Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Anduril]

Zanimljivi tekstovi. Bilo bi ih dobro prodiskutovati...

 

 

The IMF’s “Tough Choices” on Greece

ATHENS – The International Monetary Fund’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, recently asked a simple and important question: “How much of an adjustment has to be made by Greece, how much has to be made by its official creditors?” But that raises two more questions: How much of an adjustment has Greece already made? And have its creditors given anything at all?

In May 2010, the Greek government agreed to a fiscal adjustment equal to 16% of GDP from 2010 to 2013. As a result, Greece moved from a primary budget deficit (which excludes interest payments on debt) of more than 10% of GDP to a primary balance last year – by far the largest such reversal in post-crisis Europe.

 

The IMF initially projected that Greece’s real (inflation-adjusted) GDP would contract by around 5% over the 2010-2011 period, stabilize in 2012, and grow thereafter. In fact, real GDP fell 25%, and did not recover. And, because nominal GDP fell in 2014 and continues to fall, the debt/GDP ratio, which was supposed to stabilize three years ago, continues to rise.

Blanchard notes that in 2012, Greece agreed “to generate enough of a primary surplus to limit its indebtedness” and to implement “a number of reforms which should lead to higher growth.” Those so-called reforms included sharply lower public spending, minimum-wage reductions, fire-sale privatizations, an end to collective bargaining, and deep pension cuts. Greece followed through, but the depression continued.

The IMF and Greece’s other creditors have assumed that massive fiscal contraction has only a temporary effect on economic activity, employment, and taxes, and that slashing wages, pensions, and public jobs has a magical effect on growth. This has proved false. Indeed, Greece’s post-2010 adjustment led to economic disaster – and the IMF’s worst predictive failure ever.

Blanchard should know better than to persist with this fiasco. Once the link between “reform” and growth is broken – as it has been in Greece – his argument collapses. With no path to growth, the creditors’ demand for an eventual 3.5%-of-GDP primary surplus is actually a call for more contraction, beginning with another deep slump this year.

But, rather than recognizing this reality and adjusting accordingly, Blanchard doubles down on pensions. He writes:

“Why insist on pensions? Pensions and wages account for about 75% of primary spending; the other 25% have already been cut to the bone. Pension expenditures account for over 16% of GDP, and transfers from the budget to the pension system are close to 10% of GDP. We believe a reduction of pension expenditures of 1% of GDP (out of 16%) is needed, and that it can be done while protecting the poorest pensioners.”

Note first the damning admission: apart from pensions and wages, spending has already been “cut to the bone.” And remember: the effect of this approach on growth was negative. So, in defiance of overwhelming evidence, the IMF now wants to target the remaining sector, pensions, where massive cuts – more than 40% in many cases – have already been made. The new cuts being demanded would hit the poor very hard.

Pension payments now account for 16% of Greek GDP precisely because Greece’s economy is 25% smaller than it was in 2009. Without five years of disastrous austerity, Greek GDP might be 33% higher than it is now, and pensions would be 12% of GDP rather than 16%. The math is straightforward.

Blanchard calls on Greece’s government to offer “truly credible measures.” Shouldn’t the IMF do likewise? To get pensions down by one percentage point of GDP, nominal economic growth of just 4% per year for two years would suffice – with no further cuts. Why not have “credible measures” to achieve that goal?

This brings us to Greek debt. As everyone at the IMF knows, a debt overhang is a vast unfunded tax liability that says to investors: enter at your own risk. At any time, your investments, profits, and hard work may be taxed away to feed the dead hand of past lenders. The overhang is a blockade against growth. That is why every debt crisis, sooner or later, ends in restructuring or default.

Blanchard is a pioneer in the economics of public debt. He knows that Greece’s debt has not been sustainable at any point during the last five years, and that it is not sustainable now. On this point, Greece and the IMF agree.

In fact, Greece has a credible debt proposal. First, let the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) lend €27 billion ($30 billion), at long maturities, to retire the Greek bonds that the European Central Bank foolishly bought in 2010. Second, use the profits on those bonds to pay off the IMF. Third, include Greece in the ECB’s program of quantitative easing, which would let it return to the markets.

Greece would agree to fair conditions for the ESM loan. It does not ask for one cent of additional official funding for the Greek state. It is promising to live within its means forever, and rely on internal savings and external investment for growth – far short of what any large country, controlling its own currency, would do when facing a comparable disaster.

Blanchard insists that now is the time for “tough choices, and tough commitments to be made on both sides.” Indeed it is. But the Greeks have already made tough choices. Now it is the IMF’s turn, beginning with the decision to admit that the policies it has imposed for five long years created a disaster. For the other creditors, the toughest choice is to admit – as the IMF knows – that their Greek debts must be restructured. New loans for failed policies – the current joint creditor proposal – is, for them, no adjustment at all.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/imf-greece-debt-restructuring-by-james-k-galbraith-2015-06#P5rHWXg5YML7hR7t.99

 

 

The Endgame in Greece

PARIS – After months of wrangling, the showdown between Greece and its European creditors has come down to a standoff over pensions and taxes. Greece is refusing to acquiesce to demands by its creditors that it cut payments to the elderly and raise the value-added tax on their medicine and electricity.

Europe’s demands – ostensibly aimed at ensuring that Greece can service its foreign debt – are petulant, naive, and fundamentally self-destructive. In rejecting them, the Greeks are not playing games; they are trying to stay alive.

 

Whatever one might say about Greece’s past economic policies, its uncompetitive economy, its decision to join the eurozone, or the errors that European banks made when they provided its government with excessive credit, the country’s economic plight is stark. Unemployment stands at 25%. Youth unemployment is at 50%.

Greece’s GDP, moreover, has shrunk by 25% since the start of the crisis in 2009. Its government is insolvent. Many of its citizens are hungry.

Conditions in Greece today are reminiscent of those in Germany in 1933. Of course, the European Union need not fear the rise of a Greek Hitler, not only because it could easily crush such a regime, but also – and more important – because Greece’s democracy has proved impressively mature throughout the crisis. But there is something that the EU should fear: destitution within its borders and the pernicious consequences for the continent’s politics and society.

Unfortunately, the continent remains split along tribal lines. Germans, Finns, Slovaks, and Dutch – among others – have no time for the suffering of Greeks. Their political leaders tend to their own, not to Europe in any true sense. Relief for Greece is an especially fraught issue in countries where far-right parties are on the rise or center-right governments face popular left-wing opposition.

To be sure, European politicians are not blind to what is happening in Greece. Nor have they been completely passive. At the beginning of the crisis, Greece’s European creditors eschewed debt relief and charged punitive interest rates on bailout funds. But, as Greeks’ suffering intensified, policymakers pressed private-sector banks and other bondholders to write off most of their claims. At each stage of the crisis, they have done only what they believed their national politics would bear – no more.

In particular, Europe’s politicians are balking at steps that would implicate taxpayers directly. The Greek government has asked Europe to swap existing debts with new debts to lock in low interest rates and long maturities. It has also requested that interest payments be linked to economic growth. (It has notably not asked for cuts in the face value of its debt).

But debt relief of this sort vis-à-vis European governments or the European Central Bank has been kept off the table. Such measures would likely require parliamentary votes in countries across the eurozone, where many governments would face intense public opposition – no matter how obvious the need.

Rather than confront the political obstacles, Europe’s leaders are hiding behind a mountain of pious, nonsensical rhetoric. Some insist that Greece finish its payment program, regardless of the humanitarian and economic consequences – not to mention the failure of all previous Greek governments to meet its terms. Others pretend to worry about the moral-hazard implications of debt relief, despite the fact that the country’s private-sector debt has already been written off at EU insistence, and that there are dozens, if not hundreds, of precedents for restructuring the debts of insolvent sovereigns.

Almost a century ago, at World War I’s end, John Maynard Keynes offered a warning that holds great relevance today. Then, as now, creditor countries (mainly the US) were demanding that deeply indebted countries make good on their debts. Keynes knew that a tragedy was in the making.

“Will the discontented peoples of Europe be willing for a generation to come so to order their lives that an appreciable part of their daily produce may be available to meet a foreign payment?” he asked in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. “In short, I do not believe that any of these tributes will continue to be paid, at the best, for more than a few years.”

Several European countries now seem content to force Greece into an outright default and provoke its exit from the euro. They believe that the fallout can be contained without panic or contagion. That is typical wishful thinking among politicians. Indeed, it is the type of heedlessness that led US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to let Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008, ostensibly to teach the market a “lesson.” Some lesson; we are still digging out from Paulson’s monumental mistake.

Similarly, Keynes watched in horror as economic policymakers blundered repeatedly in the years following WWI, through the upheavals of the 1920s, and into the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 1925, Keynes criticized the insouciance of those “who sit in the top tier of the machine.” He argued “that they are immensely rash in their regardlessness, in their vague optimism and comfortable belief that nothing really serious ever happens. Nine times out of ten, nothing really serious does happen – merely a little distress to individuals or to groups. But we run a risk of the tenth time…”

Today, Greece’s European creditors seem ready to abandon their solemn pledges on the irrevocability of the euro in order to insist on collecting some crumbs from the country’s pensioners. Should they press their demands, forcing Greece to exit, the world will never again trust the euro’s longevity. At a minimum, the eurozone’s weaker members will undergo increased market pressures. In the worst case, they will be hit by a new vicious circle of panic and bank runs, also derailing the incipient European recovery. With Russia testing Europe’s resolve to the east, the timing of Europe’s gamble could not be worse.

The Greek government is right to have drawn the line. It has a responsibility to its citizens. The real choice, after all, lies not with Greece, but with Europe.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greece-endgame-eurozone-default-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2015-06#zlrMvBHSdpFbZSMD.99

Edited June 18, 2015 by Anduril

[Prospero]

Svop ECB duga za 27B€ u dugoročnom ESM dugu se pominje par nedelja, i on može otključati gomilu drugih stvari, ali je naravno deo paketa pošto u biti predstavlja čišćenje duga što Brisel neće dozvoliti bez ustupaka Atine u drugim stvarima - primarni suficit, možda pitanje remonta poreskog sistema itd itd.

[Anonymous]

EU će ili ići u ful federaciju ili se ubrzo raspasti. Ovo je katalizator, brexit će biti finish of.

 

+1, to je odavno trebalo da bude urađeno (federalizacija).

[vememah]

Varufakis okačio svoj predlog ministrima Evrogrupe:

http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/18/greeces-proposals-to-end-the-crisis-my-intervention-at-todays-eurogroup/

[MancMellow]

Zanimljivi tekstovi. Bilo bi ih dobro prodiskutovati...

 

Bilo bi. Zapravo, ja i jos neki smo ih vec prodiskutovali minimum jedno tri puta u poslednja 4 meseca jos i pre nego sto su bili napisani :D Ozbiljno, ne ocekujem da ce ove argumente da prihvate oni koji do sada nisu. 

[vememah]

Rojters objavio da ljudi iz ECB nisu sigurni da će se grčke banke otvoriti u ponedeljak. ECB i Varufakis kasnije to demantovali, dok je briselskom dopisniku FT-a Piteru Spigelu potvrđeno da je Rojtersova vest tačna. Uz to, za sutra, samo dva dana od prošlog povećanja ELA zakazana je vanredna sednica ECB-a jer su Grci tražili dodatnu pomoć.

 

Two officials said that during the meeting, Eurogroup chairman Jeroen Dijsselbloem asked ECB Executive Board member Benoit Coeure if Greek banks would be able to open tomorrow.

Coeure answered: "Tomorrow, yes. Monday, I don't know."

 

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/18/uk-eurozone-greece-banks-ecb-idUKKBN0OY2LP20150618

 

[vememah]

Pol Mejson, urednik C4 koji je napravio afirmativni dokumentarac o Sirizi tvrdi da je Varufakis upozorio Špance i Luksemburžane da ne spekulišu o grčkim bankama, dok izvor iz vlade kaže da je u pitanju pokušaj podsticanja masovnog povlačenja novca iz banaka (pre će biti ubrzavanja, pošto se ono već dešava).

 

 

U sredu je ELA podignuta za 1,1 mlrd €, Grci sad izgleda traže još 3 mlrd.

 

Paradoks je da Grčka pregovara o deblokiranju 7 milijardi evra (i eventualno još 10), a da je od dolaska Sirize na vlast ELA pomoć podignuta za znatno veći iznos - 25 milijardi.

 

Dinamika podizanja ELA pomoći bankama od februara:

Edited June 19, 2015 by vememah

[Muwan]

Bilo bi. Zapravo, ja i jos neki smo ih vec prodiskutovali minimum jedno tri puta u poslednja 4 meseca jos i pre nego sto su bili napisani :D Ozbiljno, ne ocekujem da ce ove argumente da prihvate oni koji do sada nisu.

Koje argumente, da je za sve ovo kriva Evropa a Grčka je njena nevina žrtva? Pošto u ovom drugom tekstu značajno provejava takvo stanovište, onaj prvi tekst je bolje fokusiran.

 

Nije sporno da je ono što je do sada uradjeno na sanaciji grčkog raspada 1 velika katastrofa i da pristup kreditora treba drastično da se menja. Apsolutno je legitiman stav grčke vlade da neće pristati na pomor svojih penzionera kako bi se odigrala još jedna runda ovog austerity ludila posle koje će stanje opet biti još gore a ne bolje. Ja prvi ne bih na to pristao.

 

Ali Syriza uporno igra na to da će se kreditori 'dozvati pameti' i pristati na nekakav specijalan aranžman. Well, not gonna happen. Kreditori se neće dozvati pameti jer i sami, baš kao i Grci, presipaju iz šupljeg u prazno dok im u redu za austerity čeka još 5-6 zemalja čiji kumulativni dug poznata matematika jedva da može da izrazi. Pošto govorimo o političarima, jasno je da će oni nastaviti da presipaju uporno i do samog kraja. Baš kao i za Grke, i za njih važi da im nema drugog izlaza nego da počnu da rade stvari drastično drugačije i da se pripreme na ozbiljne društveno-političke potrese.

 

Naravno njima je mnogo lakše da kinje Grčku dok ova skroz ne odumre. Ali oni su jači i može im se, to je ono što Syriza ne razume. Oni se neće dozvati pameti, barem ne dok je samo Grčka u fokusu. Oni će radije uništiti Grčku svojim idiotskim merama.

 

Zbog toga grčka vlada mora imati plan B, što nas vraća na obračun sa domaćim kancerom. Syriza baca sve karte na plan A koji glasi 'dozvati Evropu pameti'. Evo u 10 evra da plan A neće uspeti ni u ludilu. A pošto nema plana B ostaje samo haos.

[MancMellow]

Jedan je odgovor: 80 posto Grka ne zeli Grexit  I to je, generalno to. Plan B su novi izbori i to je potpuno demokratski, posto nisu dobili mandat da izlaze iz EZ. O ovome za domaci kancer smo pricali juce, pa da se ne ponavljam

Edited June 19, 2015 by MancMellow

[Muwan]

Novi izbori jedino mogu da promene nešto ako pretpostavimo da će kreditori ponuditi ND/PASOKu razumniji dogovor tj. da ovo sada rade zbog ideološkog otklona koji imaju prema radikalnoj levici i kako bi sprečili da ona pobedi u nekim malo važnijim™ zemljama EU.

 

Ako kreditori zadrže ovu austerity mantru ko god da dodje na vlast, ili ako Syriza ponovo sastavi vladu, novi izbori će samo produžiti agoniju. IMHO tako će verovatno i biti, pošto će ND/PASOK lagano i ukinuti penzije ako to od njih bude zatraženo. To su poželjni partneri™ za razgovor, negde u rangu Vučića. Pa ćemo da vidimo gde će taj austerity da ih odvede.

 

Edit: grexit se takodje piše grkickout ako se ovima u Briselu nadigne mlohava patka, tako da može i 110% Grka da bude protiv toga ali to ne znači da se neće desiti.

Edited June 19, 2015 by beowl

[Prospero]

Pa to, grexit kao proces nije prerogativ samo Grka već i Brisela, s tim da posle eventualnog grekickouta možemo komotno da pobacamo u đubre politikološke studije EU napisane pre leta 2015AD.

Edited June 19, 2015 by Prospero

[Prospero]

Dimokratia - Greece | Thursday, June 18, 2015

 

Greeks will never cut back on military spending

 

In the talks over a Greek austerity package EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on Tuesday proposed a "modest cut" in the country's defence spending. Cutbacks in the defence budget could replace the controversial hike in VAT, he explained.

 

The conservative daily Dimokratia finds the idea absurd: "The ignorant or naïve might think the creditors weren't aware of the specific features of the region. Wrong! … Of course the godfathers of the euro know that Greece shares borders with countries that want to invade its territory. No doubt they are also aware of the military adventures in the region, and the fact that our country has greater military requirements than Luxembourg. They insist on weakening the Greek army because a country with powerful armed forces can't be turned into a protectorate. … Naturally we won't do them the favour. The Greeks won't give up their weapons."

 

via TT

[Bat Bat]

I dalje tvrdim da je potpuni sf da GR izadje iz evrozone i predje na drahmu od danas do sutra, bez obzira da li ce to da se desi 1. jula ili 1. avgusta ili 1. koznakad.

 

Nema mehanizma za izlazak iz evrozone u Lisabonskom ugovoru - ima samo za izlazak iz EU oltugeder - znači morao bi ugovor da se menja dodavanjem nekakvog aneksa - gde bi s tim morala da se slozi Grcka (sto znamo da nece) a onda i svih drugih 27, pa onda rasprave u parlamentu, pa ratifikacija u svim nacionalnim parlamentima (u Belgiji u 7, recimo), pa u Evropskom parlamentu (koji ce biti protiv 100%)...kad bi se svi slozili kao jedan, sto je nemoguce, trebalo bi 2 godine.

 

Sta bi bilo u medjuvremenu, hipoteticki? I dalje evro? Obe valute?

[Muwan]

Ja pričao sa par pozicioniranih™ persona u EIB i EBRD, oboje potvrdili da je čitav proces izbacivanja Grčke iz evrozone spreman, razradjen i u slučaju aktivacije tehnički sprovodljiv u jednoj radnoj nedelji. Sve naknadne rasprave, ratifikacije i pravna usaglašavanja sa Lisabonskim ugovorom obavljala bi se u situaciji u kojoj je Grčka de facto i praktično izvan evrozone, tako da mogu da traju koliko god. Ume jevropa još kako da batali legalizam ako je stani-pani.

[MancMellow]

Novi izbori jedino mogu da promene nešto ako pretpostavimo da će kreditori ponuditi ND/PASOKu razumniji dogovor tj. da ovo sada rade zbog ideološkog otklona koji imaju prema radikalnoj levici i kako bi sprečili da ona pobedi u nekim malo važnijim™ zemljama EU.

 

Ako kreditori zadrže ovu austerity mantru ko god da dodje na vlast, ili ako Syriza ponovo sastavi vladu, novi izbori će samo produžiti agoniju. IMHO tako će verovatno i biti, pošto će ND/PASOK lagano i ukinuti penzije ako to od njih bude zatraženo. To su poželjni partneri™ za razgovor, negde u rangu Vučića. Pa ćemo da vidimo gde će taj austerity da ih odvede.

 

Edit: grexit se takodje piše grkickout ako se ovima u Briselu nadigne mlohava patka, tako da može i 110% Grka da bude protiv toga ali to ne znači da se neće desiti.

 

Bold 1 - To cemo jos da vidimo tj valjda necemo. Pasok je mrtav. Moja 2 centa u slucaju nove vlade posle nekih skorih izbora je da ce vladu sastavljati ND uz podrsku ANEL ili ZZ ili oba. A Syriza bi takodje dobro prosla na izborima ili bi se cak levo krilo odvojilo i izaslo na izbore u nekoj koaliciji sa KKE pa bi u zemlji koja ce i dalje biti u stravicnoj krizi dobio po ulicama beskrajne tuce crnih i crvenih. 

 

I jos jedna prognoza - ako Syriza slucajno ponovo dobije mandat - izaci ce im vise u susret. 

 

Ovo poslednje - naravno da to ne znaci da se to nece desiti, ali ja samo kazem da je plan B Syrize demokratski legitiman