Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[harper lee]

jel' bilo :

habermas:  'We are stuck in a political trap.' 

 

Guardian: What is your verdict on the deal reached on Monday?

 

Habermas: The Greek debt deal announced on Monday morning is damaging both in its result and the way in which it was reached. First, the outcome of the talks is ill-advised. Even if one were to consider the strangulating terms of the deal the right course of action, one cannot expect these reforms to be enacted by a government which by its own admission does not believe in the terms of the agreement.

 

Secondly, the outcome does not make sense in economic terms because of the toxic mixture of necessary structural reforms of state and economy with further neoliberal impositions that will completely discourage an exhausted Greek population and kill any impetus to growth.

 

Thirdly, the outcome means that a helpless European Council is effectively declaring itself politically bankrupt: the de facto relegation of a member state to the status of a protectorate openly contradicts the democratic principles of the European Union. Finally, the outcome is disgraceful because forcing the Greek government to agree to an economically questionable, predominantly symbolic privatisation fund cannot be understood as anything other than an act of punishment against a left-wing government. It’s hard to see how more damage could be done.

 

The European Council is effectively declaring itself politically bankrupt

And yet the German government did just this when finance minister Schaeuble threatened Greek exit from the euro, thus unashamedly revealing itself as Europe’s chief disciplinarian. The German government thereby made for the first time a manifest claim for German hegemony in Europe – this, at any rate, is how things are perceived in the rest of Europe, and this perception defines the reality that counts. I fear that the German government, including its social democratic faction, have gambled away in one night all the political capital that a better Germany had accumulated in half a century – and by “better” I mean a Germany characterised by greater political sensitivity and a post-national mentality.

 

Guardian: When Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras called a referendum last month, many other European politicians accused him of betrayal. German chancellor Angela Merkel, in turn, has been accused of blackmailing Greece. Which side do you see as carrying more blame for the deterioration of the situation?

 

Greece’s rescue package: utter humiliation or disaster averted?

Guy Verhofstadt, Josef Joffe, Mariana Mazzucato, Nick Malkoutzis, Costas Lapavitsas, Dan O'Brien, Ivan Miklos, Pierre Haski, Pablo Iglesias, Marina Prentoulis

Read more

Habermas: I am uncertain about the real intentions of Alexis Tsipras, but we have to acknowledge a simple fact: in order to allow Greece to get back on its feet, the debts which the IMF has deemed “highly unsustainable” need to be restructured. Despite this, both Brussels and Berlin have persistently refused the Greek prime minister the opportunity to negotiate a restructuring of Greece’s debts since the very beginning. In order to overcome this wall of resistance among the creditors, prime minister Tsipras finally tried to strengthen his position by means of a referendum – and he got more domestic support than expected. This renewed legitimation forced the other side either to look for a compromise or to exploit Greece’s emergency situation and act, even more than before, as the disciplinarian. We know the outcome.

 

Guardian: Is the current crisis in Europe a financial problem, political problem or a moral problem?

 

Habermas: The current crisis can be explained both through economic causes and political failure. The sovereign debt crisis that emerged from the banking crisis had its roots in the sub-optimal conditions of a heterogeneously composed currency union. Without a common financial and economic policy, the national economies of pseudo-sovereign member states will continue to drift apart in terms of productivity. No political community can sustain such tension in the long run. At the same time, by focusing on avoidance of open conflict, the EU’s institutions are preventing necessary political initiatives for expanding the currency union into a political union. Only the government leaders assembled in the European Council are in the position to act, but precisely they are the ones who are unable to act in the interest of a joint European community because they think mainly of their national electorate. We are stuck in a political trap.

 

 

Merkel 'gambling away' Germany's reputation over Greece, says Habermas

Read more

Guardian: Wolfgang Streeck has in the past warned that the Habermasian ideal of Europe is the root of the current crisis, not its remedy: Europe, he has warned, would not save democracy but abolish it. Many on the European left feel that current developments confirm Streeck’s criticism of the European project. What is your response to their concerns?

 

Habermas: His prediction of an imminent demise of capitalism aside, I broadly agree with Wolfgang Streeck’s analysis. Over the course of the crisis, the European executive has accrued more and more authority. Key decisions are being taken by the council, the commission and ECB – in other words, the very institutions that are either insufficiently legitimated to take such decisions or lack any democratic basis. Streeck and I also share the view that this technocratic hollowing out of democracy is the result of a neoliberal pattern of market-deregulation policies. The balance between politics and the market has come out of sync, at the cost of the welfare state. Where we differ is in terms of the consequences to be drawn from this predicament. I do not see how a return to nation states that have to be run like big corporations in a global market can counter the tendency towards de-democratisation and growing social inequality – something that we also see in Great Britain, by the way. Such tendencies can only be countered, if at all, by a change in political direction, brought about by democratic majorities in a more strongly integrated “core Europe”. The currency union must gain the capacity to act at the supra-national level. In view of the chaotic political process triggered by the crisis in Greece we can no longer afford to ignore the limits of the present method of intergovernmental compromise.

 

 

Habermas se ne vazi, on je sociolog.

[vememah]

NEW GREEK CABINET

No great surprise that Euclid Tsakalotos keeps his job as finance minister, nor that energy minister Panagiotis Lafazanis and labor minister Panos Skourletis have lost their cabinet positions.

 

http://www.politico.eu/article/live-greece-crisis-bailout-germany-debate-debt-grexit-negotiations/

[vememah]

Zapravo Skurletis zamenjuje Lafazanisa.

 

Grčki premijer Aleksis Cipras sproveo je danas rekonstrukciju vlade u kojoj više neće biti mesta za one koji su se protivili usvajanju paketa ključnih reformi u parlamentu.

Dosadašnjeg ministra energetike Panajotisa Lafazanisa, jednog od najžešćih kritičara predloženih mera u redovima vladajuće Sirize, zameniće Panos Skurletis koji je dosad bio ministar rada.

Na njegovo mesto doći će dosadašnji ministar za administrativnu reformu Jorgos Katugalos.

Zamenik ministra finansija biće Trifon Aleksijadis umesto Nađe Valavani koje je podnela ostavku prošle nedelje.

Aktuelni ministar finansija Euklid Cakalotos ostaće na toj poziciji, preneo je Rojters.

Zamenik ministra odbrane biće Kristoforos Vernardakis, dok je Olga Gerovašli, poslanica Sirize, imenovana za portparola vlade.

 

http://www.novimagazin.rs/svet/rekonstrukcija-grcke-vlade

[Frank Pembleton]

Spiegel

Šojbleova diplomatija: Sumrak Evrope

Grcka je kapitulirala, Nemacka pobedila: to je tužni bilans proteklog vikenda. Šojbleova diplomatija je bila povratak Evrope u nekadašnje formule moći, po kojima najjači ostalima nameće sopstvenu volju.

Nemačka Savezna vlada je za samo jedan vikend uspela da uništi sedamdeset godina nemačke posleratne diplomatije. Predlog privremenog isklučenja Grčke, kao sredstvo pritiska za vreme maratonskog susreta na vrhu, je na kraju bio poluga kojom je Grčka prisiljena na kapitulaciju. Taktika Volfganga Šojbela je dovela do velike pobede, posve u stilu Mišela Fukoa, koji je politiku razumeo kao obrnuti prikaz čuvenog citata generala fon Klauzevica: „nastavak rata drugim sredstvima“.

To što se za vikend desilo u Briselu je bio povratak Evrope u formule moći 19-tog i ranog 20-tog veka, po kojima najjači ostalima nameće svoju volju. A usput, to je bio i početak kraja monetarne Unije, koja je degradirana na čvrsti sistem zajedničkog sredstva plaćanja, a bez ikakve zajedničke politike.

Grča ne mora sada samo da odradi mere štednje, koje je na referendumu nedelju dana pre toga odbacila, nego mora i da realizuje sve reforme iz prošlosti, koje do sad nije realizovala čak i one, koje ni u Nemačkoj niko ne bi mogao da provede: ukidanje radnog vremena, anuliranje privilegija zaštićenih profesija i ukidanje tarifnog monopola, što su i grčke konzervativne partije u prošlosti decidno odbijale da urade.

Grexit samo privremeno odložen

Ono što su Nemačka i ostali kreditori oktorisali Atini jed tako ekstremno, da je izazvalo šok i to ne samo u Grčkoj. Potrajaće još nekoliko dana dok u Atini ne shvate šta se za vikend u Briselu desilo.

Rekacije zgražavanja ne dolaze, sto je veoma interesntno, od uobičajnih levih sumnjivaca, nego od konzervatvnih ekonoma, prijateljski nastrojenih prema Nemačkoj, kao npr. Liuz Garisano, čuveni španski naučnik, pisac političkog programa nove konzervativne španske partije Cuidadanos. Garisano je, kao konzeravtivac, do sada permanentno podržavao i branio nemačke pozicije. Njegov komentar na twitteru prošlog vikenda vredi citirati: „ Euro-grupa je pogrešno reagovala na Ciprasove predloge. Tamo se diskusija otela kontroli pa su nastale nepopravive štete za EU: krajnje zabrinjavajuće“.

Nemačka je preko svoje diplomatije osigurala da program za Grčku ni u kom slučaju ne moze da funkcioniše. Francuski predlog kompromisa je imao odlučujuću prednost što je omogućavao vladi Grčke da zadrži unutrašnju kontrolu nad dešavanjima.

Realno rečeno: u Grčkoj nema nikoga, ko bi sadržinski stao iza odluka iz Brisela. Radi se o diktatu jedne neprijateljske strane sile prema Grčkoj. I time će Grexit biti u najboljem rešenju samo odložen, ali nije nikako sprečen. Jedino što će troškovi Grexita za sve uključene biti itekako veći. Nemački dosadašnji riziko je bio ocenjen na 80 do 90 milijardi eura, sada se dodaju još minimum 20.

Politička konsekvenca sporazuma iz Brisela je oštećenje premjera Aleksisa Ciprasa, što je i bio cilj nemačke pregovaračke strategije. Još tri godine poitike štednje, recesije, rasta nezaposlenosti ce ostaviti jasne tragove na političkom tkivu Grčke. Za one, koji u Evropi ili USA podržavaju keynesijansku privrednu politiku, u Grčkoj ostaje izbor izmedju komunističke partije i desno-radikalne Zlatne Zore.

Možda će sada u Grčkoj na vlast biti dovedena jedna tehnokratska vlada bez demokratskog legitimiteta, što smo u Atini videli već 2011, kad je šef Centralne Banke Lukas Papademos preuzeo vladu Grčke. Ili će na vlast biti dovedena velika koalicija korumpiranih partija, tzv. konzervativne i tzv. socijalisticke, koje su Grčku i dovele u katastrofalnu situaciju. Svim tehničkim silama će se sada pokušati vladati protiv volje naroda ne bi li se briselski program realizovao.

Nemački SPD?

Ono što je šokantno je takodje odsutnost bilo kakve jače političke reakcije u Nemačkoj na dešavanja prošlog vikenda, ako se izuzmu Zeleni, koji su s pravom naglasili da je Šojbleova ideja suspenzije Grčke iz euro-zone protivna i svim ugovorima EU i nemačkom ustavu.

A nemački SPD ? Za razliku od tridesetih godina prošlog veka, kad ova partija ni pod najvećim pretanjama nije htela da podrži ondašnju privrednu politiku, danas je SPD potpuno na liniji nemačkog kancelara. Presednik nemačkih socijaldemokrata Zigmar Gabrijel je čak i nadmašio nemačku kancelarku u anti-grčkoj retorici i javno priznao da je upućen u Šojbleove planove za izbacivanje Grčke, čime je otvoreno izblamirao svoju partiju, koja o tome nije znala ništa. Time Gabrijel onemogućava svoju partiju da kritikuje Merkelin i Šojbleov kurs: takvu inkompetenciju rukovodstvo SPD u 150 godina istorije doživelo nije.

Za demokratiju i u Nemačkoj i u Evropi je ovo bio crni vikend.

Autor: Wolfgang Münchau (Volfgang Minhau), bivši glavni i odgovorni urednik Financal Times

Prevod: Mirko Vuletic

 

[odmor]

^^ dug nacin da se napise "ne ume nemac"

[vememah]

No bailout can save Greece from itself - or from the German voters

 

Greeks will resist reform imposed from abroad - but Germans will demand it while their cash is on the line. So we go on, locked together in misery

 

By Kristian Niemietz

 

 

In 1991, the Kohl government introduced the "Solidarity Tax", effectively an earmarked tax on incomes, capital gains and profits to finance fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. The president of the Mannheim-based Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Clemens Fuest, has recently proposed to raise the Solidarity Tax rate from 5.5% to 8%, and to use the additional revenue to fund fiscal transfers to Greece, in lieu of the recurring bailouts and rescue packages.

 

Fuest’s logic is simple: Emergency ‘loans’ to Greece are not really loans. Much of it will be never be repaid; it will not be officially written off, but it will be decimated through all kinds of accountancy tricks. So either way, there will be a net transfer of resources from Germany to Greece, and according to Fuest’s back-of-the-envelope calculation, a 2.5 percentage point hike in the Solidarity Tax would cost the German taxpayer no more than the policies currently pursued. It would merely replace a roundabout, highly complex transfer mechanism with a direct and simple one.

 

It is the sort of proposal only an economist could make. It would be transparent, it would be honest, and it would be far more efficient than what is currently going on. And that is exactly why it has exactly zero chance of becoming a reality. Instead, the current course of muddling through will continue. Today, the Bundestag has ratified the third Greek bailout package with an overwhelming majority. The Social Democrats are in favour of it, the Greens are in favour, and a few grumbling backbenchers aside, the Christian Democrats are in favour of it too.

 

But the general population is far less enthusiastic. According to the latest survey, Germans are roughly evenly split on the issue, with 46% supporting the third bailout package, and 49% opposing it. Now imagine Fuest’s proposal were implemented. The tax would immediately become known as the "Greece Tax", or something to that effect. Month after month, people would see on their payslip how much of their income is being transferred to Greece, euro by euro, cent by cent. That brutal transparency would tip the balance towards Germany’s own "Oxi" camp.

 

The Solidarity Tax was never hugely popular in West Germany, but it did not cause much discontent either. Most West Germans are prepared to subsidise East Germany, just as most people in London and the South East of England are prepared to subsidise the less prosperous parts of the UK. But unless very special circumstances apply (say, a country has been hit by a natural disaster), that sense of solidarity does not automatically extend to other countries, and this is one of the fundamental design flaws of the eurozone. Pushing transfer levels above what most people feel comfortable with is a surefire way to create resentment and bitterness.

 

 

Before the euro crisis, Greece was already a long-term net recipient of transfers from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the European Cohesion Fund. This seemed to be roughly the level of transfers that taxpayers in the net contributor countries were prepared to pay (although the funding streams were never particularly transparent, so we cannot even know that for sure). But a currency union of countries that are so economically far apart requires transfer levels an order of magnitude above that.

 

The founders of the euro project hoped that a common currency would help to foster a pan-European identity: West Germans would be as naturally prepared to pool resources and share sovereignty with Greeks as they are with East Germans. That, frankly, has not happened, but in Germany and elsewhere, political elites are not willing to admit that to themselves. So they insist on dragging on, whilst trying to hide the true cost of their policies from their electorates.

 

When German politicians try to present themselves as hardliners in negotiations with Greece, don’t take it at face value. The tough-on-Greece rhetoric is really just a signalling exercise to assuage voters back home.

 

Yet the Greek crisis will not be solved by this this package, nor by the next, because the country’s structural problems are far deeper than that. The Greek economy is simply not productive enough to sustain incomes and government transfers anywhere near the pre-crisis level, and that cannot be solved by a few parametric changes. Greece’s economy needs a fundamental overhaul, and this overhaul will never happen as long as it is perceived as an imposition from outside.

 

Greece needs to find its own way towards reform, which means that Northern European politicians need to stop meddling – but they cannot stop meddling as long as Greece is a recipient of transfers that most Northern European voters are not really prepared to pay for. That is the fundamental dilemma behind this never-ending Greek tragedy, and as long as Greece remains within the Eurozone, it will continue in one way or another.

 

Dr Kristian Niemietz is senior research fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs

 

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11746707/No-bailout-can-save-Greece-from-itself-or-from-the-German-voters.html

 

Why is Germany so tough on Greece? Look back 25 years

 

Dirk Laabs

 

To understand Wolfgang Schäuble’s demands in the bailout talks, look at what he inflicted on his own country when it reunified

 

 

Every drama needs a great baddie, and in the latest act of the Greek crisis Wolfgang Schäuble, the 72-year-old German finance minister, has emerged as the standout villain: critics see him as a ruthless technocrat who strong-armed an entire country and now plans to strip it of its assets. One part of the bailout deal in particular has scandalised many Europeans: the proposed creation of a fund designated to cherrypick €50bn (£35bn) worth of Greek public assets and privatise them to pay the country’s debts. But the key to understanding Germany’s strategy is that for Schäuble there is nothing new about any of this.

 

It was 25 years ago, during the summer of 1990, that Schäuble led the West German delegation negotiating the terms of the unification with formerly communist East Germany. A doctor of law, he was West Germany’s interior minister and one of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s closest advisers, the go-to guy whenever things got tricky.

 

The situation in the former GDR was not too dissimilar from that in Greece when Syriza swept to power: East Germans had just held their first free elections in history, only months after the Berlin Wall fell, and some of the delegates from East Berlin dreamed of a new political system, a “third way” between the west’s market economy and the east’s socialist system – while also having no idea how to pay the bills anymore.

 

The West Germans, on the other side of the table, had the momentum, the money and a plan: everything the state of East Germany owned was to be absorbed by the West German system and then quickly sold to private investors to recoup some of the money East Germany would need in the coming years. In other words: Schäuble and his team wanted collateral.

 

At that time almost every former communist company, shop or petrol station was owned by the Treuhand, or trust agency – an institution originally thought up by a handful of East German dissidents to stop state-run firms from being sold to West German banks and companies by corrupt communist cadres. The Treuhand’s mission: to turn all the big conglomerates, companies and tiny shops into private firms, so they could be part of a market economy.

 

Schäuble and his team didn’t care that the dissidents had planned to hand out shares of companies to the East Germans, issued by the Treuhand – a concept that incidentally led to the rise of the oligarchs in Russia. But they liked the idea of a trust fund because it operated outside the government: while technically overseen by the finance ministry, it was publicly perceived as an independent agency. Even before Germany merged into a single state in October 1990, the Treuhand was firmly in West German hands.

 

Their aim was to privatise as many companies as possible, as soon as possible – and if you were to ask most Germans about the Treuhand today they would say it achieved that objective. It didn’t do so in a way that was popular with the people of East Germany, where the Treuhand quickly became known as the ugly face of capitalism. It did a horrible job in explaining the transformation to shellshocked East Germans who felt overpowered by this strange new agency. To make matters worse, the Treuhand became a hotbed of corruption.

 

The agency took all the blame for the bleak situation in East Germany. Kohl and Schäuble’s party, the conservative CDU, was re-elected for years to come, while others paid the price: one of the Treuhand’s presidents, Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, was shot and killed by leftwing terrorists. (Schäuble too became the victim of an attack that left him permanently in a wheelchair, only days after German reunification – but his paranoid attacker’s motives were unrelated to the political events)

 

But the reality of what the Treuhand did is different from the popular perception – and that should be a warning for both Schäuble and the rest of Europe. Selling East Germany’s assets for maximum profit turned out to be more difficult than imagined. Almost all assets of real value – the banks, the energy sector – had already been snapped up by West German companies. Within days of the introduction of the West German mark, the economy in the east completely broke down. Like Greece, it required a massive bailout programme organised by Schäuble’s government, but in secret: they set aside 100bn marks (£35bn) to keep the old East German economy afloat, a figure that became public only years later.

 

With prices for labour and supplies going through the roof, the already stressed East Germany economy went into freefall and the Treuhand had no chance to sell many of its businesses. After a couple of months it started to close down entire companies, firing thousands of workers. In the end the Treuhand didn’t make any money for the German government at all: it took in a mere €34bn for all the companies in the east combined, losing €105bn.

 

In reality, the Treuhand became not just a tool for privatisation but a quasi-socialist holding company. It lost billions of marks because it went on paying the wages of many workers in the east and kept some unviable factories alive – a positive aspect usually drowned out in the vilifications of the agency. Because Kohl and, during the summer of 1990, Schäuble weren’t Chicago economists keen on radical experiments but politicians who wanted to be re-elected, they pumped millions into a failing economy. This is where parallels with Greece end: there were political limits to the austerity a government could impose on its own people.

 

The lesson Schäuble learned – and which is likely to influence his decision-making now – is that if you act the pure-hearted neoliberal you can still get away with decisions that don’t make perfect economic sense. If Schäuble is acting tough with Greece right now, it is because his electorate wants him to act that way; it’s not just that he doesn’t care about the Greek people, he wants people to believe he doesn’t care, because he sees the political advantage in it.

 

But Schäuble should have learned from history that the Treuhand gamble had catastrophic psychological consequences. Even though the agency was run by Germans, who spoke German, still it was seen by many in the east as an occupying force.

 

Schäuble’s idea of foreign countries controlling Greek assets and moving them abroad is an even more humiliating concept for any country. Schäuble comes across as a tough and sober accountant. In fact he is just an ordinary politician repeating old mistakes.

 

 

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/17/germany-greece-wolfgang-schauble-bailout

Edited July 18, 2015 by vememah

[Prospero]

Džejms Galbrajt (Varufakisov prijatelj, mislim da je bitno napomenuti) daje svoj osvrt (doom & gloom) na šire trendove:
 

Greece, Europe, and the United States

“A progressive Europe—the Europe of sustainable growth and social cohesion—would be one thing. The gridlocked, reactionary, petty, and vicious Europe that actually exists is another. It cannot and should not last for very long.”

By James K. Galbraith

The full brutality of the European position on Greece emerged last weekend, when Europe’s leaders rejected the Greek surrender document of June 9, and insisted instead on unconditional surrender plus reparations. The new diktat—formally accepted by Greece yesterday—requires 50 billion euros’ worth of “good assets”–which incidentally do not exist—to be transferred to a privatization fund; all financial legislation passed since SYRIZA took control of parliament in January to be rolled back; and the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) to return to Athens. From now on, the Greek government must get approval from these institutions before introducing “relevant” legislation—indeed, even before opening that legislation for public comment. In short: as of now, Greece is no longer an independent state.

Comparisons have been drawn to the Treaty of Versailles, which set Europe on the path to Nazism after the end of World War I. But the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended a small country’s brave experiment in policy independence, is almost as good an analogy. In crushing Czechoslovakia, the invasion also destroyed the Soviet Union’s reputation, shattering the illusions that many sympathetic observers still harbored. It thus set the stage for the final collapse of Communism, first among the parties of Western Europe and then in the USSR itself.

Six months ago one could hope that SYRIZA’s electoral victory would spark a larger discussion of austerity’s failure and inspire a continent-wide search for better solutions. But once it became clear that there was no support for this approach from Spain, Portugal, or Ireland; only polite sympathy from Italy and France; and implacable hostility from Germany and points north and east, the party’s goal narrowed. SYRIZA’s objective became carving out space for a policy change in Greece alone. Exit from the Euro was not an option, and the government would not bluff. SYRIZA’s only tool was an appeal to reason, to world opinion, and for help from outside. With these appeals, the Greeks argued forcefully and passionately for five months.

In this way, the leaders of the Greek government placed a moral burden on Europe. Theirs was a challenge based on the vision of “sustainable growth” and “social inclusion” that has been written into every European treaty from Rome to Maastricht—a challenge aimed at the soul of the European project, if it still had a soul. No one in the Greek government entertained illusions on that point; all realized that Greece might arrive at the end of June weakened, broke, and defenseless. But given the narrow margins for maneuver, which were restricted both by SYRIZA’s platform and the Greek people’s attachment to Europe, it was the only play they had.

European creditors responded with surprise, irritation, exasperation, obstinacy, and finally fury. At no time did the logic of the Greek argument—about the obvious failure, over the past five years, of austerity policies to produce the predicted levels of growth—make any dent. Europe did not care about Greece. After resigning as Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis described the negotiation process:

The complete lack of any democratic scruples on behalf of the supposed defenders of Europe’s democracy. The quite clear understanding on the other side that we are on the same page analytically … [And yet] to have very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say “You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway.”

What Europe’s “leaders” do care about is power. They posture for their own parliaments and domestic polities. There is an eastern bloc, led by Finland, which is right-wing and ultra hard line. There is a model-prisoner group—Spain, Ireland, and Portugal—which is faced with Podemos and Sinn Fein at home and cannot admit that austerity hasn’t worked. There is a soft pair, France and Italy, which would like to dampen the threats from Marine Le Pen and Beppe Grillo. And there is Germany, which, it is now clear, cannot accept debt relief inside the euro zone, because such relief would allow other countries in trouble to make similar demands. Europe’s largest creditor would then face a colossal write-off, and the Germans would face the stunning realization that the vast debts built up to finance their exports over the past fifteen years will never be repaid.

SYRIZA was not some Greek fluke; it was a direct consequence of European policy failure. A coalition of ex-Communists, unionists, Greens, and college professors does not rise to power anywhere except in desperate times. That SYRIZA did rise, overshadowing the Greek Nazis in the Golden Dawn party, was, in its way, a democratic miracle. SYRIZA’s destruction will now lead to a reassessment, everywhere on the continent, of the “European project.” A progressive Europe—the Europe of sustainable growth and social cohesion—would be one thing. The gridlocked, reactionary, petty, and vicious Europe that actually exists is another. It cannot and should not last for very long.

What will become of Europe? Clearly the hopes of the pro-European, reformist left are now over. That will leave the future in the hands of the anti-European parties, including UKIP, the National Front in France, and Golden Dawn in Greece. These are ugly, racist, xenophobic groups; Golden Dawn has proposed concentration camps for immigrants in its platform. The only counter, now, is for progressive and democratic forces to regroup behind the banner of national democratic restoration. Which means that the left in Europe will also now swing against the euro.

As that happens, should the United States continue to support the euro, aligning ourselves with failed policies and crushed democratic protests? Or should we let it be known that we are indifferent about which countries are in or out? Surely the latter represents the sensible choice. After all, Poland, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Romania (not to mention Denmark and Sweden, or for that matter the United Kingdom) are still out and will likely remain so—yet no one thinks they will fail or drift to Putin because of that. So why should the euro—plainly now a fading dream—be propped up? Why shouldn’t getting out be an option? Independent technical, financial, and moral support for democratic allies seeking exit would, in these conditions, help to stabilize an otherwise dangerous and destructive mood.

[Anduril]

Mozda najbolji tekst u poslednje vreme na temu:

 

https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ronald-g-asch/decline-and-fall-of-european-union-is-it-time-to-rip-it-up-and-star

 

 

The decline and fall of the European Union: is it time to rip it up and start again?
Ronald G. Asch 17 July 2015

There was no distinction in EU politics between friend and foe. Everything worked so nicely. But this was also the reason why nobody was greatly interested. This has definitely changed now.

Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande. Demotix/Madeleine Lenz. All rights reserved.

The Brussels summit of July 11 and 12 was undoubtedly one of the darkest moments in the EU’s more recent history. The new agreement between Athens and its creditors within in the Eurozone has rightly been called ‘Europe’s insane deal with Greece’.

Everybody knows that the new agreement can’t work and including the Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras, who said as much on television. Everybody knows that this is only one more hopeless attempt to kick the can down the road. Most experts who have ever given any thought to the matter know that for Greece to survive within the Eurozone and to regain some amount of economic stability and prosperity, it needs not only a radical haircut which reduces its national debt to a sustainable level – let us say 60-70% of GDP from about 180 % now – but also permanent financial support not in the form of so called loans but as direct financial transfers.

For the next 10 to 15 years or – more likely - indefinitely, the country would probably need at least 20 billion euros per annum to survive. Would such transfers be affordable for the rest of the Eurozone? In theory the answer is yes, in particular if one reminds oneself that the EU is spending a lot of money on fanciful projects such as paying vast subsidies to farmers so that they can ruin their competitors in Africa or South America, by selling their products below the normal market price.

Then why did the Northern countries – a group which in this case includes Belgium and Slovakia - resist a solution along such lines so fiercely? The problem is that paying permanent subsidies to Greece would only be the thin end of the wedge. At least that is what is widely assumed in The Hague, Helsinki, Bratislava and Berlin and probably in Antwerp as well where the Flemish look back on their own history of fiscal transfers to a region which does not pull its weight in economic terms.

Once Greece receives permanent fiscal transfers, other European countries would demand their share as well, or so one must assume. Although Spain, Portugal and to a lesser extent, Italy have to some extent recovered from the crisis of 2009-10, unemployment remains high. Moreover these countries are still burdened by very high public (and in some cases, such as Spain, commercial and private) debt which is only sustainable if interest rates remain very low for a long time to come.

To an extent this also holds true for France which, like Italy, is punching below its weight in economic terms. France is suffering from an overblown civil service, too much centralisation and an overregulated job market. Moreover medium size companies receive very little support because industrial policy has always tried to give backing to a few big companies which could qualify as global players.

So thirty billion Euro each year from Brussels would certainly be more than welcome to sustain a system which to all intents and purposes has become unsustainable without painful reforms.

The problem is that a full fiscal union for the Eurozone – the only real solution for the future of the Euro if the currency system does not become more flexible - would involve enormous sums in terms of subsidies and transfer payments. One should not forget that even 25 five years after reunification the German government, the welfare, health care and pension agencies and the various state governments spend about 75 billion Euro each year in the new Länder (eastern Germany) in revenues which have not been generated in the East but in the more prosperous Länder of the West (if one includes pensions etc. in this bill).

All the same, the per capita income in the East remains much lower than in the West. And Eastern Germany (without Berlin) has only got about 13 million inhabitants - hardly more than Greece. The mind boggles when one considers the amount of money which would be needed to give more stability to the Eurozone via permanent fiscal transfers once the present convenient expedient – financing governments in need of support via the printing press of the ECB – has been abandoned.

The two nations which would in all likelihood be the principal net contributors in future, the Germans and the Dutch would be forced not only to raise much higher taxes, thereby eliminating in the long run large sections of their middle classes, but they would also need to dismantle their costly welfare states in radical and unheard of ways. The necessary ‘reforms’ would make the present Chancellor of the Exchequer in Whitehall, Osborne, look like an old fashioned socialist.

So the attitude of the northern countries in negotiation with Greece becomes understandable. However, under French and Italian pressure they finally surrendered and could no longer refuse further financial support for Greece, thus keeping the country in the Eurozone’s sick bay for the foreseeable future. But what they could do was to make life for the Greek government and most Greeks themselves as unpleasant and miserable as possible.

Greece is to serve as a deterrent for other European countries which might be tempted to ask for further help from the bailout fund or for radical debt relief without being able or willing to implement further structural reforms. Greece has of course seen a considerable reduction of public spending since 2010, there has been much cost cutting, but nevertheless obsolete legislation, closed markets for goods without real competition, deficient administrative structures, rampant tax evasion and clientelism still present enormous obstacles to economic growth and sounder public finances and it is unlikely that this will change any time soon.

The attitude Schäuble and his northern colleagues showed during the negotiations can be called cruel and heartless despite the fact that Tsipras’ kamikaze approach in dealing with the country’s creditors was bound to destroy all trust in his government right from the beginning. Many observers see Schäuble as a mean moneylender who relentlessly demands his pound of flesh.

However, one should not forget that what is at stake here are not a few billions here and there. What is at stake is in many ways the economic future and prosperity of all countries concerned, their very survival. This holds true for both the creditors in the North and the weaker countries in the South.

But can the Eurozone go on like that? That seems unlikely not least because profound conflicts of interest between France and Germany – which always existed below the surface – have emerged since 2010 and in particular during the present negotiations.

These threaten to destroy the very structure of the EU. Of course, the alliance between France and Germany in Europa was always a mere marriage of convenience: tensions always existed. France needed a strong economic partner and Germany a country less powerful and dominant than the mighty US which would prevent the Federal Republic – never a country popular with most of its European neighbours – from becoming isolated again, as Germany had been before the first World War, with well known consequences.

But these days one cannot resist the gathering impression that French and German interests within the Eurozone are totally incompatible, as France wants a fiscal union with very few and extremely flexible rules and, ideally, a huge fiscal input either from the ECB or from the German treasury, whereas this is exactly what the German government is determied to prevent, although it is in fact being dragged kicking and screaming into the very system of financial transfers which it wants to avoid

So what is the solution to this problem, if there is a solution, and from a historical point of view one has to say, that problems of such a magnitude are often beyond solution. A final crash and collapse becomes as a rule inevitable at some stage and one can only hope that one is dead or in Switzerland when this happens.

But let us for moment assume that matters are not quite so desperate. The cosmopolitan idealists – those who reject the very idea of the nation state and believe that the existing ones can just be wished out of existence - argue of course that the solution of the present crisis is more than ever the creation of a unified European state which would in the end largely be responsible for welfare benefits, for financing health care and pensions and would ultimately replace the present nation states in all these areas.

The problems this approach encounters regarding the staggering sums in financial transfers required under such a system have already been outlined.

But apart from the fact that one may perhaps overestimate the eagerness of tax payers, welfare recipients and pensioners in northern countries to commit suicide, such an approach also underestimates the amount of structural and constitutional change the EU would have to undergo to assume the sort of authority a national government enjoys.

The problem is that until recently the European institutions - and this includes the EU parliament – have strongly favoured a consensus approach to politics. There are in reality conflicts of course all the time, both between various national governments and between Left and Right, but these are carefully concealed. Government in the EU has as a rule been de-politicised.

Decisions are justified as being evidently good for Europe as a whole not as the outcome of a deliberate choice of a set of policies on ideological grounds and even less as the result of the victory of one group of nations over another group (the recent summit was an exception to this rule of course in some ways, although there were at the end only losers. no winners, with the possible exception of the French president).

This seeming consensus or façade of consensus has mostly created a sufficient amount of acquiescence among European citizens whatever new legislation the European Commission, supported and driven on by the EU parliament and seconded by the Council of ministers, decided to impose on these citizens.

However, when politics is depoliticized in this way, people do not get involved. They may accept the laws they have to obey willy-nilly, but they do not feel that they have had a part in making them – by voting in elections for a particular party for example.

This is one of the reasons that Brussels seems so remote to even those Europeans who are generally in favour of further European integration. This is a point which a Spanish professor of communication studies, Francisco Seoane Pérez, has recently made in a brilliant book.[1]

There was until a short time ago no distinction in EU politics between friend and foe. Therefore everything worked so nicely. However, this was also the reason why nobody was greatly interested in what went on in Brussels. This has definitely changed now.

But this change also shows what the dangers are in creating a European ministry of finance and some kind of common European government laying down rules for economic and social policy, an approach much favoured in a somewhat selective way by France but also with less reservations by the Green party and parts of the SPD, the Labour party in Germany.

Let us assume we really had a common policy on welfare and employment in Europe, a policy designed by a true European government, a prime minister and a cabinet dominated either by the supporters of neo-liberalism or of traditional Keynesian economics and of the idea that a strong state should act as an entrepreneur itself.

In this government, some smaller nations would in all likelihood not be represented at all, as ministers would be chosen primarily because of their party affiliation not, on the basis that commissioners are being appointed now, with regard to their nationality, and others would be represented only by politicians who in their own countries would belong to the opposition or might even be total outsiders at home in the same way in which Tories are total outsiders in Scotland these days.

Would such a government, supported perhaps by a narrow majority of MPs in the EU parliament (representing possibly only a distinct group of countries), really be seen as sufficiently legitimate throughout Europe to distribute entitlements and benefits, but also to take them away at will? This seems very unlikely.

National revolts against such a government would be almost inevitable in the same way in which the Union between England and Scotland was damaged, perhaps beyond repair, by Mrs Thatcher’s neo-liberal policies that never enjoyed any real support in Scotland.

A European government taking real political decisions without disguising them as merely administrative acts and implementing self evident technocratic rules would damage the coherence of the EU. In fact this is exactly what is happening now with the so called austerity policies which Brussels half heartedly and very reluctantly tries to implement.

Political and economic cultures in Europe are very different from country to country, even more different than in Scotland and England or Flanders and southern Belgium. The moment the façade of consensus politics is dismantled everything will fall apart. But that same consensus politics, because it does not name the real political issues, and does not put its cards on the table, can never persuade citizens to really identify with the EU, and will never make Brussels a real focus of loyalty.

Such identification, as Francisco Pérez has rightly emphasized, demands the kind of politics where there are real opponents and real ideological choices. But this is exactly what the EU cannot contemplate, as Tsipras - who clearly favoured such a more ideological and antagonistic approach - has sufficiently demonstrated in his downfall.

So what is the alternative? The Euro must somehow become more flexible. It must become more like the European Monetary System which we had in the 1980s and 1990s, only this time the central role would be played by the ECB, not the Bundesbank, and the ECB would need to act, as it does now, as a lender of last resort in times of crisis.

Why not let a country leave the Euro virtually (not for five years as Schäuble has proposed) but on a weekend for 12 hours (or in fact five minutes) only to re-enter the system again immediately but at a different exchange rate. This could restore competitiveness without creating too much hardship.

Yes, investors holding bonds issued by this country would lose money, but as long as such devaluations are not more than let us say 10 % at a time (there would have to be an iron rule ensuring that), and not more than 20 % per annum, the losses would be manageable. After all, American or Chinese investors who have bought European bonds have also lost money over the last six months or so, because the exchange rate of the Euro has changed. Was there any turmoil in the bond markets? No there wasn’t.

Whatever the solution is, more integration for the Eurozone is a dead end. It will only make matters worse and create even more conflicts. Politicians must learn to concede defeat. They must be prepared to admit that they or rather their benighted predecessors in the 1990s have made a terrible mistake in creating the Euro in its present form.

The Euro was not one step too far but a thousand steps, a truly frivolous experiment, designed by people who were either totally illiterate in economic matters (like the wonderfully obtuse German minister of finance Theo Waigel of blessed memory) or were inspired by a utopian and dogmatic vision which seemed to give them the right to ignore reality. The European monetary system must become much more flexible again. It is time to go back to square one and design a new system. It's time for a complete reset.

But it is ultimately France that holds the key to overcoming the present problems, as the recent Brussels summit has shown once more. No German government will ever risk a head=on conflict with France – which by the way played a central role in creating the Euro in the first place – and as long as French governments believe that their country will benefit from the system as it stands, Europe will continue to devise ever more preposterous fudged compromises which only make matters worse.

Until recently many believed that the only sensible policy in this situation was muddling through to ensure at least the orderly management of decline, the best Europe could hope for anyway. At present the only thing we can expect in the most optimistic scenario is that chaos and national animosities – which are now an inherent and inevitable part of all debates in Brussels - will not result in immediate total disaster.

But then politicians often have a great talent for making matters worse than they are anyhow, and no politicians are better at this than those who believe that they can replace rational economic thought by a blind enthusiasm for an ever closer European integration.

And there are still far too many such politicians around, who subscribe to some kind of romantic idealism. Others on the other hand only pretend to be pro-European, and just hope that some kind of selective further integration will serve the interests of their own country or their own personal purposes as advocates of various vested interests (as for example the German export industry).

But even they should remember the old sentence: If you are in a hole stop digging. In the long run there can be no winners at all in the Euro-game the European politicians play. It is self destructive.

[1] F. Seoane Pérez, Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits oft he European Public Sphere (Basingstoke, 2013)

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National revolts against such a government would be almost inevitable in the same way in which the Union between England and Scotland was damaged, perhaps beyond repair, by Mrs Thatcher’s neo-liberal policies that never enjoyed any real support in Scotland.

A European government taking real political decisions without disguising them as merely administrative acts and implementing self evident technocratic rules would damage the coherence of the EU. In fact this is exactly what is happening now with the so called austerity policies which Brussels half heartedly and very reluctantly tries to implement.

Edited July 18, 2015 by Anduril

[Prospero]

Dobar tekst, teško je ne složiti se sa popisom problema, samo se pitam odakle će lideršip™ da stigne i bitno menja politiku EU.
 

[MancMellow]

Andurile, tekst je, pre svega zamena teza. Npr.

 

 

 

Everybody knows that the new agreement can’t work and including the Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras, who said as much on television. Everybody knows that this is only one more hopeless attempt to kick the can down the road. Most experts who have ever given any thought to the matter know that for Greece to survive within the Eurozone and to regain some amount of economic stability and prosperity, it needs not only a radical haircut which reduces its national debt to a sustainable level – let us say 60-70% of GDP from about 180 % now – but also permanent financial support not in the form of so called loans but as direct financial transfers.

 

ova dva, uzeta zajedno, materijalno nisu tacna. Grcka je prosle godine imala suficit ako se otplata dugova ne uzme u obzir. Prema tome, ni svi ostali zakljucci ne stoje na najboljim nogama. 

 

Meni je ovo jos jedan primer sindroma razmazenog velikog deteta sa loptom: ako nije penal, dajte mi loptu idem kuci. To je njegovo pravo. Medjutim, mnogo ce lakse onih preostalih 11 (ili cak 8-9) na terenu naci jos jednog i skupiti pare za loptu, nego sto ce ovaj skupiti drugih 11 i naci teren. To vazi i u ovom slucaju. Ako cemo/ce da krenu from the scratch - kako ovim nemackim intelektualcima (ili privrednicima) zvuce carine na rajni, breneru i odri, npr? Mogu misliti kako im zvuce. 

 

Zajednica za ugalj i celik, EEZ, EZ i EU, kao i evrozona jesu, i tu je "kolega", naravno, u pravu, prevashodno francuske tvorevine. One imaju realpoliticku motivaciju i dimenziju - vezati Nemacku za Francusku kroz trajne evropske integracije. Sama srz formiranja EEZ je 1) strah Francuske od Nemacke 2) interes Nemacke da prevazidje svoju svakakvu izolovanost u odnosu na evropsku periferiju, sto je posthodilo shvatanju da Mitteleuropa nije ekonomski i geografsko-politicki odrziv nadnacionalni projekat. EEZ/EU je mirovni i ekonomski projekat po karakteru, ali motivacije u njegovom samom centru su dublje. 

 

Ova nemacka vlada (namerno necu da kazem "Nemci") pokusava(la je do vikenda) da stvori jednu tvorevinu koja bi nesumnjivo bila evropski ekonomski i politicki hegemon, namely EZ minus Grcka, a u okviru koga bi Nemacka bila hegemon. Francuzi, kao sto napisah, mozda jesu malo ekonomski neefikasniji u poredjenju sa Nemcima, ali budale nisu - to je pre svega razlog zasto su tako zustro stali protiv izbacivanja Grcke, pa i po cenu velikih ekonomskoh teskoca (po Grke) i visoke cene u novcu za sve. Ovakav projekat Nemcke ce, paradoksalno, pre cak naci podrsku u Rusiji nego u Americi (ovo MMF-ovo insistiranje na dugovima je recimo zajednicko US-FRA drndanje Merkel i Sojblea). 

Edited July 18, 2015 by MancMellow

[Anduril]

Tim gore po sadašnju nemačku poziciju u grčkoj krizi. Ako je već tako, a slažem se da jeste, onda da bi opravdao poziciju prve zemlje EU biraš manje zlo, spasiš Grčku, pokažeš kako u tvojim skutima ima mesta i za dobre i za loše đake (vađenje duše na pamuk Grcima može da se odradi i kasnije, to je fine tuning) i poguraš federalizaciju.

Interes SAD je trenutno da se ne dogodi Grexit zbog lošeg presedana, koji bi mogao da ima nesagledive posledice po NATO. Za Evropu samu ih generalno verovatno zabole.

 

Za lose djake prosto nema mesta jer bi jedan los ali malo veci djak unistio ceo sistem.

 

Evo da pitam još jednom:

Ako imamo Nemce koji tonu u siromaštvo dok plaćaju grčki nerad i izvrdavanje, i ako sve to pretvara stanovnike drugih kilavih zemalja EU u gradjane drugog reda u odnosu na Grke...

... onda zašto se za ime sveta traži način da Grčka ostane u evrozoni? Zašto Nemci treba da po treći put dreše kesu dok im siromaštvo kod kuće raste? Zašto rizikuju da im sutra Italijani kažu: 'Pravili ste sto presedana sa Grcima, vadite sad i nas!' Svi znaju da Grčkoj nema pomoći i da ih na kraju igranke čeka klot bankrot kako god da okreneš. I svi znaju da je Grčka prekršila sva moguća pravila igre i dobila ohoho razumevanja za to. Pa zašto ih onda ne izbace umesto što tako bandoglavo traže način da ih ostave u evrozoni ali tako da Grci plate najveći deo tog ostanka (što je jedino moguće nekom ludačkom štednjom i rasprodajom zemlje na doboš)? Brate mili, ili im pomozi ljudski i bez umobolnih dilova ili diži ruke od njih i prepuštaj ih sudbini. Ova varijanta: "Pomoći ćemo vam ali morate da date bubreg, slezinu i plućno krilo u zalog" stvarno nema nikakvog smisla i niko iz toga neće profitirati.

 

Pa vidis da ima ljudi i argumenata za obe opcije - poenta je da vise nema dobrih opcija koje ne podrazumevaju pad standarda ma sta populisti ili bankari govorili.

 

Dobro je da smo se na kraju slozili da je tekuca ekonomska politika u Evrozoni promasena

 

Pa slazemo se samo sto su nam dijagnoze i resenja sasvim razlicita.

 

Grcka je najgora od sve dece zbog milion stvari za koje su uglavnom sami oni krivi, ali opet Grcka je samo ekstremnija verziija Italije, Spanije, i Portugalije. Mogu oni da se reformisu do sutra i da postanu tip top drzava, ali privreda nece prici ni blizu onoga sto su imali na vrhuncu a nekom priblizavanju severnom standardu i da ne pricamo. To vazi i za ostatak evropskog juga. Na dugi rok, ako evrozona ostane takva kakva je, sa politikom ECB takvom kakva je, neizbezno je ili uvodjenje direktnih fiskalnih transfera od "jezgra" (uglavnom severa) ka "periferiji" (uglavnom jugu) ili raspad evrozone. Evropska integracija pocela je zbog mira na kontinentu (upleteti toliko evropske ekonomije da rat bude izuzetno nepraktican) ali to su izgleda svi zaboravili. Sada je glavni motivator evrointegracija ekonomska korist koja se iz toga moze izvuci, a jezgro tj. bogati sever prvi (na celu sa Nemackom) forsira takav pristup. Kada vide da unutar evrozone samo postaju siromasnije, juzne clanice ce se u jednom trenutku pitati koji ce kurac tamo. I onda ce izaci - ne samo Grcka, vec i Italija, i Spanija, i Portugalija, a mozda i Irska. Medjutim to nece biti kraj jer ce posle par godina ispasti Francuska, koja trenutno balansira u evrozoni izmedju juga i severa, jezgra i periferije. To ce ostaviti samo Nemacku i (realno) prilepke, koji ce onda da osete stravicni sunovrat izvoza kada im valuta ode u nebo. A kako je Nemacka interna potraznja smesna u odnosu na izvoz, bice to strahovit pad.

Evro je trenutno perverzna tvorevina, umesto da pomaze konvergenciju privreda njegovih clanica, on (tj. prevashodno politika evrogrupe i ECB) trenutno pojacava razlike koje su postojale pre njegovog uvodjenja. Na ovakvom autopilotu on polako i lagano ali sigurno ide ka samodestrukciji. Urusice se u jednom trenutku kao zlatni standard.

 

Hoces da kazes da bi Grcka ili Italija sa mekim valutama, inflacijom i ogromnim kamatama bile bogatije?

 

Pa da. I tokom onog maratonskog samita, Grci su govorili da je Draghi najaktivniji za njihovu stvar. 

 

Merkel i Sojble kad cuju odusevice se :D

 

koja faca  ^_^

ovde je namerio nasilnik protiv prevaranta, ima jos da se igra :D

 

A ovo je gde se ne slazemo - tipovi poput Goldman Sucks Dragija su pored populista koji vide rast samo u besomucnoj potrosnji bez pokrica zapravo najveci problem.

 

Da podvučemo - Filip Legren:

....

By putting the narrow interests of the banks ahead of those of ordinary citizens, Merkel and other Eurozone policymakers have set Europeans against each other. While governments bailed out the banks, first directly and then indirectly through the EU loans to southern European governments, they didn’t force them to clean up their balance sheets. As a result, the Eurozone now has state-sponsored zombie banks that use the cheap liquidity provided by the ECB to roll over their bad loans to zombie borrowers while denying credit to new ones.

 

Interests of ordinary citizens? Mislim da nisu problem tu samo zli bankari i zli politicari nego upravo i ti obicni gradjani, tj. glasaci.

Francuske i nemacke banke su 2009. imale nekih 80-100 milijardi evra u Grckoj putem lokalnih banaka. Sa Irskom, Spanijom i Portugalijom ta cifra ide na nekih 600 milijardi.

 

Da su tada te banke pustene da bankrotiraju nemacke i francuske milijarde bi odmah isle na stabilizaciju njihovih domacih bankarskih sistema, podigli bi se deficiti, podigli bi poreze, neki bi izgubili deo ustedjevine, itd. To bi bio ogroman politicko-ekonomski potres za obe drzave i verovatno dobra lekcija ali sa katastrofalnim posledicama po Evrozonu i EU. Posledice po obicne gradjane ovaj Legren ocigledno zaboravlja.

 

Grcka je tada imala deficit od 16%, drzava bi momentalno bankrotirala a u uslovima monumetalne krize u Francuskoj i Nemackoj, Grcka bi se bukvalno ekonomski a verovatno i politicki raspala u roku od nekoliko nedelja sa gorom perspektivnom od zemalja istocne Evrope pocetkom devedesetih. U Spaniji, Portugaliji i Irskoj bi situacija bila nesto bolja ali bi se nasle govoro sigurno u depresijama slicnoj onoj u Argentini. Sve ove drzave bi verovatno morale da izadju iz Evra a ako bi i Italija bila u slicnom problemu, Evro bi se totalno raspao jer severne clanice Evra ne bi mogle da finansiraju stabilizaciju kroz stampanje ECB-a.

 

Sve ovo su vlade Irske, Spanije, Portugalije i Grcke veoma dobro znale i upravo zato su prihvatili ovu verziju resavanja krize - gde im se dug povecava ali kamate smanjuju uz uslov strukturnih reformi evropskog bankarskog sistema i zakrzljalih nacionalnih ekonomija dok kreditori u Evrozoni gube kroz postepene transfere, beljaute i stampanje kroz ECB.

 

No, sada se opet pojavljuju u osnovi isti likovi i ideologije koje su najvise skrivile krizu - neoliberalni bankari koji se neodgovorno kockaju tudjim ili jos gore stampanim novcem (citaj Dragi i kompanija) i populisti koji ga neodgovorno pozajmljuju i trose. Poruka je opet ista kao i pre krize - cemu osteriti, hajde da opet dizemo deficite, hajde da kamufliramo rastuce socijalne razlike potrosnjom i zaduzivanjem (kao u US i UK), hajde da tako dizemo GDP jer se samo to racuna i tako do sledece krize...

 

 

Spiegel

Šojbleova diplomatija: Sumrak Evrope

Grcka je kapitulirala, Nemacka pobedila: to je tužni bilans proteklog vikenda. Šojbleova diplomatija je bila povratak Evrope u nekadašnje formule moći, po kojima najjači ostalima nameće sopstvenu volju.

....

Autor: Wolfgang Münchau (Volfgang Minhau), bivši glavni i odgovorni urednik Financal Times

Prevod: Mirko Vuletic

 

 

 

Minhau je upravo primer takvog neoliberalnog ideologa koji se sistematski protivi postulatima ordoliberalizma, tj. ideologije koja pokusava da regulise liberalizam sa ciljem socijalnog balansa. Neoliberalima naravno regulacija u domenu finansija i ogranicavanja potrosnje ne odgovara. Za njih je lak otpis dugova, stampanje, novi dugovi i potrosnja odlicno resenje jer stvara superbogate kreditore i zaduzene/siromasne potrosace - trickle down economics.

[pacey defender]

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Edited July 18, 2015 by pacey defender

[Anduril]

Andurile, tekst je, pre svega zamena teza. Npr.

ova dva, uzeta zajedno, materijalno nisu tacna. Grcka je prosle godine imala suficit ako se otplata dugova ne uzme u obzir. Prema tome, ni svi ostali zakljucci ne stoje na najboljim nogama. 

...

 

Zaboravljas dve stvari - Grcka je imala suficit u uslovima osteritija koji su postali politicki neodrzivi sa Grckom u okviru evrozone.

Osteriti i strukturne refome nametnute spolja se tamo nece zapatiti.

 

Drugo, ako se i otpise dug prema ECB-u/ESM-u i Grcka ostane sa 80% duga i izadje na trziste obveznica, ti ozbiljno verujes da nece biti ponovo problema sa deficitima, zaduzivanjem i rastucim kamatama? I to sa ovakvom populistickom vladom?

Naravno da ce im biti potrebni direktni transferi ili novi zajmovi sa povoljnim kamatama.

 

Zanimljivo je da bi ovakvim rezanjem duga koje svi traze Grcka placala manje kamate od same Nemacke, tj. verovatno manje od 2% GDP-a (sa sadasnjih 3%). O tome druge drzave mogu samo da sanjaju.

[MancMellow]

Zaboravljas dve stvari - Grcka je imala suficit u uslovima osteritija koji su postali politicki neodrzivi sa Grckom u okviru evrozone.

Osteriti i strukturne refome nametnute spolja se tamo nece zapatiti.

 

 

zasto su postali politicki neodrzivi? Syriza kad je izasla sa svojim samo malo modifikovanim planom austerityija i dalje je bila daleko najpopularnija partija u Grckoj? Zasto su Grci nesposobni da sprovedu strukturne reforme i, posebno, zasto su bas sada nesposobni kad su dve glavne partije generatori oligarhijskog politicko-ekonomskog sistema otisle s vlasti? Ja ti samo ukazujem da je covek, koga sad ti branis ali to radis svojim recima, prosto napisao netacnost i odna gradio na tome. 

 

 

Drugo, ako se i otpise dug prema ECB-u/ESM-u i Grcka ostane sa 80% duga i izadje na trziste obveznica, ti ozbiljno verujes da nece biti ponovo problema sa deficitima, zaduzivanjem i rastucim kamatama? I to sa ovakvom populistickom vladom?

Naravno da ce im biti potrebni direktni transferi ili novi zajmovi sa povoljnim kamatama.

 

to je predvidjanje buducnosti, ali je i jos nesto, mnogo opakije - proglasavanje citavih naroda za vlasnike njima samima trajnih i imanentnih osobina. To ti je isto ko kad se za Nemce kaze da su nepopravljivi contol-freaks. Bukvalno. Ali na stranu to, kao sto rece kancelarka - kad se hoce, sve se moze. Apsolutno je moguce napraviti nezavisno statistiscko telo i apsolutno je moguce napraviti specijalno za Grcku automatizovan izlazak iz evrozone cim prekoraci neki minimalni deficit od 1-2% ili cak ima defecit uopste i to ugovoriti na 10-20 godina. 

 

 

 

Zanimljivo je da bi ovakvim rezanjem duga koje svi traze Grcka placala manje kamate od same Nemacke, tj. verovatno manje od 2% GDP-a (sa sadasnjih 3%). O tome druge drzave mogu samo da sanjaju.

 

zato je bolji hair-cut. I nemoj mi sad reci - to ne moze u EZ. Ne moze po sadasnjim pravilima, koja nisu pala s nebesa na kamenim plocama. Propisi su propisi, ali propise ponekad dogadjaji prevazidju. Kako bi druge zemlje to podnele? Pa lepo, druge zemlje ne bi imale mac izlaska iz EZ nad glavom ukoliko naprave deficit. 

 

Ovde, u tom tekstu koji si preneo, je jos jedan odjek onog sentimenta: ako necete ovako, onda necu da se igram. Legitimno pravo svake zemlje (ukoliko je to vecinsko misljenje), ja samo opisujem malo poblize sta je to, a i navodim sta mislim da mogu biti posledice. 

[Budja]

Dobar tekst, teško je ne složiti se sa popisom problema, samo se pitam odakle će lideršip™ da stigne i bitno menja politiku EU.

 

 

Tekst ciju glavnu tezu smo ovde vec pretresli: fiskalna unija politicki i demokratski u ovom trenutku nije moguca.