Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[vememah]

Novi članak Kaleckog, on je prilično optimističan:

 

JUL 22, 2015 13

Why the Greek Deal Will Work

ANATOLE KALETSKY

LONDON – Now that Greek banks have reopened and the government has made scheduled payments to the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, does Greece’s near-death experience mark the end of the euro crisis? The conventional answer is a clear no.

According to most economists and political commentators, the latest Greek bailout was little more than an analgesic. It will dull the pain for a short period, but the euro’s deep-seated problems will metastasize, with a dismal prognosis for the single currency and perhaps even the European Union as a whole.

But the conventional wisdom is likely to be proved wrong. The deal between Greece and the European authorities is actually a good one for both sides. Rather than marking the beginning of a new phase of the euro crisis, the agreement may be remembered as the culmination of a long series of political compromises that, by correcting some of the euro’s worst design flaws, created the conditions for a European economic recovery.

To express guarded optimism about the Greek deal is not to condone the provocative arrogance of former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis or the pointless vindictiveness of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. Neither is it to deny the economic criticism of the bailout provisions presented by progressives like Joseph Stiglitz and conservatives like Hans-Werner Sinn.

The arguments against creating a European single currency and then allowing Greece to cheat its way into membership were valid back in the 1990s – and, in theory, they still are. But this does not mean that breaking up the euro would be desirable, or even tolerable. Joining the euro was certainly ruinous for Greece, but there is always “a great deal of ruin in a nation,” as Adam Smith remarked 250 years ago, when losing the American colonies seemed to threaten Britain with financial devastation.

The great virtue of capitalism is that it adapts to ruinous conditions and even finds ways of turning them to advantage. The United States in the mid-nineteenth century was badly suited for a single currency and a single economic structure, as evidenced by the Civil War, which was provoked as much by single-currency tensions as by moral abhorrence to slavery. Italy would probably be better off today if Garibaldi had never launched unification.

But once unification has happened, the pain of dismantling the political and economic settlement usually overwhelms the apparent gains from a break-up. This seems to be the case in Europe, as clear majorities of voters are saying in all eurozone countries, including Germany and Greece.

 

Thus, the question was never whether the single currency would break up, but what political reversals, economic sacrifices, and legal subterfuges would occur to hold it together. The good news is that Europe now has some persuasive answers.

Indeed, Europe has overcome what could be described as the “original sin” of the single-currency project: the Maastricht Treaty’s prohibition of “monetary financing” of government deficits by the ECB and the related ban on mutual support by national governments of one another’s debt burdens. In January, ECB President Mario Draghi effectively sidestepped both obstacles by launching a program of quantitative easing so enormous that it will finance the entire deficits of all eurozone governments (now including Greece) and mutualize a significant proportion of their outstanding bonds.

Moreover, European governments have belatedly understood the most basic principle of public finance. Government debts never have to be repaid, provided they can be extended in a cooperative manner or bought up with newly created money, issued by a credible central bank.

But for this to be possible, interest payments must always be made on time, and the sanctity of debt contracts must always take precedence over electoral promises regarding pensions, wages, and public spending. Now that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government has been forced to acknowledge the unqualified priority of debt servicing, and can now benefit from unlimited monetary support from the ECB, Greece should have little problem supporting its debt burden, which is no heavier than Japan’s or Italy’s.

Finally, Germany, Spain, Italy, and several northern European countries required, for domestic political reasons, a ritual humiliation of radical Greek politicians and voters who openly defied EU institutions and austerity demands. Having achieved this, EU leaders have no further reason to impose austerity on Greece or strictly enforce the terms of the latest bailout. Instead, they have every incentive to demonstrate the success of their “tough love” policies by easing austerity to accelerate economic growth, not only in Greece but throughout the eurozone.

This raises a key issue that the Tsipras government and many others misunderstood throughout the Greek crisis: the role of constructive hypocrisy in Europe’s political economy. Gaps between public statements and private intentions open up in all political systems, but these become huge in a complex multinational structure like the EU. On paper, the Greek bailout will impose a fiscal tightening, thereby aggravating the country’s economic slump. In practice, however, the budget targets will surely be allowed to slip, provided the government carries out its promises on privatization, labor markets, and pension reform.

These structural reforms are much more important than fiscal targets, both in symbolic terms for the rest of Europe and for the Greek economy. Moreover, the extension of ECB monetary support to Greece will transform financial conditions: interest rates will plummet, banks will recapitalize, and private credit will gradually become available for the first time since 2010. If budget targets were strictly enforced by bailout monitors, which seems unlikely, this improvement in conditions for private borrowers could easily compensate for any modest tightening of fiscal policy.

In short, the main conditions now seem to be in place for a sustainable recovery in Greece. Conventional wisdom among economists and investors has a long record of failing to spot major turning points; so the near-universal belief today that Greece faces permanent depression is no reason to despair.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-the-greek-deal-will-work-by-anatole-kaletsky-2015-07

Edited July 22, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

nisu grci suicidni jebote!sistem ne valja.posvadjace se govna ili ce precutati.kraj ovakve europe je na pomolu.birokratsko-ekonomski bogovi zivota nista nisu svatili.nikad brze, zbog glupavih.. ce propasti jedna dobra ideja.

kakva sigurnost,plemenitost propada od jedne nonsalantne grcke.

kakvo poseravanje u birokratsku eu!

[vememah]

A evo i jednog vrlo pesimističnog gledišta:

 

JUL 22, 2015

Moving on From the Euro

KEVIN HJORTSHØJ O'ROURKE, Professor of Economic History and Fellow of All Souls College, University of Oxford

SAINT-PIERRE-D’ENTREMONT, FRANCE – European Monetary Union was never a good idea. I remember my surprise when, as a young assistant professor, I realized that I was opposed to the Maastricht Treaty. I believed then – and still do – that European integration is a very good thing. But the textbook economics I was teaching showed how damaging EMU could be in the absence of European fiscal and political union.

Nothing that has happened since has convinced me that the textbook was excessively pessimistic. On the contrary: it was far too optimistic. Life is strewn with banana skins, and when you step on one you need to be able to adjust. But the monetary union itself turned out to be a gigantic banana skin, inducing capital flows that pushed up costs around the European periphery. And adjustment – that is, currency devaluation – was not an option.

Furthermore, most textbooks of the time ignored the financial sector; thus, they ignored the fact that capital flows to the periphery would be channeled via banks, and that when the capital stopped flowing, bank crises would strain peripheral members’ public finances. This, in turn, would further erode banks’ balance sheets and constrain credit creation – the sovereign-bank doom loop that we have heard so much about in recent years. And no textbooks predicted that European cooperation would impose pro-cyclical austerity on crisis-struck countries, creating depressions that in some cases have rivaled those of the 1930s.

It has been obvious for some years that the “actually existing EMU” has been a costly failure, both economically and politically. Trust in European institutions has collapsed, and political parties skeptical not just of the euro, but of the entire European project, are on the rise. And yet most economists, even those who were never keen on EMU in the first place, have been reluctant to make the argument that the time has come to abandon a failed experiment.

A famous article by Barry Eichengreen pointed out that an anticipated EMU breakup would lead to the “mother of all financial crises.” It is hard to disagree with him. That is why economists of all stripes, whether or not they supported the introduction of the common currency, have spent the last five years developing and promoting a package of institutional reforms and policy changes that would make the eurozone less dysfunctional.

 

In the short run, the eurozone needs much looser monetary and fiscal policy. It also needs a higher inflation target (to reduce the need for nominal wage and price reductions); debt relief, where appropriate; a proper banking union with an adequate, centralized fiscal backstop; and a “safe” eurozone asset that national banks could hold, thereby breaking the sovereign-bank doom loop.

Unfortunately, economists have not argued strongly for a proper fiscal union. Even those who consider it economically necessary censor themselves, because they believe it to be politically impossible. The problem is that silence has narrowed the frontier of political possibility even further, so that more modest proposals have fallen by the wayside as well.

Five years on, the eurozone still lacks a proper banking union, or even, as Greece demonstrated, a proper lender of last resort. Moreover, a higher inflation target remains unthinkable, and the German government argues that defaults on sovereign debt are illegal within the eurozone. Pro-cyclical fiscal adjustment is still the order of the day.

The European Central Bank’s belated embrace of quantitative easing was a welcome step forward, but policymakers’ enormously destructive decision to shut down a member state’s banking system – for what appears to be political reasons – is a far larger step backward. And no one is talking about real fiscal and political union, even though no one can imagine European Monetary Union surviving under the status quo.

Meanwhile, the political damage is ongoing: not all protest parties are as pro-European as Greece’s ruling Syriza. And domestic politics is being distorted by the inability of centrist politicians to address voters’ concerns about the eurozone’s economic policies and its democratic deficit. To do so, it is feared, would give implicit support to the skeptics, which is taboo.

Thus, in France, Socialist President François Hollande channels Jean-Baptiste Say, arguing that supply creates its own demand, while the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen gets to quote Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz approvingly. No wonder that working-class voters are turning to her party.

A victory for the National Front in 2017 or 2022, which is no longer unthinkable, would destroy the European project. Citizens of smaller eurozone member states will have noted the brutal way the ECB was politicized to achieve Germany’s goals in Greece, and the conclusion that the eurozone is a dangerous “union” for small countries will seem inescapable. If centrist parties remain on the sidelines, rather than protesting what has happened, the political extremists will gain further valuable territory.

As for economists like me, who have balked at advocating an end to the failed euro experiment and favored reform, perhaps it is time to admit defeat and move on. If only anti-Europeans oppose EMU, the EU baby could end up being thrown out with the euro bathwater.

An end to the euro would indeed provoke an immense crisis. But ask yourself this: Do you really think the euro will be around in its present form a century from now? If not it will end, and the timing of that end will never be “right.” Better, then, to get on with it before more damage is done.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eurozone-failed-experiment-by-kevin-o-rourke-2015-07

Edited July 22, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

kake gluposti.a i reci nesto svoje ili si link deliveri.ajde bre! ohh koliko briselskih botova lep ti poljubim!!

[MancMellow]

Ne postoji alternativa fiskalnoj uniji. Naravno da glasači imaju svako pravo da glasaju za protest-stranke koje će dokrajčiti (bar) EZ, ali oni realno - ne znaju šta rade. Naravno, prvi oni koji su krivi nisu glasači, koji najnormalnije imaju, kao što rekoh, svako pravo da glasaju za promenu sistema koji percipiraju kao štetan, nego oni koji su i pored toga što im je sve to savršeno jasno, su toliko slepi pa nastavljaju sa insistiranjem na principima koji samo mogu da unište EZ. Kao što je O'Rourke i rekao.Zapravo, lepo je rekao "ovakav evro" 100% neće opstati. Ono što je veliki problem je što je teško zamisliv opstanak EU uz raspad Evrozone. Teoretski je veoma zamisliv, ali praktično - bilo bi puno teškoća.

[Budja]

Ne postoji alternativa fiskalnoj uniji. Naravno da glasači imaju svako pravo da glasaju za protest-stranke koje će dokrajčiti (bar) EZ, ali oni realno - ne znaju šta rade. Naravno, prvi oni koji su krivi nisu glasači, koji najnormalnije imaju, kao što rekoh, svako pravo da glasaju za promenu sistema koji percipiraju kao štetan, nego oni koji su i pored toga što im je sve to savršeno jasno, su toliko slepi pa nastavljaju sa insistiranjem na principima koji samo mogu da unište EZ. Kao što je O'Rourke i rekao.Zapravo, lepo je rekao "ovakav evro" 100% neće opstati. Ono što je veliki problem je što je teško zamisliv opstanak EU uz raspad Evrozone. Teoretski je veoma zamisliv, ali praktično - bilo bi puno teškoća.

 

I opet u krug po stoti put. Kako politicki do fiskalne unije?

[bradilko]

Ne postoji alternativa fiskalnoj uniji. Naravno da glasači imaju svako pravo da glasaju za protest-stranke koje će dokrajčiti (bar) EZ, ali oni realno - ne znaju šta rade. Naravno, prvi oni koji su krivi nisu glasači, koji najnormalnije imaju, kao što rekoh, svako pravo da glasaju za promenu sistema koji percipiraju kao štetan, nego oni koji su i pored toga što im je sve to savršeno jasno, su toliko slepi pa nastavljaju sa insistiranjem na principima koji samo mogu da unište EZ. Kao što je O'Rourke i rekao.Zapravo, lepo je rekao "ovakav evro" 100% neće opstati. Ono što je veliki problem je što je teško zamisliv opstanak EU uz raspad Evrozone. Teoretski je veoma zamisliv, ali praktično - bilo bi puno teškoća.

zato se grci sprdaju

..jer nema volje za promene u berlinubriseluparizu i uvek ljigavo dezurnom londonu

kad bi smanjili apetite,no idu na populizam.to je kraj.ne njihov.odredjenih sorti drustva.ali nema stabilnosti vise!!!!

niko nije za placanje nerada grka  .ooh!to je najveci problem!!imali smo to kuci pre dvajes5 godina.nista novo.ulazi se u zidove.pre 10 godinica nije bila moguca gradnja slicnog.danas podrska sa skoro svih strana a berlinbrisel stidljivo ocekuju reakcije.govna!cekaju haha!i mole boga da uspe

[vememah]

Ako se krene ka fiskalnoj uniji, evroskeptične suverenističke snage mogu samo da rastu, a ne da padaju.

 

Takođe je teško poverovati da bi je svi prihvatili, tako da bi, čak i da DE-FR osovina počne da je intenzivno gura, svakako morao da se uspostavi kakav-takav mehanizam regularnog izlaska iz Evrozone za one zemlje kojima je fiskalna unija neprihvatljiva.

 

Da se vratim na dešavanja u Grčkoj, glasanje još nije započelo.

 

Ciprasu bliski mediji intenzivno spinuju za pobunjenike u Sirizi da su Šojbleovi poslušnici. Iz pregleda naslovnica za sredu:

 

KONTRANEWS: End to (Panagiotis) Lafazanis, (Yanis) Varoufakis, (Zoi) Konstantopoulou who follow (German Finance Minister Wolfgang) Schaeuble's line

 

http://www.amna.gr/english/category.php?id=2723

 

EDIT: Evo počinje glasanje. Pre nedelju dana je rezultat bio 229-64-6, navodno Ciprasova ekipa očekuje da se neki od ovih 6 neutralaca vrate u vladinu većinu, dok se od OXI-jevaca to ne očekuje.

Edited July 23, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

ne mehanicki.to nigde nikad nije dovelo.ta zadrtost.puna historija propalih zadrtosti.hmm!

rotalni promasaj a savrsena scena.nikad nikom nije bila bolja

[vememah]

Varufakis ovaj put glasao ZA.

Edited July 23, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

normalno.uletece kinta koju necemo vracati.malo osteritija uvodimo ali ne znamo to da izvedemo.

grcite shvatili da imaju taoca..

jebite se glupi ekonomisti!!

zivot ide dalje i mimo vas, tenkreotidi!!

 

hahaha

vas max je da sklapate ugovore o glupostima

[vememah]

Konačan rezultat je: 230-63-5, dakle 1 više NAI, 1 manje OXI i 1 manje uzdržani (glasalo 298, prošli put 299).

 

Po tviteru tvrde da je sada 36 članova Sirize bilo protiv vlade, dok ih je prošli put bilo 39, to onda znači da je u drugim strankama neko prešao iz NAI u OXI kamp.

Edited July 23, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

nije licnos bitna vec politicka sloga.nema para i nece se vracati!!umrite nedosledni iz eu!!otimace vam grci kintu a nista nema nazad.dobro ste prosli briselski debeloguzani!i nato oficircici

znaci jebte se

[vememah]

Juce MNI javio da Cipras razmatra raspisivanje izbora za 13. ili 20. septembar (odmah demantovano), a danas na naslovnici provladinog Kontranewsa piše da će biti 13.

[MancMellow]

I opet u krug po stoti put. Kako politicki do fiskalne unije?

 

 

Fiskalna unija je - država. Države su zaista samo ponekad nastajale tako što su seli sastavni delovi i demokratski se njihovi građani većinom glasova (tj bar parlamentarci) dogovorili da je osnuju. Jbg. Kvaka 22.Ujedinjena Evropa se ne može osnovati poštujući do kraja i principijelno demokratsku proceduru. Posebno ne u ovim granicama EU. A raspad je katastrofa. A ovako više ne ide. Zajebano.

Edited July 23, 2015 by MancMellow