Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[hazard]

Mozda. Ali u tom slucaju predvidjam jedno veliko sranje u samoj Grckoj, jer bar 30% tamosnjeg stanovnistva (ako ne i 40-50%) nema vise ni kapaciteta ni volje da trpi dalje skidanje gaca.

[MancMellow]

Za šestomesečni dil se slažem, za ostalo - previše je široka definicija "skidanja gaća". 

 

Ali bez obzira na to, mislim da je pogrešna procena da će se u slučaju sloma Syrize samo prosto vratiti ND na vlast kao da ništa nije bilo. Ni kod mnogo racionalnijih glasača od Grka ne funkcionište to tako - mi smo rekli šta (skoro) svi hoćemo, vi ste nas iskulirali i oteralni u bankrot (btw, upravo su ih ND i PASOK stvarno i oterali u bankrot, pre svega)...pa dobro ništa, jbg, probali smo. Do takvih kolektivnih kapitulacija se obično stiže u najmnanju ruku posle vojne pretnje, a u većini slučajeva posle vojnog poraza. Ako se želi Grčka zadržati u EZ neki ključni ustupak će se morati napraviti, jal na sufucitu, jal na debt relief-u. I taj ustupak ne zavisi od Syrize na vlasti, a onako poslušnu paščad kakvu su imali u prošloj vladi više neće imati. A pošto ja volim da se pozivam na realnost i u drugim stvarima, to činim i ovde - ove mere, sa ovim dugom su jednostavno nesprovodive. I još uz to vršiti unutrašnje poreske i administrativne reforme, to je politički nemoguće. 

 

Naravno, uvek ih se može pustiti niz vodu, tipa umrite junačkom smrću kad već nećete laganim ubrizgavanjem otrova. To jeste opcija. Samo kakva?

[hazard]

Pustanje Grcke niz vodu moze da prodje bez dugorocnih katastrofalnih posledica po evrozonu jedino ako u vr' glave 7 dana posle izbacivanje Grcke potpisu ful federalizaciju. Inace ce uvek postojati crv sumnje da je neko sledeci, a u trzisnoj maniji crv lako postane piton.

Edited June 22, 2015 by hazard

[MancMellow]

^^U svakom slučaju je realnija od ove dve

 

- da Syriza (ili neka druga buduća GR vlada) prihvati ovakav program bez daljeg olakšavanja duga

- da ovaj program sa ovim dugom može da dovede vraćanja dugova. 

 

Drugim rečima, nekome, ne Junckeru, ali recimo Schäubleu ili Lagarde cilj i jeste ili čisto iživljavanje ili namerno izbacivanje GR iz EZ

Edited June 22, 2015 by MancMellow

[MancMellow]

Pustanje Grcke niz vodu moze da prodje bez dugorocnih katastrofalnih posledica po evrozonu jedino ako u vr' glave 7 dana posle izbacivanje Grcke potpisu ful federalizaciju. Inace ce uvek postojati crv sumnje da je neko sledeci, a u trzisnoj maniji crv lako postane piton.

 

Ja mislim da bi to i bila ideja nekog produžetka od 6 meseci. Da se napravi dodatni institucionalni safety belt u odnosu na Grexit. Ali to je jedno pitanje, drugo pitanje je - ostanak GR u EU. 

[hazard]

6 meseci nije dovoljno osim ako ne misle da za 6 meseci osnuju sjedinjene drzave evrozone (bez Grcke).

[MancMellow]

6 meseci nije dovoljno osim ako ne misle da za 6 meseci osnuju sjedinjene drzave evrozone (bez Grcke).

 

pa u tih 6 meseci ce ih teško osnovati bez Grčke, to se slažem. 

[radisa]

Drugim rečima, nekome, ne Junckeru, ali recimo Schäubleu ili Lagarde cilj i jeste ili čisto iživljavanje ili namerno izbacivanje GR iz EZ

+1

 

Ja to mislim od pre 2-3 nedelje, nemaju oni nameru da sapsavaju Grčku, samo ne kontam koji im je dugoročni plan? Da izbace i Portugaliju, Španiju i Italiju i da ostanu samo jeke zemlje sa protestantskom radnom etikom™?

[MancMellow]

Ja jedino ne znam koje je to "beskrajno popuštanje grčkim zahtevima", ali ok. 

[hazard]

Sa druge strane, beskrajno popustanje grckim zahtevima salje los signal ostalim clanicama. Manje od dva zla...

 

Uostalom, videcemo uskoro.

 

Napomena: pisem na osnovu razgovora sa ljudima iz ECBa, ne bih voleo da se predvidjanja ostvare.

 

Jebiga, ako je ono sto trazi Grcka ,,beskrajno popustanje zahtevima" onda...pa ne znam.   Ako je to mindset ljudi iz EU institucija, onda od cele te konkstrukcije na duzi rok leba nema.

 

Jebiga, nije ovo 2010. Grcka uporno radi ono sto joj se kaze, i uporno srlja jos dublje u ponor. I jasno mi je da neki Nemci misle da je to "los signal", s druge strane ja bas mislim da je "dobar signal". Tzv. "periferne" zemlje EU (i Italija, i Grcka, itd.) moraju proci nekakvo restrukturiranje dugova, i to veliko i znacajno, da se te zemlje dugorocno iskopaju i vrate nekakvom rastu je inace nemoguce.

[Prospero]

Otvoriće Brisel vrata za debt relief u nekom obliku, za lakše gutanje paketa.

 

via TT

[hazard]

U ovoj konstelaciji politickih snaga, cisto sumnjam. Da je tako kao sto kazes, vec bi time mahali - podnesite jos 2 godine osteritija i eto oprosticemo 50% duga - ili sta vec.

 

Medjutim toga nema, ovo je sad vec cisto siljenje ideoloske patke nad Sirizom. Ili je to, ili je u pravu Varufakis kada kaze da vecinu clanica evrozone (narocito one severne) zanima samo kako ce Grcka zapravo da vrati taj dug - ceo - i nista vise.

[MancMellow]

Na toj liniji su se izgleda i pojavili cracks između "Institucija". Očigledno je da Lagarde nije bila zadovoljna ovim danas razgovorima

[MancMellow]

zanimljiv tekstić

 

 

 

 

The real challenge this week is to save the eurozone

Wolfgang Münchau

Grexit would be the point when the EU moves from integration, via stagnation, to disintegration

 

Europe’s leaders will have the unique opportunity to commit two mistakes in a single week. On Monday, Europe’s leaders will decide on the future of Greece. On Thursday and Friday, they will meet again to discuss, among other things, the future governance of the eurozone. The latter is more important in the long run: a healthy eurozone may even withstand a Greek exit from the single currency and prosper. But a crippled eurozone would be no less crippled if Greece were to remain a member. A dual failure would be a disaster.

 

When I heard Christine Lagarde complain about the lack of “adults in the room” on Thursday night, I knew that things were getting out of hand. Whatever the purpose of the remark by the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, it was not helpful to dish out personal insults. It makes the search for a compromise even harder.

 

None of the drafts I have seen comes even close. A change in the treaties is needed to do anything meaningful. Without treaty change, it is impossible to create a road map to a fiscal union. Nor is it possible to create a genuine banking union with a joint deposit guarantee fund, and a banking resolution mechanism. The eurozone has pretty much exhausted the scope of what it can do inside the existing treaties.

 

If the eurozone goes down the of path of no ambition, it will find it progressively harder to handle future crises. Apart from the consequences of a Grexit, the other big foreseeable problem is the macroeconomic imbalances. The current account surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands are heading towards 10 per cent of gross domestic product per annum — a position that is neither sustainable, nor self-correcting: a bad combination.

 

The summits confront the eurozone’s dual demons — a mismanaged crisis and the lack of a small fiscal union that can act as an economic and financial stabiliser. Without tackling them, we will still be talking about the eurozone crisis in 2030, if it lasts that long.If the eurozone goes down the of path of no ambition, it will find it progressively harder to handle future crises. Apart from the consequences of a Grexit, the other big foreseeable problem is the macroeconomic imbalances. The current account surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands are heading towards 10 per cent of gross domestic product per annum — a position that is neither sustainable, nor self-correcting: a bad combination.

 

The EU’s leaders will be called upon to fix Greece on Monday, the rest on Thursday and Friday — or at least start a process that gets them towards economic integration. There is more than a chance that they could fail in at least one of those respects, if not in both.

 

Europe’s finance ministers and Ms Lagarde signalled at last week’s disastrous meeting in Luxembourg that they, like the Bourbons of the 18th century, have learnt nothing, and forgotten nothing. The research department of the IMF admitted some time ago that austerity did not work in Greece — as Athens also insists. The fund’s leadership is now telling us that such criticism is inconsistent with adult behaviour.

 

It is Chefsache now, as they say in Germany. My hope is that the bosses grasp what is at stake. My experience tells me that this may not be so.

 

 

 

 

[Prospero]

Hopes for Greece bailout deal rise sharply as Athens gives ground
 

The Greek government insisted that none of its red lines had been crossed but finance ministers from eurozone countries believe Athens has now made significant concessions by agreeing to raise an additional €2.7bn (£1.9bn) in revenues this year. Brussels called the plan “detailed, credible and impressive”, and viewed it as the basis for an agreement that would involve further bailout funds released to Greece. “It’s the first big positive sign from the Greeks,” said one official. “It’s the most comprehensive proposal they have made.”

Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister, who chairs the group of 19 eurozone countries, said the Greek plan was “a basis to really restart the talks again and really get a result”.

In a letter accompanying the economic plan, Tsipras said that “the requirements of the [creditor] institutions for covering the fiscal gaps for 2015-16” would be met absolutely and completely.
...

In its 11-page proposal, Greece accepted that its pension system needed to be reformed, and said it would save money by increasing pension contributions, health payments by retirees and a new tax on businesses. But pension rates would be left untouched, allowing Tsipras to say that he has not crossed his red lines. Greece said higher VAT would net an additional €1.3bn in 2016.

Edited June 22, 2015 by Prospero