Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[MancMellow]

^^Citajuci raspravu, delim utisak da vise pises na osnovu onoga sto (ideoloski) verujes, a manje na osnovu proverljivih informacija. Meni se cini da poverioci pokusavaju da drze pregovore u tajnosti, a da Grci plasiraju lazne vesti namenjene grckim biracima. Dobar deo njihove kampanje se svodi na gicanje da im se oprosti sto veci procenat duga. Sasvim legitimna taktika, ciji uspeh zavisi od toga koliko EU veruje u legitimnost pretnji. Ja bih rekao da se EU pripremila za Grexit i da je time izbila poslednji grcki adut.

 

Manje-vise se slazem sa Beowlom, s tim da postoje i druge mere kako da se nadoknadi manjak, jedino je pitanje efekta na privredu (recimo, naplata poreza onima koji ga ne placaju je bolja opcija od povecanja poreske stope). Jedno od predizbornih obecanja Sirize i jeste bilo smanjenje vojnog budzeta, da stvarno hoce da ga sprovedu mislim da ne bi bilo problema, ako zanemarimo njihove koalicione partnere sa krajnje desnice.

 

Na temu protivustavnog smanjenja penzija, mozes li mi reci kako je prosla taksa na kiparske depozite pred ustavnim sudom?

 

Ne, ja sam, da kažem, recimo levi liberal, a ne socijalista, čak ni socijal-demokrata, i to se lepo videlo dok su pravi teorijom potkovani levičari bili na Vorumu ili hteli da se detaljnije bakću sa politikom, međutim sad ja izgledam kao socijalista i to je u stvari tačno slika i prilika onoga što se desilo sa evropskim političkim establišmentom. 

 

I naravno da ne pišem napamet, lepo piše u FAZu, da je to podneo Junker sa odobrenjem Merkelke i Holandea. Fair play to them, to je dobar predlog, ali... Dakle šta god ja mislio o FAZ, to je ozbiljna novina za ovakve stvari. Dakle, s grček strane ne bi bio problem, a to je ujedno i smanjenje budžeta vojske. S tim što i njima zbog koalicionog partnera dobro dođe da to predloži neko drugi, ali to je nebitno. 

 

Plan poboljšanja naplate poreza se nalazi u okviru grčkog predloga. Ako im ne veruju nek im traže monitoring. 

 

Nije reč o tome kako je nešto prošlo, nego o tome da po definiciji ne može da bude "dugoročno rešenje" nešto što može da padne na sudu. 

Edited June 17, 2015 by MancMellow

[Tribun_Populi]

nešto što može da padne na sudu. 

 

Zar nije već palo?

[MancMellow]

pa ponovo :)

[Prospero]

Sa druge strane, kakvo je to smanjenje vojnog budzeta ako grcka vlada u tom trenutku potpisuje vojni ugovor vredan $500M?

 

Malo sam guglao:

 

 

 

The deal, worth 500 million dollars, is the first major deal in the last 10 years and was signed after the recommendation of Defense Minister and coalition government junior partner Independent Greeks (ANEL) leader Panos Kammenos. The agreement was also signed by Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias, Alternate Minister of Citizen Protection Giannis Panousis as well as Alternate Economy, Infrastructure, Maritime and Tourism Minister Thodoris Dritsas.

According to the Greek Sunday newspaper Proto Thema that published the story first, the SYRIZA-led government has already authorized a down payment of 45 million dollars to the U.S. colossal multinational company as a first installment so that the upgrade can begin.

...

The modernization plan is a 7-year program and includes the maintenance and support of five of the six P-3B Orion turbo-prop aircraft granted to Greece by the United States during 1991 and 1992. The Greek government hopes to extend their life span for another 15,000 flight hours. They had been in the service of the Hellenic Navy until 2009 but were withdrawn as their modernization had been considered too costly. -

 

See more at: http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/04/05/greek-govt-signs-500-mln-contract-with-u-s-company-for-modernization-of-p-3b-orion-planes/#sthash.jRVsqVmh.dpu

Nisu dali 500M$ ove godine nego se gotovo sigurno plaća anuitetno, program traje 7 godina.

 

Ne menja nužno na percepciji trošenja novca, ali čisto da razjasnimo da to nije jednokratni trošak koji na tom nivou opterećuje budžet.

[Tribun_Populi]

 

Isti sud je 2014. godine poništio smanjenje plata uniformisanih službenika - policajaca, vojnika, vatrogasaca i pomorskog osoblja.

Prethodna vlada, koalicija desnice i socijalista je imala nekoliko meseci da sprovede tu presudu, ali je plate samo delimično povećala, navodeći kao razlog budžetska ograničenja.

Po grčkom sajtu za ekonomske informacije Macropolis, presuda o penzijama će koštati državu između 1,2 i 1,5 milijarde evra godišnje.

 

Što jeste realno, a pošto će sve to ponovo da padne dug će se u pojedinačnim sudskim postupcima, koje će bez sumnje pokretati penzioneri i uniformisani službenici, progresivno povećavati za kamatu itd. i jednom morati da se plati. I 'ajd sad, kome je bolje dugovati, strendžerima ili svojim građanima?

 

 

Slobodno povlačite paralele, ovo gotovo sigurno čeka i nas u nekoj bližoj perspektivi.

 

 

I ulog se diže

 

 

The Greek central bank took the unusual step on Wednesday of warning that a failure to reach a bailout deal with its international creditors would leave Greece on a “painful course” of not only leaving the eurozone but threaten its membership of the EU.

Edited June 17, 2015 by Tribun_Populi

[nautilus]

 

Malo sam guglao:

 

 

 

Nisu dali 500M$ ove godine nego se gotovo sigurno plaća anuitetno, program traje 7 godina.

 

Ne menja nužno na percepciji trošenja novca, ali čisto da razjasnimo da to nije jednokratni trošak koji na tom nivou opterećuje budžet.

 

 

P3 im zaista treba zbog velike povrsine teritorijalnih voda. 

 

Pitanje je da li im bas treba 1500 tenkova i 3000 oklopnih vozila.  

[Prospero]

Grčka centralna banka trenutnu poziciju naziva "upravljivom dužničkom krizom" i upozorava na rizike usled nepostizanja sporazuma:

 

17/06/2015 - The Bank of Greece Report on Monetary Policy 2014-2015
 

Today, in accordance with its Statute, the Bank of Greece submitted its Report on Monetary Policy 2014-2015 to the Speaker of the Greek Parliament and the Cabinet.
At the time of writing of the present report, news kept unfolding, especially as regards the negotiation of a financial support agreement. As of today, the negotiations are still ongoing. As the Bank of Greece had assessed in its Governor's Report for the year 2014, the conclusion of a new agreement with our partners is of the utmost importance to fend off the immediate risks to the economy, reduce uncertainty and ensure a sustainable growth outlook for Greece.
Failure to reach an agreement would, on the contrary, mark the beginning of a painful course that would lead initially to a Greek default and ultimately to the country's exit from the euro area and – most likely – from the European Union. A manageable debt crisis, as the one that we are currently addressing with the help of our partners, would snowball into an uncontrollable crisis, with great risks for the banking system and financial stability. An exit from the euro would only compound the already adverse environment, as the ensuing acute exchange rate crisis would send inflation soaring.
All this would imply deep recession, a dramatic decline in income levels, an exponential rise in unemployment and a collapse of all that the Greek economy has achieved over the years of its EU, and especially its euro area, membership. From its position as a core member of Europe, Greece would see itself relegated to the rank of a poor country in the European South.
This is why the Bank of Greece firmly believes that striking an agreement with our partners is a historical imperative that we cannot afford to ignore. From all the evidence available so far, it seems that a compromise has been reached on the main conditions attached to this agreement and that little ground remains to be covered. Besides, the lowering of the primary surplus targets is a decision of paramount importance that significantly extends the time needed for fiscal adjustment and allows for additional degrees of freedom in the conduct of fiscal policy. Equally important will be the reaffirmation and articulation in more specific terms of our partners’ willingness to provide debt relief, as initially stated at the Eurogroup meeting of 27 November 2012. What we need today is a viable debt deal which will spare future generations burdens that we have no right to saddle them with.
 
...

Čini mi se da je ovo (i) kontriranje Varufakisovom kurčenju oko izlaska iz EZ.

[vememah]

Guverner BOG je bivši minfin iz Samarasove vlade. Siriza je pobesnela zbog izveštaja. Predsednica skupštine ga je odbacila kao "apsolutno neprihvatljiv", a Sirizini poslanici najavljuju da će guvernera preslišati u skupštini zbog ovoga.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jun/17/greek-crisis-austria-default-ecb-banks-live#block-55816776e4b05c5f91d258ca

Edited June 17, 2015 by vememah

[MancMellow]

Grčka centralna banka trenutnu poziciju naziva "upravljivom dužničkom krizom" i upozorava na rizike usled nepostizanja sporazuma:

 

 

Čini mi se da je ovo (i) kontriranje Varufakisovom kurčenju oko izlaska iz EZ.

 

Sad se potezu sva oruzja :D Ne da je to u vezi nekontrolisanog defaulta netacno, nego 1 tajming...

[Prospero]

Peta kolona!

[MancMellow]

:D

 

Ovo ce otici u "zaustavno vreme"...

[Prospero]

Grčki parlamentarci iz Debt-truther-skog komiteta izdali saopštenje - svi dugovi prema MMF-u, ECB-u i EK su nelegalni, nelegitimni i odvratni, a Grčka je bila objekat njihovog smišljenog i organizovanog napada kako bi se privatni dug pretočio u javni.

 

Athens, June 17, 2015

Hellenic Parliament’s Debt Truth Committee Preliminary Findings - Executive Summary of the report

In June 2015 Greece stands at a crossroad of choosing between furthering the failed macroeconomic adjustment programmes imposed by the creditors or making a real change to break the chains of debt. Five years since the economic adjustment programmes began, the country remains deeply cemented in an economic, social, democratic and ecological crisis. The black box of debt has remained closed, and until now no authority, Greek or international, has sought to bring to light the truth about how and why Greece was subjected to the Troika regime. The debt, in whose name nothing has been spared, remains the rule through which neoliberal adjustment is imposed, and the deepest and longest recession experienced in Europe during peacetime.
There is an immediate need and social responsibility to address a range of legal, social and economic issues that demand proper consideration. In response, the Hellenic Parliament established the Truth Committee on Public Debt in April 2015, mandating the investigation into the creation and growth of public debt, the way and reasons for which debt was contracted, and the impact that the conditionalities attached to the loans have had on the economy and the population. The Truth Committee has a mandate to raise awareness of issues pertaining to the Greek debt, both domestically and internationally, and to formulate arguments and options concerning the cancellation of the debt.
The research of the Committee presented in this preliminary report sheds light on the fact that the entire adjustment programme, to which Greece has been subjugated, was and remains a politically orientated programme. The technical exercise surrounding macroeconomic variables and debt projections, figures directly relating to people’s lives and livelihoods, has enabled discussions around the debt to remain at a technical level mainly revolving around the argument that the policies imposed on Greece will improve its capacity to pay the debt back. The facts presented in this report challenge this argument.
All the evidence we present in this report shows that Greece not only does not have the ability to pay this debt, but also should not pay this debt first and foremost because the debt emerging from the Troika’s arrangements is a direct infringement on the fundamental human rights of the residents of Greece. Hence, we came to the conclusion that Greece should not pay this debt because it is illegal, illegitimate, and odious.
It has also come to the understanding of the Committee that the unsustainability of the Greek public debt was evident from the outset to the international creditors, the Greek authorities, and the corporate media. Yet, the Greek authorities, together with some other governments in the EU, conspired against the restructuring of public debt in 2010 in order to protect financial institutions. The corporate media hid the truth from the public by depicting a situation in which the bailout was argued to benefit Greece, whilst spinning a narrative intended to portray the population as deservers of their own wrongdoings.
Bailout funds provided in both programmes of 2010 and 2012 have been externally managed through complicated schemes, preventing any fiscal autonomy. The use of the bailout money is strictly dictated by the creditors, and so, it is revealing that less than 10% of these funds have been destined to the government’s current expenditure.
This preliminary report presents a primary mapping out of the key problems and issues associated with the public debt, and notes key legal violations associated with the contracting of the debt; it also traces out the legal foundations, on which unilateral suspension of the debt payments can be based.
 
The findings are presented in nine chapters structured as follows:

Chapter 1, Debt before the Troika, analyses the growth of the Greek public debt since the 1980s. It concludes that the increase in debt was not due to excessive public spending, which in fact remained lower than the public spending of other Eurozone countries, but rather due to the payment of extremely high rates of interest to creditors, excessive and unjustified military spending, loss of tax revenues due to illicit capital outflows, state recapitalization of private banks, and the international imbalances created via the flaws in the design of the Monetary Union itself.
Adopting the euro led to a drastic increase of private debt in Greece to which major European private banks as well as the Greek banks were exposed. A growing banking crisis contributed to the Greek sovereign debt crisis. George Papandreou’s government helped to present the elements of a banking crisis as a sovereign debt crisis in 2009 by emphasizing and boosting the public deficit and debt.


Chapter 2, Evolution of Greek public debt during 2010-2015, concludes that the first loan agreement of 2010, aimed primarily to rescue the Greek and other European private banks, and to allow the banks to reduce their exposure to Greek government bonds.

Chapter 3, Greek public debt by creditor in 2015, presents the contentious nature of Greece’s current debt, delineating the loans’ key characteristics, which are further analysed in Chapter 8.

Chapter 4, Debt System Mechanism in Greece reveals the mechanisms devised by the agreements that were implemented since May 2010. They created a substantial amount of new debt to bilateral creditors and the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), whilst generating abusive costs thus deepening the crisis further. The mechanisms disclose how the majority of borrowed funds were transferred directly to financial institutions. Rather than benefitting Greece, they have accelerated the privatization process, through the use of financial instruments.

Chapter 5, Conditionalities against sustainability, presents how the creditors imposed intrusive conditionalities attached to the loan agreements, which led directly to the economic unviability and unsustainability of debt. These conditionalities, on which the creditors still insist, have not only contributed to lower GDP as well as higher public borrowing, hence a higher public debt/GDP making Greece’s debt more unsustainable, but also engineered dramatic changes in the society, and caused a humanitarian crisis. The Greek public debt can be considered as totally unsustainable at present.

Chapter 6, Impact of the “bailout programmes” on human rights, concludes that the measures implemented under the “bailout programmes” have directly affected living conditions of the people and violated human rights, which Greece and its partners are obliged to respect, protect and promote under domestic, regional and international law. The drastic adjustments, imposed on the Greek economy and society as a whole, have brought about a rapid deterioration of living standards, and remain incompatible with social justice, social cohesion, democracy and human rights.

Chapter 7, Legal issues surrounding the MOU and Loan Agreements, argues there has been a breach of human rights obligations on the part of Greece itself and the lenders, that is the Euro Area (Lender) Member States, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and theInternational Monetary Fund, who imposed these measures on Greece. All these actors failed to assess the human rights violations as an outcome of the policies they obliged Greece to pursue, and also directly violated the Greek constitution by effectively stripping Greece of most of its sovereign rights. The agreements contain abusive clauses, effectively coercing Greece to surrender significant aspects of its sovereignty. This is imprinted in the choice of the English law as governing law for those agreements, which facilitated the circumvention of the Greek Constitution and international human rights obligations. Conflicts with human rights and customary obligations, several indications of contracting parties acting in bad faith, which together with the unconscionable character of the agreements, render these agreements invalid.

Chapter 8, Assessment of the Debts as regards illegtimacy, odiousness, illegality, and unsustainability, provides an assessment of the Greek public debt according to the definitions regarding illegitimate, odious, illegal, and unsustainable debt adopted by the Committee.
Chapter 8 concludes that the Greek public debt as of June 2015 is unsustainable, since Greece is currently unable to service its debt without seriously impairing its capacity to fulfill its basic human rights obligations. Furthermore, for each creditor, the report provides evidence of indicative cases of illegal, illegitimate and odious debts.

Debt to the IMF should be considered illegal since its concession breached the IMF’s own statutes, and its conditions breached the Greek Constitution, international customary law, and treaties to which Greece is a party. It is also illegitimate, since conditions included policy prescriptions that infringed human rights obligations. Finally, it is odious since the IMF knew that the imposed measures were undemocratic, ineffective, and would lead to serious violations of socio-economic rights.

Debts to the ECB should be considered illegal since the ECB over-stepped its mandate by imposing the application of macroeconomic adjustment programs (e.g. labour market deregulation) via its participation in the Troïka. Debts to the ECB are also illegitimate and odious, since the principal raison d’etre of the Securities Market Programme (SMP) was to serve the interests of the financial institutions, allowing the major European and Greek private banks to dispose of their Greek bonds.

The EFSF engages in cash-less loans which should be considered illegal because Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) was violated, and further they breach several socio-economic rights and civil liberties. Moreover, the EFSF Framework Agreement 2010 and the Master Financial Assistance Agreement of 2012 contain several abusive clauses revealing clear misconduct on the part of the lender. The EFSF also acts against democratic principles, rendering these particular debts illegitimate and odious.

The bilateral loans should be considered illegal since they violate the procedure provided by the Greek constitution. The loans involved clear misconduct by the lenders, and had conditions that contravened law or public policy. Both EU law and international law were breached in order to sideline human rights in the design of the macroeconomic programmes. The bilateral loans are furthermore illegitimate, since they were not used for the benefit of the population, but merely enabled the private creditors of Greece to be bailed out. Finally, the bilateral loans are odious since the lender states and the European Commission knew of potential violations, but in 2010 and 2012 avoided to assess the human rights impacts of the macroeconomic adjustment and fiscal consolidation that were the conditions for the loans.

The debt to private creditors should be considered illegal because private banks conducted themselves irresponsibly before the Troika came into being, failing to observe due diligence, while some private creditors such as hedge funds also acted in bad faith. Parts of the debts to private banks and hedge funds are illegitimate for the same reasons that they are illegal; furthermore, Greek banks were illegitimately recapitalized by tax-payers. Debts to private banks and hedge funds are odious, since major private creditors were aware that these debts were not incurred in the best interests of the population but rather for their own benefit.

The report comes to a close with some practical considerations.
 
Chapter 9, Legal foundations for repudiation and suspension of the Greek sovereign debt, presents the options concerning the cancellation of debt, and especially the conditions under which a sovereign state can exercise the right to unilateral act of repudiation or suspension of the payment of debt under international law.
Several legal arguments permit a State to unilaterally repudiate its illegal, odious, and illegitimate debt. In the Greek case, such a unilateral act may be based on the following arguments: the bad faith of the creditors that pushed Greece to violate national law and international obligations related to human rights; preeminence of human rights over agreements such as those signed by previous governments with creditors or the Troika; coercion; unfair terms flagrantly violating Greek sovereignty and violating the Constitution; and finally, the right recognized in international law for a State to take countermeasures against illegal acts by its creditors , which purposefully damage its fiscal sovereignty, oblige it to assume odious, illegal and illegitimate debt, violate economic self-determination and fundamental human rights. As far as unsustainable debt is concerned, every state is legally entitled to invoke necessity in exceptional situations in order to safeguard those essential interests threatened by a grave and imminent peril. In such a situation, the State may be dispensed from the fulfilment of those international obligations that augment the peril, as is the case with outstanding loan contracts. Finally, states have the right to declare themselves unilaterally insolvent where the servicing of their debt is unsustainable, in which case they commit no wrongful act and hence bear no liability.

People’s dignity is worth more than illegal, illegitimate, odious and unsustainable debt

Having concluded a preliminary investigation, the Committee considers that Greece has been and still is the victim of an attack premeditated and organized by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission. This violent, illegal, and immoral mission aimed exclusively at shifting private debt onto the public sector.

Making this preliminary report available to the Greek authorities and the Greek people, the Committee considers to have fulfilled the first part of its mission as defined in the decision of the President of Parliament of 4 April 2015. The Committee hopes that the report will be a useful tool for those who want to exit the destructive logic of austerity and stand up for what is endangered today: human rights, democracy, peoples’ dignity, and the future of generations to come.
In response to those who impose unjust measures, the Greek people might invoke what Thucydides mentioned about the constitution of the Athenian people: "As for the name, it is called a democracy, for the administration is run with a view to the interests of the many, not of the few” (Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in the speech from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War).

 
 
 
Tukidid na kraju.

[Аврам Гојић]

[Prospero]

Eee, posle fuckanja nema kajanja :(

[archi]

Grčka će se izvući, naravno.

 

Po antičkoj Agori šetao se Aristotel, a imaju i Delfe gde su oduvek odlučivale najjače cice, u zanosnom transu usled neviđenih aromatičnih isparenja.

 

Partenon. Kakav hram. Na kamenu mudrosti izraslom iz temelja Atine. Iz korena sveta. Sa svim svetskim, izuzetnim cicama koje se gore fotkaju.

 

Grčka. NATO carica.

 

Sa američkim bazama, suvlakijima, girosima i lukumadesima.

 

http://www.lukumades.com/