Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[hazard]

Evo i Economist se slaze samnom :Dhttp://www.economist.com/node/18866979

While the EU’s leaders are trying to deny the need for default, a rising chorus is taking the opposite line. Greece should embrace default, walk away from its debts, abandon the euro and bring back the drachma (in a similar way to Britain leaving the gold standard in 1931 or Argentina dumping its currency board in 2001).That option would be ruinous, both for Greece and for the EU. Even if capital controls were brought in, some Greek banks would go bust. The new drachma would plummet, making Greece’s debt burden even more onerous. Inflation would take off as import prices shot up and Greece had to print money to finance its deficit. The benefit from a weaker currency would be small: Greece’s exports make up a small slice of GDP. The country would still need external finance, but who would lend to it? And the contagion risk would be bigger than from restructuring alone: if Greece left, why not Portugal or even Spain and Italy? If the euro zone were to break up it would put huge pressure on the single market.The third wayThere is an alternative, for which this newspaper has long argued: an orderly restructuring of Greece’s debts, halving their value to around 80% of GDP. It would hardly be a shock to the markets, which have long expected a default (an important difference from Lehman). The banks that still hold a big chunk of the bonds are in better shape to absorb losses today than they were last year. Even if Greece’s debts were cut in half, the net loss would still represent an absorbable proportion of most European banks’ capital.An orderly restructuring would be risky. Doing it now would crystallise losses for banks and taxpayers across Europe. Nor would it, by itself, right Greece. The country’s economy is in deep recession and it is running a primary budget deficit (ie, before interest payments). Even if Greece restructures its debt and embraces the reforms demanded by the EU and IMF, it will need outside support for some years. That is bound to bring more fiscal-policy control from Brussels, turning the euro zone into a more politically integrated club. Even if that need not mean a superstate with its own finance ministry, the EU’s leaders have not started to explain the likely ramifications of all this to voters. But at least Greece and the markets would have a plan with a chance of working.No matter what fictions they concoct this week, the euro zone’s leaders will sooner or later face a choice between three options: massive transfers to Greece that would infuriate other Europeans; a disorderly default that destabilises markets and threatens the European project; or an orderly debt restructuring. This last option would entail a long period of external support for Greece, greater political union and a debate about the institutions Europe would then need. But it is the best way out for Greece and the euro. That option will not be available for much longer. Europe’s leaders must grab it while they can.

[Dimitrije]

Ako sam dobro razumeo, taj "treci put" koji predlaze Ekonomist znaci da bi EU trebalo da izdrzava Grcku na duze vreme u nadi da ce grcka privreda da postane kompetativna u evro-zoni. Ili je to nacin da se prolongira period do totalnog kraha i da se ostavi narednoj generaciji Evropljana da se sa time bakce.

Edited June 28, 2011 by Dimitrije

[hazard]

Pa i ako odu u totalni bankrot, i izadju iz evrozone, opet ce im biti potrebna podrska spolja, da l' EU, da l' MMF, ili ce da se sledi totalni krah, haos i raspad.

[hazard]

http://www.economist.com/node/18867023

That ought not to be true of Greece. It has far fewer creditors: two-thirds of its debt is probably held by about 30 institutions. And whereas Lehman’s exposures were hidden from public view, Greece’s are largely out in the open and are also reasonably easy to value. The more light has been shone into the dark vaults of banks holding Greek government debt over the past year, the more markets have been reassured that few, if any, foreign banks are dangerously exposed.According to public data collected by Barclays Capital, an investment bank, few foreign banks’ holdings of Greek government bonds are worth even 10% of their capital (Greek banks are a different matter: see chart 1). That means they should comfortably withstand the substantial losses that might arise if Greece said that it would repay less than 100 cents on the euro. Softer forms of default, such as extending the maturities of existing bonds, would probably cause almost no harm to the financial system, especially if the interest payments remained the same as when the bonds were issued.Holdings of bonds do not tell the full story of banks’ exposure to Greek government debt. By buying credit-default swaps (CDSs), which are essentially insurance policies against a default, banks are likely to have shifted some risk to insurers or investment funds that are less important to the financial system as a whole. Some banks, however, will have sold CDSs.Across the entire financial system these CDS exposures largely net off, Barclays reckons, and collateral and margin-calls should have reduced the outstanding exposures to relatively small amounts. However, not everyone will end up with a net position close to zero. It is reasonable to suppose that there would be some large losses (and some large gains) on CDS contracts if Greece stopped paying its bills. Quite where these would emerge is causing some worry in markets.Bank regulators have made progress in publishing information on exposures. Banks themselves have been giving quarterly or half-yearly updates on their ownership of Greek bonds. But weaker banks have been the most reluctant to come clean: public data on their holdings are a year out of date. Were panic to seize the banking system, regulators could do much to restore calm by releasing information they have collected in the past three months as part of “stress tests” of Europe’s banks.Government bonds are not the only assets on which foreign banks could lose money in Greece. Loans to Greek companies, made either directly or by their Greek subsidiaries, might also go bad. Foreign insurers as well as banks might suffer contagion, because they also own Greek government bonds. However, because Greece’s insurance market is relatively small, most foreign insurers would have correspondingly small amounts of Greek debt.Explore our interactive guide to Europe's troubled economiesThe hard numbers alone thus suggest that a Greek default would do little lasting harm to the rest of Europe’s financial system. Yet investors act on fear as well as figures. What is more worrying for Europe’s policymakers is the thought that Greece’s affliction would spread not just to foreign banks but to foreign governments. Just as Lehman’s collapse told investors that a Wall Street bank could fail, a Greek default would tell them that a Western government could renege on its debts: Greece would be the first developed country to default for 60 years.

[Roger Sanchez]

Dok se oni dogovore bi ili ne bi, svi grčki fatcatsi su već daaaavno evakuirali svoje depozite iz svoje najdraže Hellas, tako da sa drahmom mogu opljačkat samo najjadnije i najgluplje Grke. Koliko čitam, depoziti se iz domicilnih bankica izljevaju ko Niagara.Btw., Argentina je koliko čitam na +10 u GDPu. Cristinu će reizabrati samo tako.

Edited June 28, 2011 by Roger Sanchez

[Dimitrije]

Za razliku od Grcke, Argentina ima prirodna boatstva, poljoprivredu i preradjivacku industriju koje moze da izvozi i na njima dobro zaradjuje. Grcka osim turizma i trgovacke flote nema nista drugo za izvoz. Brodogradnja, koja je jedno vreme bila glavna grcka izvozna industrija, je odavno u krizi (ne samo u Grckoj nego i u celoj Evropi jer se epicentar preselio u Aziju).

[yolo]

mrzim kad postavljate tabele koje ne razumem. sta kaze gore za alpha banku? ionako sam teo da vadim pare posto su preko noci prepolovili kamate na mesecnu stednju, jedino ne znam da li da poranim ujutro ili imam fore jos par dana.

[Tresko]

mrzim kad postavljate tabele koje ne razumem. sta kaze gore za alpha banku? ionako sam teo da vadim pare posto su preko noci prepolovili kamate na mesecnu stednju, jedino ne znam da li da poranim ujutro ili imam fore jos par dana.

Ja bih poranio, za svaki slučaj.

[Anduril]

mrzim kad postavljate tabele koje ne razumem. sta kaze gore za alpha banku? ionako sam teo da vadim pare posto su preko noci prepolovili kamate na mesecnu stednju, jedino ne znam da li da poranim ujutro ili imam fore jos par dana.

Kaze da Alpha banka drzi pozamasnu kolicinu grckih obveznica (84% svog osnovnog kapitala prema Baselu) ali da od grckih banaka u tom pogledu zapravo stoji najbolje. Ostale evropske banke su u riziku do 10% sto nije previse ali problem je mnogo vise psiholoski efekat koji bi proizvela kriza kao i CDS trziste gde nije jasno ko je sta osigurao.Btw., grcke banke gube oko 2 milijarde depozita svakog meseca tako da se nekima vec zuri. To bankarski sistem nece moci dugo da izdrzi pogotovo sto internacionalno imaju problem sa finansiranjem a jedini izvor koji im ostaje je ECB koja je pocela da se necka.Evo, danas demonstracije i neredi - bice cupavo.

[hazard]

mrzim kad postavljate tabele koje ne razumem. sta kaze gore za alpha banku? ionako sam teo da vadim pare posto su preko noci prepolovili kamate na mesecnu stednju, jedino ne znam da li da poranim ujutro ili imam fore jos par dana.

znaci da Alfa banka drzi Grcki dug (tj. grcke drzavne obveznice) u vrednosti od 84% svog tier-1 kapitala (sad kako se razlikuje tier-1 od tier-2, ne bi znao da ti objasnim osim da je tier-1 onaj "najbolji" kapital). S druge strane, NBG drzi kolicinu duga koja vredi kao 272% njihovog kapitala, tj. skoro triput vise im grcka drzava duguje nego sto oni osnovnog kapitala imaju. Drugim recima ako grcka drzava bankrotira, odlaze u bankrot i sve pobrojane grcke banke.

[Roger Sanchez]

Ovoga, kad pukne banka, njez'ne filijale u inozemstvu zakonomerno pucau? Ostaje samo ono što garantiraju razne nacionalne verzije FDICa?

Edited June 28, 2011 by Roger Sanchez

[nautilus]

Strane banke u Srbiji su samostalna pravna lica. Ukoliko puknu za depozite garantuje drzava do 20k evra, cini mi se.

[Roger Sanchez]

Strane banke u Srbiji su samostalna pravna lica. Ukoliko puknu za depozite garantuje drzava do 20k evra, cini mi se.

To znam, ali kako se pucanje centrale odražava na njih, upravo zato što znam da su de iure samostalne tvrtke?

[nautilus]

To znam, ali kako se pucanje centrale odražava na njih, upravo zato što znam da su de iure samostalne tvrtke?

Majka banka puca i ide u stecaj. Akcije (sve ili dio) cerke banke u Srbiji su svojina majke banke i one se prodaju u stecajnom postupku. Nikako se ne preuzimaju depoziti, harije od vrednosti koje posjeduje cerka banka itd.. Samo se prodaju akcije pa ako neko kupi kupi. Cerka banka i dalje posluje normalno i pod kontrolom je NBSa.

[Roger Sanchez]

A vrijednost tih dionica?