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Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

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a Srbija isplaćuje staru deviznu štednju preko EFG Eurobank... how convenient

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Koga zanima, tekst o "Planu Z" iz 2012. koji je trebalo da odradi brzi i uređeni izlazak iz EZ, zaštitu EZ i stavljanje ekonomije na svoje noge:
 

 

Reveal hidden contents

 

Videćemo da li će biti potrebe da se nešto ovakvo radi u praksi.

Edited by Prospero

CNBC

 

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We just heard from the IMF's Lagarde, here's what she had to say:

First of all would remind everyone Greece is under program until March 2016. We are discussing european program
 
Everything depends on next few days
 
Greece still member of euro zone
 
We remain willing to talk 
 
More from Lagarde:

This ultimatum discussion is a bit over the top. 
 
I think there has been a lot of progress
 
Fiscal targets significantly reduced 
 
We have always advocated balanced reforms
 
Balanced approach needs to happen 


Question of debt sustainability has always been in background
 

Jel se to indirektno obraća Briselu?

 

Čini mi se da je stvar u punoj meri prešla na politički teren, pa bi za EU popuštanje Grcima sada bilo blisko političkom samoubistvu. Za popuštanje Brisela potreban je ne samo salto mortale Berlina nego i par drugih prestonica, što se ne čini verovatnim.

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 16:58, radisa said:

OK, ideje, kretanje € u odnosu na CHF ili USD u ponedeljak? Imali smisla raditi konvertovanje?

jbte.....

Da se podsetimo najboljeg teksta u poslednje vreme na ovu temu:

 

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Anatole Kaletsky is Chief Economist and Co-Chairman of Gavekal Dragonomics and Chairman of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. A former columnist at the Times of London, the International New York Times and the Financial Times, he is the author of Capitalism 4.0, The Birth of a New Economy, which… read more JUN 11, 2015104

 

A Greek Suicide?

 

LONDON – The good news is that a Greek default, which has become more likely after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ provocative rejection of what he described as the “absurd” bailout offer by Greece’s creditors, no longer poses a serious threat to the rest of Europe. The bad news is that Tsipras does not seem to understand this.

To judge by Tsipras’s belligerence, he firmly believes that Europe needs Greece as desperately as Greece needs Europe. This is the true “absurdity” in the present negotiations, and Tsipras’ misapprehension of his bargaining power now risks catastrophe for his country, humiliation for his Syriza party, or both.

 

The most likely outcome is that Tsipras will eat his words and submit to the conditions set by the “troika” (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) before the end of June. If not, the ECB will stop supporting the Greek banking system, and the government will run out of money to service foreign debts and, more dramatically, to pay Greek citizens their pensions and wages. Cut off from all external finance, Greece will become an economic pariah – the Argentina of Europe – and public pressure will presumably oust Syriza from power.

This outcome is all the more tragic, given that the economic analysis underlying Syriza’s demand for an easing of austerity was broadly right. Instead of seeking a face-saving compromise on softening the troika program, Tsipras wasted six months on symbolic battles over economically irrelevant issues such as labor laws, privatizations, even the name of the troika.

This provocative behavior lost Greece all potential allies in France and Italy. Worse still, the time wasted on political grandstanding destroyed the primary budget surplus, which was Tsipras’s trump card in the early negotiations.

Now Tsipras thinks he holds another trump card: Europe’s fear of a Greek default. But this is a delusion promoted by his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis. A professor of game theory, Varoufakis recently boasted to the New York Times that “little Greece, in order to survive, [could] bring down the financial world,” and that his media image “as an irrational fool… is doing my work for me” by frightening other EU finance ministers.

Apparently, Varoufakis believes that his “sophisticated grasp of game theory” gives Greece a crucial advantage in “the complicated dynamics” of the negotiations. In fact, the game being played out in Europe is less like chess than like tic-tac-toe, where a draw is the normal outcome, but a wrong move means certain defeat.

The rules of this game are much simpler than Varoufakis expected because of a momentous event that occurred in the same week as the Greek election. On January 22, the ECB took decisive action to protect the eurozone from a possible Greek default. By announcing a huge program of bond purchases, much bigger relative to the eurozone bond market than the quantitative easing implemented in the United States, Britain, or Japan, ECB President Mario Draghi erected the impenetrable firewall that had long been needed to protect the monetary Union from a Lehman-style financial meltdown.

The ECB’s newfound ability to print money, essentially without limit, to support both banks and governments has reduced Greek contagion to insignificance. That represents a profound change in Europe’s financial environment, which Greek politicians, along with many economic analysts, still fail to understand.

Before the ECB’s decision, contagion from Greece was a genuine threat. If the Greek government defaulted or tried to abandon the euro, Greece’s banks would collapse, and Greeks who failed to get their money out of the country would lose their savings, as occurred in Cyprus in 2013. When savers in other indebted euro countries such as Portugal and Spain observed this, they would fear similar losses and move their money to banks in Germany or Austria, as well as sell their holdings of Portuguese or Spanish government bonds.

As a result, the debtor countries’ bond prices would collapse, interest rates would soar, and banks would be threatened with collapse. If the contagion from Greece intensified, the next-weakest country, probably Portugal, would find itself unable to support its banking system or pay its debts. In extremis, it would abandon the euro, following the Greek example.

Before January, this sequence of events was quite likely, but the ECB’s bond-buying program put a firebreak at each point of the contagion process. If holders of Portuguese bonds are alarmed by a future Greek default, the ECB will simply increase its bond buying; with no limit to its buying power, it will easily overwhelm any selling pressure.

If savers in Portuguese banks start moving their money to Germany, the ECB will recycle these euros back to Portugal through interbank deposits. Again, there is no limit to how much money the ECB can recycle, provided Portuguese banks remain solvent – which they will, so long as the ECB continues to buy Portuguese government bonds.

In short, the ECB bond-buying program has transformed the ECB from a passive observer of the euro crisis, paralyzed by the outdated legalistic constraints of the Maastricht Treaty, into a proper lender of last resort. With powers to monetize government debts similar to those exercised by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England, the ECB can now guarantee the eurozone against financial contagion.

Unfortunately for Greece, this has been lost on the Tsipras government. Greek politicians who still see the threat of financial contagion as their trump card should note the coincidence of the Greek election and the ECB’s bond-buying program and draw the obvious conclusion. The ECB’s new policy was designed to protect the euro from the consequences of a Greek exit or default.

The latest Greek negotiating strategy is to demand a ransom to desist threatening suicide. Such blackmail might work for a suicide bomber. But Greece is just holding a gun to its own head – and Europe does not need to care very much if it pulls the trigger.


Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greek-default-political-suicide-by-anatole-kaletsky-2015-06#ABvzWxyLXdAeFVrz.99

Edited by Anduril

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 18:54, Prospero said:

Jel se to indirektno obraća Briselu?

 

Čini mi se da je stvar u punoj meri prešla na politički teren, pa bi za EU popuštanje Grcima sada bilo blisko političkom samoubistvu. Za popuštanje Brisela potreban je ne samo salto mortale Berlina nego i par drugih prestonica, što se ne čini verovatnim.

 

Nije nemoguce. Mislim, i ona je, ipak, iz F, malo su previse blizu njena i izjava Sapina (iako su, naravno, iz suprotstavljenih tabora unutar Francuske)

Edited by MancMellow

^^ Kačio sam ja Kaleckog :D

Edited by Prospero

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 19:11, Anduril said:

Da se podsetimo najboljeg teksta u poslednje vreme na ovu temu:

 

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This provocative behavior lost Greece all potential allies in France and Italy.

 

 

ocigledno ne jos. naravno, ne znaci da nece biti u pravu, ali jos uvek nije sasvim gotovo. 

Zvučiš kao Edvard Grej negde 29.7.1914. uveče.   :happy:

 

Posle ide "The lamps are going out...." :(

Edited by Prospero

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 19:26, Prospero said:

Zvučiš kao Edvard Grej negde 29.7.1914. uveče.   :happy:

 

Pa pazi, ni oni koji su na totalno drugoj strani ne zvuce/rade puno drugacije od Betman-Holvega  :happy:

Financial Times Europe Editor

 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c990f1a2-1cfe-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html?ftcamp=published_links/rss/world_europe/feed//product#axzz3eIIJZA2d

 

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Greece must be saved from political, economic and social collapse

Tony Barber



In spite of the recklessness of its radical leftist-led government, in spite of the failures of the political classes that have misruled the nation since the return of democracy in 1974, in spite of the chronic clientelism and corruption of the state, in spite of the selfishness of its business oligarchies and in spite of the unerring capacity of its foreign creditors to miss the big picture, Greece must today be saved from political, economic and social collapse.

Without such an effort, which must be led by the EU, Greece will be sucked ever more deeply into the political radicalism, economic misery, organised crime, uncontrolled migration and even outright war that characterises an arc of countries from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans to Syria on the east Mediterranean coast. 



It is irrelevant today to assign blame for what is shaping up as a Greek debt default and exit from the eurozone. The clock will not stop just because Greece’s eurozone partners — if “partners” even the right word any more — have stated their patience is at an end. Greece is in south-eastern Europe, and the stability of south-eastern Europe is a matter of the highest importance to the EU and the Nato alliance. If Plan A was to find a way of kicking the can down the road and keeping Greece in a support programme that maintained its eurozone membership, and if Plan B (now being implemented) is to protect the rest of the eurozone from Grexit, then there needs to be a Plan C. Plan C will require immediate action to prevent the implosion of the Greek economy and contain the poisonous political repercussions of the failed aid-for-reform negotiations. It will mean demonstrating to ordinary, desperately hard-pressed Greek citizens that its allies will not let down their country.

 

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Even if these efforts achieve some success, however, let there be no doubt about the broader historical significance of what is unfolding in the Greek tragedy. It marks the first step backwards in what used to be celebrated as a steady, if sometimes wobbly, process towards the harmonious integration of Europe, a continent torn to shreds in the second world war and then divided, until 1989, into a democratic west and Soviet-controlled communist east.

 

The goal of harmonious European integration is now under greater threat than ever, thanks to the challenges of irregular migration, economic stagnation, Russian truculence, narrow-minded British attitudes and the appalling mishandling of the eurozone’s troubles.

 
 

 

ovo je mnooogo bolji kandidat za najbolji tekst :)

Edited by MancMellow

Mislim da nema sumnje da Grckoj treba pomoci da izbegne totalni haos.

 

Zato je i potrebna procedura za izlazak iz Evra a okakvi referendumi treba da se odrzavaju blagovremeno.

 

Nazalost, sve ovo od strane Sirize mirise na teski politicki amaterizam, pa se nadam da su se bar pripremili za ovo sto sledi.

 

Prema internim pravilima ECB, ako zemlja nije vise u bajlaut programu, ne postoji vise mogucnost podrske grckim bankama.

 

Dakle, najkasnije u sredu banke vise nece otvoriti i u tim haoticnim uslovima koje su samo pocetak ce se onda do nedelje odrzati referendum.

 

Totalni politicki fejl.

Edited by Anduril

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 20:17, Anduril said:

 

Totalni politicki fejl.

Izvini, a ciji tacno?

  On 27. 6. 2015. at 20:17, Anduril said:

Mislim da nema sumnje da Grckoj treba pomoci da izbegne totalni haos.

 

Zato je i potrebna procedura za izlazak iz Evra a okakvi referendumi treba da se odrzavaju blagovremeno.

 

Nazalost, sve ovo od strane Sirize mirise na teski politicki amaterizam, pa se nadam da su se bar pripremili za ovo sto sledi.

 

Prema internim pravilima ECB, ako zemlja nije vise u bajlaut programu, ne postoji vise mogucnost podrske grckim bankama.

 

Dakle, najkasnije u sredu banke vise nece otvoriti i u tim haoticnim uslovima koje su samo pocetak ce se onda do nedelje odrzati referendum.

 

Totalni politicki fejl.

 

Ne slazem se, ali to savrseno nije bitno da li se ti i ja slazemo u vezi ovoga. Bitno je da se resenja ne nude u konjuktivu

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