Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Prospero]

Ja stvarno ne verujem da je mogući "tihi" prelazak na političku uniju/"državu" kojekakvim administrativnim rešenjima koja vuku "ever closer" pa se onda jednog dana probudimo i, voila, eto nas u EU državi. Taj iskorak se ne može preći tako; potreban je ogroman pritisak, potrebne su okolnosti, verovatno je potreban i vidljivi i nedvosmisleni spoljni neprijatelj koji pravi računicu da je bolje full Unija nego ovako.

 

Ja zapravo vidim samo nastavak "taktiziranja" tjo briselskih odgovora na tekuće teme i probleme, U to može ući i posebna vlada Evrozone, i onaj plan 5 predsednika (doduše treba mu 10 godina za realizaciju). Nama siromašnima odgovara federalizacija i transfer novca, ali bogatiji nisu budale i moraju oni dobiti nešto za to. Pitanje je šta?

[vememah]

Poslanik nemačkih Zelenih u EP objavio očekivani raspored narednih poteza u vezi sa trećim bailoutom, do 20.8. treba sve da bude gotovo kako bi Grčka mogla tada da vrati dugove koji nisu pokriveni ovim premošćavanjem koje su dobili pre neki dan.
 

Sven Giegold ‏@sven_giegold

 

Exclusive: This is the rough timeline for the Greek ESM programme. On 7 August the insane #Grexit should be buried!

 

4:11 PM - 23 Jul 2015

[Prospero]

Izgleda da će CIpras da radi po principu "poturica gori od Turčina"  -_-

[vememah]

U prilog tome, kao i tezi da će izbora verovatno biti jer Ciprasu treba pouzdanija većina, pošto čak ni svi ND-ovci ne žele da izglasaju sve što bi on.

 

ATHENS (MNI) - Greece's government Monday withdrew a bill of law concerning the taxation of farmers and early retirements from the prior actions that will be presented to parliament for a vote on Wednesday, amid protests from peripheral lawmakers of the governmental coalition and the main opposition party New Democracy.

 

These legal changes are not included in the list of the prior actions Greece was called to implement based on the Eurozone summit agreement, but the government initially mulled to present them in an effort to speed up the process and show good faith to the creditors.

 

https://www.marketnews.com/content/greece-watchgovt-withdraws-law-farmers-early-retirements

Edited July 23, 2015 by vememah

[MancMellow]

Ja stvarno ne verujem da je mogući "tihi" prelazak na političku uniju/"državu" kojekakvim administrativnim rešenjima koja vuku "ever closer" pa se onda jednog dana probudimo i, voila, eto nas u EU državi. Taj iskorak se ne može preći tako; potreban je ogroman pritisak, potrebne su okolnosti, verovatno je potreban i vidljivi i nedvosmisleni spoljni neprijatelj koji pravi računicu da je bolje full Unija nego ovako.

 

Ja zapravo vidim samo nastavak "taktiziranja" tjo briselskih odgovora na tekuće teme i probleme, U to može ući i posebna vlada Evrozone, i onaj plan 5 predsednika (doduše treba mu 10 godina za realizaciju). Nama siromašnima odgovara federalizacija i transfer novca, ali bogatiji nisu budale i moraju oni dobiti nešto za to. Pitanje je šta?

 

pa to bi vec bio korak od ne sedam, nego 14 milja. 

 

ovo gore boldovano - pa naravno, to svi znamo. Dobro ne svi...svi mi™  ^_^

Edited July 23, 2015 by MancMellow

[hazard]

Zapostavismo Varufakisa...evo sta pise o alternativi koja je Grcka predlagala onom privatizacionom fondu (jos pre nego sto su kreditori to trazili), i kako je to odbijeno:

 

http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/21/europes-vindictive-privatization-plan-for-greece-project-syndicate/

 

 

 

Europe’s Vindictive Privatization Plan for Greece – Project Syndicate

 

ATHENS – On July 12, the summit of eurozone leaders dictated its terms of surrender to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who, terrified by the alternatives, accepted all of them. One of those terms concerned the disposition of Greece’s remaining public assets.

 

Eurozone leaders demanded that Greek public assets be transferred to a Treuhand-like fund – a fire-sale vehicle similar to the one used after the fall of the Berlin Wall to privatize quickly, at great financial loss, and with devastating effects on employment all of the vanishing East German state’s public property.

 

This Greek Treuhand would be based in – wait for it – Luxembourg, and would be run by an outfit overseen by Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, the author of the scheme. It would complete the fire sales within three years. But, whereas the work of the original Treuhand was accompanied by massive West German investment in infrastructure and large-scale social transfers to the East German population, the people of Greece would receive no corresponding benefit of any sort.

Euclid Tsakalotos, who succeeded me as Greece’s finance minister two weeks ago, did his best to ameliorate the worst aspects of the Greek Treuhand plan. He managed to have the fund domiciled in Athens, and he extracted from Greece’s creditors (the so-called troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) the important concession that the sales could extend to 30 years, rather than a mere three. This was crucial, for it will permit the Greek state to hold undervalued assets until their price recovers from the current recession-induced lows.

Alas, the Greek Treuhand remains an abomination, and it should be a stigma on Europe’s conscience. Worse, it is a wasted opportunity.

 

The plan is politically toxic, because the fund, though domiciled in Greece, will effectively be managed by the troika. It is also financially noxious, because the proceeds will go toward servicing what even the IMF now admits is an unpayable debt. And it fails economically, because it wastes a wonderful opportunity to create homegrown investments to help counter the recessionary impact of the punitive fiscal consolidation that is also part of the July 12 summit’s “terms.”
It did not have to be this way. On June 19, I communicated to the German government and to the troika an alternative proposal, as part of a document entitled “Ending the Greek Crisis”:

 

“The Greek government proposes to bundle public assets (excluding those pertinent to the country’s security, public amenities, and cultural heritage) into a central holding company to be separated from the government administration and to be managed as a private entity, under the aegis of the Greek Parliament, with the goal of maximizing the value of its underlying assets and creating a homegrown investment stream. The Greek state will be the sole shareholder, but will not guarantee its liabilities or debt.”

 

The holding company would play an active role readying the assets for sale. It would “issue a fully collateralized bond on the international capital markets” to raise €30-40 billion ($32-43 billion), which, “taking into account the present value of assets,” would “be invested in modernizing and restructuring the assets under its management.”

The plan envisaged an investment program of 3-4 years, resulting in “additional spending of 5% of GDP per annum,” with current macroeconomic conditions implying “a positive growth multiplier above 1.5,” which “should boost nominal GDP growth to a level above 5% for several years.” This, in turn, would induce “proportional increases in tax revenues,” thereby “contributing to fiscal sustainability, while enabling the Greek government to exercise spending discipline without further shrinking the social economy.”

 

In this scenario, the primary surplus (which excludes interest payments) would “achieve ‘escape velocity’ magnitudes in absolute as well as percentage terms over time.” As a result, the holding company would “be granted a banking license” within a year or two, “thus turning itself into a full-fledged Development Bank capable of crowding in private investment to Greece and of entering into collaborative projects with the European Investment Bank.”

 

The Development Bank that we proposed would “allow the government to choose which assets are to be privatized and which not, while guaranteeing a greater impact on debt reduction from the selected privatizations.” After all, “asset values should increase by more than the actual amount spent on modernization and restructuring, aided by a program of public-private partnerships whose value is boosted according to the probability of future privatization.”

 

Our proposal was greeted with deafening silence. More precisely, the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers and the troika continued to leak to the global media that the Greek authorities had no credible, innovative proposals on offer – their standard refrain. A few days later, once the powers-that-be realized that the Greek government was about to capitulate fully to the troika’s demands, they saw fit to impose upon Greece their demeaning, unimaginative, and pernicious Treuhand model.

At a turning point in European history, our innovative alternative was thrown into the dustbin. It remains there for others to retrieve.

 

[Prospero]

O internim Sirizinim podelama tokom pregovora, uvoditi drahmu ili ne...
 
 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a0a1d94-3201-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d.html#ixzz3gtJvAQku
 

July 24, 2015 7:50 pm
Syriza’s covert plot during crisis talks to return to drachma
Kerin Hope and Tony Barber in Athens
 
Arresting the central bank’s governor. Emptying its vaults. Appealing to Moscow for help.
These were the elements of a covert plan to return Greece to the drachma hatched by members of the Left Platform faction of Greece’s governing Syriza party.
 
 

They were discussed at a July 14 meeting at the Oscar Hotel in a shabby downtown district of Athens following an EU summit that saw Greece cave to its creditors, leaving many in the party feeling despondent and desperate.

The plans have come to light through interviews with participants in the meeting as well as senior Greek officials and sympathetic journalists who were waiting outside the gathering and briefed on the talks.

They offer a sense of the chaos and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring as Greece nearly crashed out of the single currency before prime minister Alexis Tsipras agreed to the outlines of an €86bn bailout at the EU summit. With that deal still to be finalised, they are also a reminder of the determination of a sizeable swath of Mr Tsipras’ leftwing party to return the country to the drachma and increase state control of the economy.

Chief among them is Panayotis Lafazanis, the former energy and environment minister and leader of Syriza’s Left Platform, which unites a diverse group of far left activists — from supporters of the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez to old-fashioned communists. He was eventually sacked in a cabinet reshuffle after voting against reforms tied to the bailout.

“Obviously it was a moment of high tension,” a Syriza activist said, describing the atmosphere as the meeting opened. “But you were also aware of a real revolutionary spirit in the room.”

Yet even hardline communists were taken aback when Mr Lafazanis proposed that the Syriza government should seize control of the Nomismatokopeion, the Greek mint, where the bulk of the country’s cash reserves are kept. “Our plan is that we go for a national currency. This is what we should have done already. But we can do it now,” he said, according to people present at the meeting. Mr Lafazanis said the reserves, which he claimed amounted to €22bn, would pay for pensions and public sector wages and also keep Greece supplied with food and fuel while preparations were made for launching a new drachma.

Meanwhile, the central bank would immediately lose its independence and be placed under government control. Its governor, Yannis Stournaras, would be arrested if, as expected, he opposed the move.

“For people planning a conspiracy to undermine the Greek state, they were pretty open about it,” said one reporter who staked out the event.
 

The plan demonstrates the apparently ruthless determination of Syriza’s far leftists to pursue their political aims — but also their lack of awareness of the workings of the eurozone financial system. For one thing, the vaults at the Nomismatokopeion currently hold only about €10bn of cash — enough to keep the country afloat for only a few weeks but not the estimated six to eight months required to prepare, test and launch a new currency. The Syriza government would have quickly found the country’s stash of banknotes unusable. Nor would they be able to print more €10 and €20 banknotes: From the moment the government took over the mint, the European Central Bank would declare Greek euros as counterfeit, “putting anyone who tried to buy something with them at risk of being arrested for forgery,” said a senior central bank official. “The consequences would be disastrous. Greece would be isolated from the international financial system with its banks unable to function and its euros worthless,” the official added. 

 

As the details of the Left Platform meeting have leaked out, some political opponents are demanding an accounting. “Members of this government planned a trip to hell for Greeks,” said Stavros Theodorakis, leader of the pro-EU To Potami party. “They planned to raid the vaults of the people and invade the mint as if it were a Playmobil game. Alexis Tsipras must tell us the truth about what happened.”

Mr Lafazanis did not respond to repeated requests for comment. A spokesman did not deny the plans but called Mr Theodorakis’ reaction “garbage” and dismissed it as typical of the country’s political class. 

 

Mr Lafazanis was not alone in suggesting unorthodox ways in which Greece might adopt a new drachma: Just before Mr Tsipras signed up to the bailout, his former finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, publicly proposed issuing IOUs to cover all payments until a new currency could be formally issued. He also called for the government to take over control of the central bank.

Even before the Oscar Hotel meeting, Mr Lafazanis, a former Greek Communist Party official, was pursuing desperate schemes to address the government’s financial woes. Given the communist past of Mr Tsipras and other leading government figures, Athens believed it would be a simple matter to win $5bn to $10bn in financial backing from Vladimir Putin, the Russian president.
 
Mr Lafazanis visited Moscow three times as Mr Tsipras’s envoy after Syriza came to power in January. In return for signing up to a new gas pipeline project, he hoped for at least €5bn in prepayments of gas transit fees, according to people briefed on the initiative. But the Russians rejected the deal the week before the EU summit.

“It was all a fantasy,” said a senior Greek banker. “The Left Platform’s dreams of free gas and a Russian-backed drachma have crumbled away.”

 

[yolo]

dodjoh iz grcke, nekoliko utisaka sa lica mesta. uzasno je bizarno kada ukrstite sve to znate o krizi sa onim sto vidite, zato sto stvari ne samo da ne deluju tako tragicno kao sto covek ocekuje, nego se stvarno stanje ni po cemu ne razlikuje od onog od pre 7-8 godina. zapravo su sve promene pozitivne, cene su umerenije, nema nikakvih pokusaja pljacke turista, svi jure za tobom da ti daju fiskalni racun - od jedno 50 raznih novcanih transakcija samo dva puta nisam dobio isti i to u nekim zabacenim tavernama. bio sam na jednom povelikom severnoegejskom ostrvu koje nije preterano naslonjeno na turizam, mnogo vise na poljoprivredu (sir i mlecni proizvodi, zitarice, vino), znaci imaju neki realan zivot 365 dana. ne deluju napadnuti krizom - mnogo vise je osecaju ovi koji zavise od turizma jer su grcki gosti vecim delom ostali kod kuce i generalno je sezona bas slaba. ovi drugi se ponasaju potpuno normalno, nema tog osecaja da je kraj blizu ili da prekosutra pocinje smak sveta. 

 

inace odnos prema ciprasu dosta podseca na odnos koji je ovde vladao prema milosevicu dok nije postalo previse ocigledno da pravi sranja. on trenutno ima taj neki silent majority jer ipak ne zele staro vodjstvo a bolje novo nemaju. uglavnom svi misle da je referendum bio farsa i budalastina, a samo da dodam, dok ne zaboravim, niko drugi sem syrize nije imao NIKAKVU kampanju - u svakom selu koje ima vise od 10 kuci stoji veliki OXI plakat i vrlo cesto i drugi plakat - objasnjenje za polupismene zasto OXI.

 

najinteresantniju teoriju mi je dao aristidis, levicar i fanaticni obozavalac KK partizan koji ima vinski podrum i zivi od prodaje tradicionalnih proizvoda sa ostrva. on je rekao da cipras radi isto sto je radio papandreu kada je PASOK dosao na vlast 1981 na dosta radikalnoj levoj teoriji, posle 15 godina neprekidne vladavine ND. on je radikalno levom retorikom pobedio a onda je to u praksi kompromitovao i tako vladao dva puna mandata. on kaze da ce levo krilo sirize verovatno ostati u koaliciji ali da ce njen uticaj biti verbalan dok ce sustinski cipras vladati politikom koja ce biti surov realpoliticki kompromis koji bi bez mnogo razlike mogli da potpisu i njihovi najveci oponenti na sceni, i da je to vec uveliko pocelo sa ovim glasanjem u parlamentu.

[vememah]

Statis Kuvelakis, londonski profesor poliitčke teorije i član CK Sirize iz redova Leve platforme dao je opsežan intervju za američki levičarski tromesečnik Jacobin.

 

O potpuno pogrešnim procenama Ciprasovog okruženja u vezi sa reakcijama na referendum i glavnom lideru pro-osteriti struje unutar Sirize Dragasakisu:
 

Tsipras and most of the people close to him thought it was going to be a walk in the park.
...
What happened in that cabinet meeting was that a certain number of people — the rightist wing of the government, lead by Deputy Prime Minister Giannis Dragasakis — disagreed with the move. Dragasakis is actually the person who has been monitoring the whole negotiation process on the Greek side. Everyone on the negotiating team with the exception of the new finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos, are his people and he was the most prominent of those in the cabinet who really wanted to get rid of Varoufakis.

This wing thought that the referendum was a high-risk proposal, and they understood, in a way that Tsipras did not, that this was going to be a very confrontational move that would trigger a harsh reaction from the European side — and they were proved right.

They were also afraid about the dynamic from below that would be released by this initiative. On the other hand, the Left Platform’s leader and minister of energy and productive reconstruction, Panagiotis Lafazanis said that the referendum was the right decision, albeit one that came too late, but he also warned that this amounted to a declaration of war, that the other side would cut off the liquidity and we should expect within days to have the banks closed. Most of those present just laughed at this suggestion.

 

O tome je li Cipras izdao građane koji su glasali OXI na referendumu i kako se doveo u situaciju u kojoj više nema dobrog izbora:
 

Of course, objectively we can say that there has been a betrayal of the popular mandate, that people very legitimately feel they have been betrayed.

However, the notion of betrayal usually means that at some moment you make a conscious decision of reneging on your own commitments. What I think actually happened was that Tsipras honestly believed that he could get a positive outcome by putting forward an approach centered on negotiations and displaying good will, and this also why he constantly said he had no alternative plan.

He thought that by appearing as a loyal “European,” deprived of any “hidden agenda,” he would get some kind of reward. On the other side, he showed for some months a capacity to resist to the escalating pressure and made some unpredictable moves such as the referendum or travelling to Moscow.

He thought this was the right mix to approach the issue, and what happens is that when you consistently follow this line you are led to a position in which you are left only with bad choices.

 

O pogrešnim procenama i impotentnosti levice:
 

This meant that, until the very end, those people believed that they could get something from the troika, they thought that between “partners” they would find some sort of compromise, that they shared some core values like respect for the democratic mandate, or the possibility of a rational discussion based on economic arguments.

The whole approach of Varoufakis’s more confrontational stance amounted actually to the same thing, but wrapped in the language of game theory. What he was saying was that we have to play the game until the very, very, very end and then they would retreat, because supposedly the damage that they would endure had they not retreated was too great for them to accept.

But what actually happened was akin to a fight between two people, where one person risks the pain and damage of losing a toe and the other their two legs.

So it is true that there was a lack of elementary realism and that this was directly connected with the major problem that the Left has to face today — namely, our own impotence.

 

O sopstvenim iskustvima tokom kampanje za referendum:
 

It was totally clear for these people that No would win, because the Yes campaign was invisible in workplaces and among the working class generally, so there was no doubt about what the result would be. But there was a massive amount of anxiety about what would happen after the victory.

So the questions were: what are your plans? What are you going to do? Why do you still talk about negotiations when for five and a half months we have seen this approach clearly fail?

I was in a very embarrassing situation, because, in my role as a Syriza spokesperson and central committee member, I couldn’t give convincing answers to all this.

 

O neuspešnosti Sirize u sprovođenju sopstvenog programa:
 

More generally, Syriza implemented almost nothing of its electoral program. The best Left Platform ministers have been able to do is block a certain number of processes, particularly privatization in the energy sector that had been previously initiated. They won a bit of time, but that was all. What we also clearly saw in that period is that the government, the leadership, became totally autonomous of the party. That process had already started — we talked about it in our last conversation — but now it has reached a kind of climactic level.

 

O Lapavicasovoj izjavi da još nije vreme za Grexit, jer se za njega treba pripremiti i o Dragasakisovoj ulozi:
 

What Costas wanted to emphasize in the declaration he made, behind closed doors in the parliamentary group, is the following: that Grexit needs to be prepared for practically and that there was a political decision to not prepare anything and therefore cutting off any possibility, materially speaking, of alternative choices at the most critical moment.

It was that bridge-burning type of strategy that was very systematically put forward by the government. And I think this was the obsession more particularly of Giannis Dragasakis — he made it impossible to make any moves towards public control of the banks. He is the man of trust actually of the bankers and sectors of big business in Greece and has made sure that the core of the system would remain unchanged since Syriza took power.

 

Ceo intervju od pre desetak dana na:
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/tsipras-varoufakis-kouvelakis-syriza-euro-debt/

Edited July 25, 2015 by vememah

[MancMellow]

Obračun sa Dragasakisom, pre svega. To jedno, drugo, lako je iz Londona pozivati na grexit i preuzimanje državne kontrole nad bankama :) Ali meni je zanimljivo nešto drugo - po njegovim rečima i Varufakis u stvari nije hteo grexit, samo je hteo da sve dovede do još većeg usijanja. Ko zna... Da je ispoljen 1 nivo nesnalaženja u međunarodnoj politici - ispoljen je. Uostalom i zbog toga što je jasno da Syrizu čine ipak različiti elementi sa različitim shvatanjima šta je bio bottom line. 

Edited July 25, 2015 by MancMellow

[MancMellow]

 

najinteresantniju teoriju mi je dao aristidis, levicar i fanaticni obozavalac KK partizan koji ima vinski podrum i zivi od prodaje tradicionalnih proizvoda sa ostrva. on je rekao da cipras radi isto sto je radio papandreu kada je PASOK dosao na vlast 1981 na dosta radikalnoj levoj teoriji, posle 15 godina neprekidne vladavine ND. on je radikalno levom retorikom pobedio a onda je to u praksi kompromitovao i tako vladao dva puna mandata

 

 

Ovo je tačno. Međutim kao neko ko od svoje sedme pa do svoje dvadeset prve godine (1981-1995) samo tokom dve godine nije posetio Grčku, meni je savršeno jasno da je vladavina A.Papandreua (1981-89 i 1993-96) definitivno - uspeh. To je (bilo) veoma očigledno. 

Edited July 25, 2015 by MancMellow

[vememah]

po njegovim rečima i Varufakis u stvari nije hteo grexit, samo je hteo da sve dovede do još većeg usijanja

 

Naravno da nije, to je pisao i WSJ, prenosio sam ranije u temi:

 

others, such as Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, championed confrontation, convinced that playing chicken until the very end would scare Europe into blinking, easing Greece’s bailout terms and its debt burden.

http://www.parapsihopatologija.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=11906&page=259&do=findComment&comment=3115380

 

kao i njegov intervju za New Statesman:

 

And in the past week, was that a decision you felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]?

 

My view was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn’t want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

http://www.parapsihopatologija.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=11906&view=findpost&p=3135346

 

On je za Grexit bio samo u slučaju da kreditori nimalo ne popuste.

Edited July 25, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Nego ovo je zanimljivo: Cipras ostao nem na zahteve opozicije da se sa izborima sačeka do prve revizije memoranduma i početka pregovora o restrukturiranju duga.
 

Party leaders asked PM to put off elections until after new bailout's first review, sources say

 

Political party leaders attending the luncheon at the presidency on Friday (24/7) asked Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to put off elections under after the new bailout programme is completed and once talks on a road map for relieving Greece's public debt have begun, sources said.

 

According to the same sources, Tsipras did not reply.

...

 

http://www.newsbomb.gr/en/story/610219/party-leaders-asked-pm-to-put-off-elections-until-after-new-bailout-s-first-review-sources-say

 

Uzgred, ND i zvanično imenovala dosadašnjeg VD-a, bivšeg min. odbrane i predsednika skupštine Meimarakisa, na čelo stranke.

http://www.newsbomb.gr/en/story/610183/new-democracy-is-the-party-that-serves-national-unity-party-leader-meimarakis-says

 

EDIT: Šojble navodno otvoren za razgovore o uspostavljanju funkcije minfina Evrozone i transferu dela poreza u zajedničku kasu kojom bi on upravljao, prenosi Spiegel.

 

Meanwhile, a report said that Germany was willing to discuss the creation of a eurozone finance minister who would have his or her own budget and be able to raise extra taxes.

 

It follows proposals laid out last month by the European Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, for greater joint control over the currency zone’s economies.

 

On Saturday, the German magazine Der Spiegel quoted government sources saying that finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble was open to the idea of transferring “substantial financial resources” from his tax revenues to a separate budget of the monetary union.

 

One option could be that the 19 eurozone member countries would hand over parts of their national revenues from income and value-added tax to such a eurozone budget, the report said.

 

The eurozone finance minister could also get the right to put a surcharge on taxes, which would amount to the creation of a “euro tax”.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/25/greek-bailout-talks-european-commission-ecb-imf

Edited July 25, 2015 by vememah

[Budja]

Mart mesec, institucije preimenovane u trojku.

 

I jedno optimisticko vidjenje od, ocigledno, neformalnog Varufakisovog portparola.

 

Paul Mason

http://blogs.channel4.com/paul-mason-blog/greece-deal-details-wrong-were-finished/3395

 

 

Da dodam da mi se sve manje svidja i ovo guslanje o demokratiji: demokratska volja gradjana nije populizam vec i svest o preuzetim odlukama. 

Cini mi se da se apeli na postovanje grcke demokratije svode samo na "Grci su oducili da zive bolje i tacka. Dajte nam kes.". Tu nema troskova, rizika, odgovornosti. To je populizam.

 

 

Da li sam ja jedini kome pregovaracka taktika Grka i pozitivni komentari iste lice na tapsanje po ramenu Vucica u vezi Briselskog sporazuma (Vucic skidao sako, Varufakis hteo da se tuce, ah, kako su se hrabo borili) i da tu ima vrlo malo racionalnosti a mnogo vise projektovanih zelja i nada?

 

 

 

U to ime.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/02/austerity-greece-euro-currency-syriza

 

 

Costas Lapavitsas is a Syriza MP and an economics professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies

Costas Lapavitsas is a Syriza MP and an economics professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies

 

 

 

 

 

Sa "hleba za tri dinara" ?

Naravno da ne.

 

Samo ilustrujem da ce biti zanimljivo, i da izborni slogan "i Euro i hleba za tri dinara" ne ide. i tu je Lapavicas u pravu, a Peston je vec Ciprasa proglasio za Blera.

 

 

nije vazno sta pricaju, vazna je konsistentnost price i dela. 

 

 

Ne, ovde je "vucicevski" zjapeci jaz izmedju realnosti i price, a koji se od pozno-milosevicevog razlikuje u tome sto gradjani nemaju drugog izbora nego da veruju u pricu.

 

 

Ah, to je taj povratak ideologije u politiku!

Zvemo se radikalna levica, ali smo zapravo socijaldemokrate koji uz to jos privatizuju.

 

Ja jesam za povratak ideologije i u tome smo se slozili kada je bilo reci u uticaju Sirizine pobede (iako sam i tada bio skeptican prema programu).

 

Ali ako sada koraci Sirize krenu da se racionalizuju:

- nisu tako mislili

- vidi Tonija Blera

onda od pocetne optimisticke teze o revolucionarnom uticaju Sirizine pobede na polticke procese u Evropi nije ostalo nista, vec se samo umesto PASOKa pojavio PASOK.

[MancMellow]

 

 

onda od pocetne optimisticke teze o revolucionarnom uticaju Sirizine pobede na polticke procese u Evropi nije ostalo nista

 

Pa da, ovo je prošlo...onako, niko nije ni primetio.