Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[hazard]

Naravno da svaka partija ima odredjeni ideoloski sentiment, pa i nabrojane. Nije u tome poenta - poenta je u tome da se Siriza putem svog imena jasno i odrecno ideoloski odredjuje - Koalicije radikalne levice. I u tom smislu se ocekuje da deluju radikalno levicarski, a ne kao socijaldemokratska partija (socijaldemokratija nije radikalna levica, jel). O tome je govorio Budja. Zato je izlistao stranke koje imaju "ideolosko neutralna" imena - ne u odnosu na ideologiju uopste, vec u odnosu na tradicionalnu levo-desno podelu. Vecina tih stranaka ima neki miks ideologije (kod nekih, poput G17, je uglavnom bio populizam, svetski trendovi i daj sta treba da predjemo cenzus) i ne moze se svrstati lako u neku klasicnu levicu ili desnicu, i ako (narocito u svom lokalnom kontekstu) mozda vise vuce na levo (npr. Podemos) ili desno (npr. DJB). Da ilustrujem koliko si promasio poentu, evo primera:

 

 

 Dosta je bilo - ekstremni neoliberalizam (Sasa Radulovic poznat po svojim "mudrim izjavama" tipa "gazde nisu krive kada otpustaju radnike jer to rade kada je radnik los ili kada je smanjena privredna aktivnost" i "lose gazde su losi ljudi, a sa losim ljudima vam ne pomazu nikakvi zakoni")

 

Da, i takodje je poznat po izjavama "penzioneri koji nisu zaradili penziju dovoljno veliku za zivot treba da imaju socijalnu penziju od drzave u visini minimalca" i "zdravstveno osiguranje mora biti dostupno svima, i svi treba da imaju overenu knjizicu bez obzira da li su zaposleni, nezaposleni, na birou, studenti, itd. itd. vec samom cinjenicom da su gradjani Srbije" i "treba uvesti univerzalnu socijalnu pomoc da ljudi bez posla primaju nekakav minimalac od drzave" i "treba povecati porez na imovinu i na profite kompanija".

 

"Ekstremni neoliberal" bi valjda rekao

- potpuno privatizovati penzijski sistem, od drzave da ne dobijas nista zato sto si penzioner

- potpuno privatizovati zdravstveni sistem, drzava tu ne treba da se petlja

- sniziti (ili bar ne povecavati) poreze na profit

- snizit (ili bar ne povecavati) poreze na imovinu

- za socijalnu pomoc obratite se crkvi, crvenom krstu i humanitarnim fondacijama, sta tu ima drzava da se petlja

 

Takodje, oni koji se percipiraju kao "ekstremni neoliberali" uglavnom titraju jajca velikim korporacijama, dok je Radulovic izricito protiv toga i pobornik je malih i srednjih privrednika.

 

Elem, s obzirom na ideoloski miks, DJB je odlican primer onoga sto je Budja govorio. Za ove ostale slicno vazi, al da ne ulazimo sad u program svakih u sitna crevca (DJB znam manje vise napamet, ove druge bi morao da guglam da bi potvrdio sve).

[hazard]

Nije poenta u DJB i Radulovicu (ima topik o njemu ako bas oces), poenta je da ja znam njegov program manje-vise detaljno (:D) pa je fina ilustracija za tvoje totalno promasivanje Budjine poente. Mislim, mozemo i da seciramo program Trece Srbije ako hoces, ali je to vec opasno gubljenje vremena (s obzirom da su oni zapravo grupa razbojnika ciji je glavni cilj isisavanje budzetskih para u svoje dzepove, a kojim se ideoloskim carsavom prekrivaju manje je bitno).

 

Sirize nije bas koalicija svega i svacega vec - radikalne levice. Koliko god raznorazni elementi te koalicije bili drugaciji, svi se oni kao identifikuju sa tom radikalnom levicom, pa se s toga ocekuje i njihovo ponasanje u skladu sa tim. I njihov predizborni program bio je dosta levlji od recimo PASOKa. U tom smislu je i Budjina kritika bila upucena.

[Ariel]

boro tj. ramize, očigledno u priču o nrduletu ulaziš s jasno definisanim predrasudama, mislim, zakucan ti čovek kao ekstremni neo-liberal, iako jedini zapravo ima nekakav suvisao socijaldemokratski program, čime si već dosta rekao o svojoj neupućenosti. naravno, kao odgovor ti projektuješ da će se on ponašati isto kao SPS ako ikada okusi neku vlast, što verovatno znaš tako što imaš moć da vidiš budućnost ili poseduješ galaktički intelekt koji laserski vidi kroz sve maske u srce suštine i istine.

 

edit: a jes oftopičkaranje, neću više

Edited April 15, 2015 by Ariel

[hazard]

 OK, mozda nisam ukapirao poentu posta!

 Normalno je da je program SIRIZA-e radikalniji od programa PASOK-a jer je PASOK partija socijaldemokratije i to socijaldemokratije koja je od doba Tonija Blera i Gerharda Sredera u Evropi ostala prazna ljustura! Osim sto je ostao sterilna, mejnstrim partija, PASOK je u dve velike koalicije sa Novom demokratijom postao partija koja je sprovodila program kreditora. Dakle, bila je partija sistema. Nastavila je da brani sistem u Grckoj i sada, kada je on dosao do ivice pucanja. SIRIZA je antisistemska partija, ne u smislu da ce puskama i terorizmom da rusi sistem, vec da zeli korenite promene koje prevazilaze okvire zadatog politickog, ekonomskog i ideoloskog sistema savremene Grcke.

  Sada, pitanje za tebe: ako su toliki ideoloski cistunci, nevezano za to da li sam promasio ili ne @Budjin post, zasto nisu napravili postizbornu koaliciju sa KPG nego sa Nezavisnim Grcima, koji mu dodju, otprilike, kao neka Grcka verzija DSS-a?

 

Koliko sam ja shvatio Komunisti mrze Sirizu i smatraju ih za neke izdajnike i otpadnike, a u sustini su poprilicno staljinisti (komunisti, ne Siriza), tako da verovatno to ne bi moglo sve i da Siriza hoce. Grcki DSS im je legao jer s jedne strane dele njihov antisistemski i anti-stednjacki/anti-kreditorski stav, dok su s druge strane mali, tj. najlaksa je bila postizborna kombinatorika sa njima. Takodje mislim da su uzeti da bi se konzervativni/nacionalisticki deo grckog deep state-a (pre svega mislim na vojsku i sa njima povezane) uverio da Siriza ne namerava da sprovodi marskisticku revoluciju, tj. da pokazu da nisu komunisti.

 

To da je bitno da zele korenite i sistemske promene i da su protiv trenutnog sistema, to je govorio i Manc, Budja ih je onda prozivao i rekao - OK, ali zasto se onda zovu koalicija radikalne levice, a ne Podemos, DJB, Potami, Cuididanos ili kako vec? Elem slazem se ja sa tobom da je bitno da dodje neka antisistemska stranka i da razbuca "grcki oligarhijski sistem" kako je rekao Varufakis, i sto se mene tice bolje je da ne budu radikalni levicari u praksi, ali ostaje cinjenica da postoji prostor za kritiku Sirize zbog raskoraka izmedju onoga za sta se izdaju, njihovog predizbornog programa i onoga sto sprovode u praksi otkad su na vlasti.

[aram]

!

[MancMellow]

To da je bitno da zele korenite i sistemske promene i da su protiv trenutnog sistema, to je govorio i Manc, Budja ih je onda prozivao i rekao - OK, ali zasto se onda zovu koalicija radikalne levice, a ne Podemos, DJB, Potami, Cuididanos ili kako vec? 

 

 

Zato što, u najkraćem, 2004 nisu mogli da znaju kakve će biti grčke, evropske, svetske i sve ostale prilike 2015 godine. To za početak.

[hazard]

Zato što, u najkraćem, 2004 nisu mogli da znaju kakve će biti grčke, evropske, svetske i sve ostale prilike 2015 godine. To za početak.

 

Ili mozda zato sto su stvarno radikalni levicari? Hajde da usvojimo jednostavnije objasnjenje :D

 

Rekoh, sto se mene tice, bolje je da Siriza na vlasti ne bude radikalna levica (osim simbolicno), bolje je da budu centristicki realni razbucivaci okostalog trulog grckog sistema. Medjutim, ako bude tako, vrlo verovatno ce se desiti dve stvari:

 

1) Deo glasaca, oni koji zele radikalnu levicu, ce ih napustiti. Sad, ako Siriza bude uspesan reformator, to ce nadomestiti glasovima drugih partija.

 

2) Imace raskol u partiji.

 

E sad je pitanje da li ce ih dotuci raskol i/ili napustanje od strane razocaranih levo-radikalnih glasaca pre nego sto uspeju nesto da urade. Ja im svakako zelim uspeh, jer su trenutno Grckoj jedina sansa

[Budja]

Greece’s government has just passed a decree to force local government authorities to place cash reserves at the central bank, according to local reports.

[Budja]

Konacno nesto prilicno konkretno od Varufakisa.

http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/04/24/a-new-deal-for-greece-a-project-syndicate-op-ed/

 

Doduse, jos uvek ne objasnjava konkretno koji je njegov protiv-plan za "reform trap".

 

 

 

A New Deal for Greece – a Project Syndicate Op-Ed

ATHENS – Three months of negotiations between the Greek government and our European and international partners have brought about much convergence on the steps needed to overcome years of economic crisis and to bring about sustained recovery in Greece. But they have not yet produced a deal. Why? What steps are needed to produce a viable, mutually agreed reform agenda?

We and our partners already agree on much. Greece’s tax system needs to be revamped, and the revenue authorities must be freed from political and corporate influence. The pension system is ailing. The economy’s credit circuits are broken. The labor market has been devastated by the crisis and is deeply segmented, with productivity growth stalled. Public administration is in urgent need of modernization, and public resources must be used more efficiently. Overwhelming obstacles block the formation of new companies. Competition in product markets is far too circumscribed. And inequality has reached outrageous levels, preventing society from uniting behind essential reforms.

This consensus aside, agreement on a new development model for Greece requires overcoming two hurdles. First, we must concur on how to approach Greece’s fiscal consolidation. Second, we need a comprehensive, commonly agreed reform agenda that will underpin that consolidation path and inspire the confidence of Greek society.
Beginning with fiscal consolidation, the issue at hand concerns the method. The “troika” institutions (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) have, over the years, relied on a process of backward induction: They set a date (say, the year 2020) and a target for the ratio of nominal debt to national income (say, 120%) that must be achieved before money markets are deemed ready to lend to Greece at reasonable rates. Then, under arbitrary assumptions regarding growth rates, inflation, privatization receipts, and so forth, they compute what primary surpluses are necessary in every year, working backward to the present.

The result of this method, in our government’s opinion, is an “austerity trap.” When fiscal consolidation turns on a predetermined debt ratio to be achieved at a predetermined point in the future, the primary surpluses needed to hit those targets are such that the effect on the private sector undermines the assumed growth rates and thus derails the planned fiscal path. Indeed, this is precisely why previous fiscal-consolidation plans for Greece missed their targets so spectacularly.
Our government’s position is that backward induction should be ditched. Instead, we should map out a forward-looking plan based on reasonable assumptions about the primary surpluses consistent with the rates of output growth, net investment, and export expansion that can stabilize Greece’s economy and debt ratio. If this means that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be higher than 120% in 2020, we devise smart ways to rationalize, re-profile, or restructure the debt – keeping in mind the aim of maximizing the effective present value that will be returned to Greece’s creditors.

Besides convincing the troika that our debt sustainability analysis should avoid the austerity trap, we must overcome the second hurdle: the “reform trap.” The previous reform program, which our partners are so adamant should not be “rolled back” by our government, was founded on internal devaluation, wage and pension cuts, loss of labor protections, and price-maximizing privatization of public assets.

Our partners believe that, given time, this agenda will work. If wages fall further, employment will rise. The way to cure an ailing pension system is to cut pensions. And privatizations should aim at higher sale prices to pay off debt that many (privately) agree is unsustainable.

By contrast, our government believes that this program has failed, leaving the population weary of reform. The best evidence of this failure is that, despite a huge drop in wages and costs, export growth has been flat (the elimination of the current-account deficit being due exclusively to the collapse of imports).

Additional wage cuts will not help export-oriented companies, which are mired in a credit crunch. And further cuts in pensions will not address the true causes of the pension system’s troubles (low employment and vast undeclared labor). Such measures will merely cause further damage to Greece’s already-stressed social fabric, rendering it incapable of providing the support that our reform agenda desperately needs.

The current disagreements with our partners are not unbridgeable. Our government is eager to rationalize the pension system (for example, by limiting early retirement), proceed with partial privatization of public assets, address the non-performing loans that are clogging the economy’s credit circuits, create a fully independent tax commission, and boost entrepreneurship. The differences that remain concern how we understand the relationships between the various reforms and the macro environment.

None of this means that common ground cannot be achieved immediately. The Greek government wants a fiscal-consolidation path that makes sense, and we want reforms that all sides believe are important. Our task is to convince our partners that our undertakings are strategic, rather than tactical, and that our logic is sound. Their task is to let go of an approach that has failed.

[MancMellow]

Čekaj, pa to pričamo svi sve vreme - ne možeš da zadaš surplus, jer, realno, to ne može. Odakle garancije za surplus, ko to može da pruži? Otpuštaš i smanjiješ plate i penzije - smanji se privredna aktivnost - onda moraš da povećaš poreze da bi dostigao ciljani surplus - opet se smanji, ne možeš da devalviraš + tržište se sužava (shrinks) - ko će da investira? Tako samo jedeš samog sebe. Za sve to vreme potpuno se gubi politička podrška za reforme. Naravno da je ovo sto puta logičnije, plus je ono na čemu je od početka i trebalo insistirati - strukturne reforme, tax evasion, i sve ostalo. 

[Budja]

Čekaj, pa to pričamo svi sve vreme - ne možeš da zadaš surplus, jer, realno, to ne može. Odakle garancije za surplus, ko to može da pruži? Otpuštaš i smanjiješ plate i penzije - smanji se privredna aktivnost - onda moraš da povećaš poreze da bi dostigao ciljani surplus - opet se smanji, ne možeš da devalviraš + tržište se sužava (shrinks) - ko će da investira? Tako samo jedeš samog sebe. Za sve to vreme potpuno se gubi politička podrška za reforme. Naravno da je ovo sto puta logičnije, plus je ono na čemu je od početka i trebalo insistirati - strukturne reforme, tax evasion, i sve ostalo. 

 

Pa, ovaj, strukturne reforme idu sa fiskalnim.

 

Varufakis je sada za:

- privatizaciju;

- reformu penzionog sistema (nema prevremenih penzija)

- reformu javne uprave.

 

Jos je spor oko plata u javnom sektoru.

 

+ Targeti su tu da disciplinuju pa se zato postavljaju. Da ih nije bilo, ne bi bilo nikakvog surplus-a vec bi samo islo jedno restruktuiranje za drugim. Cipras i Merkelka su danas smanjili target sa 3% na 1.5% ali target i dalje postoji.

 

Drugim recima, Varufakis i SIRIZA su legli na rudu:

- Privatizacija je bila anatema.

- Varufakis ne govori nista o zlom trojstvu banaka, medija i zaboravih ono trece.

 

 

Drugim recima, od radikalne levice presaltali su se na antikorupciono, centristicki program. To je savim ok, ali nema veze sa levicom.

[Prospero]

"danguba, kockar, amater", počastili ga ljudski:
 

Varoufakis Said to Take Hammering From Riled EU Ministers

by Ian WishartJeff Black
11:52 AM CEST 
April 24, 2015
 
Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis was heavily criticized by his euro-area colleagues amid mounting frustration at his refusal to deliver measures to fix his country’s economy and release financial aid, according to three people familiar with the talks.

Euro-area finance chiefs said Varoufakis’s handling of the talks was irresponsible and accused him of being a time-waster, a gambler and an amateur, one of the people said. Another said the Greek complained of the hostile atmosphere in the meeting, as he was criticized from all sides. A Greek official in Riga, Latvia, for the meeting wasn’t able to comment on the talks when reached by phone.

Going into the talks, the 19-nation bloc’s finance ministers voiced their frustration over Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s attempt to bypass their veto on financial aid with an appeal to Angela Merkel.
 
“I demand very urgently that we get results on the table,” Austrian Finance Minister Hans Joerg Schelling said before sitting down for talks. “If you follow the media of the past days you hear time and again that ‘Tsipras says’ and ‘Tsipras thinks’, so apparently this has been moved to leaders’ level.”

With Greece running out of money and stalling over commitments to reform, euro-zone finance chiefs said the country’s authorities still haven’t shown sufficient progress on plans to revamp the economy to justify a loan payout.

Tsipras sought to circumvent the finance ministers’ authority less than 24 hours earlier, pleading his case with the German Chancellor and French President Francois Hollande on the sidelines of a summit on immigration in Brussels. Under euro-area procedures, it’s the finance ministers who have to sign off on any aid disbursement and Merkel said last month she’s not prepared to override those controls.

[MancMellow]

Mislim da su oni zapravo ljuti i na Merkel pomalo, samo jbg to im se bas ne prica...

[vememah]

Grci opet tražili da se zaobiđe procedura i hitno im se dodeli pomoć, a malteški minfin opisao današnji sastanak Evrogrupe kao potpuni raspad komunikacija sa Grčkom:

 

http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/business/business_news/52203/scicluna_reports_complete_breakdown_in_communication_with_greece

 

Dajselblum odbio privremeno parcijalno plaćanje Grčkoj i najavio da zamrznute 7,2 mlrd evra iz ovog bailouta neće biti dostupne posle juna.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/24/us-eurozone-greece-idUSKBN0NF0BJ20150424

 

Sledeća epizoda sapunice sa ministrima finansija zakazana za 11. maj, dan pre nego što Grčka treba da plati ratu od 750 mil. evra MMF-u.

[MancMellow]

Ili lomljenje kicme ili grexit. Pri tom, sve mi se vise cini da ni ciprasu nije previse mrska neka vrste psiholoske pripreme glasaca za grexit