Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Budja]

Dream On

 

ovo je, in a nutshell, nemački pogled na stvar (i to ne Merkel, nego veoma obrazovanih ljudi):

 

 

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/08/grexit-strengthen-not-weaken-eurozone-fears-euro-overblown

 

znači, ako neko izabere vladu koja se ne slaže sa tim u kamen uklesanim principima, može izvoleti izaći. Samo jednu vladu. U međuvremenu, mi ćemo se, oslobođeni balasta Grčke, još više ujediniti, ali ćemo se ujedno i osigurati (bogatiji members) da ako neko slučajno hoće da izađe, da nas to ni najmanje ne pogodi. Uostalom, to je jedna in/out vrteška suverenih država u kojoj možete da se igrate dok poštujete pravila koja smo vam odredili mi i naših xy trabanata sa severoistoka. One size fits all nije poželjno, OSIM naravno, kad je takav pristup potrebno primeniti na fiskalnu politiku svih bez razlike koji se u toj "monetarnoj uniji" nalaze. Faiweather assumptions su stvar prošlosti, sad je vreme da igra onaj ko plati. 

 

Francuzi su javašlije i svašta još nešto, ali glupi nisu. Ovo ni njihovi socijalisti, ni Lepenovci neće potpisati i to će, jednom, biti kraj EU. A onda - spektakl, part III, što im je lepo rekao Šmit - periferija vs centar. Dovoljno je i ekonomski, ne mora gore od toga. 

 

Da jos jednom podsetim da su principi  uklesani u kamen, osim ako nije rec o Nemackoj i Francuskoj.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stability_and_Growth_Pact

 

 

Germany, Europe's biggest economy, finally admitted today it would breach the deficit limits it insisted on establishing to protect monetary union, posing the biggest challenge yet to EU budget discipline.

After months of denial, German Finance Minister Mr Hans Eichel said for the first time what many have long suspected - that Berlin will probably be unable to keep its 2002 deficit below the EU limit of three per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

 

 

 

Opinion: Burying the Euro Stability Pact

EU finance ministers have agreed to reform the rules underpinning the euro. But in doing so, the floodgates have been opened for reinterpreting the regulations meant to ensure budgetary discipline and a stable currency.

 

 

 

 

Also, the Stability Pact has been watered down at the request of Germany and France.

[Budja]

EU u dosadasnjem obliku tesko moze da prezivi ovu krizu. Silina nemackog odgovora nema toliko veze sa Grcima koliko sa ostalima koji cekaju u redu. Grcka je mala, periferna, tradicionalno los djak. Spanski izbori su za par meseci. Ako Podemos razbije (a svi su izgledi da hoce), Spanija ce biti mnogo veci problem od Grcke. Pritom, problem Merkel et al nije toliko u samim dugovima, koliko u formiranu ozbiljne nove internacionalne Levice kakve nije bilo u EU od pada Berlinskog zida.

 

Podemos je po anketama na aoko 20%, par manje od socijalista i narodnjaka.

I to je tako vec mesecima.

Uzlazni rast je gotov.

 

Podemos nece biti u stanju da sam formira vlast.

 

Spaniju pre ceka neka vrsta politicke nestabilnosti od nekog izbornog razbijanja Podemosa koji ce da pomete sve pred sobom.

 

 

Pri tome, odgovorno tvrdim, Iglesias je daleko veci sarlatan od Ciprasa i njegove ekipe.

[Budja]

To je i moj utisak. Spanija je jos uvek daleko ispred Grcke po ukupnim efektima krize, ali je i mnogo veci i bitniji igrac od Grcke. Pobeda Ciprasa je bila ogroman vetar u ledja Podemosovim kandidatima (tj. onima koje su podrzali) na lokalnim izborima gde su dobili i Barselonu i Madrid.

 

Pritom, ono sto su Ciprasu Turska i Rusija, kao nekakav backup, to je Iglesiasu latinska Amerika.

 

Meni ostaje najveca nepoznanica kako ce se stvari razvijati u Italiji. Koliko god je Levica tamo tradicionalno jaka, toliko mi deluje da su kao drustvo potpuno retardirani godinama pod Berluskonijem. Ne znam kakva je zvanicna statistika, ali njihov odliv mozgova je uzasavajuci bar sudeci po mojim poznanicima, prijateljima i kolegama.

 

I barselonu i madrid prave sa koalicijom.

U Madridu su bili nedva nesto ispred narodnjaka.

 

Da, pobedili jesu, ali je to daleko od nekog landslide-a.

[Prospero]

Cipras će izgleda predlog mera prvo poslati opoziciji da čuje mišljenje pa tek onda Briselu. Net chatter je da postoji izvesna opasnost da delovi koalicije na vlasti neće podržati predlog, pa je dobro da postoji opcija da ga podrži neko iz opozicije. 

[Prospero]

Možda može da se instalira da na ATMu bude pitanje tipa "Da li ste za xyz predlog" pre ukucavanja PIN koda, moglo bi svaki dan da se vrti novo pitanje a bilo bi i puno glasača.  :(

 

 

Kopirajtujem predlog, tužiću svakog ko ga primeni a da mi ne plati rojalti.

[MayDay]

Bafalo, jesi čitao možda Euro Trap? Išla sam na autorovo predavanje pre par meseci i bila sam prezadovoljna količinom informacija koje pruža na jednom mestu, a koje su relevantne za ovu temu. U nastavku knjige on diskutuje potencijalna rešenja, daje pros and cons, pa na kraju izvlači optimum. Iako je vrlo rigidan Nemac, on zapravo veoma želi da EU opstane. Btw, predlaže jedinstvenu vojsku, na prvom mestu. Trenutno savetuje Vladu Nemačke, tako da ima insight u stvarne tokove. Nije da samo komunicira na apstraktnom nivou iz nekog modela.

 

This book offers a critical assessment of the history of the euro, its crisis, and the rescue measures taken by the European Central Bank and the community of states. The euro induced huge capital flows from the northern to the southern countries of the Eurozone that triggered an inflationary credit bubble in the latter, deprived them of their competitiveness, and made them vulnerable to the financial crisis that spilled over from the US in 2007 and 2008. As private capital shied away from the southern countries, the ECB helped out by providing credit from the local money-printing presses. The ECB became heavily exposed to investment risks in the process, and subsequently had to be bailed out by intergovernmental rescue operations that provided replacement credit for the ECB credit, which itself had replaced the dwindling private credit. The interventions stretched the legal strictures stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty which, in the absence of a European federal state, had granted the ECB a very limited mandate. These interventions created a path dependency that effectively made parliaments vicarious agents of the ECB's Governing Council. This book describes what the author considers to be a dangerous political process that undermines both the market economy and democracy, without solving southern Europe's competitiveness problem. It argues that the Eurozone has to rethink its rules of conduct by limiting the role of the ECB, exiting the regime of soft budget constraints and writing off public and bank debt to help the crisis countries breathe again. At the same time, the Eurosystem should become more flexible by offering its members the option of exiting and re-entering the euro - something between the dollar and the Bretton Woods system - until it eventually turns into a federation with a strong political power centre and a uniform currency like the dollar.

 

Naručila sam je pre par dana, pa kad završim, sa zadovoljstvom ću da pozajmim onome koga interesuje problematika.

[Prospero]

Ima da se skine epub, koga interesuje poslaću mu link na PM.

 

 

 

Prelistao sam pre neki dan, zaključak mahom. Meni je previše komplikovana jer prosto nemam to ekonomsko znanje, mogu da otpratim argumente ali ne i da baš znam da li su dobri ili ne.

 

Ima ovo, bitno za temu, str. 459, 462, 465 i 469.

 

 

Greece in particular may need another haircut, this time at the expense of its public creditors, to reduce its debt burden. The first Greek haircut of March 2012 cost foreign and Greek private investors € 105 billion, and the restructuring of November 2012 meant wealth losses for other Eurozone states amounting to € 43 billion in present-value terms, as shown in Chapter 8, and yet a further restructuring of Greek debt might be in order.

...

Given the huge levels of interrelated debt, a solution that just prolongs maturities and reduces interest rates, as was chosen in the case of Greece and Ireland, is not advisable. That is not really a solution, but an attempt at camouflage that allows creditors to avoid write-off losses in their balance sheets and pretend to have more equity than they actually do. While it helps the banks and governments of the debtor countries, it makes the creditors vulnerable by allowing them to conduct their businesses with less capital than they show in their books. They should instead be forced to recapitalize by bringing in more equity capital from outside. The European financial industry could become a hollow shell with the camouflage strategy the EU has begun. It is much better for the long-run stability and prosperity of the European economy if the debt restructuring is honest, in the sense of going for outright debt reductions and imposing a more parsimonious strategy on the economy, with more private savings and investment, and less consumption.

 The public debt reductions will not only hit private investors but also creditor governments and their ESM and EFSF rescue funds, which will have to be recapitalized with more equity injections by governments. In the early stages of the crisis, governments could have avoided these losses, but now that they have bailed out private investors and taken over large parts of their portfolios, they will have to foot the bill. Nowadays, 80% of the Greek public debt is held by external public institutions and only 20% privately.40 Moreover, the privately held debt is nearly exclusively located in the balance sheets of Greek commercial banks, which have used it as collateral for drawing refinancing credit from the Greek NCB.41 This shows the nature of the problem. Taxpayers are already trapped. They should acknowledge this fate and write off their losses, rather than let their politicians continue along this path, which is merely dragging them ever deeper into the trap.

...

Despite the need to forgive some of the debt, the countries themselves could make a significantly greater effort to redeem their debt. One possibility would be the sale of state property. Greece, for example, has state-owned property (excluding real-estate holdings) worth 85% of GDP in 2010, and additional real-estate holdings worth an estimated 87% to 130% of Greek GDP.42 The Greek government had promised the Troika (ECB, IMF, EU), in a memorandum of understanding dated 2 July 2011, that it would privatize state property worth € 50 billion.43 Its efforts have been rather scanty, however. By the end of 2012 its privatization receipts were only € 1.6 billion.44 As of this writing, the Greek Finance Ministry’s privatization website is still empty. Recall in this context that Alexander Hamilton’s debt mutualization of 1790 came in exchange for handing over western territories. It is not plausible to solve all of Greece’s debt problems without the country itself making a contribution.

...

The catastrophic developments in the southern European labour markets depicted in Chapter 1 also show that such a strategy is a dead end. As was shown in Tables 8.1 and 9.2, Greece had received public credit of around € 288 billion, or 157% of 2013 GDP, by December 2013. Had Greek prices not increased faster than the Eurozone average since the Madrid Summit of 1995, that ratio would be 198% of GDP, given Greece’s actual real 2013 GDP level. In relative terms, that sum is about forty times as large as the help the Marshall Plan provided to Germany after the war which, aggregated over the years, amounted to a credit equal to 5.2% of Germany’s GDP for 1952.52 In addition, Greece has benefited from an open haircut on public debt at the expense of private foreign investors of around € 65 billion, or 36% of its 2013 GDP (€ 105 billion including domestic investors). The implicit haircut represented by interest relief at the expense of other states, furthermore, benefited Greece to the tune of € 43 billion, or 24% of its 2013 GDP. A further € 32 billion in rescue credit, equivalent to 18% of Greece’s 2013 GDP, has already been earmarked for the country and will be disbursed if Athens satisfies the Troika conditions. All of this has merely kept the patient alive, but has obviously not been able to cure it. Greek unemployment rates in 2013 were more than twice as high as those prevailing in May 2010, when the official rescue operations for Greece began. It is time to reconsider the therapy.

Edited July 9, 2015 by Prospero

[vememah]

Cipras će izgleda predlog mera prvo poslati opoziciji da čuje mišljenje pa tek onda Briselu. Net chatter je da postoji izvesna opasnost da delovi koalicije na vlasti neće podržati predlog, pa je dobro da postoji opcija da ga podrži neko iz opozicije. 

 

DPA javlja da će Cipras dozvoliti levoj platformi da glasa po savesti, zato se trudi da obezbedi podršku opozicije.

 

Irac Nunan misli da je verovatnoća da će biti dila veća od 50%.

[MancMellow]

ima nesto na ytubetu

 

[morgana]

ajd, sta mislite, kakvo ce biti konacno rjesenje?

[Prospero]

40% da će sada postići dogovor, činom uspešnog slanja predloga to raste na 60% :)

 

80% da će za 3 godine GRE biti u sličnom/gorem stanju nego sada.

Edited July 9, 2015 by Prospero

[Аврам Гојић]

75% za dogovor, uz otezanje, novi brinkmanship i dramu u Grckoj. bilo bi i meni 40 posto da USA nisu navalile kao smrt na babu.

 

 

80% da će za 3 godine GRE biti u sličnom/gorem stanju nego sada.

 

 

+1

Edited July 9, 2015 by Грешни Василије

[Аврам Гојић]

Bilo kakav sporazum moraju da ratifikuju neki parlamenti.

 

Edited July 9, 2015 by Грешни Василије

[vememah]

Bafalo, jesi čitao možda Euro Trap?

 

Pa to Zin pisao? Gledao sam ga par puta u debatama o Grčkoj na nemačkoj televiziji, zalaže se za Grexit odavno tj. misli da Grčka ne može da upostavi konkurentnost privrede bez njega. I na mene je ostavio utisak čoveka koji dobro barata činjenicama.

 

Opinion: Why 'Grexit' could be good for Greece

 

By Hans-Werner Sinn, President of Germany's Ifo Institute

 

Hans-Werner Sinn is president of Germany's Ifo Institute for Economic Research, and professor of economics and public finance at the University of Munich. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

 

It is a shame that Greece was unable to manage its finances and is now slipping into chaos. But this outcome was inevitable and could not be permanently averted with loans from the international community.

 

The Greek government was effectively bankrupt back in 2012, in what was the biggest state insolvency to date, with write-downs worth 105 billion euros ($115 billion) by private creditors and a rescheduling of public sector debt equivalent to a 43 billion euro ($47 billion) write-down.

 

Despite the debt relief, everything continued to go downhill. While the economy shrank, Greek government debt grew, fueled by Greece's large trade deficits and obvious lack of competitiveness. The country had become uncompetitive in the inflationary credit bubble that the euro had brought upon the country.

 

Inside the euro, Greek unemployment hit 25%, while youth unemployment soared to 50%. The 330 billion euros ($361 billion), or 185% of Greece's GDP, that the international community lent the country was unable to improve these figures.

 

As problematic as events in Greece may be, government insolvency is not an unusual occurrence in Greece, or indeed in the global community. This is Greece's sixth insolvency in the last 200 years, and its second in the euro. The global community, meanwhile, has experienced over 180 such state insolvencies since World War II.

 

Insolvencies are painful, but they can be liberating for debtors, who at least get to clear some of their debts. And if sovereign insolvency is linked to a currency devaluation, it may kick start the economy. The study of 71 currency crises since 1980 that were followed by devaluation shows that growth normally resumes rather quickly.

 

For about one year after the depreciation, countries on average experience a lower growth rate than in the pre-crisis period, but then the economy starts to perk up. After two years, growth tends to have returned to pre-crisis levels. These are the findings of a report by the Ifo Institute conducted in 2012, which were backed up by a study published by Oxford Economics this year. Even Argentina managed to get back on track fast.

 

Many baseless arguments have been put forward about the difficulties a "Grexit" would bring. They include the assertion that the country would sustain heavy damage because it would be cut off from financial markets. This statement not only overlooks the fact that access to markets would be forfeited by Greece's insolvency, and not by exiting the euro; it also fails to recognize that Greece would temporarily no longer need access to markets following an exit.

 

According to Greek figures, the state is already showing a primary budget surplus, and the trade deficit will disappear after a devaluation. If Greece decides no longer to service its foreign debt, it will not require any fresh loans after a devaluation of its new currency.

 

Another untenable argument is that the Greek economy would not stand to gain from a weaker currency because it barely exports anything. Firstly, it is not true that Greece does not export anything. Tourist services and building materials will play a significant role in this respect.

 

Secondly, the main advantage of the devaluation is that Greek citizens would now have to turn to domestic producers, because imports will be too expensive. This will revive the economy, including agriculture, which is currently suffering from the fact that the country imports 23% more agricultural products than it exports.

 

The fear that an exit would lead to capital flight is also absolutely unfounded. Naturally there is capital flight prior to the devaluation due to fears of asset losses. Once the devaluation has taken place, however, the reverse effect will occur. Capital will start to flow back and investors will buy property, followed by investment in renovating those properties. This will generate a great deal of construction activity as, for example, in Italy after the 1992 depreciation.

 

Seen in these terms, fear of a "Grexit" is unfounded. While the state insolvency creates chaos, an exit offers the opportunity to overcome that chaos.

 

http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/07/news/economy/greece-grexit-sinn-opinion/

 

[Budja]

Cipras će izgleda predlog mera prvo poslati opoziciji da čuje mišljenje pa tek onda Briselu. Net chatter je da postoji izvesna opasnost da delovi koalicije na vlasti neće podržati predlog, pa je dobro da postoji opcija da ga podrži neko iz opozicije. 

 

Dobro, taj chatter je takodje deo pritiska. Ponavljaju to vec sest meseci. 

Hocu reci, malo se sta u ovoj igri moze verovati tviteru i ostalima.

 

Kao deo te igre, evo i ovoga.

 

And it emerged that president Juncker will meet Greek opposition parties today