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Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje


Mp40

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Pisali smo da su mozda neki potezi bili davanje vremena velikom tati da uleti...

Jel neko video znakove "uletanja"?

 

 

Britain has called on Greece and its eurozone partners to sit down together and find a sustainable solution, Reuters reports.

Prime minister David Cameron’ spokeswoman said finding a solution was clearly in Britain’s best interests, and Britain supports a 28 member EU.

 

 

Mozda u ovakvoj formi? :unsure: 

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Mozda u ovakvoj formi? :unsure:

 

 

možda, ali mislim da za takvu poruku mogu ovi i sami da se odvaže. Ovaj deo "Britain supports a 28 member EU." u principu znači, ok EZ i šta već, ali ova opcija prosto ne dolazi u obzir. 

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jos ce se Ciprasu i Grcima isplatiti ova kocka, kako je krenulo

Edited by Грешни Василије
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jos ce se Ciprasu i Grcima isplatiti ova kocka, kako je krenulo

sta ce da bude u opipljivom smislu ja pojma nemam ali ne znam ni kad sam gledala komunikacijski zanimljiviju situaciju od ovih pregovora i medijskog pokrivanja grcke krize.

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pa...neko mora da ispadne budala. A ono što mi govori da su bilo kakve optimistične procene veoooma upitne je što ako Merkel ispadne budala, može slobodno da ode da hekla. A to mi nekako ne izgleda verovatan scenario (iako, naravno, nemam ništa protiv...)

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pa...neko mora da ispadne budala. A ono što mi govori da su bilo kakve optimistične procene veoooma upitne je što ako Merkel ispadne budala, može slobodno da ode da hekla. A to mi nekako ne izgleda verovatan scenario (iako, naravno, nemam ništa protiv...)

 

zato su i zrtvovali Varufakisa valjda. Merkelka moze i kompromis da predstavi kao polovicnu pobedu.

Edited by Грешни Василије
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koji je toliko elegantno izisao iz posla da i oni sa slabijim kartama mogu da vide sta je po srijedi. i grci siti i angela na broju.

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Cakalotosov (novi minfin) koautorski tekst:

http://www.workersliberty.org/system/files/milios.pdf

 

Communist Dilemmas on the Greek Euro-Crisis: To Exit or Not to Exit?

Christos Laskos, John Milios and Euclid Tsakalotos

 

 

 

The exit strategy has two main elements. The first relies on a deconstruction of any argument that the EU provides any privileged terrain for left wing strategies. The second relies on showing how debt default and withdrawing from the euro provide the indispensable starting point for such strategies.

...

In other words, the issue at stake is not the need to think about the balance of class forces, but, rather, where the more favourable terrain for the Left lies, or where should the emphasis be, given that “revolutionary Europeanists” do not ignore national struggles, and nor do supporters of the exit strategy neglect the need for supra-national interventions.

...

For the KKE the exit is postponed to the longer run, under conditions of “popular power”. Thus the stance of Syriza, and also to a certain extent the KKE, with respect to the exit strategy has nothing to do with their acceptance of a “role of passive repositories for popular rage” (Kouvelakis, 2011, p. 31) but more with a class analysis of the capitalist crisis and their historical understanding of the dynamics of nationalistic politics.

...

The central issue, for us, at least revolves around whether the basic contradiction is between capital and labour or between capital and the people. What we need is a discourse, or rhetoric, that elevates class, and not the “popular”, and which has the potential to unite the bluecollar worker, the precariously employed and the supermarket employee. This does not imply that there are no middle classes that can take sides with the forces labour. But thinking about this issue relies going beyond the anti-monopoly schemas that dominate some parts of the Greek Left. The category of the middle classes, including the petit bourgeoisie (Milios & Economakis 2011), covers a wide range of experiences and social practices. The Left needs to analyse these distinctions. It also needs a hegemonic politics that seeks to reach out to some these classes, not on the basis of their traditional mode of operation, which in the Greek case could simply imply tax evasion or worse, but on the basis of new practices and new consumption and production prototypes.

...

When Kouvelakis (2011) argues that Syriza limited its political strategy to opposing austerity and hoping that the Greek debt problem would be solved at some unspecified moment in the future he is doubly misleading. First, one section of the radical Left argues that we need to go beyond the issue of debt, important though it is, if the Left is to provide convincing answers to the crisis. To conceptualize the issue as a straight fight between those arguing for austerity within the euro and those arguing for exiting the euro to provide space for the restructuring of the economy and growth, is to remain on the terrain of the dominant ideology. For that ideology, most often experienced as a threat, maintains that the only alternative to austerity is being expelled of the eurozone and all the significant costs this entails. This dilemma can only be transcended when the problem of debt is given its proper weighting, along with the issues of the crisis in capitalist production and consumption prototypes discussed above.

...

Opponents of the line of exiting the euro and the suspension of debt repayment were/are keen to argue that, whatever we think of the issue, it need not become an obstacle to finding common ground in the here and present. After all nobody in their right minds actually announces a devaluation - just think what would happen to bank deposits on the eve of an election when a victory for the Left was on the cards. But the main issue is whether, in the period when the movement to support a radical break with the present system is emerging, we prioritize the essential unity of the movement and its interconnectedness on common concerns and aspirations, or, on the other hand, the “correct” political line? Is the movement to be divided now because of the very different answers to what a Left government needs to do once in power concerning the exchange rate and reducing the level of debt repayments? More than the actual answer to the question of the appropriate exchange rate regime, it is the priority given to the question that we have found immensely problematic, and especially when it has been used as an excuse to resist social pressures for the unity of the Left in response to the austerity programmes.

 

 

 

 

 

Nisam pažljivo čitao, preleteo sam.

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pa...neko mora da ispadne budala. A ono što mi govori da su bilo kakve optimistične procene veoooma upitne je što ako Merkel ispadne budala, može slobodno da ode da hekla. A to mi nekako ne izgleda verovatan scenario (iako, naravno, nemam ništa protiv...)

 

Kancelar je 10 godina, vreme je za heklanje :fantom:

 

Jedan od problema parlamentarnog sistema je sto ti omogucuje da budes sef vlade...u nedogled

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Hm, devalvacija rešava unutrašnji dug (ako ga ima), a time implicitno povećava mogućnost rešavanja spoljnog duga?

 

Pa sad...

 

150127131739-greek-debt-chart-780x439.jp

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