Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[vememah]

Pol Mejson sa nekim insajderskim informacijama:

 

Greece: did the just Euro die at 4pm?

 

We’re staying in Europe! says the headline of the Greek liberal paper Kathimerini today.

 

While the far left government will pose the referendum as a vote for or against austerity, the right will say it’s an in-out vote for the single currency and the EU itself.

 

The problem is, at around 4pm on Saturday Europe changed. Faced with a proposal from the Greeks to extend the existing bailout until after 7 July, the Eurogroup refused.

 

At this point chairman Jeroen Dijsselbloem announced there would be “a meeting of the 18” — that is the Eurogroup without Greece. Asked how such a meeting could issue a communique he replied, according to a Greek witness “we can do what we like since we are an ad hoc body”.

 

The Brussels press corps dutifully reported that the Greeks had “walked out”. But if the Greek account is right, what happened at that moment was the psychological breakpoint of the Euro.

 

The political willpower had already ebbed. The Greeks haggled over the fiscal details all week but were minded to sign an €8bn austerity package if it could be sold as (a) redistributional and (b) accompanied by a promise to discuss restructuring the debt.

 

What changed? By Thursday morning it was the lenders’ document that was the basis of discussions with the Greeks allowed to propose amendments. But when the elected ministers of the Eurogroup saw what the EC, IMF and ECB had proposed they rowed back.

 

“We can’t get this through our own parliaments” they said: it’s too soft.

 

Since Alexis Tsipras would have struggled to get any compromise through the Greek parliament, what triggered the breakdown is — in fact — democracy.

 

So bleak has Europe become, so lacking in solidarity, that an agreement worked on for weeks, embodying further austerity for the Greeks and further financial solidarity by the rest, could not pass through either side.

 

It was this that led to what Greeks call the “rupture”. The currency arrangements of Europe no longer fit the democratic wishes of its people.

 

And it is not the only breakdown of solidarity. The Schengen agreement on free movement is breaking down as the European powers refuse to absorb the refugees arriving in Greece and Spain.

 

So what next? The Greek strategy is to attempt to go on negotiating with its lenders, through back channels, in order to resume negotiations with a strengthened hand next Monday. Whatever they say in public, the institutions, too, will try to prepare a compromise — either for Tsipras to sign or for the next prime minister if he falls.

 

Today’s ECB meeting is critical. There are already calls from the group of countries around Germany to cut off aid to the Greek banks today, triggering the collapse of its banking system. If that happens it will be the second phase of psychological breakdown of the Euro — in which the institution charged with maintaining financial stability and bank solvency actually creates the opposite.

 

It will represent the effective capture of the ECB by elected politicians, and will puncture the illusion that it is an “independent” central bank governing a unified currency.

 

Either way, Greeks are in for a week of financial pain and chaos. But anybody who thinks they can predict the outcome is wrong.

 

The normal receptors for information do not work in Greece. The press and TV are owned by billionaires. Not unusual, but in Greeece there’s no regulation, so the incessant talk channels — which pay no tax, and no licence fees for the airwaves — will simply churn out a bleach-blond version of what their bosses want to hear.

 

Most Greeks, including all those inclined to vote No in the referendum, have mentally switched off from the mainstream media.

 

Instead this will be a battle of rumour, emotion, mass rallies and iconic speeches.

 

By posing the question: do you accept the deal offered by the creditors, Alexis Tsipras tosses a handgrenade into the right and centre right. The old coalition government fell because it could not accept a much tougher deal.

 

Many of the technocrats and young professionals who have thronged to the pro-Euro rallies, which will now become the Yes camp, are sickened to be surrounded by cashmere wearing oligarchs — the very people the young centrists think ripped the country off and built the debt mountain.

 

If the week starts with chaos, and gets more chaotic as the ECB grinds the banks to pulp, the outcome will depend on who Greeks blame. That in turn will depend on the deeply memetic conversations taking place in the kafeneions, vineyards, hotel staff canteens.

But both sides will, effectively, be voting for options that don’t exist.

 

Tsipras told his voters Syriza could negotiate an end to austerity and debt relief within the Euro. He and Varoufakis believed this: because the Italian PM Matteo Renzi had told them it was possible; and Hollande, and also the US State Department. The hard left of his own party were existentially anti-Euro, and pro Moscow, and he was determined to prove them wrong. So it’s been a hard swallow for Tsipras to make this break.

 

But his new position: vote No and strenghten our hand in pursuit of an austerity-lite deal within the Euro, may no longer be based on possibility.

 

If the ECB is just a cypher for what 18 parliaments will pass, and the Commission powerless, and if north European public opinion hardens against Greece, then the best a No vote might produce is an offer from Brussels and Berlin to fund a “velvet exit” — i.e. a controlled and subsidised return to a national currency.

 

If not it will depend on the size and composition of the vote.

 

No less delusional is the position of the Greek right. When they say “We want Europe” what they mean is: we want Europe to go on ignoring corruption, tax evasion and oligarchy on a grand scale, and to go on crashing our economy at the expense of the poor. We want, in effect, says the Yes campaign, the Europe that caused the problem.

 

Though they’ll join the Yes movement, many Western-educated professionals and business people will do so warily because of this.

 

And it will get fractious. Last week, when anarchists disrupted the pro-Euro demo, burning the EU’s flag, there was a standoff between them and a largely nouveau riche crowd. The left chanted “EAM, ELAS, Meligalas”.

 

EAM was the mass resistance movement in World War Two. ELAS was its military wing, led by communists, which beat the Nazis. Meligalas was a village where in 1944 the partisans defeated a battalion of Nazi collaborators, executed some, and failed to prevent others from being lynched by local villagers.

 

https://medium.com/@paulmasonnews/greece-did-the-just-euro-die-at-4pm-e4ac4fdc37ca

 

Francuski premijer Vals kaže da ECB ne treba da zavrće slavinu:

 

Piter Spigel misli da će ELA pomoć biti ukinuta tek 20. jula nakon defaulta i na obveznice koje drži ECB, tj. da je to rok do kojeg posle referenduma treba da dođe do dogovora, a da će sada biti ograničena.

Edited June 28, 2015 by vememah

[Muwan]

Jbt, gorak utisak svega je da je balkanskoj politici očigledno imanentno kockanje kao metod. Pa ako ispušimo, ispušili smo.

 

... i to epski, da se pamti i pominje.

 

Bez obzira na taj momenat meni je ipak malo nategnuta ta teza o grčkom "samoubistvu". Syriza je na izborima dobila prilično jasan mandat koji glasi "i Kosovo i Evropa" (opet se vraćam na tu paralelu jer mislim da je odlična). Elektorat je jasno rekao da neće austerity i u isto vreme hoće evrozonu. ND/PASOK su pokazali da hoće evrozonu ali će prihvatiti svaki austerity (pri čemu su oni zakuvali sve ovo) i elektorat ih je poslao u majčinu. Syriza je ponudila jednostavan plan: nećemo austerity i idemo da sa poveriocima ispregovaramo neki drugi način ostanka u evrozoni. Plan zvuči savršeno i nije čudo da je dobio 50% podrške na izborima ali u sebi nosi jednu malu i sudbonosnu falinku: naime, plan uopšte nije predvideo mogućnost da poverioci neće biti zainteresovani za bilo kakve pregovore, da će Grčkoj nuditi isključivo "uzmi ili ostavi" pakete, ponižavati Syrizu sa 100% tracked changes u Word dokumentima koje im ovi dostave na razmatranje, i od samog početka biti spremni da pritisnu crveno dugme ako Cipras ne legne na rudu kao pajtosi iz ND/PASOK.

 

Meni se čini da Syriza uopšte nije očekivala tako tvrd doček za svoj romantični projekat "i Kosovo i Evropa" (zamisli čuda, Evropa se ne slaže sa tim :o) i sad nemaju kud nego da ponovo pitaju elektorat šta da rade. Evrope nema bez odricanja od penzija, a penzija nema bez odricanja od Evope što znači da ih nema i ovako i onako (tačno kao sa Kosovom). Elektorat bi logično i penzije i Evropu ali sada se ispostavlja da je ta opcija u isključivoj nadležnosti Evrope koju malkice zabole za muzičke želje grčkog elektorata.

 

Sad imamo solidne šanse da elektorat na referendumu kaže da hoće austerity. Ali kada ih taj austerity bude zveknuo, na prvim izborima će opet dati mandat nekom ko će reći da ne može austerity nego mora nešto drugo da se smisli. Tamo jednostavno neko mora da objasni ljudima da je to sve neviđeno gubljenje vremena na gluposti i da je došlo apsolutno poslednje vreme da se zatraži krivična i materijalna odgovornost ekipe koja je među sobom raspodelila 300 milijardi, da se uvede neki red u zemlji tako da posle nekoliko godina zlopaćenja (koje im ne gine kako god da okreneš) stvari postanu suštinski drugačije i nikada se više ne ponovi ovakva situacija.

 

Meni se, na žalost, čini da ćemo umesto ovoga gledati periodične grčke bankrote jer suštinu tamo niko neće pipnuti. Samo će se iz godine u godinu uzalud preganjati sa formom i šminkerajem.

[Prospero]

^^^ Dobar tekst sa Huffingtona.

[Kreator]

... i to epski, da se pamti i pominje.

 

Bez obzira na taj momenat meni je ipak malo nategnuta ta teza o grčkom "samoubistvu". Syriza je na izborima dobila prilično jasan mandat koji glasi "i Kosovo i Evropa" (opet se vraćam na tu paralelu jer mislim da je odlična). Elektorat je jasno rekao da neće austerity i u isto vreme hoće evrozonu. ND/PASOK su pokazali da hoće evrozonu ali će prihvatiti svaki austerity (pri čemu su oni zakuvali sve ovo) i elektorat ih je poslao u majčinu. Syriza je ponudila jednostavan plan: nećemo austerity i idemo da sa poveriocima ispregovaramo neki drugi način ostanka u evrozoni. Plan zvuči savršeno i nije čudo da je dobio 50% podrške na izborima ali u sebi nosi jednu malu i sudbonosnu falinku: naime, plan uopšte nije predvideo mogućnost da poverioci neće biti zainteresovani za bilo kakve pregovore, da će Grčkoj nuditi isključivo "uzmi ili ostavi" pakete, ponižavati Syrizu sa 100% tracked changes u Word dokumentima koje im ovi dostave na razmatranje, i od samog početka biti spremni da pritisnu crveno dugme ako Cipras ne legne na rudu kao pajtosi iz ND/PASOK.

 

Meni se čini da Syriza uopšte nije očekivala tako tvrd doček za svoj romantični projekat "i Kosovo i Evropa" (zamisli čuda, Evropa se ne slaže sa tim :o) i sad nemaju kud nego da ponovo pitaju elektorat šta da rade. Evrope nema bez odricanja od penzija, a penzija nema bez odricanja od Evope što znači da ih nema i ovako i onako (tačno kao sa Kosovom). Elektorat bi logično i penzije i Evropu ali sada se ispostavlja da je ta opcija u isključivoj nadležnosti Evrope koju malkice zabole za muzičke želje grčkog elektorata.

 

Sad imamo solidne šanse da elektorat na referendumu kaže da hoće austerity. Ali kada ih taj austerity bude zveknuo, na prvim izborima će opet dati mandat nekom ko će reći da ne može austerity nego mora nešto drugo da se smisli. Tamo jednostavno neko mora da objasni ljudima da je to sve neviđeno gubljenje vremena na gluposti i da je došlo apsolutno poslednje vreme da se zatraži krivična i materijalna odgovornost ekipe koja je među sobom raspodelila 300 milijardi, da se uvede neki red u zemlji tako da posle nekoliko godina zlopaćenja (koje im ne gine kako god da okreneš) stvari postanu suštinski drugačije i nikada se više ne ponovi ovakva situacija.

 

Meni se, na žalost, čini da ćemo umesto ovoga gledati periodične grčke bankrote jer suštinu tamo niko neće pipnuti. Samo će se iz godine u godinu uzalud preganjati sa formom i šminkerajem.

 

 odlican post.

[MancMellow]

https://twitter.com/julianaapostate/status/615081037861900288

 

to je zvuli ludacki samo zato sto niko ne pretpostavlja da Varufakis zapravo hoce Yes vote

[Budja]

to je zvuli ludacki samo zato sto niko ne pretpostavlja da Varufakis zapravo hoce Yes vote

 

Sto bi zapravo znacilo da je Siriza=ND=Aleksandar Vucic-Nedic i politicko samoubistvo nakon dizanja dreke. Ne izgleda mi vrlo verovatno.

 

Kao, hocemo YES vote, ali cemo kampanjom i patriotskim govorima da vodimo kampanju za OXI. Ne znam kako to moze da se izvede.

[San Epifanio]

Ako se Siriza zalaze za NE, a na referendumu prodje suprotna opcija, ne znaci li to da ni Siriza vise nema legitimitet da vodi Vladu i ne vodi li to novim izborima

[MancMellow]

Sto bi zapravo znacilo da je Siriza=ND=Aleksandar Vucic-Nedic i politicko samoubistvo nakon dizanja dreke. Ne izgleda mi vrlo verovatno.

 

Kao, hocemo YES vote, ali cemo kampanjom i patriotskim govorima da vodimo kampanju za OXI. Ne znam kako to moze da se izvede.

 

Mislim da Syriza nije jedinstvena u ovom pitanju. 

 

Drugo - da li je posle proglasnja referenduma zamislivo da sam Cipras predvodi "Yes" kampanju? 

 

Nesumnjivo, u slucaju da narod glasa "YES" (sto mislim da hoce), politicki kapital vlade ce biti znatno ostecen. Ali s druge strane da su prihvatili ovaj sporazum vlada bi najverovatnije pala, jer bi 30% Syrizinih poslanika + ANEL glasalo protiv. 

[Tribun_Populi]

Znači taktika De Golovskog legitimisanja političkih odluka by popular vote, da bi se sačuvala sopstvena koža? A da nije malo kasno, ono, moglo je to i pre dve nedelje, u principu se nije promenilo ništa u pozicijama od tada. Biće da ipak ima malo kockanja/podizanja uloga i balkanskog političkog amaterizma kako bi se nešto izboksovalo, rekao bih, pa tek onda sve ostalo.

[MancMellow]

 Syriza je na izborima dobila prilično jasan mandat koji glasi "i Kosovo i Evropa" 

 

Da, ali Syriza ne pokusava to da dobije, nego i austerity i Evropa. Medjutim, the devil is in the detail, ima osteritija i osteritija. I ono sto je predlozila sama Syriza jeste austerity, nista manji od dosadanjeg. Sustinski, u tom smsilu, ovo vise i nije ideoloska bitka, niti ekonomska, cista medjunarodna politika . Syrizini su zahtevi znatno razumniji od srpskih, a karte, iako i dalje relativno slabe, daleko jace od onih koje drzi Srbija. Imho, oni moraju da nadju putem backchannel komunikacija nacina da sa nekim potpisu "primirje", posto su "bitke" koje vode IMF i zemlje okupljene oko Nemacke su razlicite. Sojble je degenerik, a nemacko javno mnjenje izgleda zaista zeli GR izvan EZ. Dakle ta strana otpada. Po izjavama i ponasanju Junkera, Sapina, pa donekle i Lagarde izgleda da tu jos uvek ima prostora za nekakav dogovor. Videcemo danas da li je to slucaj i sa Dragijem. I tu bih stao sa daljim razmatranjima posto ono sto bih dalje napisao mozda i ne bi bilo narocito "moralno" :P

Edited June 28, 2015 by MancMellow

[MancMellow]

Znači taktika De Golovskog legitimisanja političkih odluka by popular vote, da bi se sačuvala sopstvena koža? A da nije malo kasno, ono, moglo je to i pre dve nedelje, u principu se nije promenilo ništa u pozicijama od tada. Biće da ipak ima malo kockanja/podizanja uloga i balkanskog političkog amaterizma kako bi se nešto izboksovalo, rekao bih, pa tek onda sve ostalo.

 

Pa pre dve nedelje nisu znali da ce, na primer, konacan predlog sadrzati 23% za ugostiteljstvo i prehrambene industrijske proizvode

[gone fishing]

....

 

. Tamo jednostavno neko mora da objasni ljudima da je to sve neviđeno gubljenje vremena na gluposti i da je došlo apsolutno poslednje vreme da se zatraži krivična i materijalna odgovornost ekipe koja je među sobom raspodelila 300 milijardi

 

- koja je to ekipa razgrabila toliki novac?

- kao da grci nisu 30 godina živeli daleko iznad svog realno održivog standarda koji je omogućila država deljenjem duplo većih plata u javnom sektoru i penzija nego što je bilo realna mogućnost njihovog budžeta...

- to je omogućilo pristojan život i grka pa čak i onih koji su radili za privatnike, 400€ plata nije nešto posebno ali su barem mogli da nađu posao

 

- evo da naša vlada duplira plate i penzije sutra i da to neko dovoljno velikodušan u eu aminuje i iskešira, koliki bum bi doživela naša privreda, imho nezaposlenost bi se prepolovila u roku od 2 god. max

[vememah]

Varufakis objavio svoj govor od juče i potvrdio Mejsonovo pisanje da su ga izbacili sa drugog dela sastanka.

 

As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting

 

Posted on June 28, 2015

by yanisv

 

The Eurogroup Meeting of 27th June 2015 will not go down as a proud moment in Europe’s history. Ministers turned down the Greek government’s request that the Greek people should be granted a single week during which to deliver a Yes or No answer to the institutions’ proposals – proposals crucial for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. The very idea that a government would consult its people on a problematic proposal put to it by the institutions was treated with incomprehension and often with disdain bordering on contempt. I was even asked: “How do you expect common people to understand such complex issues?”. Indeed, democracy did not have a good day in yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting! But nor did European institutions. After our request was rejected, the Eurogroup President broke with the convention of unanimity (issuing a statement without my consent) and even took the dubious decision to convene a follow up meeting without the Greek minister, ostensibly to discuss the “next steps”. 

 

Can democracy and a monetary union coexist? Or must one give way? This is the pivotal question that the Eurogroup has decided to answer by placing democracy in the too-hard basket. So far, one hopes.

 

Intervention by Yanis Varoufakis, 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting

 

Colleagues,

In our last meeting (25th June) the institutions tabled their final offer to the Greek authorities, in response to our proposal for a Staff Level Agreement (SLA) as tabled on 22nd June (and signed by Prime Minister Tsipras). After long, careful examination, our government decided that, unfortunately, the institutions’ proposal could not be accepted. In view of how close we have come to the 30th June deadline, the date when the current loan agreement expires, this impasse of grave concern to us all and its causes must be thoroughly examined.

We rejected the institutions’ 25th June proposals because of a variety of powerful reasons. The first reason is the combination of austerity and social injustice they would impose upon a population devastated already by… austerity and social injustice. Even our own SLA proposal (22nd June) is austerian, in a bid to placate the institutions and thus come closer to an agreement. Only our SLA attempted to shift the burden of this renewed austerian onslaught to those more able to afford it – e.g. by concentrating on increasing employer contributions to pension funds rather than on reducing the lowest of pensions. Nonetheless, even our SLA contains many parts that Greek society rejects.

So, having pushed us hard to accept substantial new austerity, in the form of absurdly large primary surpluses (3.5% of GDP over the medium term, albeit somewhat lower than the unfathomable number agreed to by previous Greek governments – i.e. 4.5%), we ended up having to make recessionary trade-offs between, on the one hand, higher taxes/charges in an economy where those who pay their dues pay through the nose and, on the other, reductions in pensions/benefits in a society already devastated by massive cuts in basic income support for the multiplying needy.

Let me say colleagues what we had already conveyed to the institutions on 22nd June, as we were tabling our own proposals: Even this SLA, the one we were proposing, would be extremely onerous to pass through Parliament, given the level of recessionary measures and austerity it entailed. Unfortunately, the institutions’ response was to insist on even more recessionary (aka parametric) measures (e.g. increasing VAT on hotels from 6% to 23%!) and, worse still, on shifting the burden massively from business to the weakest members of society (e.g. to reduce the lowest of pensions, to remove support for farmers, to postpone ad infinitum legislation that offers some protection to badly exploited workers).

The institutions new proposals, as expressed in their 25th June SLA/Prior Actions document, would make a politically problematic package – from the perspective of our Parliament – into a package that would extremely difficult to push through our Parliamentary caucus. But this is not all. It gets worse much worse than that once we take a look at the proposed financing package.

What makes it impossible to pass the institutions’ proposal through Parliament is the lack of an answer to the question: Will these painful measures at least give us a period of tranquillity during which to carry out the agreed reforms and measures? Will a shock of optimism counter the recessionary effect of the extra fiscal consolidation that is being imposed on a country that has been in recession for 21 consecutive quarters? The answer is clear: No, the institutions’ proposal is offering no such prospect.

This is why: The proposed funding for the next 5 months (see below for a breakdown) is problematic in a variety of ways:

First, it makes no provision for the state’s arrears, caused by five months of making payments without disbursements and of falling tax revenues as a result of the constant threat of Grexit that has been wafting in the air, so to speak.

Secondly, the idea of cannibalising the HFSF in order to repay the ECB’s SMP-era bonds constitutes a clear and present danger: These monies were earmarked, correctly, for strengthening Greece’s fragile banks, possibly through an operation that deals with their mountainous NPLs that eat into their capitalisation. The answer I have been given by senior ECB officials, whose name will remain unsaid, is that, if need be, the HFSF will be replenished to cope with the banks’ capitalisation needs. And who will do the replenishing? The ESM, is the answer I was given. But, and this is a gigantic but, this is not part of the proposed deal and, moreover, it could not be part of the deal as the institutions have no mandate to commit the ESM in this manner – as I am sure Wolfgang will remind us all. And, moreover, if such a new arrangement could be made, why then is our sensible, moderate, proposal of a new ESM facility for Greece that helps shift SMP liability from the ECB to the ESM not discussed? The answer “we will not discuss it because we will not discuss it” will be very hard for me to convey to my Parliament, together with another package of austerity.

Thirdly, the proposed disbursements’ schedule is a minefield of reviews – one per month – that will ensure two things. First, that the Greek government will be immersed every day, every week in the review process for five long months. And well before these five months expire, we shall enter into another tedious negotiation over the next program – since there is nothing in the institutions’ proposal capable of inspiring even the faintest of hopes that at the end of this new extension Greece can stand on its own two feet.

Fourthly, given that it is abundantly clear that our debt will remain unsustainable by the end of the year, and that market access will remain as distant then as it is now, the IMF cannot be counted upon to disburse its share, the 3.5 billion that the institutions are counting as part of the funding package on the table.

These are solid reasons why our government does not consider it has a mandate to accept the institutions’ proposal or to use its majority in Parliament in order to push it through and onto the statutes.

At the same time, we do not have a mandate to turn down the institutions’ proposals either, cognizant of the critical moment in history we find ourselves in. Our party received 36% of the vote and the government as a whole commanded a little more than 40%. Fully aware of how weighty our decision is, we feel obliged to put the institutions’ proposal to the people of Greece. We shall endeavour to spell out to them fully what a Yes to the Institutions’ Proposal means, to do the same regarding a No vote, and then let them decide. For our part we shall accept the people’s verdict and will do whatever it takes to implement it – one way or another.

Some worry that a Yes vote would be a vote of no confidence in our government (as we shall be recommending a No vote), in which case we cannot promise to the Eurogroup that we shall be in a position to sign and implement the agreement with the institutions. This is not so. We are committed democrats. If the people gives us a clear instruction to sign up on the institutions’ proposals, we shall do whatever it takes to do so – even if it means a reconfigured government.

Colleagues, the referendum solution is optimal for all, given the constraints we face.

If our government were to accept the institutions’ offer today, promising to push it through Parliament tomorrow, we would be defeated in Parliament with the result of a new election being called within a very long month – then, the delay, the uncertainty and the prospects of a successful resolution would be much, much diminished
But even if we managed to pass the institutions’ proposal through Parliament, we would be facing a major problem of ownership and implementation. Put simply, just as in the past the governments that pushed through policies dictated by the institutions could not carry the people with them, we too would fail to do so.

On the question that will be put to the Greek people, much has been said about what it should be. Many of you tell us, advise us, instruct us even, that we should make it a Yes or No question on the euro. Let me be clear on this. First, the question was formulated by the Cabinet and has just been passed through Parliament – and it is “Do you accept the institutions’ proposal as it was presented to us on 25th June in the Eurogroup?” This is the only pertinent question. If we had accepted that proposal two days ago, we would have had a deal. The Greek government is now asking the electorate to answer the question you put it to me Jeroen – especially when you said, and I quote, “you can consider this, if you wish, a take or leave it proposal”. Well, this is how we took it and we are now honouring the institutions and the Greek people by asking the latter to deliver a clear answer on the institutions’ proposal.

To those who say that, effectively, this is a referendum on the euro, my answer is: You may very well say this but I shall not comment. This is your judgement, your opinion, your interpretation. Not ours! There is a logic to your view but only if there is an implicit threat that a No from the Greek people to the institutions’ proposal will be followed up by moves to eject Greece, illegally, out of the euro. Such a threat would not be consistent with basic principles of European democratic governance and European Law.

To those who instruct us to phrase the referendum question as a euro-drachma dilemma, my answer is crystal clear: European Treaties make provisions for an exit from the EU. They do not make any provisions for an exit from the Eurozone. With good reason, of course, as the indivisibility of our Monetary Union is part of its raison d’ etre. To ask us to phrase the referendum question as a choice involving exit from the Eurozone is to ask us to violate EU Treaties and EU Law. I suggest to anyone who wants us, or anyone else, to hold a referendum on EMU membership to recommend a change in the Treaties.

Colleagues,

It is time to take stock. The reason we find ourselves in the present conundrum is one: Our government’s primary proposal to you and the institutions, which I articulated here in the Eurogroup in my first ever intervention, was never taken seriously. It was the suggestion that common ground be created between the prevailing MoU and our new government’s program. For a fleeting moment, the 20th February Eurogroup statement raised the prospect of such common ground – as it made no reference to the MoU and concentrated on a new reform list by our government that would be put to the institutions.

Regrettably, immediately after the 20th of February the institutions, and most of colleagues in this room, sought to bring the MoU back to the centre, and to reduce our role in marginal changes within the MoU. It is as if we were told, to paraphrase Henry Ford, that we could have any reform list, any agreement, as long as it was the MoU. Common ground was thus sacrificed in favour of imposing upon our government a humiliating retreat. This is my view. But it is not important now. Now it is up to the Greek people to decide.

Our task, in today’s Eurogroup, ought to be to pave the ground for a smooth passage to the referendum of 5th July. This means one thing: that our loan agreement be extended by a few weeks so that the referendum takes place in conditions of tranquillity. Immediately after 5th July, if the people have voted Yes, the institutions’ proposal will be signed. Until then, during the next week, as the referendum approaches, any deviation from normality, especially in the banking sector, will be invariably interpreted as an attempt to coerce Greek voters. Greek society has paid a hefty price, through huge fiscal contraction, in order to be part of our monetary union. But a democratic monetary union that threatens a people about to deliver their verdict with capital controls and bank closures is a contradiction in terms. I would like to think that the Eurogroup will respect this principle. As for the ECB, the custodian on our monetary stability and of the Union itself, I have no doubt that, if the Eurogroup takes a responsible decision today to accept the request for an extension of our loan agreement that I am now tabling, it will do what it takes to give the Greek people a few more days to express their opinion.

Colleagues, these are critical moments and the decisions we make are momentous. In years to come we may well be asked “Where were you on the 27th of June? And what did you do to avert what happened? At the very least we should be able to say that: We gave the people who live under the worst depression a chance to consider their options. We tried democracy as a means of breaking a deadlock. And we did what it took to give them a few days to do so.

 

 

POSTSCRIPT – The day the Eurogroup President broke with the tradition of unanimity and excluded Greece from a Eurogroup gathering at will

 

Following my intervention (see above) the Eurogroup President rejected our request for an extension, with the support of the rest of the members, and announced that the Eurogroup would be issuing a statement placing the burden of this impasse on Greece and suggesting that the 18 ministers (that is the 19 Eurozone finance ministers except the Greek minister) reconvene later to discuss ways and means of protecting themselves from the fallout.

 

At that point I asked for legal advice, from the secretariat, on whether a Eurogroup statement can be issued without the conventional unanimity and whether the President of the Eurogroup can convene a meeting without inviting the finance minister of a Eurozone member-state. I received the following extraordinary answer: “The Eurogroup is an informal group. Thus it is not bound by Treaties or written regulations. While unanimity is conventionally adhered to, the Eurogroup President is not bound to explicit rules.” I let the reader comment on this remarkable statement.

 

For my part, I concluded as follows:

 

Colleagues, refusing to extend the loan agreement for a few weeks, and for the purpose of giving the Greek people an opportunity to deliberate in peace and quiet on the institutions’ proposal, especially given the high probability that they will accept these proposals (contrary to our government’s advice), will damage permanently the credibility of the Eurogroup as a democratic decision making body comprising partner states sharing not only a common currency but also common values.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3xShvssQr4

 

http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/28/as-it-happened-yanis-varoufakis-intervention-during-the-27th-june-2015-eurogroup-meeting/

 

Edited June 28, 2015 by vememah

[Prospero]

Torigraf prenosi ankete, doduše od pre najave referenduma:
 

We want to stay in

Despite Alexis Tsipras' insistence the people of Greece would say "an emphatic no" to creditor demands, opinion polls suggest otherwise.
Two polls published in Greek newspapers today indicate that most Greeks want to keep the euro and would prefer to keep European officials on side.
 
In a poll published the Proto Thema Sunday paper, 57pc said they believed Greece should make a deal with its EU partners, while 29pc wanted to break away.
Separately, 47pc of respondents told the To Vima newspaper they wanted a deal with the EU, compared to 33pc who would vote no and 18.4pc who were undecided.
 
Both nationwide polls were conducted earlier this week, before the decision to call a referendum last night.
Many Greeks are still nervous at what the uncertainty means for their finances, as this queue for an ATM in Thessaloniki, yesterday, suggests.

edit:
 

Colleagues, refusing to extend the loan agreement for a few weeks, and for the purpose of giving the Greek people an opportunity to deliberate in peace and quiet on the institutions’ proposal, especially given the high probability that they will accept these proposals (contrary to our government’s advice), will damage permanently the credibility of the Eurogroup as a democratic decision making body comprising partner states sharing not only a common currency but also common values.

 

 

Jel ovo još neka finta velikog teoretičara igara - "mi smo u manjini, a vi gledajte kako da zadržite većinu Grka na vašoj strani"?

Edited June 28, 2015 by Prospero

[vememah]

Bukiji prestali da primaju opklade o Grexitu jer niko ne želi da uloži novac na to da će Grčka ostati u Evrozoni.

 

 

William Hill stops taking Grexit bets

William Hill, the UK bookmaker, has refused to accept any more bets on Greece leaving the eurozone, after a flood of wagers on an early Grexit.

Hill’s spokesman Graham Sharpe says:

    ‘The only option people want to back at the moment is that Grexit will happen this year and we can no longer hope to balance the market so we have decided to pull the plug’

Greece is also the 1/3 favourite to be the first country to leave the European Union, followed by the UK at 4/1, and Hungary at 12/1.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jun/28/greek-crisis-ecb-emergency-liquidity-referendum-bailout-live#block-558fc0a5e4b024248ae9a47b

 

 

 

Torigraf prenosi ankete

 

Malo kasne, ali dobro, bar daju više detalja.

http://www.parapsihopatologija.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=11906&page=251&do=findComment&comment=3113812

Edited June 28, 2015 by vememah