Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Prospero]

The IMF decision: How Greece skirted disaster

Greece has paid the fund a day early — and might thus lift the mood at a meeting of eurozone finance ministers tonight.

By PIERRE BRIANÇON

11/5/15, 6:59 PM CET

 

 

Greece faced a Faustian bargain this week: whether to default on an International Monetary Fund loan or continue defaulting on its own people — such as the thousands of businesses whose invoices haven’t been paid by the government for months. It has opted for the latter, according to the Greece finance ministry, and paid the IMF a day early. It’s easy to see why: the consequences of even a partial default to the fund would have sent the Greek economy into a tailspin and paved the way for an accidental euro exit.

Athen’s decision is bound to lift the mood at a meeting of eurozone finance ministers Monday – even though hopes for breakthrough progress on the stalled cash-for-reforms negotiations were subdued at best. Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, sidelined from the direct conduct of the talks, expressed the hope that his country’s “red lines and (the eurozone’s) red lines” would ultimately prove compatible. But the feeling wasn’t shared.

His French counterpart, Michel Sapin, summed up the general feeling by warning that even if the eurogroup meeting proved “positive,” it wouldn’t be “decisive.”

“Political willingness and substance always go together. Political willingness has to be there in order to put Greece back on a stable footing,” said Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the chair of the eurogroup, adding that “no final outcome, no result (was)on the table.”

Still, the IMF payment will be seen both as good news and a decision that avoided much worse news. The €750 million in principal Greece paid back to the IMF as of Tuesday amount to a lot of cash for a country reduced to barrel-scraping to pay its teachers, policemen and tax inspectors. But not paying would have marked a historical precedent, and cost the country much more.

In and by itself, a default on the loan would not have plunged the country into immediate financial and legal Armageddon. But the decision would have triggered unpredictable ripple effects.

In a meeting with Varoufakis last month in Washington. IMF General Director Christine Lagarde said she had “explained the policy of the IMF in terms of payment delays and give the precedents and history of that” to the Greek finance minister. “Payment delays have not been granted by the board of the IMF in 30 years,” she added. Varoufakis had denied media reports that he had explored the possibility of delays with the IMF head.

It would have taken a few months before Greece could be declared in formal arrears at the IMF, and other creditors wouldn’t have necessarily declared a formal default. The most important actor would have been the European Central Bank, which retains its discretionary power over the Greek banking system, and can decide at any time to continue allowing Athens’ emergency liquidity assistance even after a Greek IMF incident.

But all these technicalities paled in comparison to the risk induced by defaulting on the IMF. First, there was the signal. The only countries currently in arrears with the Fund are Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Three poor and war-torn countries, who together own the IMF the equivalent of €1.6 billion. “Not paying is sending the strong message that there’s no money left,” notes Robert Kuenzel, eurozone economist at Daiwa Capital Markets. “Even at the ECB, no one is really sure about the extent of Greece’s cash crunch,” he added. “Some think they can last till the end of June, but no one knows. Not paying the IMF really means: this is the end of the road.”

Second, the reaction. A public acknowledgment by the Greek government that it is out of cash could have triggered a full-blown bank run. Greek bank customers have withdrawn about 20 percent of their deposits since December. That’s where the ECB’s decision was to be crucial. It must first assess the solvency of Greek banks — good so far, but at some point a serious liquidity crisis can tip a bank into insolvency. That in turn raises the possibility of capital controls to stem the flow, which would have to be in place quickly, with or without the ECB’s tacit blessing. “In any case of depositors’ flight you want to get there before it happens of if you can’t, immediately after it has happened,” Kuenzel notes.

Finally there’s the immediate cost, to the Greek government, of a default: it would have lost further IMF funding the moment it failed to pay back in time – just as the IMF was to contribute €3.5 billion of the €7.2 billion aid tranche Greece and its partners are currently fighting over. In other words, failing to pay on Tuesday would cost five times as much in the very short term.

A decision by the IMF to opt out of the Greek bailout would have forced the European bailout fund (now called European Stability Mechanism) to pick up the 10 billion-odd difference the IMF was expected to provide until mid-2016, or some European governments might have decided to pull the plug. Some creditor countries made IMF contribution in the Greek bailout a condition of their own participation in 2010 and 2012. At the very least an IMF default would have rekindled protests among national parliaments in the north. “You can see German hardliners hiding behind the IMF incident to say: ‘That government is hopeless, let’s get out,’ ” notes an ECB insider.

If panic didn’t freeze the banking system, requiring emergency measures, the ECB could always decide to keep funding the country’s lenders, notes Raoul Ruparel, head of economic research at Open Europe, a London-based think tank. “The central bank’s rules have become fluid during the crisis. The IMF situation could always be massaged and managed”, he says.

That’s not the case of the money owed the ECB in July and August, when about €7 billion of Greek bonds mature. The central bank might not be as relaxed with its own cash as it may possibly be with the IMF’s. But Mario Draghi is walking a fine line. If a bank run follows a partial default Tuesday, and forces Greece to a messy euro exit, getting the ECB money back this summer will be a moot concern. That’s the perspective that is sobering minds and pushing everyone to come to an agreement by the end of June, when Greece’s current bailout expires.

 

 

[Prospero]

Niko ne komentariše što je Grčka pozvana da pristupi BRICS razvojnoj banci?

 

rusi buškaju gde misle da je meko.

 

nisam siguran da su brojke koje su potrebne grčkoj prihvatljive brics-u u celini, mada ako kinezi zalegnu i za svoje investicije (pirejska i solunska luka) možda nešto i urade. 

[Shan Jan]

Economist je najgore propagandno smece.

[Prospero]

zanimljivo viđenje grčkog problema:
 

Why Greece is Different

DANIEL GROS
 
 

BRUSSELS – The seemingly interminable negotiations between the new Greek government and its international creditors – the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission – on a new loan deal have entered a dangerous phase. At this point, a mistake on either side threatens to trigger the kind of accident that could precipitate a new crisis in Europe.

The IMF seems ready to throw in the towel – not least because of the recent revelation that Greece could post a small primary budget deficit (which excludes interest payments) this year, rather than the planned sizeable surplus. But, with Greece’s economy tanking again, its government is convinced that the current repayment program is not working – and that, in the absence of significant adjustments, it never will.

Fundamental to Greece’s case for new bailout terms is the narrative – reinforced by its current economic travails – that it has been a victim of excessive austerity. But this neglects a crucial fact: austerity worked in Europe’s other crisis-hit countries. Indeed, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and even Cyprus are showing clear signs of recovery, with unemployment finally falling (albeit slowly and from high levels) and access to capital markets restored.

Why is Greece different?

The short answer is exports. In all of the other crisis-hit countries (and, indeed, in most of the dozens of countries that have received IMF loans in recent decades), rising exports offset, at least partly, the hit that demand took when their governments slashed spending and raised taxes to balance their books.

Of course, in a large economy where external financing is not a problem, as in the United States or the eurozone, attempting to reduce a budget deficit could conceivably lead to such a large decline in demand (and thus tax revenues) that austerity becomes self-defeating. But this argument does not apply to Greece.

In fact, Greece was running very large current-account deficits – exceeding 10% of GDP – when external financing dried up suddenly in 2008-2009, forcing an adjustment in domestic spending. If the Greek government had not made such an adjustment, domestic demand and employment would certainly have remained higher – but so would imports and large external deficits. So, while austerity did cause a deep recession, it enabled Greece to avoid large external deficits, thereby reducing the size of the bailout the country needed.

Export performance is thus the key to escaping the austerity trap. The problem for Greece is that what little export growth it has experienced lately is largely illusory, as it has come mostly from petroleum products. Since Greece does not produce oil, this can mean only that Greek refiners, which now have considerable excess capacity, are simply exporting imported crude oil in a slightly different form. With refinery margins typically less than 5%, the economy is gaining little added value from these exports. Other exports that have increased, such as metals, raise a similar problem.

Moreover, Greece’s largest services export, maritime shipping, has few real links with the rest of the economy, given that companies in the sector pay no taxes and employ few Greeks (the crews hail from low-wage countries). Undermining the sector’s economic contribution further is the fact that global commodity prices, on which shipping rates depend, have lately been declining. Meanwhile, manufactured goods, which do add domestic value and employment, form only a small share of Greece’s overall exports.

In fact, Greece’s total foreign trade, if properly measured, amounts to only 12% of its GDP, much less than what one would expect from such a small economy. More jarring is the fact that Greece’s total trade deficit (including both goods and services), was even higher in 2008, amounting to 13% of GDP, implying that, in order to avoid a subsequent decline in imports and thus in domestic demand, exports would have had to more than double.

In Portugal, by contrast, the trade deficit amounted to only about one-third of exports in 2008, meaning that exports had to increase by one-third to close the external deficit, without reducing imports. Since then, Portugal has increased exports cumulatively by more than one-quarter, so that, despite a slight increase in imports since 2007, it runs a trade surplus.

To be sure, Greece’s trade deficit has declined, but only because imports collapsed. Meanwhile, exports stagnated, even as wages declined by more than 20%. That, not austerity, is Greece’s real problem. If Greece had experienced the same growth in exports as Portugal (a country of similar size and per capita income), it would not have experienced such a deep recession, and tax revenues would have been higher, making it much easier for the government to achieve a primary budget surplus.

This suggests that a combination of fiscal consolidation, lower wages, and export-oriented reforms could have enabled Greece to move toward a sustainable recovery. This approach has been tried before, and it has failed only once, when Argentina had to default on its foreign debt in 2002 and break a decade-long 1:1 peg to the US dollar.

Unfortunately, Greece resembles Argentina in two key respects. Both countries have only a small export sector, which makes external adjustment much more difficult; and both have an export structure that is skewed toward commodities, the supply of which is unlikely to change much, even as structural reforms are pursued or wages decline.

Of course, this does not mean that Greece is doomed to follow in Argentina’s footsteps toward default. But it does highlight the challenge that the country faces today – namely, to rebuild its export sector from the ground up.

It is time for Greece’s government to recognize this imperative and expand the scope of negotiations with its creditors to include not just the budget, but also strategies for stimulating exports. But, first, Greece must finally recognize that austerity is not the enemy.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greece-export-problem-by-daniel-gros-2015-05#eAWEcF4VjDsLwO2F.99

 

[Ariel]

Meni kao ekonomskom laiku ovo ima smisla, ali malo mi redukcionistički, kao sve će biti kul ako samo povećate izvoz, mislim, kaže baja da to zahteva čitav niz strategija stimulacije, ali to mi deluje kao prilično dugoročan projekat, teško je učiniti konkurentijim ono što već izvoze a da ne daš subvencije, a podići neku novu granu proizvodnje ili industrije do nivoa kada bi se to moglo prodavati preko je jako zajebano i dugotrajno, čak i kada je neka tercijarna npr. softverska industrija.

 

Ima li austerity još nekih sakrivenih negativnih posledica osim očigledne aždaje tj. smanjenja kupovne moći pa samim tim i potražnje pa samim tim itd. itd?

[hazard]

Interesantno viđenje. No pitanje je kako do tog izvoza? I onda je jasno da dok ne dođe do te strukturne promene, yes, austerity is the enemy.

 

Mislim bez neke konkretne preporuke kako to uraditi, svodi se na zajebanciju šefa mog druga koji radi u jednoj finansijskoj firmi, koji je 2009. izjavio ,,Izračunao sam! Grčka treba da duplira cenu maslina. Onda svi mi na Zapadu treba da kupujemo duplo više maslina. To će učetvostručiti njihov prihod od maslina, i tako rešiti sve njihove probleme platnog bilansa i deficita".

[Prospero]

u pokojnom sovjetskom gosplan-u bi bili ponosni na njegov genij.

[Prospero]

svakakve opcije se vrte na stolu, pa i kolaps/bankrot unutar evrozone, a brisel se čini spremnin i za to:

 

 

Anatole Kaletsky

MAY 14, 2015

 

Why Syriza Will Blink

 

LONDON – Once again, Greece seems to have slipped the financial noose. By drawing on its holdings in an International Monetary Fund reserve account, it was able to repay €750 million ($851 million) – ironically to the IMF itself – just as the payment was falling due.

 

This brinkmanship is no accident. Since coming to power in January, the Greek government, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza party, has believed that the threat of default – and thus of a financial crisis that might break up the euro – provides negotiating leverage to offset Greece’s lack of economic and political power. Months later, Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, an academic expert in game theory, still seem committed to this view, despite the lack of any evidence to support it.

 

But their calculation is based on a false premise. Tsipras and Varoufakis assume that a default would force Europe to choose between just two alternatives: expel Greece from the eurozone or offer it unconditional debt relief. But the European authorities have a third option in the event of a Greek default. Instead of forcing a “Grexit,” the EU could trap Greece inside the eurozone and starve it of money, then simply sit back and watch the Tsipras government’s domestic political support collapse.

 

Such a siege strategy – waiting for Greece to run out of the money it needs to maintain the normal functions of government – now looks like the EU’s most promising technique to break Greek resistance. It is likely to work because the Greek government finds it increasingly difficult to scrape together enough money to pay wages and pensions at the end of each month.

 

To do so, Varoufakis has been resorting to increasingly desperate measures, such as seizing the cash in municipal and hospital bank accounts. The implication is that tax collections have been so badly hit by the economic chaos since January’s election that government revenues are no longer sufficient to cover day-to-day costs. If this is true – nobody can say for sure because of the unreliability of Greek financial statistics (another of the EU authorities’ complaints) – the Greek government’s negotiating strategy is doomed.

 

The Tsipras-Varoufakis strategy assumed that Greece could credibly threaten to default, because the government, if forced to follow through, would still have more than enough money to pay for wages, pensions, and public services. That was a reasonable assumption back in January. The government had budgeted for a large primary surplus (which excludes interest payments), which was projected at 4% of GDP.

 

If Greece had defaulted in January, this primary surplus could (in theory) have been redirected from interest payments to finance the higher wages, pensions, and public spending that Syriza had promised in its election campaign. Given this possibility, Varoufakis may have believed that he was making other EU finance ministers a generous offer by proposing to cut the primary surplus from 4% to 1% of GDP, rather than all the way to zero. If the EU refused, his implied threat was simply to stop paying interest and make the entire primary surplus available for extra public spending.

 

But what if the primary surplus – the Greek government’s trump card in its confrontational negotiating strategy – has now disappeared? In that case, the threat of default is no longer credible. With the primary surplus gone, a default would no longer permit Tsipras to fulfill Syriza’s campaign promises; on the contrary, it would imply even bigger cutbacks in wages, pensions, and public spending than the “troika” – the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF – is now demanding.

 

For the EU authorities, by contrast, a Greek default would now be much less problematic than previously assumed. They no longer need to deter a default by threatening Greece with expulsion from the euro. Instead, the EU can now rely on the Greek government itself to punish its people by failing to pay wages and pensions and honor bank guarantees.

 

Tsipras and Varoufakis should have seen this coming, because the same thing happened two years ago, when Cyprus, in the throes of a banking crisis, attempted to defy the EU. The Cyprus experience suggests that, with the credibility of the government’s default threat in tatters, the EU is likely to force Greece to stay in the euro and put it through an American-style municipal bankruptcy, like that of Detroit.

 

The legal and political mechanisms for treating Greece like a municipal bankruptcy are clear. The European treaties state unequivocally that euro membership is irreversible unless a country decides to exit not just from the single currency but from the entire EU. That is also the political message that EU governments want to instill in their own citizens and financial investors.

 

If Greece defaults, the EU will be legally justified and politically motivated to insist that the euro remains its only legal tender. Even if the Greek government decides to pay wages and pensions by printing its own IOUs or “new drachmas,” the European Court of Justice will rule that all domestic debts and bank deposits must be repaid in euros. That, in turn, will force a default against Greek citizens, as well as foreign creditors, because the government will be unable to honor the euro value of insured deposits in Greek banks.

 

So a Greek default within the euro, far from allowing Syriza to honor its election promises, would inflict even greater austerity on Greek voters than they endured under the troika program. At that point, the government’s collapse would become inevitable. Instead of Greece exiting the eurozone, Syriza would exit the Greek government. As soon as Tsipras realizes that the rules of the game between Greece and Europe have changed, his capitulation will be just a matter of time.

 

 

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/syriza-eu-default-negotiation-by-anatole-kaletsky-2015-05#kMkU0348sPBXIXLs.99

Edited May 18, 2015 by Prospero

[Budja]

Glup clanak.

Zasto bi u slucaju prisilnog ostanka grcka Vlada izabrala da ostane u evro-zoni? Koji je tu dobitak za njih?

 

 

Edit: + igranje politickim kolapsom usred EU koji moze da ode na sve strane je, onako, bas odgovorno.

Edited May 18, 2015 by Budja

[Prospero]

šta si ti čitao?

 

 The European treaties state unequivocally that euro membership is irreversible unless a country decides to exit not just from the single currency but from the entire EU.

...

 

Even if the Greek government decides to pay wages and pensions by printing its own IOUs or “new drachmas,” the European Court of Justice will rule that all domestic debts and bank deposits must be repaid in euros. 

nema dobitka za njih.

[MancMellow]

 

Edit: + igranje politickim kolapsom usred EU koji moze da ode na sve strane je, onako, bas odgovorno.

 

Sad videh, sorry.

 

Pa ja to pricam sve vreme. Moze da se desi da je ovo poslednje grcko resenje u okviru kakvog-takvog mejnstrima. Jedino sto ja sada vec mislim da neke cak i za to bas briga. 

[Prospero]

Greece: We really mean it this time

Greek leaders swear they're truly going to run out of money as another key payment deadline looms.

 

By JAN CIENSKI

25/5/15, 5:23 PM CET

 

As Greece nears another payment deadline, its leaders are issuing increasingly dire warnings about their inability to make good on their debts.

 

It’s becoming a common routine: Greek politicians take to local television claiming that the country’s creditors will not get repaid. They did it over the weekend, just as they had earlier in May, only to make the payments and avoid default. 

 

But this time, Greek officials swear, the money won’t be there June 5 when a €301 million bill to the International Monetary Fund comes due.

“This money will not be given and is not there to be given,” Greek interior minister Nikos Voutsis said on Greece’s Mega TV.

 

Voutsis, who actually doesn’t have any sway over Greece’s economic policy, said Greece won’t be able to repay the IMF the €1.5 billion it owes through June. The comment followed earlier statements by the ruling anti-austerity Syriza party that Greece won’t be able to make the June 5 payment without help from its creditors.

 

Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister who does have a lot to say on the issue, appeared on the BBC over the weekend and sounded slightly more upbeat, saying that Greece has made “enormous strides” in talks with its creditors. But he too warned that the point was coming when “we are not going to be able to do it” and the repayments will stop.

 

He said Greece’s European partners are fooling themselves if they think that Greece’s exit from the eurozone and the chaos that results from a return to the drachma would be anything but “catastrophic.”

 

It would be “a disaster for everyone … the beginning of the end of the common currency project,” Varoufakis said.

 

Those gloomy noises spooked markets, with the main Athens stock index down 2.9 percent during trading Monday.

 

They are also raising fears over the stability of the Greek banking system. Deposit outflows slowed in March to only €2.5 billion from 10 times that amount in the first two months of this year. But any signal that a Greek departure from the eurozone is becoming probable could spur another rush for the exits as bank customers shift their savings to safer countries.

 

Speaking on Greek television Monday, a former opposition foreign minister, Dora Bakogiannis, warned that if Greece doesn’t quickly strike a deal with its creditors then capital controls could be imposed as early as this weekend. Government spokesman Gavriil Sakellaridis called the idea “ridiculous,” saying that the possibility of capital controls “simply do not exist.”

 

After four months of talks, Greece’s government still has not reached a point at which the remaining €7.2 billion in an earlier loan package can be released and negotiations can start on a third bailout that could finally end the Greek crisis.

 

“We have met them three quarters of the way, they need to meet us one-quarter of the way,” Varoufakis told the BBC.

 

But that isn’t entirely the case. Creditors have already loosened some of their goals, namely the size of the budget surplus that Greece would have to run in the next years. There appears to be no flexibility on allowing the Greek government to backtrack on earlier austerity promises by increasing the minimum wage and keeping up labor protection regulations, but those issues go to the heart of the promises Syriza made to its voters in elections earlier this year.

“We are prepared to bargain all the way to the wire,” Varoufakis said.

 

 

 

Grčki ministri za sada uspešno obaraju atinsku berzu, za ostalo ćemo videti  -_-

 

Inače, sin Dore Bakojanis, Kostas, je upravnik oblasti Tebe i pljucka po 'starim partijama' pa ne znam jel zaista to misli ili se samo familija podelila kako bi u svakoj vlasti imala nekog svog. :D

[Prospero]

Maxime Sbaihi @MxSba 11m11 minutes ago

CHART: #Greece bleeding continues. New OFFICIAL data show bank deposits down (again!) by 6 bn€ in April. 11-year low.

 

[Frank Pembleton]

 

DANICA POPOVIĆ

 

Siriza i Srbiza

Ako si dužan – pare moraš da vratiš, makar te podržavao ceo narod i još trista nobelovaca. – Ako hoćeš da uđeš (Srbija) ili da ostaneš u EU (Grčka) – onda prihvataš sistem koji tamo vlada

Liči li vam Srbija na Grčku? Dugovi rastu, vlast sve jače steže kaiš, narodu sve gore, da ne nabrajam, znam da znate... Kad odjednom, tamo, u Grčkoj, neka mala stranka (inače, ekstremna levica) osvaja apsolutnu većinu u parlamentu! Grčka u delirijumu: znači, može bez MMF-a, bez uslovljavanja, otpuštanja, privatizacija... I ne samo to. Siriza obećava da će plate da porastu, otpušteni da se vrate na posao, da će privreda najzad da procveta. A dugovi? Njih će „trojka” (MMF, Evropska komisija i Evropska centralna banka) da otpiše – takva je narodna volja, protiv toga se ne može – govorila je u februaru Siriza.

I nobelovci – ekonomisti su ih podržali, to jest, barem dva: Džozef Stiglic i Kristofer Pisarides. A petnaestak najuglednijih ekonomista sveta (pred same izbore) u „Fajnenšel tajmsu” poručiše: Siriza je spas! Mislio ko šta hoće, ovoliku podršku nauke nijedna partija u svetu nije zabeležila.

Treba li se onda čuditi srpskim demokratama što bi i oni da skinu kajmak? Hajde da priznamo: Siriza je jasno pokazala put kojim se dolazi do parlamentarne većine, ko bi tome odoleo!

I sad, da se tamo cela stvar nije urušila za sto dana, pa da se ne čudimo. Ali ovako, posle totalnog fijaska grčke pregovaračke strategije, najava potpredsednika DS-a da pravi isti takav program (povećaćemo plate i penzije, udružićemo se sa zemljama zapadnog Balkana radi moratorijuma na isplatu spoljnog duga) stvarno zvuči – nadrealno.

Gde je to Siriza pogrešila, a naše demokrate ne vide? Najpre u tome što Evropom vladaju institucije, to jest, pravila. Ako si dužan – pare moraš da vratiš, makar te podržavao ceo narod i još trista nobelovaca. Ako hoćeš da uđeš (Srbija) ili da ostaneš u EU (Grčka) – onda prihvataš sistem koji tamo vlada. Ako hoćeš pregovore, moraš nešto da ponudiš. A Siriza, da se vratim na temu, od februara nudi mačku u džaku, a traži – pare.

Kako izgleda ta Sirizina mačka u džaku? Nakon bezbroj izvrdavanja, grčki ministar finansija konačno je početkom maja objavio da je Grčka spremna da uvede dve nove institucije: jedna je razvojna banka, a druga – banka za loše plasmane. To bi, kaže ministar, podstaklo investicije i ubrzalo privredni rast. Kako da ne, razmišljam. Barem mi znamo šta to znači: sveže pare tajkunima i prijateljima, pa onda (de fakto) otpis duga za sve ostale – i udri brigu na veselje!

Varufakis, doduše, priznaje da Grčka time ne rešava nijedan od mnogobrojnih problema, pa ih onda redom navodi. To su, dakle: „sramna sprega tajkuna i političara, skandalozne procedure javnih nabavki, klijentelizam, trajno urušeni mediji, prekomerno darežljive banke, slaba poreska administracija i degradirano i plašljivo sudstvo”. Varufakis dalje kaže da će sve to izlečiti „jaka svetlost demokratske transparentnosti”, što u prevodu znači – niko.

Posle ove objave, Varufakisa napustiše svi: i Evropa – i Grci. „Trojka” mu je kroz usta jednog zvaničnika poručila da je zgubidan, kockar i amater, a Grci su još ogorčeniji, jer u tom programu nema ništa od otpisa duga, ni od rasta plata, ni od novih radnih mesta!

Gde je Siriza pogrešila? Pa, greška je u tome što su mislili da „trojka” ima samo dve opcije: da prihvati njihove zahteve – ili da ih otera iz monetarne unije. A oni uradiše nešto treće: sede i čekaju. I gledaju kako Grci više ne mogu da skupe ni ono malo para koje je prethodna vlada uspevala da utera u budžet. A privredni rast od preko dva odsto, koliko se ove godine moglo ostvariti sa prethodnom vladom, pretvorio se u pad od minus pola procenta. Za sada.

Ne čudi, stoga, što ankete pokazuju da se prepolovila podrška Sirizinoj strategiji pregovora sa poveriocima, kao ni to da je danas više onih koji bi da odustanu (61 odsto) nego onih koji bi da nastave sa tvrdom pregovaračkom strategijom (35 odsto).

Od apsolutne većine do apsolutne katastrofe put je trajao sto dana. U redovima Sirize tinja pobuna, poslanici više ne podržavaju svoje rukovodstvo. Za usvajanje bilo kog zakona vlast koja ima apsolutnu većinu moraće da se osloni na podršku opozicionih partija.

Tuga, velika. Grčka je, za razliku od Srbije, zemlja gde ljudi rade više nego bilo koji narod u Evropi. Evo brojeva: Grci rade 42,2 sata nedeljno; Nemci – 35,6 sati; Holanđani – 30,5 sati i tako redom.

I još je, za razliku od Srbije, Grčka u Evropskoj uniji, te će se svi još dugo truditi da se nađe kompromis i da svi nekako sačuvaju obraz. Tako da mi Grka, u stvari, i nije žao.

Žao mi je nas, kada nam kao alternativu ovom rušenju institucija u kome živimo ponude – Srbizu.

Profesorka Ekonomskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu

Danica Popović

[MancMellow]

Ma nema, kakav Stiglic, kakav Krugman, koji Nobel, trista svetskih ekonomista, kurac palac, Dana je za njih majka. 

 

 

 

Ako si dužan – pare moraš da vratiš

 

Imam par istoriceskih ekvivalenata ovoj viskoj ekonomskoj mudrosti> Npr: Nemacka je izgubila WW2 zato sto je izgubila vazne bitke. Ili - Ako je Napoleon hteo da osvoji Evropu morao je da pobedi Rusiju. I tako to. Ako nema para - stedi. Fala. Fala gospodji sto prodaje paradajz na pijaci posto je to otprilike nivo pameti koji neophodan za takve zakljucke. 

 

Ja sam u stvari tek sad u depresiji posto oni koji su kao vrh ekonomske nauke kod nas ne znaju nista pametnije nego da se nasladju jednoj prostoj pobedi sile i politike nad (njihovom) naukom.