Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[vememah]

Šef EFSF-a Regling za Katimerini kaže da bi Grčka uz primenu ispravne ekonomske politike već sledeće godine mogla da dobije pristup tržištu i da se ne slaže da bi reforme morale da budu teže nego ranije.

 

 

 

EFSF chief says new program would not need to be as tough as previous deals

ELENI VARVITSIOTIS

 

Just a few days before Greeks were to vote on whether to accept a bailout deal from the country’s international creditors, the head of the European Financial Stability Facility, Klaus Regling, told Kathimerini on July 2 that Greece has already implemented a large part of its fiscal adjustment program and that any new deal with the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission will not be as harsh as previous bailouts.

 

Regling believes that with the right policies Greece can succeed like other eurozone countries that have been bailed out. He is concerned about the outcome of Sunday’s referendum, however, reminding that Greece has borrowed around 140 billion euros from the EFSF.

 

• The Greek government argues that a vote against the latest deal will not lead to the country’s being ousted from the eurozone. What do you believe?

 

I am a democrat and a European, so I fully respect the referendum. We need to wait for the sovereign decision of the Greek people and then see how the government reacts to the result. There are many uncertainties now about the future of Greece. I want Greece to continue to be part of Europe and the euro area, therefore I hope for a positive result in this difficult process.

 

• The problem is that the referendum question is about accepting or rejecting specific measures rather than on the country’s future in the eurozone.

 

I understand that the question might be difficult for people who are not experts in economics and have not followed the negotiations in such detail over the past months, or the program of previous years. It may be difficult for the people to really understand the far-reaching consequences of this decision.

 

• What possible implications do you foresee?

 

I lead the institution that is the largest creditor of the Greek government, therefore I have a very clear interest in positive developments in Greece.

For me it’s very clear why this adjustment was overall unavoidable. During the decade before the crisis, there were wrong economic policy decisions which led to unsustainable developments. Examples are a fiscal deficit of 15.3 percent of GDP in 2009, and a big loss in competitiveness because wages increased much faster than productivity. In 2008, unit labor rose 40 percent faster in Greece than in the rest of the euro area. In the end, this led to a loss of market access, as private investors were no longer willing to lend money to Greece.

Under these circumstances, an adjustment was unavoidable. This was the situation in Greece when the euro-area countries and the IMF stepped in to provide emergency financing. No one else was willing to do so. But money is only provided if there is a clear commitment to correct what went wrong in the first place. This is why Greece went through a very difficult adjustment, which was very painful for the population.

 

• Has Greece adopted measures that are harsher than other bailed-out countries?

 

Greece’s starting point was much worse than those of Cyprus, Portugal and Ireland. That’s why we see today that Ireland and Spain have the highest growth rate in the euro area. Greece was also on a path for positive results, growth had returned, the unemployment rate had dropped by two points in 2014 and the Greek government was able to issue a bond. So market access started to be restored. Our strategy was beginning to work in Greece. Growth projections at the end of 2014 were for 2.5 percent in 2015 and 3.5 percent in 2016. That shows that with continued reforms Greece could have left this desperate situation behind.

 

• What if the Greeks vote “no”?

 

With a “no” vote there would be great skepticism as to whether the necessary follow-up reforms would be implemented. To implement a program requires ownership, the government needs to be convinced that it is necessary to implement difficult measures in a credible way. If conviction and ownership are not there, then we will not see the positive results that Greece needs.

 

• Why would someone vote “yes” knowing that a tougher adjustment program will follow?

 

Greece needs to continue reforms, but the measures required on the fiscal side and on competitiveness are much smaller than in the past. The large reduction from the deficit of 15.3 percent of GDP has mostly been achieved. Compared to what was done in the past five years, the remaining fiscal adjustment is relatively small but necessary. Also, competitiveness has been restored. We can see that by looking at the good export growth of the Greek economy last year. What are needed are structural reforms to stimulate future growth. I would not subscribe to the view that adjustment and reforms will need to be tougher than in the past.

 

• Why did the situation deteriorate so rapidly? I remember talking to you in December about the end of the program and the possibility of a precautionary credit line being granted. The government contends that the problems today are due to past policies.

 

If confidence is lost, situations can change rapidly. Good policies lead to positive results and the opposite is also true. With growth-friendly policies I am confident trust will come back and eventually market access can be regained. This happened in Greece last year. The objective is to get back to that situation quickly.

 

• How quickly?

 

It will depend on the strong implementation of the right economic policies and on the government implementing them with conviction. Market access could return as soon as next year.

 

• Do you think Greece is different to other countries that have gone through the adjustment and rebounded?

 

The magnitude of the imbalances was bigger than in any other euro country. But when I look at the results that were visible last year, such as falling unemployment, growth returning after six years of recession and market access coming back with a 5-year bond, Greece is not such a special case after all. That is why I am confident that Greece can be successful again like the other countries.

 

• The IMF has said that Greek debt needs to be reduced. Would something along these lines be part of a third program?

 

There is no conflict among institutions here. Our lending terms have become so beneficial they have produced effective debt relief. Given loans of more than 30 years, very low interest rates, and a 10-year interest deferral, the Greek budget saves around 8 billion euros every year. That corresponds to more than 4 percent of Greek GDP. That is solidarity from the euro area.

In addition, the Eurogroup said in November 2012 that, if reforms continue to be implemented, Europe would be ready to consider additional relief measures, if they are necessary.

 

• When would this happen? It had been understood that a debt reduction would be considered after Greece achieved a primary surplus, which it did, but the discussion never started. The IMF is also pushing in this direction.

 

The IMF shares my view that we are providing permanent debt relief by having these very favorable lending terms: The EFSF loans are six times larger than the IMF’s, they are far cheaper and have much longer maturities. If needed, these relief measures could even be reinforced.

 

• What did Greece defaulting on its IMF payment last month mean to the EFSF?

 

I am deeply concerned by this development. The Greek government has repeatedly stated that it would honor its obligation toward all its creditors. A non-payment to the IMF constitutes an event of default for the EFSF because we have cross-default clauses. This gives the EFSF the right to cancel the loan and demand immediate full repayment, to waive its rights, or to reserve its rights.

 

http://www.ekathimerini.com/198904/article/ekathimerini/news/efsf-chief-says-new-program-would-not-need-to-be-as-tough-as-previous-deals

 

 

Edited July 4, 2015 by vememah

[nezvanova]

Pa, realno on je za NAI taman na onaj način na koji sam i ja za NAI :D

 

Poslano sa mog Z520 koristeći Tapatalk

[nezvanova]

Sit, Izvinite ljudi, ja bas brljavim danas... A ne znam ni gde je edit na ovom sokocalu ...[emoji5]

[vememah]

Telegraf poredi sa igrom "muzičke stolice" očajničke napore ljudi u Grčkoj da što pre isprazne račune vraćajući dugove i plaćajući usluge unapred kako bi u slučaju haircuta prošli sa što manjom štetom:

 

 

In the meantime, people are trying to offload their bank holdings as fast as possible. (Electronic bank transfers within the country are still allowed). "Everybody is afraid of a haircut. Our clients are trying to pay us as much as possible, and transfer their problems to us. We, in turn, are paying everything in advance: taxes, gas, anything we can."

 

"It is like musical chairs because nobody wants to be the last one left standing with money in their account when the music stops. Before all this happened we were about to invest €5m to build new warehouses and buy a new cutting machine from Italy. It is totally suspended," he said.

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11716318/Greeces-Yanis-Varoufakis-prepares-for-economic-siege-as-companies-issue-private-currencies.html

 

 

 

Hjugo Dikson o razvoju situacije nakon referenduma i razlozima zašto misli da je NAI bolja opcija:

 

 

The lesser of evils

Hugo Dixon: Greeks choose between bad and terrible

02 July 2015 | By Hugo Dixon Follow @@Hugodixon

The Greeks have to choose between the bad and the truly ugly in Sunday’s referendum. If I was Greek - and I’m not, although I speak the language and had a Greek great-grandmother - I would plump for the bad option, voting “Yes”.

Officially, this is a vote in favour of an offer made by Greece’s creditors on June 25, which would have involved Athens committing to more reforms and austerity in return for cash to stop it going bust. But this offer is no longer on the table. So what might happen after a “Yes” vote?

The most likely scenario is that Alexis Tsipras, the radical left prime minister who is advocating a “No” vote, would resign. Then there would be new elections. The opposition would probably form a united front, win the elections and cut a new deal with the creditors.

In one important respect, the new government would be in a position to cut a better deal than Tsipras. The euro zone countries and the International Monetary Fund would trust it more because it had campaigned for an agreement and had secured a strong mandate both from the referendum and the election to implement it.

The new government might be able to secure a deal that was heavy on reforms to deal with the country’s deep-seated problems, but light on fiscal austerity. It would probably even get a promise to reschedule Athens’ massive debts, provided it implemented the deal properly.

The problem is that Greece would be starting in a much worse place than it was before Tsipras was elected. Not only have the past five months destroyed confidence in an economy which was just beginning to grow; this week’s closure of the banks has accelerated the downturn.

Given that capital controls would only be lifted gradually, the best-case scenario is probably what Cyprus suffered after it closed its banks in 2013. Its economy shrank 5.4 percent that year followed by another 2.3 percent in 2014 before starting to grow.

Now look at the truly ugly option, voting “No”. Tsipras says this would give him a mandate to secure a better deal from the creditors. But it’s hard to see why this would be so. There is not a shred of trust left. The creditors would probably conclude that “No” means “No” and that there was therefore no point in talking about a deal.

The immediate consequence is that the banks would stay closed. At the moment, depositors are allowed to take out 60 euros a day. But after perhaps another week, they would run out of cash totally.

The government would default on its debt to the European Central Bank, which would conclude the banks were insolvent. There would then be only two ways of reopening them: either bringing back the drachma, or confiscating a portion of depositors’ money and converting it into new bank capital. In practice, the government would probably choose the drachma route - something that would be shambolic and lead to years of litigation.

Many people would stop paying their taxes. So in order to pay salaries and pensions, the government would resort to printing IOUs – which would be the precursor of the new currency. This would trade at a big discount to the euro, maybe half its value.

There would be precious little money to pay for imports either, even essential commodities such as oil and drugs. Greece has virtually no foreign exchange reserves and, since it has just defaulted on its loan from the IMF, Athens could hardly appeal to it for help.

The economy would go into meltdown. Shortages would appear in shops. Everybody would want to be paid in cash and then hoard it. Consumption would plummet. Companies would go bust because they couldn’t pay their suppliers. Tourism, Greece’s most important industry, would suffer a blow as foreigners cancelled holidays.

All this is already happening to some extent. But after a “No” vote, the current dire situation would seem like halcyon days. The European Union would probably step in with humanitarian aid.

In theory, after such mayhem, Greece might be able to grow again from a new, much lower base. After all, it would have regained its competitiveness in one fell swoop. Tourists would lap up cheap holidays and consumers would turn to cheaper products at home rather than expensive imports.

But there’s another risk. Once Tsipras had started printing drachmas to compensate for the fact that taxes were low, he would find it hard to kick the habit. This could lead to hyperinflation.

So voting “Yes” in Sunday’s referendum would mean at best two years of recession. Meanwhile, voting “No” would probably mean economic havoc in the short run probably followed by inflation and yet more chaos. It is a terrible choice for the Greeks. But the right answer is a positive one.

 

http://www.breakingviews.com/hugo-dixon-greeks-choose-between-bad-and-terrible/21206244.article

 

 

Prigodna karikatura:

 

 

 

 

 

 

Član EP Martin Veber iz bavarskog CSU-a skicira šta će se desiti u oba slučaja:

 

 

DA: Grčki narod time odbacuje ideološku katastrofu vlade i izjašnjava se za saradnju unutar Evrope. To predstavlja jačanje Evrope i omogućava brze i odlučne pregovore o dodatnoj pomoći.

 

NE: Uprkos odbijanju saradnje u Evrozoni, Evropa ne sme da napusti stanovništvo Grčke. U tom slučaju reč je o ljudima, a ne o vladi. Evrozona bi morala da zbije redove, čak i ako joj Grčka više ne bi pripadala.

 

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/eurokrise/griechenland/kommt-der-grexit-nach-dem-referendum-live-blog-griechenland-13671349.html

Edited July 4, 2015 by vememah

[Takeshi]

jel bilo ovo iz guardiana?

 

Greek referendum: how would top economists vote?

 

Joseph Stiglitz - NO

A no vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands. Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present.

 

 

Paul Krugman - NO

The troika clearly did a reverse Corleone – they made Tsipras an offer he can’t accept, and presumably did this knowingly. So the ultimatum was, in effect, a move to replace the Greek government. And even if you don’t like Syriza, that has to be disturbing for anyone who believes in European ideals.

 

 

Thomas Piketty - NO

It’s a complicated choice. The question being asked is whether the plan from the creditors is good or not. If that is the question being asked, the answer for me is clear: it is a bad plan.

 

 

Jeffrey Sachs - NO

I recommend that the Greek people give a resounding “No” to the creditors in the referendum on their demands this weekend.

 

 

Christopher Pissarides - YES

The way forward is to reform from within, not by running away from the problem. There are already signs that sentiments are changing ... With patience other changes will follow. It is clear to most politicians in Europe that austerity is dividing the continent and damaging the European project. Reforms will follow. Greece has a role to play in this agenda but only if it stays within the eurozone.

 

 

Vicky Pryce - YES

There has been too much austerity but a no vote would make things worse. It would almost certainly mean banks becoming insolvent, an exit from the euro and a much faster decline in economic activity, with hyperinflation following as the drachma that is introduced instantly devalues.

A yes vote would keep banks open and give mandate for a deal to be struck that recognises the new Greek realities and includes, as the IMF now says, restructuring of the debt which every economist knows is unsustainable.

 

 

Professors of economics at Greek universities - YES

Taking into account that the proposals of our creditors and the Greek government were converging until last Friday, we believe that what is really at stake in the coming referendum, irrespective of the precise formulation of the question, is whether Greece will remain, or not, in the eurozone and, possibly, whether it will remain in the EU itself...

Leaving the eurozone, especially in this chaotic and superficial way, would likely lead to a process of leaving the EU too, with unpredictable and disastrous consequences for the national security and the democratic stability of our country.

 

 

 

 

[Muwan]

E, da, ovi grčki profesori ekonomije. Da li je iko od njih u poslednjih 20 godina objavio jedan tekst ili rad koji upozorava na totalnu neodrživost i fatalnu ranjivost grčkog ekonomskog modela? Da li je iko od njih upozorio da se neće dobro završiti to panhelensko podizanje životnog standarda na kredu? Pitam onako retorički.

[Budja]

E, da, ovi grčki profesori ekonomije. Da li je iko od njih u poslednjih 20 godina objavio jedan tekst ili rad koji upozorava na totalnu neodrživost i fatalnu ranjivost grčkog ekonomskog modela? Da li je iko od njih upozorio da se neće dobro završiti to panhelensko podizanje životnog standarda na kredu? Pitam onako retorički.

 

Onako napamet: grcka akademska zajednica je toliko brojna da je sasvim sigurno takvih radova bilo. 

[Prospero]

Bivši irski premijer, u kritici Štiglica, Krugmana i dr:

 

Greek voters should not listen to siren calls of American economists

Non-euro zone states like US and UK, whose banks were also saved, could contribute more

John Bruton

 

 

Nobel economics laureate Paul Krugman, in the New York Times, urges the Greeks to vote “No” in the referendum tomorrow. So does fellow laureate Joseph Stiglitz in another article in the Guardian. But is this serious advice, or in reality an unhelpful extension to Europe of an ongoing American polemic?

 

 

 

Krugman says the euro was a “terrible mistake” because he claims it failed to insulate the public finances of the states of the euro zone from bubbles in particular countries, like he says the US system does. In fact, the US only does this to a limited extent and, unlike the EU, it has no general bailout fund for states.

 

If I recall things correctly, our present collapse in confidence originated in the US, in a housing bubble in a small number of US states, that eventually engulfed the whole world. The US system did not prevent that. Puerto Rico, a US dependency in the dollar zone, has got itself into a Greek-style debt trap without the US monetary union, which is much older and stronger than the EU one, being able to prevent it.

 

Krugman says that “most of what you hear about Greek profligacy is false”.

 

He makes this bizarre claim on the basis that Greece has made cuts and tax increases since 2010. He completely ignores the profligacy, poor tax collection, and debt accumulation that went on for decades before that, when Greece erected a completely unsustainable pension regime on the strength of borrowed money. He says that, since 2010, the Greek economy has collapsed because of “austerity”.

He fails to outline what the Greeks might have used for money since 2010 if, as he seems to advocate, they had continued with their previous “non-austere” spending policies. They would not have been able to borrow the difference on commercial markets. Where would they have got the money?
Just because a country is in the euro zone it does not mean it can have an unlimited call on the taxes or loans of other euro members.

While there is more to do, like euro area-wide deposit insurance, the EU has remedied many of the initial design flaws in the euro, something Krugman does not acknowledge . He says that “even harsher austerity is a dead end”, as if cuts and tax increases were all that the EU has been urging unsuccessfully on the Greeks.
 
Recommended recipe

Product and labour market reforms, opening up the professions, better tax collection and privatisations, have been an important part of the recipe urged on Greece by the EU, and these would greatly improve the allocative efficiency of the Greek economy and promote growth.
 
Greece needs to move its human resources out of unproductive activities into areas that will earn money from abroad and the EU reforms will assist that.

Stiglitz, in his Guardian article also calls for a “No” vote, but is more extreme.

He claims the euro zone was “never a democratic project”. He seems to have completely forgotten the Maastricht Treaty, which created the legal basis for the euro, was approved by the elected parliaments of every state currently a member. It was approved in referendums in several countries, including France and Ireland.

Furthermore each of the eurogroup finance ministers, who make all the key decisions, represents democratically elected governments.
Greece was not forced to join the euro in the conditions, and at the time, that it did. This was a free choice of the Greek government. Now, governments everywhere would sometimes like to repudiate some decisions of their predecessors, but if that luxury is to be afforded it would destroy the basis for credit and inter-state relations.

He makes a more substantial point when he says a good deal of the money, lent to Greece by taxpayers of other EU countries and the International Monetary Fund, has gone to help them pay debts they owe to private creditors. But he fails to point out that, unlike those of Ireland and Portugal, Greece’s private creditors have been obliged to take a haircut.

It is true the money from the EU has been used in part to repay banks money they put into Greek government bonds. Some of these banks were indeed French and German. But some were from outside the euro zone altogether, including from Prof Stiglitz’s own country and from the UK, in one of whose newspapers he is writing.

Back in the 2010/2012 period, thanks the crisis which started after Lehman Brothers went south, there was a legitimate public interest, a public good, in preventing a run on any of these banks.

There remains a justifiable argument, however, that it was unfair the taxpayers of a few countries should now be bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of this public good, which the whole world has enjoyed. Yes, the taxpayers of the rest of the euro zone should, in moral terms, bear more of the burden. But if that is so, so also should the taxpayers of non-euro zone countries like the US and the UK, whose banks were also saved when Ireland, Greece and Portugal got help .

Why should German taxpayers, whose personal incomes have grown more slowly than elsewhere in Europe, and who face substantial extra costs in the near future due to ageing, be the focus of all the wrath?
 

Safe distance

But then neither Prof Krugman nor Prof Stiglitz are writing for German, Slovak or Latvian public opinion. They are writing in journals published in countries whose governments are not being asked to write more and more cheques for a Greek government that seems to blame everyone else for home-grown problems.
 
There is, I believe, an argument for a comprehensive debt conference to consider whether the burdens of dealing with the aftermath of the Lehman collapse have been fairly distributed between the governments of the world.

But the convening of any such conference, and eligibility for any help from it, should be something that might happen five years from now. It should be conditional on growth-promoting reforms and budget-balancing, already having been fully implemented by governments seeking debt relief from it.
Perhaps a third party might put such a proposal forward, as a way of getting out of the terrible situation Greece is bringing upon itself.

 

John Bruton is a former taoiseach

 

 

Edited July 4, 2015 by Prospero

[vememah]

Onako napamet: grcka akademska zajednica je toliko brojna da je sasvim sigurno takvih radova bilo. 

 

Tim pre što ih je 246 potpisalo to pismo. Ima ovde ceo spisak, pa ko hoće može da pretražuje baze naučnih radova.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/198826/article/ekathimerini/news/declaration-of-professors-of-economics-at-greek-universities-on-the-referendum

Edited July 4, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Grčka ostala bez PayPala, iTunesa i App Storea

Grčka se nalazi u ozbiljnoj financijskoj krizi iz koje je, čini se, neće izvući niti šaljiva Indiegogo kampanja o kojoj smo pisali prije nekoliko dana. Kako se kriza produbljuje a rješenja nema na vidiku, tako sve više stanovnika te južnoeuropske zemlje sve više osjeti njezine posljedice. Najnoviji problem koji su Grci primijetili jest činjenica da im je zabranjeno putem Interneta kupovati aplikacije, glazbu ili bilo što drugo od kompanija iz inozemstva.

 

Posljedica je to mjera koje je uvela grčka vlada, a prema kojima se protok novca strogo kontrolira, te se zabranjuje njegovo iznošenje izvan zemlje. Tako Grci odnedavno više ne mogu na App Storeu kupiti aplikacije, kao niti pjesme na iTunes servisu. PayPal je također privremeno obustavio svoje usluge korisnicima iz ove zemlje, te poručio da pomno prate situaciju s kontrolom kapitala koju je uvela tamošnja vlast.

 

Grcima, do nekih boljih vremena, ostaje tek da se oko svega požale na društvenim mrežama i nadaju se brzom razrješenju krize.

 

http://www.bug.hr/vijesti/grcka-ostala-bez-paypala-itunesa-app-storea/144491.aspx

 

Ono što je zanimljivo jeste da se prekidaju i transferi novca u suprotnom smeru. Bazler cajtung piše da su Western Union i Moneygram prekinuli slanje novca u Grčku jer nemaju keša da ga isplaćuju u toj zemlji.

http://bazonline.ch/wirtschaft/unternehmen-und-konjunktur/Western-Union-stoppt-Ueberweisungen-nach-Griechenland/story/29872664

 

[Indy]

Grci pobeđuju Nemce na kraju...

 

 

 

[čekmeže]

 

 

Ono što je zanimljivo jeste da se prekidaju i transferi novca u suprotnom smeru. Bazler cajtung piše da su Western Union i Moneygram prekinuli slanje novca u Grčku jer nemaju keša da ga isplaćuju u toj zemlji.

http://bazonline.ch/wirtschaft/unternehmen-und-konjunktur/Western-Union-stoppt-Ueberweisungen-nach-Griechenland/story/29872664

 

Vezano za poslovanje grčkih banaka u Srbiji, Pireus je prestao da koristi račun kod grčke banke za devizne transakcije, dakle trebalo bi da funkcioniše ok. Verovatno su i drugi isto uradili mada nisam čuo.

[vememah]

Počelo glasanje, 5 velikih stanica trenutno ima izborni program (Mega, Ant1, Skai, Alfa i naravno ERT1/HD), uveče će ga imati još više njih. Slike u spojleru.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ovi kamermani/fotoreporteri kod svih su na protopurgosovom (Ciprasovom) izbornom mestu, čekaju ga.

 

EDIT: Dočekaše ga, odmah nakon glasanja je dao i izjavu koju su mediji pustili live, tišina izgleda u Grčkoj nema veze.

 

 

Nazivi večerašnjih izbornih programa po televizijama:

 

Mega: Greece Zero Hour

Ant1: Referendum 2015 - Time to Take Responsibility

Star: Yes or No? Time to Decide

Skai: The Time of the Great Responsibility

Alpha: Greece Decides

m.tv: Referendum 2015

ERT: Referendum 2015

Edited July 5, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Cipras vodi Grčku glavom u zid, rekla Merkelova najbližim saradnicima u CDU prošlog ponedeljka.

 

Međutim, koliko je Merkelova razočarana u Ciprasa i njegovu vladu, saznao je samo ovaj mali krug članova Predsedništva u Kući Konrada Adenauera (sedište CDU): od svojih partijskih kolega Merkelova nije krila koliko ju je Cipras iznervirao. Ona zna da izlazak Grka iz Evrozone nije samo gorak lom za Evropu, već i za njen kancelarski mandat. Merkelova je najpre u internom krugu pričala isto što i dva sata kasnije pri ceremoniji pred celokupnom javnošću. Govorila je o solidarnosti i solidnosti, koje moraju ići zajedno. Za grčki narod vrata Evrope naravno ostaju otvorena, rekla je Merkelova.

Za Ciprasa i njegovu Siriza-vladu to očigledno više ne važi. "Sa ovom vladom Grčka očigledno ne želi da se pridržava osnova Evrope", kaže Merkelova. "Ona krši osnove saradnje." Zatim je direktno napala grčkog premijera, na jedan kratki trenutak na površinu je izbila frustracija koju nosi u sebi. Ciprasova politika je "tvrda i ideološka", rekla je nemačka kancelarka i dodala da on svoju zemlju "potpuno svesno vodi glavom u zid". Citate je Špigelu potvrdilo više učesnika.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-ueber-tsipras-sehenden-auges-gegen-die-wand-a-1042033.html

 

Edited July 5, 2015 by vememah

[Muwan]

Dobar joj je svaki pučista istočno i južno ali joj ne valja neko ko radi ono za šta je dobio mandat od svojih birača. Najbolji su Evropljani kada krenu da šalju te čuvene poruke drugim narodima: "Volimo mi vas, al' za početak da počnete da glasate drugačije." Ako Syriza ponovo pobedi na izborima pitanje je momenta kada će grčki narod dobiti širom otvorene dveri Evrope ali mora prvo jedan mali puč...