Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Budja]

To, care!

Idemo, sloboda stampe u SKAIu i MEGAi.

 

Putinista, populista, ubica slobodne stampe,... sta je sledece?

 

 

Over in Athens there is mounting concern that freedom of speech has begun to pay a heavy price as the crisis deepens.

Our correspondent Helena Smith reports

Is the Greek media being one-sided or are bodies attached to prime minister Alexis Tsipras’ leftist-led administration deliberately trying to silence the press? In a country feeling the social spasms that come with economic free-fall, that is the question now being asked as prominent TV anchors faced investigation for allegedly favouring the ‘yes’ campaign in Sunday’s referendum.

Private channels (many owned by the oligarchal elite and other business interests) have been accused by the state-run media watchdog and the Union of Journalists and Athens daily newspapers (ESIEA) of purposefully cultivating a climate of fear and breaching electoral law in the run up to Sunday’s vote.

Nine anchors, household names in a nation now addicted to TV news broadcasts, have been told to appear before the disciplinary committee of ESIEA to answer allegations that the government-backed ‘no’ campaign was deliberately frozen out of programming. ESIEA’s governing board is now dominated by Syriza sympathisers; so too is the judiciary which has also launched an inquiry into the claims.

“In 2009 we missed the big story,” said Paschos Mendrevlis, who has been widely vilified for his commentary in the conservative daily, Kathimerini.

“We failed to see that the crisis was coming. Now journalists are asking the right questions, sometimes there is exaggeration but they are basically saying ‘look something is wrong, very wrong’ and for that they are being punished, deliberately hounded and silenced.”

The claims have lead to howls of protests that along with the economy democracy is now also at stake. Highlighting those concerns Kathimerini felt fit to write in its editorial today.

“The regime mentality that has evolved in certain centers of power is cause for grave concern and it is just a matter of time before it becomes a real threat to democracy and everything it holds truth.”

For its part, Syriza – many of whose members hail from the pro-Soviet KKE communist party – says it is being deliberated by the apparatus of a rotten political elite determined to oust the leftists from power.

Edited July 8, 2015 by Budja

[Meazza]

Ama ljudi, kladionice uopste ne rade na taj nacin. Kvota raste ili pada u zavisnosti od toga koliko ljudi je spremno da da pare na ovu ili onu opciju. Drugim recima, bukiji se ne kockaju, vec ciljaju malu marginu koja je sigurna koja god opcija da prodje.

 

Podatak Vilijam Hila o tolikoj i tolikoj kvoti na opciju OXI nam govori samo o tome sta misle ljudi u Engleskoj (ili vec sirom Evrope, ako su online kladionica) o ishodu referenduma. Upravo zato se Englezi kotiraju tako visoko na pesmi evrovizije - zato sto su ljudi koji se klade pristrasni; ne zato sto su oni koji prave kvote dobili podatak da je Engleska jedan od favorita. 

 

To su potpuno besmisleni podaci u ovom slucaju. Eventualno su mogli da nam budu zanimljivi da je u pitanju bila neka grcka kladionica sa iskljucivo grckim klijentima, a i to pod uslovom da uzmemo da ce se kladiti na ishod za koji glasaju.

Edited July 8, 2015 by IndridCold

[Prospero]

Evo ga jedno out-of-the-box rešenje koje deluje smisleno:
  

 

How to avoid a Grexit


Greece needs to make reforms if it is to return to growth, and it is more likely that this will happen inside the euro than outside. The key is to reactivating the logic that has worked so many times before in Europe: solidarity in exchange for reforms
 
FEDERICO STEINBERG / MIGUEL OTERO IGLESIAS 8 JUL 2015 - 15:19 CEST

 

ENRIQUE FLORES

The scenario faced by both Greece and the EU after the ‘No’ vote triumphed in the Greek referendum is extremely complex. Few things are certain. One is that a Grexit is now more likely than ever, although still avoidable. Another is that the economic situation in Greece will continue to deteriorate rapidly, with shortages in key supplies heightening the anxiety among the population. And yet another, and probably most important, is that only a hefty dose of political leadership can now prevent the economic and geostrategic disaster implied by Greece’s exit from the euro. Unfortunately, leadership has been in short supply in Europe since the crisis started.

Since the left-wing Syriza government came to power in January, trust between the Greek government and the Institutions (previously known as “the Troika”) has vanished. The dominant narrative now features words such as conflict, blackmail and punishment, and those who used to be “partners” now go by the name of “creditors,” or even more unsavoury terms. In such a tense atmosphere, an agreement looks increasingly like a pipedream.

However, since most Greeks want to remain in the euro, and a cost-benefit analysis still suggests that it would be much cheaper for the Eurozone to avoid Grexit, all efforts should be directed at reaching an agreement. It would be good to bear in mind that the worst nightmare for European creditors would be a Greece that is incapable of growing. For geostrategic reasons, the EU will have to continue pumping money into Greece even if it leaves the euro to avoid seeing it fall under the Russian sphere of influence.

Furthermore, the only way to achieve growth is through reforms, which are much more likely to happen if Greece remains in the Eurozone and “solidarity in exchange for reform” – which has worked so often in the past throughout Europe – is set in motion again. The ECB will probably continue buying time by extending its Emergency Liquidity Assistance, thus allowing negotiations to proceed, although a deal must still be reached before July 20, by which time it will be impossible for Greece to pay back the €3.5 billion it owes the ECB. That will probably be the point of no return, because it will force the Greek authorities to issue a parallel currency to pay pensions and public salaries. Once there is a parallel currency in circulation, it will be virtually impossible to re-establish the euro as the sole legal tender.

An agreement should feature the following. First, it should be politically acceptable to the electorates of all countries (the euro zone has 19 democracies, not just one). Secondly, it should ensure that structural reforms are actually implemented. OECD data show that Greece has approved more structural-reform laws than any other country (in itself a big first step) but their effective implementation is widely known to be more than problematic. That must change. Third, the new deal should downplay austerity and promote investment in Greece so that recovery can become a reality. This would probably require some form of debt relief, which is now more acceptable since it has been recommended by the IMF.

However, this agreement would only work with the right incentives structure. A debt haircut is politically toxic and would be unacceptable to the creditors. Debt restructuring by stretching the time-span of the repayments into the future and lowering interest rates even further would be more palatable. In his latest work, Paul de Grauwe, one of the euro zone’s most-respected economists, argues that Greece is illiquid but not insolvent. That means that creditors can still get 100% of their money back (while forgetting about the interest payments). However, for that to happen, Greece urgently needs to get back into growth. Although his bluntness and forms are to be regretted, Yanis Varoufakis’ proposal that debt repayment be linked to specific growth levels is actually very sensible. Politically, it would allow both Merkel and Tsipras to claim victory in the usual ambiguous European way: Tsipras could tell the Greeks that he has gained a major concession while Merkel could explain to her taxpayers that this is the only option to incentivise the Greeks to pay their debts up to the very last euro.

Nevertheless, this would be unlikely to be enough. Merkel, Rajoy and the other leaders of the Eurozone need to reassure their voters that the Greeks will be serious about implementing their structural reforms. As Merkel has argued on many occasions, solidarity comes with responsibility and the mutualisation of risk is only possible with the mutualisation of control. That is a sensible approach too. At the same time, it epitomises the Eurozone’s main problem: for as long as the European monetary union lacks a fiscal union (capable of both centralised spending and disciplining), the euro will remain a fragile currency. The creation of a fiscal union, however, would imply ceding more fiscal sovereignty to the centre. In this regard, the Spanish government’s contribution to the debate on the reform of the euro zone’s governance is welcome. It has clearly stated that member states need to relinquish more sovereignty to the centre: if a country with a long history like Spain can accept that, why not Greece?

Naturally, to create a genuine fiscal union the treaty would have to be changed, but there is no longer time for that. Greece needs an agreement before its banking system collapses. That is why we propose creating a special Euro-Greek Reform Commission, formed by both members of the Greek parliament and of the other 18 parliaments (to ensure co-ownership), which would be in charge of monitoring the implementation of Greece’s structural reforms. Such a commission, which could be formed by 15 members (seven Greeks and eight from the rest of the Eurozone) should enjoy full independence and its assessments and recommendations should be absolutely binding to the Greek government. Notwithstanding the political and legal hurdles that such a proposal would entail, if Tsipras could agree to such an arrangement, Merkel would be able to return to Germany and convince her electorate that a third rescue package is necessary because Greece is finally getting serious about reform. Cutting it off under these circumstances would be a historic mistake.


Federico Steinberg and Miguel Otero-Iglesias are senior Analysts at the Elcano Royal Institute.

[Takeshi]

ceo ciprasov danasnji govor:

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ speech to the European Parliament

My government and I, personally, came to power about five months ago. But the rescue programs have been in place for about five years. I take full responsibility for what has occurred during these five months. But we should all acknowledge that the primary responsibility for the difficulties that the Greek economy is experiencing today, for the difficulties that Europe is experiencing today, is not the result of choices made in the last five months, but in the five years of implementing programs that did not end the crisis.

...

Of course such efforts didn’t only take place in Greece. They took place elsewhere, as well – and I fully respect the effort of other nations and governments that had to cope with, and decide on difficult measures – in the many European countries where austerity programs were implemented. However, nowhere else were these programs so difficult and long-lasting as in Greece. It would not be an exaggeration to say that my country has been transformed into an experimental austerity laboratory for the last five years. But we must all admit that the experiment did not succeed.

...

In the past five years, unemployment skyrocketed, poverty skyrocketed, social marginalization grew tremendously, as did the public debt, which prior to the launch of the programs was 120% of GDP, and is currently 180% of GDP. Today, the majority of Greek people, regardless of our evaluations–this is reality and we must accept it–feel that they have no choice but to fight to escape from this hopeless course. And it is this desire, expressed in the most direct and democratic way that we, as the government, are called upon to help bring about.

[Frank Pembleton]

Ali to histerisanje oko "očijukanja" sa Putinom bi bilo smešno, da nije tužno...

Ajde bre odjebite sa Putinom bre!

U nekom ludilu zamislite da Cipras & Co puste spin kako pregovaraju o zakupu nekih ostrva sa rusima. Pa ovi bi šiznuli!

 

Poslato sa WC šolje by BVK

[MancMellow]

Pre ce biti racionalizacija sopstvenih promasenih procena.

 

Ja ipak vise verujem da su Clipras i co. bolje znali raspolozenje javnog mnjena od William Hill-a koje konstantno stavlja Britance u prvih pet favorita za pobedu na pesmi Evrovizije.

 

Čijih, procena, mojih? Ako je to nema nikakvih problema, ova kriza je malo teža za procenjivanje. Ostaje činjenica da je Cipras hteo neki dogovor do poslednjeg momenta. 

[morgana]

...

 

nedocitala sam post

Edited July 8, 2015 by morgana

[Budja]

Čijih, procena, mojih? Ako je to nema nikakvih problema, ova kriza je malo teža za procenjivanje. Ostaje činjenica da je Cipras hteo neki dogovor do poslednjeg momenta. 

 

Pricardovih.

[MancMellow]

Evo ga jedno out-of-the-box rešenje koje deluje smisleno:

  

 

 

 

 

 That is why we propose creating a special Euro-Greek Reform Commission, formed by both members of the Greek parliament and of the other 18 parliaments (to ensure co-ownership), which would be in charge of monitoring the implementation of Greece’s structural reforms. Such a commission, which could be formed by 15 members (seven Greeks and eight from the rest of the Eurozone) should enjoy full independence and its assessments and recommendations should be absolutely binding to the Greek government. 

 

ja ovo pisem vec 5 meseci

[Аврам Гојић]

nisam siguran da bi u Grckoj prosao predlog o medjunarodnom nadzornom telu koje ima mandat da obara odluke vlade, kao i da li je to uopste moguce po grckom ustavu.

[Muwan]

Čini mi se da u ovome ima dosta istine. Mislim da je lako moguće da se Cipras nadao onome što je više nas ovde napisalo da misli da je najbolji ishod – tanka pobeda NAI.

Da, i onda se prošle nedelje ubio od najfanatičnije moguće javne podrške Oxi, zbog toga što se nadao tankoj pobedi Nai.

 

Što kaže Vasa, ajde da se lepo dogovorimo da je lik šarlatan, populista, galamdžija, maoista, trećerazredni blefer, politički degenerik i notorni putinoljubac, pa da eventualno nastavimo sa nekom diskusijom (dok nam opet ne stigne neko tviter-objašnjenje od Pričarda).

[Takeshi]

a kako se u ciprasovu populisticku™ agendu uklapa varufakisova ostavka?

[MancMellow]

Da, i onda se prošle nedelje ubio od najfanatičnije moguće javne podrške Oxi, zbog toga što se nadao tankoj pobedi Nai.

 

Što kaže Vasa, ajde da se lepo dogovorimo da je lik šarlatan, populista, galamdžija, maoista, trećerazredni blefer, politički degenerik i notorni putinoljubac, pa da eventualno nastavimo sa nekom diskusijom (dok nam opet ne stigne neko tviter-objašnjenje od Pričarda).

 

ali je i do srede sakog dana zivkao brisel i trazio dogovor... nije to sarlatanstvo per se, nije lako kad si em u koaliciji, em je sama tvoja stranka koalicija

[MancMellow]

nisam siguran da bi u Grckoj prosao predlog o medjunarodnom nadzornom telu koje ima mandat da obara odluke vlade, kao i da li je to uopste moguce po grckom ustavu.

 

ne mora da obara odluke uopste, moze da vecinom glasova javi "Institucijama" sta misli, a ove na osnovu toga odobravaju transhe... nesto slicno sto imas i za zemle kandidate samo za druge stvari

[Аврам Гојић]

ne mora da obara odluke uopste, moze da vecinom glasova javi "Institucijama" sta misli, a ove na osnovu toga odobravaju transhe... nesto slicno sto imas i za zemle kandidate samo za druge stvari

 

to da.