply refuse, and throw the ball back to Europe’s squabbling finance ministers. I doubt they will do this. They seem scared about the consequences of an immediate default. Nevertheless, once the treacherous nature of this contraption is fully understood, I would expect the politics of crisis resolution in Greece to become even more difficult, and accident-prone. How about Germany? Having made so much fuss about the need for private-sector involvement, Germany managed only to secure a pitiful €2bn from its own non-state sector banks. The French banks have more short-dated Greek debt securities than their German counterparts, and thus have made a correspondingly larger commitment. Considering the line-in-the-sand rhetoric from Berlin on the issue of private sector participation, one might be surprised to hear that this tiny, cuddly, bank-friendly agreement will now miraculously secure a Yes vote in the Bundestag. The speed with which the German government is shifting inalienable positions is breathtaking.We have learnt from the financial crisis that one should not place too much faith in financial vehicles with three-letter acronyms. But that is what we are doing with this European equivalent of a late-period subprime mortgage CDO. We are not just “kicking” any old “can down the road” any more. This is a can of explosives.

Zakljucak: Grcka ce sigurno u bankrot a banakri ce se izvuci.edit: nemestanje quota Edited July 5, 2011 by Sirius

[Sirius]

-Drugi tekst nije toliko vezan za Grcku ali pokazuje probleme u US & EU zbog kojih bi i Kina mogla da pati.

America and Europe sinking togetherIn Washington they are arguing about a debt ceiling; in Brussels they are staring into a debt abyss. But the basic problem is the same. Both the US and the European Union have public finances that are out of control and political systems that are too dysfunctional to fix the problem. America and Europe are in the same sinking boat.The debt debates underway in the US and the EU are so inward-looking and overwrought that surprisingly few people are making the connection. Yet the links that make this a generalised crisis of the west should be obvious.On both sides of the Atlantic, it is now clear that much of the economic growth of the pre-crisis years was driven by an unsustainable and dangerous boom in credit. In the US it was homeowners who were at the centre of the crisis; in Europe, it was entire countries like Greece and Italy that took advantage of low interest rates to borrow unsustainably. The financial crash of 2008 and its aftermath dealt a blow to state finances, as public debts soared. In both Europe and the US this one-off shock is compounded by demographic pressures that are increasing budgetary pressures, as the baby-boomers begin to retire. Finally, on both sides of the Atlantic, the economic crisis is polarising politics, so making it much harder to find rational solutions to the debt problem. Populist movements are on the rise – whether it is the Tea Party in the USor the Dutch Freedom party or True Finns in Europe.The idea that Europe and the US represent two faces of the same crisis has been slow to sink in because, for many years, elites on either side of the Atlantic have stressed the differences between US and European models. I have lost count of the number of conferences I attended in Europe, where the debate was between two camps: one that yearned to go for US-style “flexible labour markets” and another that was passionately defending a European social model that was defined against America. Europe’s political debate was similar. There was a group that wanted to see Brussels emulate Washington and become the capital of a true federal union; and there were those who insisted that a United States of Europe was impossible. What both sides shared was the conviction that economically, politically and strategically, the US and Europe were different planets – “Mars and Venus”, as Robert Kagan, an American academic, put it.The US political debate still uses the otherness of “Europe” as a reference point. The accusation that Barack Obama is importing “European-style socialism” is used to paint the president as un-American. Some on the left do indeed look to Europe as a place that does things differently and better on some issues – such as the provision of universal healthcare.Yet the similarities between the two regions’ dilemmas are now more striking than the differences – mounting debt, a weak economy, an increasingly expensive and unreformable welfare state, fear for the future and political gridlock are the common points. The US struggle to control the costs of Social Security and Medicare will seem very familiar to European leaders, who are also battling to cut spending on pensions and healthcare. Many Europeans used to believe that American politicians had a huge advantage because they were operating in a truly federal system. Some still argue that the only way to stabilise the euro in the long term, is to move towards a “fiscal federalism” modelled on the US. However, at the moment, the politics of Washington are even more dysfunctional than those of Brussels. The seeming impossibility of having a serious debate about debt and spending (let alone actually solving the problem) makes the notion that the US political system is a model for Europe look laughable.Of course, there are still marked differences in the debates on either side of the Atlantic. The dollar has a solid history of credibility behind it. The euro has been around for little more than a decade. The political division that is most responsible for paralysing the European system is between nations. But there is no parallel in the US debate to the bitter divide between Greeks and Germans. In Europe, the idea that tax rises might be part of the solution to soaring debts is uncontroversial. In America, Republican opposition to the very notion of tax increases is at the centre of the political argument.Fixated by their own problems and differences, Americans and Europeans have been slow to see the connections between their twin crises. But analysts in the rest of the world are much more likely to spot the common trend. Among Chinese leaders and intellectuals, it is now standard practice to suggest that westerners of all sorts should stop trying to “teach China lessons” – given the depth of their own political and economic problems. Chinese critics of the west see the dilemmas of Europe and the US with the cruel clarity afforded by distance. However, their pride and confidence risks glossing over the extent to which the rise of China, India and the rest has depended on a prosperous and confident west. If the western illness worsens, there will be a temptation to try new and more radical cures. Those may include a drive towards protectionism and capital controls. If globalisation goes into reverse then China may experience its very own economic and political crisis.

[Anduril]

Gospodo, aperitiv Grci jos nisu ni popili a vec stize najavljivano predjelo - Italija. Razlika u kamati za italijanske u odnosu na nemacke obveznice pocinje nezadrzivo da raste kao sto je to vec u slucajevima Grcke, Irske i Portugalije bio jasan znak da trziste ne veruje u njihove reformske poduhvate, finansijski menadzment i uopste ekonomsku (bunga-bunga) politiku. Naravno, glavno jelo ce biti devalvacija dolara ili neka forma bankrota federalne vlade SAD ali jelovnik je prilicno dugacak i ide se redom od manjih prema vecim porcijama. Sta ce biti desert jos se ne zna ali ce ova vecera sigurno zavrsiti u masnim stolnjacima, prolivenim vinom, razbijenim casama i sa nekim od gostiju ispod stola. Edited July 11, 2011 by Anduril

[dekss]

Gospodo, aperitiv Grci jos nisu ni popili a vec stize najavljivano predjelo - Italija. Razlika u kamati za italijanske u odnosu na nemacke obveznice pocinje nezadrzivo da raste kao sto je to vec u slucajevima Grcke, Irske i Portugalije bio jasan znak da trziste ne veruje u njihove reformske poduhvate, finansijski menadzment i uopste ekonomsku (bunga-bunga) politiku. Naravno, glavno jelo ce biti devalvacija dolara ili neka forma bankrota federalne vlade SAD ali jelovnik je prilicno dugacak i ide se redom od manjih prema vecim porcijama. Sta ce biti desert jos se ne zna ali ce ova vecera sigurno zavrsiti u masnim stolnjacima, prolivenim vinom, razbijenim casama i sa nekim od gostiju ispod stola.

to zvuči kao neka dobra zabava :D

[Sirius]

Italian Debt Adds to Fears in Euro ZoneLONDON — Top European officials planned to meet on Monday to wrestle with threats to the currency union as fears mounted that Italy could become a victim of the debt crisis even as discussions stalled over a second bailout for Greece. Finance ministers in the euro zone had previously scheduled two days of talks to begin on Monday afternoon in Brussels, with an emphasis on how to resolve Greece’s troubles. Over the weekend, a meeting of more senior officials was set for Monday morning.A spokesman for Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, denied that senior officials would discuss the state of Italy’s finances, which many investors consider increasingly precarious. But another official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said Italy would probably be on the agenda.For Italy, the cost of financing its debt rose at the end of the week, though nowhere near the levels faced by Greece. The spread between the yield on the Italian 10-year bond and the German equivalent widened on Friday to 2.36 percentage points, the most since the introduction of the euro.

[Muwan]

Panika u Briselu:

11 July 2011 Last updated at 12:11Eurozone ministers meeting to discuss debt concerns Senior European Union officials are due to meet to discuss the eurozone's continuing debt woes. The talks in Brussels were arranged by European Council president Herman Van Rompuy. His spokesman denied that it was a crisis meeting. Reports say the meeting was organised because of worries that Italy could be drawn into the debt crisis. It will be followed by a planned meeting of eurozone finance ministers. The finance ministers are due to discuss a second financial support package for Greece.Greece's current bail-out funds, agreed last year, total 110bn euros ($157bn; £98bn), but the government requires more funds to prevent it defaulting on its debt payments in the future. Mr Rompuy's spokesman said the talks with fellow European Union officials were arranged to "co-ordinate positions as we have done in the past".Also due to attend are the head of eurozone finance ministers, Jean-Claude Juncker, European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and EU Economics Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn.On Monday, shares in Italy's largest bank, Unicredit Spa, were down 0.2%, following after Friday's 7.9% fall. The main Italian share index had also lost further ground, being 2.3% lower in afternoon trading. The yield on Italian bonds continued to rise as well, since investors are less willing to purchase them. The spread of Italy's 10-year government bond yield over the German equivalent hit 2.68%, its highest level since the euro was introduced. As a result, the yield on Italian bonds reached 5.45%, which analysts say is close to levels that could put pressure on Italy's public finances.

[yolo]

ahahaha pa ovo ce da bude mrtva trka da li pre vaditi pare iz unicredit ili iz alpha bankedoduse, cuj juce ultrapouzdano da je alpha najzdravija od svih grckih i da je safe i da ce u to ime uskoro da mrcne eurobank FG u nekom pseudo mergeru

[April]

Panika u Briselu

Italijanima mogu dati gorke grcke lekove, jer tamo imaju gde da ustede u javnom sektoru.Sve je to, medjutim, sranje dok se god ne budu pozabavili konkurentnoscu svojih privreda u odnosu na tigrove u razvoju.Mozes smanjiti plate, mozes povecati poreze, mogu gradjani i pristati da trpe NEKO VREME. Nešto kao SFRJ u vreme Milke Planinc.

[Muwan]

ahahaha pa ovo ce da bude mrtva trka da li pre vaditi pare iz unicredit ili iz alpha bankedoduse, cuj juce ultrapouzdano da je alpha najzdravija od svih grckih i da je safe i da ce u to ime uskoro da mrcne eurobank FG u nekom pseudo mergeru

Pseudomerger je bio razmatran za Alpha i NBG ali od toga za sada nema ništa. Možda će ga ponovo razmatrati kada zvanično krene hrkljuš.

[Muwan]

Mozes smanjiti plate, mozes povecati poreze, mogu gradjani i pristati da trpe NEKO VREME. Nešto kao SFRJ u vreme Milke Planinc.

Misliš da će Juropljanima u jednom trenutku biti milije da si ponovo prebroje krvna zrnca umesto da uživaju u platama od 1500 evara? Moguće, samo ne znam kako elite planiraju to da iskontrolišu.

[April]

Misliš da će Juropljanima u jednom trenutku biti milije da si ponovo prebroje krvna zrnca umesto da uživaju u platama od 1500 evara? Moguće, samo ne znam kako elite planiraju to da iskontrolišu.

Ne, nisam mislio na tipicno balkanska resenja.Prosto, ljudi u Evropi imaju vise razumevanja za probleme svoje drzave nego Grci i pristace da se zrtvuju godinu dve, tri... Problem je sto resenja koja Unija namece nisu resenja za gradjane, vec ruka spasa za bankare i ni za kog drugog, bedan pokusaj establišmenta da stvarne probleme gurne pod krevet. Ako ne zaseku dublje, posle par godina pritezanja kaiševa gradjani Unije ce izgubiti prvo strpljenje, a zatim i poverenje u svoje elite. To ne mora nuzno da bude lose: posle jednog takvog preispitivanja iz '68., evropske demokratije usle su u zlatno doba sedamdesetih ojacane i otresitije.Mada bih, licno, voleo da prodje bez takvih tumbanja.