Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[MancMellow]

Pa da. I tokom onog maratonskog samita, Grci su govorili da je Draghi najaktivniji za njihovu stvar. 

 

Merkel i Sojble kad cuju odusevice se :D

 

koja faca  ^_^

 

 

 

 

 

 

ovde je namerio nasilnik protiv prevaranta, ima jos da se igra :D

Edited July 16, 2015 by MancMellow

[morgana]

stvarno, kakve su opcije da se u okviru eurozone dio duga fakticki otpise?

dragi mario danas pominje i qe

Edited July 16, 2015 by morgana

[Prospero]

Pravno je nemoguće, a mogu da produzavaju rok otplate i smanjuju anuitete.

 

via TT

[morgana]

grexit se danas u medijima pominje cak i vise nego uoci pregovora

[dragance]

Ne mogu da im otpisu dug, pa nek im onda zatraze fiktivni racun za "konsultantske potrebe i marketing", kako se to vec radi.

[Prospero]

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bb34e4e-2bcf-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7.html#ixzz3g88kScY1[/size]

July 16, 2015 6:31 pm

 

Germany’s Wolfgang Schäuble puts Grexit back on the agenda

Stefan Wagstyl in Berlin

 

 

Days after Greece appeared to escape crashing out of the euro, hawkish German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble has put Grexit back on the political agenda, raising tensions in Berlin and across the EU.

Speaking before a key Bundestag vote on Friday, Mr Schäuble said voluntary departure from the eurozone “could perhaps be a better way” for Greece than a proposed €86bn bailout package, which was painfully assembled at a marathon eurozone summit in Brussels over the weekend.

Despite his misgivings, the 72-year-old German minister said he would still personally put the package to parliament. His hollow-sounding pledge was eerily familiar to one from Athens this week, where Greek premier Alexis Tsipras presented the same plan to Greece’s parliament while admitting he did not believe in it.

Mr Schäuble’s manoeuvre makes clear he is leaving open a Grexit option, even as he is formally backing the latest rescue plan to keep Greece in the eurozone. It is uncertain how much leeway he has been given by chancellor Angela Merkel to advance a historic rupture of the eurozone that he believes would ultimately strengthen both Greece and the single currency.

Ms Merkel, who celebrates her 61st birthday on Friday, has long given more weight than Mr Schäuble to the geopolitical costs of Grexit but has also said that a deal to prevent it cannot come “at any price”.

Her approach has hardened since June 26 when Mr Tsipras infuriated Greece’s international creditors by calling for a national referendum on their latest bailout offer.

 

 

It later emerged Mr Tsipras had informed the chancellor and French president François Hollande of his plans in a telephone call. But he neglected to say he would campaign against the deal. Ms Merkel only learnt the truth after Mr Tsipras announced his intentions on television. The chancellor’s complaints about the loss of trust in Athens have since multiplied.

Mr Schäuble said in a radio interview there was widespread concern — including at the International Monetary Fund — that Greece needed a debt cut for the rescue to work. But, he noted, a “debt cut is incompatible with membership of the currency union”.

Even if he favours a Grexit, Mr Schäuble may have to take a roundabout route to get there. He is wary of being seen to push Athens out the door for fear of breaking Germany’s decades-long commitment to European unity.

Such a move would also risk casting Ms Merkel as Europe’s bully — a claim many are already making after a summit in which she forced the capitulation of Greece’s defiant leftwing prime minister.

Berlin has already signalled that should Grexit come, Germany would generously support Athens, including with a debt cut

 

Some EU officials believe Mr Schäuble’s repeated insistence that the IMF, which has partnered the EU in previous rescues, be included in a new bailout may be intended to engineer an eventual Grexit. The IMF has suggested it might not join a new Greek programme once its current rescue expires in March without heavy restructuring of existing eurozone loans. One EU official said Mr Schäuble could use this as “an excuse”.

Ms Merkel in the meantime seems certain to win the Bundestag vote on Friday on the proposed bailout. But about 60 MPs from her CDU/CSU bloc could rebel in protest against lending Athens even a cent more. The fact that Mr Schäuble will on Friday recommend the plan could win over some sceptics, thereby reducing Ms Merkel’s embarrassment.

 

The vote authorises only the start of negotiations, meaning Mr Schäuble will have time to manoeuvre before a second vote on the package itself, once negotiations are concluded.

Eckhardt Rehberg, the CDU’s budget spokesman, said: “The debate over a temporary Grexit has been important.”

But social democrats, also part of the coalition, are furious that Mr Schäuble harps on about Grexit and are urging him to stick to the script. Many suspect the finance minister is playing up Grexit partly to embarrass the leader of their SPD party, Sigmar Gabriel.

Mr Gabriel had agreed with Ms Merkel and Mr Schäuble that the Grexit option should be aired at the weekend summit as a way to put pressure on Athens. But now that a deal has been done, Mr Gabriel thinks Grexit should be off the agenda, not least because some SPD leftwingers are annoyed he backed it even as a negotiating tactic.

His discomfort suggests Mr Schäuble’s Grexit plan is already bringing him political gains, even if it never materialises.

 

Additional reporting by Peter Speigel in Brussels

 

 

[hazard]

Da podvučemo - Filip Legren:

 

The official narrative that has taken hold in Germany and EU circles blames the crisis entirely on others, not least profligate and reckless southern Europeans. It argues that since others, not Germany, are responsible for the crisis, they must pay the price for it. Germany does not need to change, others do. As well as paying back their debts in full, they must emulate what Germany did a decade ago: consolidate public finances and bear down on wages to restore competitiveness. That way they can be as successful as Germany supposedly is.

 

There’s just one problem with this narrative: it is entirely false. The true story is as follows. In the years up to 2007, there was a huge credit boom across the Western financial system, from the United States to Iceland. It involved a massive expansion of cross-border lending by dysfunctional and dangerously undercapitalised banks, abetted by the complacency – and sometimes the complicity – of central bankers, regulators, supervisors and politicians. And Eurozone banks were at the heart of it.

 

As well as gambling on American subprime mortgages, German and French banks lent too much, badly to Spanish and Irish homebuyers and property developers, Portuguese consumers and the Greek government, both directly and together with local banks. When the bubbles burst and banks began to fail, governments decided to bail them out, protecting banks’ creditors. Banks’ initial losses were often related to American subprime mortgages, over which European governments had no control. But when it became clear in early 2010 that Greece could not pay its debts, Merkel – together with a French trio of Jean-Claude Trichet at the ECB, Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the IMF and President Nicolas Sarkozy – took a different approach.

 

To avoid losses for French and German banks, they decided to pretend that Greece was merely going through temporary funding difficulties. And under the pretence that the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole was at risk, they decided to breach the legal basis on which the Eurozone was formed – the “no-bailout rule” – and lend to the Greek government so that it could repay those foreign banks and investors. Further loans from EU governments to Ireland, Portugal and Spain followed, primarily to bail out local banks that would otherwise have defaulted on their borrowing from German and French banks and other financial investors.

 

As a result of these bailouts, the bad lending of private banks has become obligations between governments. And a crisis that could have united Europe in a collective effort to curb the banks that got us into this mess has instead divided it, pitting creditor countries – principally Germany – against debtor ones, with EU institutions becoming instruments for creditors to impose their will on debtors. The Eurozone has become, in effect, a glorified debtors’ prison.

 

It is tragic – but hardly surprising – that as a result Germany and EU institutions are now resented so much in debtor countries. It is also understandable that northern European taxpayers are angry at this. But instead of resenting southern Europeans, they should direct their anger at the banks that their loans, in effect, bailed out and at the policymakers who made it happen. And the upshot is that European taxpayers now have an incentive to resist the debt relief that Greece needs to recover. They would also lose out if the €64 billion bank debt unjustly imposed on Irish taxpayers were written down.

 

By putting the narrow interests of the banks ahead of those of ordinary citizens, Merkel and other Eurozone policymakers have set Europeans against each other. While governments bailed out the banks, first directly and then indirectly through the EU loans to southern European governments, they didn’t force them to clean up their balance sheets. As a result, the Eurozone now has state-sponsored zombie banks that use the cheap liquidity provided by the ECB to roll over their bad loans to zombie borrowers while denying credit to new ones.

Edited July 17, 2015 by hazard

[morgana]

sojble ponovo o grexitu, nemogucnosti neophodnog otpisa u eurozoni, akcenat na neophodnog, tako da je rekontekstualizovao svoj predlog i postavio se kao dobrotvor

 

merkel o voljenju evrope uber alles

Edited July 17, 2015 by morgana

[vememah]

Bundestag odobrio: 439-199-40.

 

Javno mnjenje u Finskoj - skoro duplo više protiv bailouta nego za njega.

 

Edited July 17, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

60 CDU/CSU-ovaca protiv. U februaru ih je 29 glasalo protiv.

 

Među ova 4 SPD-ovca koji su glasali protiv bio je i njihov kandidat za mesto kancelara iz 2013. Per Štajnbrik.

 

(zvanična statistika sa sajta Bundestaga)

 

Usvojen bridge loan:

 

EFSM: Council approves €7bn bridge loan to Greece

On 17 July 2015, the Council adopted a decision granting up to €7.16bn in short term financial assistance to Greece under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).

The loan will have a maximum maturity of three months and will be disbursed in up to two instalments. It will allow Greece to clear its arrears with the IMF and the Bank of Greece and to repay the ECB, until Greece would start receiving financing under a new programme from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

Longer term programme  

On 16 July the Eurogroup decided in principle to agree to a request made by Greece on 8 July 2015 for stability support over three years from the ESM. Once negotiated between the institutions and Greece and approved by the Eurogroup, the ESM assistance would be used, amongst other things, to repay the loan Greece receives under the EFSM.

Economic policy conditions  

The Council also adopted a decision approving a macro-economic adjustment programme setting out specific economic policy conditions attached to the financial assistance. The reforms undertaken by Greece are aimed at improving the sustainability of its public finances and the regulatory environment. Specifically, Greece was required to adopt legislation to reform its VAT and pension systems, strengthen the governance of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), and implement by 15 July 2015 the relevant provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. The adjustment programme will be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MOU).  

The financial assistance would be disbursed once the MOU and a loan facility agreement setting out in detail the financial terms have entered into force. Both are to be signed by the Commission and the Greek authorities.  

Full safeguards for non-euro area member states  

A mechanism has been designed so as to ensure that non-euro area member states do not carry any risk. Under the decision, the exposure of non-euro area member states will be fully guaranteed by liquid collateral under legally binding arrangements. If Greece were unable repay the loan in accordance with its terms, any liabilities incurred by non-euro area member states would be immediately reimbursed.  

Declaration on future use of the EFSM      

The Council and the Commission also adopted a joint declaration agreeing that "any future use of the EFSM Regulation or any other instrument of a similar nature, for the purpose of safeguarding the financial stability of a Member State whose currency is the euro, will be made conditional upon arrangements (via collateral, guarantees or equivalent measures) being in place which ensure that no financial (direct or indirect) liability will be incurred by the Member States which do not participate in the single currency. In order to reflect this principle, the Commission will make a proposal for the appropriate changes to the EFSM Regulation as soon as possible, which shall be agreed in any case before any other proposal for support under the EFSM Regulation is brought forward. Moreover, the Commission commits not bringing forward any proposal for the use of the EFSM without a mechanism for the protection of the Member States whose currency is not the euro being assured."  

EFSM  

The EFSM provides financial assistance to EU member states in financial difficulties. It relies on funds raised by the Commission on the financial markets under an implicit EU budget guarantee.

 

 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/17-efsm-bridge-loan-greece/

 

Edited July 17, 2015 by vememah

[MancMellow]

Da podvučemo - Filip Legren:

 

The official narrative that has taken hold in Germany and EU circles blames the crisis entirely on others, not least profligate and reckless southern Europeans. It argues that since others, not Germany, are responsible for the crisis, they must pay the price for it. Germany does not need to change, others do. As well as paying back their debts in full, they must emulate what Germany did a decade ago: consolidate public finances and bear down on wages to restore competitiveness. That way they can be as successful as Germany supposedly is.

 

There’s just one problem with this narrative: it is entirely false. The true story is as follows. In the years up to 2007, there was a huge credit boom across the Western financial system, from the United States to Iceland. It involved a massive expansion of cross-border lending by dysfunctional and dangerously undercapitalised banks, abetted by the complacency – and sometimes the complicity – of central bankers, regulators, supervisors and politicians. And Eurozone banks were at the heart of it.

 

As well as gambling on American subprime mortgages, German and French banks lent too much, badly to Spanish and Irish homebuyers and property developers, Portuguese consumers and the Greek government, both directly and together with local banks. When the bubbles burst and banks began to fail, governments decided to bail them out, protecting banks’ creditors. Banks’ initial losses were often related to American subprime mortgages, over which European governments had no control. But when it became clear in early 2010 that Greece could not pay its debts, Merkel – together with a French trio of Jean-Claude Trichet at the ECB, Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the IMF and President Nicolas Sarkozy – took a different approach.

 

To avoid losses for French and German banks, they decided to pretend that Greece was merely going through temporary funding difficulties. And under the pretence that the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole was at risk, they decided to breach the legal basis on which the Eurozone was formed – the “no-bailout rule” – and lend to the Greek government so that it could repay those foreign banks and investors. Further loans from EU governments to Ireland, Portugal and Spain followed, primarily to bail out local banks that would otherwise have defaulted on their borrowing from German and French banks and other financial investors.

 

As a result of these bailouts, the bad lending of private banks has become obligations between governments. And a crisis that could have united Europe in a collective effort to curb the banks that got us into this mess has instead divided it, pitting creditor countries – principally Germany – against debtor ones, with EU institutions becoming instruments for creditors to impose their will on debtors. The Eurozone has become, in effect, a glorified debtors’ prison.

 

It is tragic – but hardly surprising – that as a result Germany and EU institutions are now resented so much in debtor countries. It is also understandable that northern European taxpayers are angry at this. But instead of resenting southern Europeans, they should direct their anger at the banks that their loans, in effect, bailed out and at the policymakers who made it happen. And the upshot is that European taxpayers now have an incentive to resist the debt relief that Greece needs to recover. They would also lose out if the €64 billion bank debt unjustly imposed on Irish taxpayers were written down.

 

By putting the narrow interests of the banks ahead of those of ordinary citizens, Merkel and other Eurozone policymakers have set Europeans against each other. While governments bailed out the banks, first directly and then indirectly through the EU loans to southern European governments, they didn’t force them to clean up their balance sheets. As a result, the Eurozone now has state-sponsored zombie banks that use the cheap liquidity provided by the ECB to roll over their bad loans to zombie borrowers while denying credit to new ones.

 

Odličan tekst, nekoliko Legrenovih poenti smo ti, ja i još neki na forumu više puta napisali, no izgleda puno bolje ovako upakovano od strane nekoga ko bolje od nas zna o čemu priča. "Merkelntalizam" je završena priča, samo je pitanje da li će se to na vreme shvatiti. Draghi radi u poslednje vreme dobre stvari, samo da se ne pokaže premalo i prekasno. 

[duda]

jel' bilo :

habermas:  'We are stuck in a political trap.' 

 

Guardian: What is your verdict on the deal reached on Monday?

Habermas: The Greek debt deal announced on Monday morning is damaging both in its result and the way in which it was reached. First, the outcome of the talks is ill-advised. Even if one were to consider the strangulating terms of the deal the right course of action, one cannot expect these reforms to be enacted by a government which by its own admission does not believe in the terms of the agreement.

Secondly, the outcome does not make sense in economic terms because of the toxic mixture of necessary structural reforms of state and economy with further neoliberal impositions that will completely discourage an exhausted Greek population and kill any impetus to growth.

Thirdly, the outcome means that a helpless European Council is effectively declaring itself politically bankrupt: the de facto relegation of a member state to the status of a protectorate openly contradicts the democratic principles of the European Union. Finally, the outcome is disgraceful because forcing the Greek government to agree to an economically questionable, predominantly symbolic privatisation fund cannot be understood as anything other than an act of punishment against a left-wing government. It’s hard to see how more damage could be done.

The European Council is effectively declaring itself politically bankrupt
And yet the German government did just this when finance minister Schaeuble threatened Greek exit from the euro, thus unashamedly revealing itself as Europe’s chief disciplinarian. The German government thereby made for the first time a manifest claim for German hegemony in Europe – this, at any rate, is how things are perceived in the rest of Europe, and this perception defines the reality that counts. I fear that the German government, including its social democratic faction, have gambled away in one night all the political capital that a better Germany had accumulated in half a century – and by “better” I mean a Germany characterised by greater political sensitivity and a post-national mentality.

Guardian: When Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras called a referendum last month, many other European politicians accused him of betrayal. German chancellor Angela Merkel, in turn, has been accused of blackmailing Greece. Which side do you see as carrying more blame for the deterioration of the situation?

Greece’s rescue package: utter humiliation or disaster averted?
Guy Verhofstadt, Josef Joffe, Mariana Mazzucato, Nick Malkoutzis, Costas Lapavitsas, Dan O'Brien, Ivan Miklos, Pierre Haski, Pablo Iglesias, Marina Prentoulis
Read more
Habermas: I am uncertain about the real intentions of Alexis Tsipras, but we have to acknowledge a simple fact: in order to allow Greece to get back on its feet, the debts which the IMF has deemed “highly unsustainable” need to be restructured. Despite this, both Brussels and Berlin have persistently refused the Greek prime minister the opportunity to negotiate a restructuring of Greece’s debts since the very beginning. In order to overcome this wall of resistance among the creditors, prime minister Tsipras finally tried to strengthen his position by means of a referendum – and he got more domestic support than expected. This renewed legitimation forced the other side either to look for a compromise or to exploit Greece’s emergency situation and act, even more than before, as the disciplinarian. We know the outcome.

Guardian: Is the current crisis in Europe a financial problem, political problem or a moral problem?

Habermas: The current crisis can be explained both through economic causes and political failure. The sovereign debt crisis that emerged from the banking crisis had its roots in the sub-optimal conditions of a heterogeneously composed currency union. Without a common financial and economic policy, the national economies of pseudo-sovereign member states will continue to drift apart in terms of productivity. No political community can sustain such tension in the long run. At the same time, by focusing on avoidance of open conflict, the EU’s institutions are preventing necessary political initiatives for expanding the currency union into a political union. Only the government leaders assembled in the European Council are in the position to act, but precisely they are the ones who are unable to act in the interest of a joint European community because they think mainly of their national electorate. We are stuck in a political trap.


Merkel 'gambling away' Germany's reputation over Greece, says Habermas
Read more
Guardian: Wolfgang Streeck has in the past warned that the Habermasian ideal of Europe is the root of the current crisis, not its remedy: Europe, he has warned, would not save democracy but abolish it. Many on the European left feel that current developments confirm Streeck’s criticism of the European project. What is your response to their concerns?

Habermas: His prediction of an imminent demise of capitalism aside, I broadly agree with Wolfgang Streeck’s analysis. Over the course of the crisis, the European executive has accrued more and more authority. Key decisions are being taken by the council, the commission and ECB – in other words, the very institutions that are either insufficiently legitimated to take such decisions or lack any democratic basis. Streeck and I also share the view that this technocratic hollowing out of democracy is the result of a neoliberal pattern of market-deregulation policies. The balance between politics and the market has come out of sync, at the cost of the welfare state. Where we differ is in terms of the consequences to be drawn from this predicament. I do not see how a return to nation states that have to be run like big corporations in a global market can counter the tendency towards de-democratisation and growing social inequality – something that we also see in Great Britain, by the way. Such tendencies can only be countered, if at all, by a change in political direction, brought about by democratic majorities in a more strongly integrated “core Europe”. The currency union must gain the capacity to act at the supra-national level. In view of the chaotic political process triggered by the crisis in Greece we can no longer afford to ignore the limits of the present method of intergovernmental compromise.

 

[vememah]

Mr Schäuble’s manoeuvre makes clear he is leaving open a Grexit option

 

Dajselblum juče usred Berlina (na sastanku sa SPD-ovcima) rekao da priča o Grexitu mora da prestane ne pominjući direktno Šojblea: "ako imamo dogovor, onda imamo dogovor i svi političari moraju da stanu iza njega".

http://www.zeit.de/news/2015-07/16/finanzen-dijsselbloem-fordert-ende-der-grexit-debatte-16222017

[MancMellow]

Ne znam samo zašto to priča SPD-eovcima, to treba da kaže matorom. Ako sme. 

[vememah]

Nisam se baš precizno izrazio, to je izjavio na margini tog skupa, ne njima direktno.