Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Prospero]

Tsipras’s wild promises have worsened the Greek crisis

Hugo Dixon

 

The Greek prime minister’s false assurances have left voters adrift on the eve of a confused – and possible less than legal – referendum

 

Alexis Tsipras talks so much about democracy that one might think the Greek prime minister is a paragon of virtue when it comes to dealing with the voters. This is not the case. For a start, Tsipras has made a series of wild promises that he cannot deliver. Before January’s election, he pledged that he would tear up the country’s bailout programme while staying in the euro. The two are almost certainly incompatible goals, as the Greek people are now discovering at huge cost.

 

In advance of Sunday’s referendum, he has given further assurances. One is that savers’ bank deposits are safe. He also said he will have a deal with Greece’s creditors within 48 hours of the plebiscite, if they vote no to the bailout plan. In fact, deposits are at risk and the chance of a deal in two days is virtually nil. A good democrat only promises what he or she can deliver. Tsipras is a demagogue.

 

Now look at Sunday’s referendum. The people have been given eight days to take a decision that will have repercussions for a generation. What’s more, the question is convoluted. The people are officially being asked whether to accept or reject an offer made by Greece’s creditors on 25 June.

 

They are then referred to two complex documents, which have been translated into Greek from English. One of these was mistranslated to say that the country’s debt was unsustainable under all three scenarios considered, whereas it actually said it was unsustainable under only one of the three. The ballot paper also puts “No”, Tsipras’s favoured option, above “Yes”.

It is doubtful whether the referendum is legal. In Greece, plebiscites are not supposed to be held on fiscal matters. The country’s top administrative court was due to rule on Friday whether the vote was constitutional.

Even worse, it’s not at all clear what the two options mean. Yes cannot mean accepting the 25 June offer because it is no longer on the table. In practice, those who vote yes will think they are voting for Europe. And what does no mean? Tsipras says it means giving him stronger negotiating power with the creditors. In fact, it is likely to mean that Greece quits the euro – something he denies.

The Council of Europe, Europe’s top human rights institution, told Associated Press this week that the referendum fell short of international standards. Its secretary general, Thorbjørn Jagland, said international standards recommend that a referendum is held with at least two weeks’ notice to allow sufficient time for discussion, with a clear question put to the people and with international observers monitoring the vote.

If, despite all this, Tsipras loses the referendum and resigns, there will undoubtedly be a narrative presented that Europe undermined a democratic government because it didn’t like the fact that it was so leftwing. The real explanation will be that Tsipras undermined himself with his undeliverable promises, confrontational approach towards creditors, inexperience and inability to read the situation properly.

 

 

 

Nisam znao ovo za prevod, ako je tako onda - ugh 

[vememah]

Pisao je Bloomberg, Grci odbili da komentarišu.

 

Greek voters faced with whether to approve or reject two documents from creditors, in a referendum to be held on July 5, face an additional challenge: the translation from English.

 

One of the documents, titled “preliminary debt sustainability analysis for Greece,” lays out the views on the subject by European institutions and the International Monetary Fund. They’ve been involved in five months of talks with the Greek government.

 

There are three scenarios, and the document’s conclusion is that under the first two there are “no sustainability issues” when the country’s financing needs are taken into account. The official translation provided by the Foreign Ministry and sent to reporters on Monday, though, was missing the word “no.” So the Greek text reads that there is a sustainability issue.

In addition, Greek parliament minutes show that a separate draft translation provided to lawmakers before they were asked to approve the referendum also dropped this crucial “no.” Spokespersons from the interior and foreign ministries declined to comment on the error.

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-01/it-s-not-all-greek-to-voters-as-key-debt-document-mistranslated

 

Generalno, pored tog prevoda, skandalozni su i listić i sajt.

 

Ljudi su se vrlo kvalitetno sprdali sa listićem:

Edited July 3, 2015 by vememah

[MancMellow]

oko sustainability-ja sam kačio ja gore direktno iz izveštaja IMF-a

[Prospero]

Hmmm

 

 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9963b74c-219c-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#ixzz3erZhs6Xr
July 3, 2015 8:10 pm
Greek banks prepare plan to raid deposits to avert collapse
Kerin Hope in Athens

 

 

 

Greek banks are preparing contingency plans for a possible “bail-in” of depositors amid fears the country is heading for financial collapse, bankers and businesspeople with knowledge of the measures said on Friday.

 

The plans, which call for a “haircut” of at least 30 per cent on deposits above €8,000, sketch out an increasingly likely scenario for at least one bank, the sources said.

 

A Greek bail-in could resemble the rescue plan agreed by Cyprus in 2013, when customers’ funds were seized to shore up the banks, with a haircut imposed on uninsured deposits over €100,000.

It would be implemented as part of a recapitalisation of Greek banks that would be agreed with the country’s creditors — the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank.

“It [the haircut] would take place in the context of an overall restructuring of the bank sector once Greece is back in a bailout programme,” said one person following the issue. “This is not something that is going to happen immediately.”

Eurozone officials said no decision had been taken to wind up any Greek banks or initiate a bail-in of depositors, a process that would be started by the ECB declaring the banks insolvent or pulling emergency loans.

Greece’s banks have been closed since Monday, when capital controls were imposed to prevent a bank run following the leftwing Syriza-led government’s call for a referendum on a bailout plan it had earlier rejected. Greece’s highest court rejected an appeal by two citizens on Friday who had asked for the referendum to be declared unconstitutional.

Depositors can withdraw only €60 a day from bank ATM cash machines, while requests to transfer funds abroad have to be approved by a special finance ministry committee in co-operation with the Greek central bank.

Two senior Athens bankers said the country had only enough cash to keep ATMs supplied until the middle of next week. This followed the ECB’s decision this week not to increase Greece’s allocation of emergency liquidity assistance after the bailout programme ended on June 30.

The outcome of Sunday’s referendum will determine how quickly Greece wraps up a new bailout agreement with creditors, a top Greek banker said.
 

“The solvency of Greek banks is not currently an issue, but obviously the banks will be affected by how soon the country enters a new programme,” the same banker said.

Greek deposits are guaranteed up to €100,000, in line with EU banking directives, but the country’s deposit insurance fund amounts to only €3bn, which would not be enough to cover demand in case of a bank collapse.

With few deposits over €100,000 left in the banks after six months of capital flight, “it makes sense for the banks to consider imposing a haircut on small depositors as part of a recapitalisation. . . It could even be flagged as a one-off tax,” said one analyst.

 

[vememah]

E da, ispostavilo se da Grci stvarno nemaju čime da sami štampaju drahme, ako je verovati Varufakisu:
 

With speculation swirling that Greece might be forced out of the euro and have to print its own money after a weekend referendum, its finance minister on Thursday said the country no longer had the presses to make drachmas.

“We don’t have the capacity,” Yanis Varoufakis told Australian public radio network ABC.

In 2000, the year before Greece joined the eurozone, “one of the things we had to do was get rid of all our printing presses” as part of the bloc’s assertion that “this monetary union is irreversible,” he said.

“We smashed the printing presses — we have no printing presses,” Varoufakis said.

http://www.rawstory.com/2015/07/we-cant-print-drachmas-says-greeces-finance-minister/

Peta anketa danas, opet tesna prednost za NAI. I ovde se potvrđuje da više Grka misli da će NAI pobediti.

 

An Ipsos poll just released shows the referendum on a knife-edge. It has ‘Yes’ on 44% and ‘No’ one point behind on 43%, with 12% still undecided.

The number of undecided respondents underscores the significant potential for volatility, Ipsos said, describing the referendum as “too close to call”.

The poll is the fifth to be released on Friday, with the fourth also giving a narrow lead to the ‘Yes’ camp.

It also shows that, regardless of where they place their own support, more Greeks believe that the ‘Yes’ side will win than think victory will be handed to the ‘No’ camp.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jul/03/greek-debt-crisis-council-of-state-to-rule-on-referendum-live#block-5596ea72e4b032a39a3ba5bb

 

 

Edited July 3, 2015 by vememah

[Prospero]

Eto šanse za ZIN.

[vememah]

Neki ipak tvrde da Varufakis laže:

[stajebrebilo]

Eto šanse za ZIN.

 

Ove sekunde to htedoh da iskucam 

valjda su kalupe sacuvali

[Prospero]

<^ Šta je "printing facility"? Ne može to da štampa neka "obična" štamparija.

[Sestre Bronte]

<^ Šta je "printing facility"? Ne može to da štampa neka "obična" štamparija.

 

ne nego to rade u spejs šatlu pa odozgo šalju banknote

[vememah]

A ko zna, ako stvarno nemaju štampariju za novčanice, a ne budu imali para da plate strendžere možda će te prve drahme više ličiti na bonove (pitanje je ko će se realno cimati da falsifikuje nešto tako niske vrednosti), setimo se na šta su ličile ratne novčanice devedesetih.

 

EDIT:

Na sajtu BoG stoji da štampaju evre, tako da Varufakis laže. Njega stvarno više ne treba uzimati ozbiljno, čovek se samo bavi propagandom.

http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Bank/Organization/buildings/IETA.aspx

Edited July 3, 2015 by vememah

[Prospero]

Rogof:

 

 

Why the Greek Bailout Failed

 

 

CAMBRIDGE – As the Greek crisis evolves, it is important to understand that a successful structural-adjustment program requires strong country ownership. Even if negotiators overcome the most recent sticking points, it will be difficult to trust in their implementation if the Greek people remain unconvinced. That has certainly been the experience so far. And without structural reform, there is little chance that the Greek economy will see sustained stability and growth – not least because official lenders are unwilling to continue extending an unreformed Greece significantly more money than it is asked to pay. (This has been the case through most of the crisis, even if one would never know it from the world press coverage.)

Greece’s membership in the European Union gives its creditors significant leverage, but evidently not enough to change the fundamental calculus. Greece remains very much a sovereign country, not a sub-sovereign state. The “troika” of creditors – the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission – simply do not enjoy the kind of leverage over Greece that, say, the Municipal Assistance Corporation wielded over New York City when it teetered on the edge of bankruptcy in the mid-1970s.

The best structural-adjustment programs are those in which the debtor country’s government proposes the policy changes, and the IMF helps design a bespoke program and provides the political cover for its implementation. Imposing them from the outside is simply not an effective option. So, for reforms to take hold, the Greek government and its electorate must believe in them.

That a country must take ownership of its reform program is not a new lesson. The IMF’s rocky relationship with Ukraine began long before the latest round of negotiations. Back in 2013, IMF staff wrote a sobering report on the organization’s experience in the country. Their conclusion, in essence, was that the government’s failure to embrace the reform process fully all but guaranteed that its program would not work.

If a government is incapable of or uninterested in making the needed adjustments, the report argued, the best option is to drip money out as reforms are implemented, as is now being done in Greece. Unfortunately, that approach has not proved adequate to overcome the challenges there. Structural-reform conditions often tilt the balance between competing domestic factions, for better or for worse. If there is no will inside the country to maintain the reforms, they will quickly be undermined.

Left-wing ideologues have long viewed structural-reform programs with deep suspicion, accusing international lenders like the IMF and the World Bank of being captured by neoliberal market fundamentalists. This critique has some truth in it, but is overblown.

To be sure, structural reforms often favor policies like labor-market flexibility. But one should not make the mistake of viewing these interventions in black-and-white terms. Breaking down dual labor markets that are excluding young workers (as they do in much of southern Europe, including Italy and, to some extent, France) is very different from making it easier to fire all workers. Making pension systems sustainable does not amount to making them stingier. Making tax systems simpler and fairer is not the same as raising all taxes.

Recently, opponents of structural reform have put forward more exotic objections – most notably the problem caused by deflation when policy interest rates are at zero. If structural reforms simply lower all wages and prices, it may indeed be difficult in the short-term to counter the drop in aggregate demand. But a similar critique could be made of any other change in policy: if it is poorly designed, it will be counter-productive. The truth is that the way forward in Europe requires achieving greater productivity.

The lessons from Greece and other unsuccessful bailout programs are sobering. If a debt bailout program requires a wholesale change in a country’s economic, social, and political model, the best course of action might be to write off the private losses, rather than pour in public money to cover them. In cases like Greece, the creditors’ passion for structural reforms might be better directed at home – particularly toward improving financial regulation.

The vast majority of Greeks want to stay in the EU. In an ideal world, offering financial aid in exchange for reforms might help those in the country who want to shape it into a modern European state. But given the difficulty Greece has had so far in making the necessary changes to reach that goal, it might be time to reconsider this approach to the crisis completely. In place of a program providing the country with further loans, it might make more sense to provide outright humanitarian aid – regardless of whether Greece remains fully within the eurozone. :(


Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-the-greek-bailout-failed-by-kenneth-rogoff-2015-07#24RCJ0wXtUDMJPiO.99

 

[Sestre Bronte]

ljudi aman, novčanice se štampaju bez nekih većih problema

[stajebrebilo]

možda će te prve drahme više ličiti na bonove 

 

 

 

mozda će ličiti na vaučere ?

[vememah]

Da, WTFuckis definitivno masno laže, ispravio sam gore.

Edited July 3, 2015 by vememah