Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Прслин]

Писали су шта мисле јер знају да задржавају своје добро плаћене послове ако Ципрас оде на сметлиште историје.

[MancMellow]

Cipras možda i ode, ali ovih 60% neće. I tu je sav problem.

[Прслин]

То је и Коштуница мислио за својих 80.

[Prospero]

Tj 60% od 60% izaslih, dakle 36% ????

 

via TT

[MancMellow]

То је и Коштуница мислио за својих 80.

 

Mmm, ne, nisu tih 60 za Ciprasa, nego za, odnosno protiv nečega što nije personalno. Sledstveno, i ti Koštuničini su tu, samo nisu za Koštunicu. 

 

Nije to baš 36%, pošto su u spisku mnoooogi koji ne žive u Grčkoj. 

Edited July 8, 2015 by MancMellow

[Прслин]

Mmm, ne, nisu tih 60 za Ciprasa, nego za, odnosno protiv nečega što nije personalno. Sledstveno, i ti Koštuničini su tu, samo nisu za Koštunicu. 

 

Клизиш у апстракцију. Коштуницини гласачи су у међувремену били спремни да продају и рођену бабу ако им то дигне плате на сома евра, проблем је само што је баба тешка за продају па сада опет кисели грожђе и сви крећу да се бусају у груди и причају о породичној части. Ципрас је Грцима рекао да ће да живе боље ако одјебу остерити. Ако за пар месеци буду живели горе, умочиће га у катран, убацити у чамац, запалити и гурнути ка Турској док другом руком притискају спид дајал где је све време Брисел. Проценти подршке су лањски снег ако не испуниш обећања која си дао.

[MancMellow]

Клизиш у апстракцију. Коштуницини гласачи су у међувремену били спремни да продају и рођену бабу ако им то дигне плате на сома евра, проблем је само што је баба тешка за продају па сада опет кисели грожђе и сви крећу да се бусају у груди и причају о породичној части. Ципрас је Грцима рекао да ће да живе боље ако одјебу остерити. Ако за пар месеци буду живели горе, умочиће га у катран, убацити у чамац, запалити и гурнути ка Турској док другом руком притискају спид дајал где је све време Брисел. Проценти подршке су лањски снег ако не испуниш обећања која си дао.

 

ti opet o ciprasu. 60% onih koji su glasali i dalje neće hteti osteriti. a problem je u tome što im makar u naredne 3-4 godine neka vrsta osteritija ne gine. takve su karte, jbg. politika izlaska iz krize štednjom se neće na evropskom nivou promeniti u grčkoj.

Edited July 8, 2015 by MancMellow

[Прслин]

Опет о Ципрасу јер ће тих 60% што је гласало за његов предлог на њега да свале одговорност ако ствар не упали. Сигурно неће сви они да набију петокраке на главу и одметну се у маслињаке одакле ће да пуцају на туристе буржује из Немачке и Скандинавије.

 

Али, безвезе се надгорњавамо око епилога. Чекај прво да видимо шта ће бити у другом чину који управо почиње.

[MancMellow]

Da

[vememah]

Exclusive: Greek banks face closures, bailout or not - sources

FRANKFURT | By John O'Donnell

 

Some large Greek banks may have to be shut and taken over by stronger rivals as part of a restructuring of the sector that would follow any bailout of the country, European officials have told Reuters.

 

European leaders will gather on Sunday in a last-ditch attempt to salvage agreement with Greece after months of acrimonious negotiations that have taken the country to the brink of leaving the euro.

 

But regardless of whether or not fresh funds are now unlocked for the government, some Greek banks, damaged by political and economic havoc, may have to be closed and merged with stronger rivals, officials, who asked not to be named, told Reuters.

 

One official said that Greece's four big banks - National Bank of Greece (NBGr.AT), Eurobank (EURBr.AT), Piraeus (BOPr.AT) and Alpha Bank (ACBr.AT) - could be reduced to just two, a measure that would doubtless encounter fierce resistance in Athens.

 

 

A second person said that although mergers of banks were necessary, this could happen over the longer term.

 

"The Greek economy is in ruins. That means the banks need a restart," said the first person, adding that prompt action was necessary following any bailout between Athens and the euro zone. "Cyprus could be a role model."

 

"You have a tiny bit of time ... you would do restructuring straight away."

 

Greece's financial system has been at the heart of the current crisis, hemorrhaging deposits as relations between the radical left-wing government of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and creditors worsened.

 

After Athens defaulted on debt owed to the International Monetary Fund last month, the ECB froze emergency funding for the banks, precipitating their temporary closure and a 60-euro daily limit on withdrawals from cash machines.

 

A decision by Greek voters last week to reject bailout terms offered by the country's international creditors prompted the ECB to maintain its cap, meaning that the banks will run out of cash soon.

 

LIQUIDITY AND SOLVENCY

 

A year ago, Greece's bankers thought they were on the cusp of a new era. They had restructured as part of the country's bailout deal, had raised fresh equity from international investors and had regained access to debt markets to fund lending.

 

But the economic and political turmoil that has ensued since Tsipras came to power in January means that they are dangerously short of cash.

 

Even after the immediate liquidity problems are worked out, any restructuring of the sector would first require a prompt recapitalization of Greece's strongest lenders because rising bad debts and exposure to Greek government bonds mean they are in danger of becoming insolvent.

 

A timeline and exact plan for the sector's revamp could be finalised after a recapitalization.

 

Such action would face stiff political resistance in Athens, where Tsipras has pledged to 'restore our banking system's functioning'. Bank mergers save money but cost jobs, making them unpopular.

 

Reflecting such obstacles, a second person said: "There would be an interest in having less banks ... but I'm wondering whether this would make sense in the short term."

 

Any closures, which would be managed primarily by Greek authorities under the watch of the European Central Bank's supervisors, would not typically affect customers as their deposits and accounts would migrate to the bank's new owner.

 

Greece's finance ministry was not immediately available for comment, while a spokeswoman for the ECB said: "The ECB Banking Supervision is closely monitoring the situation of Greek banks and is in constant contact with the Bank of Greece."

 

CYPRUS MODEL

 

Any such revamp would be a stark reminder of the withered state of the country's financial system, where deposits had shriveled to their lowest level in more than a decade before savers were forced to ration cash withdrawals.

 

Of Greece's four big banks, National Bank of Greece, Eurobank and Piraeus fell short in an ECB health check last year, when their restructuring plans were not taken into account.

 

Only Alpha Bank was given an entirely clean bill of health.

 

A restructuring could follow a similar pattern to Cyprus, where one of the island's two main banks was closed as part of its stringent bailout, and Ireland, where three lenders were either shut or merged with rivals.

 

But a senior Greek banker, while acknowledging that the ECB could embark on fresh stress tests and "set the recapitalization, restructuring process going again", said any mergers would reduce competition.

 

"If the argument is cost efficiency and whether Greece is overbanked, with four players there is a semblance of competition," he said. "With fewer players, competition will be reduced even more."

 

(Additional reporting by George Georgiopoulos in Athens; Editing by Carmel Crimmins)

 

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-eurozone-greece-bankclosures-idUSKCN0PI2KI20150708

 

Nemački NDR u svojoj emisiji o medijima ZAPP javio da je ERT pod ozbiljnom Sirizinom kontrolom, neki bivši poznati voditelj ne mogu da privire na televiziju samo zato što nisu dovoljno "levi", a šef informativne redakcije je bivši urednik Sirizinih novina.

https://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/Wieder-ON-AIR-ERT-mit-Syriza-Kurs,zapp8710.html

Edited July 8, 2015 by vememah

[Dagmar]

Koliko sam procitao u onom pismu danas, u jednom delu pominju se i mere usmerene na razvoj.

 

I dalje tvrdim da je Grckoj potreban Marsalov plan, potpuna rekonstrukcija zemlje, a ne davanje para da bi mogli da vracaju pare.

 

Takodje, tvrdim da je potrebno federalizovati EU na svim nivoima, uvesti zajednicku fiskalnu politiku i direktno biranje predstavnika iz novoformiranih panevropskih stranaka.

 

Tvrdim i da bi jedna od prvih odluka u ovakvoj Evropi trebala da bude abolicija antiimigrantskih zakona, i uvodjenje najsireg moguceg programa integracije migranata iz Afrike i sa istoka. Regionima bi bile odredjene kvote za prijem. Izgradile bi se masovne naseobine za nove zitelje Evrope. One bi se gradile od sredstava prikupljenih u velikoj akciji prodaje panevropskih obveznica, koje bi za starije gradjane predstavljale dodatan vid sigurnosti u starosti, jer bi Mehmed, Ljazer, Noor, Aisa, Kenedi i Nusrat, mladi ljudi u naponu zivotne snage, navikli na tezak i posten rad u svojim zemljama, obnovili evropsku privredu, ucinili je konkurentnijom, i doneli pravi ekonomski bum na tle ostarelog kontinenta. 

 

Ovakva Evropa bi ponovo mogla da sanja o velicini, mogla bi da implementira inovativne tehnologije i takmici se na vodi, u vazduhu, na zemlji i u kosmosu.

 

A na bedemu, u stvari ne na bedemu vec na kapiji, takve, otvorene Evrope stajala bi ponosna Helada, ne Helada u kojoj caruju "megali idea" i klijentizam, vec jedna nova Helada Aristotela, Meline Merkuri i Jorgosa Seferisa koji u bratski zagrljaj zovu Um Kalsum, Avicenu i Ibn Kalduma. Ona nece vise nikome dugovati nista, vec ce biti deo zajednicke kase u novom, otvorenom svetu kolaborativnih poslovnih mreza kao sto su Uber i Airbnb.

 

Eto tako to treba da bude.

A ako ne bude, bice zlo.

Amin.

 

gospode boze.

 

I manite se ostarele Evrope i tog pećinskog ejdžizma.

Mlad čovek današnjice se drogira i skače po diskoteci a posle spava po ceo dan.

Star čovek danas, zahvaljujući napretku medicine i tehnologije, ima veću produktivnost od nekadašnjih 20 šesnaestogodišnjaka, i zarađuje i klincu za drogu i sebi i ženi za espap. Penziju će ionako primati jedno minus tri i po godine pošto će se radni vek produžiti preko biološkog, tako da nije frka ni sa te strane.

[namenski]

gospode boze.

 

I manite se ostarele Evrope i tog pećinskog ejdžizma.

Mlad čovek današnjice se drogira i skače po diskoteci a posle spava po ceo dan.

Star čovek danas, zahvaljujući napretku medicine i tehnologije, ima veću produktivnost od nekadašnjih 20 šesnaestogodišnjaka, i zarađuje i klincu za drogu i sebi i ženi za espap. Penziju će ionako primati jedno minus tri i po godine pošto će se radni vek produžiti preko biološkog, tako da nije frka ni sa te strane.

Ti ovo sama smislila ili ti neko pomagao? 

[MancMellow]

Koliko sam procitao u onom pismu danas, u jednom delu pominju se i mere usmerene na razvoj.

 

I dalje tvrdim da je Grckoj potreban Marsalov plan, potpuna rekonstrukcija zemlje, a ne davanje para da bi mogli da vracaju pare.

 

Takodje, tvrdim da je potrebno federalizovati EU na svim nivoima, uvesti zajednicku fiskalnu politiku i direktno biranje predstavnika iz novoformiranih panevropskih stranaka.

 

Tvrdim i da bi jedna od prvih odluka u ovakvoj Evropi trebala da bude abolicija antiimigrantskih zakona, i uvodjenje najsireg moguceg programa integracije migranata iz Afrike i sa istoka. Regionima bi bile odredjene kvote za prijem. Izgradile bi se masovne naseobine za nove zitelje Evrope. One bi se gradile od sredstava prikupljenih u velikoj akciji prodaje panevropskih obveznica, koje bi za starije gradjane predstavljale dodatan vid sigurnosti u starosti, jer bi Mehmed, Ljazer, Noor, Aisa, Kenedi i Nusrat, mladi ljudi u naponu zivotne snage, navikli na tezak i posten rad u svojim zemljama, obnovili evropsku privredu, ucinili je konkurentnijom, i doneli pravi ekonomski bum na tle ostarelog kontinenta. 

 

Ovakva Evropa bi ponovo mogla da sanja o velicini, mogla bi da implementira inovativne tehnologije i takmici se na vodi, u vazduhu, na zemlji i u kosmosu.

 

A na bedemu, u stvari ne na bedemu vec na kapiji, takve, otvorene Evrope stajala bi ponosna Helada, ne Helada u kojoj caruju "megali idea" i klijentizam, vec jedna nova Helada Aristotela, Meline Merkuri i Jorgosa Seferisa koji u bratski zagrljaj zovu Um Kalsum, Avicenu i Ibn Kalduma. Ona nece vise nikome dugovati nista, vec ce biti deo zajednicke kase u novom, otvorenom svetu kolaborativnih poslovnih mreza kao sto su Uber i Airbnb.

 

Eto tako to treba da bude.

A ako ne bude, bice zlo.

Amin.

 

Dream On

 

ovo je, in a nutshell, nemački pogled na stvar (i to ne Merkel, nego veoma obrazovanih ljudi):

 

 

With a final decision about Greece’s future in the eurozone expected on Sunday, the crucial question in the mind of European leaders will be what a deal would mean for the short- and long-term sustainability of eurozone and European integration. Since coming into office, the Athens government has relentlessly argued that Greek expulsion would inevitably trigger an unravelling of the monetary union, and ultimately deal a fatal blow to the European project itself.

 

Until recently this narrative had gained little traction, but as Grexit becomes the default scenario and media coverage more frantic, more commentators warn of a potential “Lehman moment” for the EU. They fear that Grexit would undermine public trust in the core values of the EU and turn the eurozone into a currency-peg arrangement, which will be unpicked by financial markets or populist political leaders seeking an easy way out. Even the German weekly Der Spiegel showed Merkel sitting on ancient Greek ruins, under the headline: “If the euro fails, so does Merkel’s chancellorship”.

 

It may be true that Grexit would be an unprecedented event in the history of European integration and raise a host of difficult legal questions. But the fears for the political sustainability of the euro are vastly overblown. In the short term Grexit would pose no existential threat to the eurozone, especially if it is done in a coordinated fashion.

 

Five years ago the risk of contagion from a Greek default and exit were real. Monetary union remained fragile, with a growing and high divergence in the borrowing costs between the core and periphery countries as investors fled for safety. But this time the markets’ reaction to last weekend’s referendum resulthas been muted, with the borrowing costs of Italy and Spain rising relatively little from low levels. The economies of Ireland, Spain and Portugal are in a much better shape as a result of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation.

 

Greek crisis: New bailout request filed; Tsipras clashes with MEPs - as it happened

European leaders told Greece it has five days to agree a reform plan, or face leaving the single currency

 

 

Read more

Moreover, the European Central Bank has become de facto lender of last resort with its OMT – outright monetary transactions – programme, flanked by new institutions and mechanisms such as the European stability mechanism and the banking union. The majority of Greek debts are held by public institutions, and the size and location of the potential losses are much clearer.

 

The second reason lies in the need for trust. Economists have torn out their hair over why the creditors have not been able to reach a deal, given the alleged failure of the programme, the certain financial losses to creditors, and the small differences in fiscal terms. What they failed to appreciate is that the governance of the eurozone, as indeed of European integration more broadly, is not a succession of single bargains but a compromise-making machine held together by law, informal rules and trust among democratically elected participants.

 

A “bad deal” that breaks the underlying macroeconomic principles of the adjustment programmes for Ireland, Spain and Portugal could trigger demands for renegotiation. After initially accepting the conditions on 20 February, the Greek government subsequently made it clear that it rejects both the formal and informal rules at the heart of the eurozone. A deal that appears to reward the abrasive negotiation tactics of the Syriza-led government could undermine the informal rules and trust that hold both the eurozone and the EU together.

 

Grexit would increase the chances of further eurozone deepening through stronger institutions and fiscal policy

Third, Grexit would increase the chances of further eurozone deepening through stronger institutions and fiscal policy, necessary to make monetary union sustainable in the long run. Before this happens many eurozone governments, including Germany, will need to spell out the full implications of economic and monetary union membership to their citizens and make an enlightened case for greater fiscal solidarity and deeper integration. However, making this case will be easier when the representatives of the recipient states don’t accuse those who provide bailouts and debt relief of “fiscal waterboarding” or financial “terrorism”.

 

Finally, Grexit would make it more likely that the eurozone will adopt a mechanism for planned exit from the euro. Plans for this have already been drawn up in Brussels and some national capitals to forestall any future danger of countries blackmailing their partners with the threat of irregular exit. Instead of engineering an exit through the back door of a misleading referendum question, governments that feel their electoral mandates are incompatible with eurozone membership can ask their populations in a transparent and informed way about leaving.

No doubt such a decision would not be taken lightly, given the experience ofGreece and the costs of doing so, but neither the euro nor EU membership is legally irreversible for sovereign states – and ultimately they depend on sustained political support among the public. Differentiated integration will have to be the answer to these challenges, rather than one size fits all.

In the past the EU has been guilty of making fairweather assumptions about internal as well as external challenges. Grexit would crystallise the need to strengthen the core to withstand such challenges, while creating more flexible and democratic arrangements for those unwilling or unable to take on the responsibilities this entails.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/08/grexit-strengthen-not-weaken-eurozone-fears-euro-overblown

 

znači, ako neko izabere vladu koja se ne slaže sa tim u kamen uklesanim principima, može izvoleti izaći. Samo jednu vladu. U međuvremenu, mi ćemo se, oslobođeni balasta Grčke, još više ujediniti, ali ćemo se ujedno i osigurati (bogatiji members) da ako neko slučajno hoće da izađe, da nas to ni najmanje ne pogodi. Uostalom, to je jedna in/out vrteška suverenih država u kojoj možete da se igrate dok poštujete pravila koja smo vam odredili mi i naših xy trabanata sa severoistoka. One size fits all nije poželjno, OSIM naravno, kad je takav pristup potrebno primeniti na fiskalnu politiku svih bez razlike koji se u toj "monetarnoj uniji" nalaze. Faiweather assumptions su stvar prošlosti, sad je vreme da igra onaj ko plati. 

 

Francuzi su javašlije i svašta još nešto, ali glupi nisu. Ovo ni njihovi socijalisti, ni Lepenovci neće potpisati i to će, jednom, biti kraj EU. A onda - spektakl, part III, što im je lepo rekao Šmit - periferija vs centar. Dovoljno je i ekonomski, ne mora gore od toga. 

Edited July 9, 2015 by MancMellow

[Indy]

Tj 60% od 60% izaslih, dakle 36%

 

Možda se i oni što nisu izašli slažu sa oxi, otkud znaš. Onda je 60%.

[Prospero]