Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Prospero]

Here's how it breaks down:

•The Eurogroup gets to keep European Union, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—"the troika"—oversight of the program extension. Greece gets to have everyone not call it the troika anymore.

• The Eurogroup has Greece's agreement on an extension of the existing bailout program. Greece has Eurogroup agreement not to call it a program anymore.

•The Eurogroup gives Greece until Monday to come up with a set of budgetary measures that will allow a successful review of the program extension. Greece gets to pick its own austerity. (And eventually it may get flexibility on reducing its primary budget surplus.)

•The Eurogroup gets to ringfence the EFSF (European Financial Stability Fund) money in the HFSF (Hellenic Financial Stability Fund) buffer so it is available only for bank recapitalization at the discretion of the ECB. Greece gets to watch this happen.

•The Eurogroup gets to have a quiet weekend. Greece gets to work really hard on a set of measures that the troika institutions must approve by Monday evening.

 

[Hella]

#grexit, mmw

 

[Аврам Гојић]

Poznato je da sam paničar.

[nezvanova]

kuljic o sirizi, ciprsau, nemcima, itd...

 

[Budja]

ja sam GET izvukao jer se citirani autor time bavio. GET je posluzio kao osnova za "racionalna ocekivanja", modeli medjunarodne trgovine, vera u efikasnost trzista. matematicki dokaz moguce efikasnosti.  

 

i ne radi se samo o tome da direktno koristis ovaj ili onaj model, vec i o tome da se pretpostavke uzimaju kao polazna tacka. 

 

Ne razumem ovaj deo. Sta je tu sporno? I koja je alternativa? Polazne tacke i analiticki okvir su uvek potrebni.

[Budja]

 

“We won time,” said government spokesman Gabriel Sakellaridis early on Saturday. “The Greek economy and the Greek government weren’t strangled, as was perhaps the original political plan by centres abroad and within the country.”

Faced with the risk of a chaotic bank run on Tuesday after a long holiday weekend, finance minister Yanis Varoufakis stressed that the deal should calm savers.

“It is quite clear that the reason why we had a deposit flight was because every day, even before we were elected, Greeks were being told that if we were elected and we stayed in power for more than just a few days the ATMs will cease functioning,” he said in Brussels on Friday night.

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“Today’s decision puts an end to this fear, to the scaremongering.”

 

Slabo je ovo spinovanje.

 

Tipa, pobedili smo NATO jer smo sacuvali zivote i tehniku (1999).

[MancMellow]

S druge strane, slavi se velika pobeda nad moćnim neprijateljem, koji neće majci nas i ostali pošten svet Evrope više uznemiravati svojim problemima i svojim cool i sexy izgledom. Bilo je teško ali u Schaeuble-u je Evropa konačno dobila nekog ko ume da kaže 10 puta slabijem od sebe kad je dosta!

 

 

German tabloid Bild leads with the headline, “Finally someone says ‘no’ to the bankrupt Greeks. Germany says: Thank you Wolfgang Schäuble!”+

German tabloid Bild leads with the headline, “Finally someone says ‘no’ to the bankrupt Greeks. Germany says: Thank you Wolfgang Schäuble!”

+

Billions in gifts to the Greek people – and we should pay for it! Schäuble is not doing this any longer!

 

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: European citizens are sick of the “Greece” issue

Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Foreign Policy Editor for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,writes, “It is time that the Tsipras government grasps reality, and recognizes who is the creditor and who is the debtor – it must understand how great the resentment is in many European countries over the “Greece” issue. Many citizens are sick of it;

 

Apparently the Greek government thinks that it could hold its partners for fools. At times, it has abused the Brussels  stage for theatrical performances, sometimes there are signs of programme change, and then it starts all over again. This is not serious

 

Die Welt: Wake up call for Greece

In a leader for the centre-right daily Die Welt, Deputy Editor in Chief, Andrea Seibel writes, “We see the statement of [schäuble] as a wake-up call. It is exactly the language understood by Athens. None of his colleagues would have dared anything of the kind.   And Seibel doesn’t make much of the Greek charm offensive in Europe either:+For weeks, it has been a pleasure for the representatives of the Greek coalition government, to bring the Brussels consensus machine close to overheating.  Every appearance of the Prime Minister and his Finance Minister is presented like a piece of entertainment on the news. The cool and alert Greek boys across from the Brussels suits and other boring types.    

 

 

http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/greeks-behaved-like-elephants-china-shop-germany-united-behind-schauble/

[Prospero]

asimetrični cripple fight

[MancMellow]

 

 

In Greece, Focus on Justice 

 

By GREGORY A. MANIATIS

FEB. 20, 2015

 

 

To solve the Greek crisis, Europe needs to focus less on debt and more on justice. Athens did not simply squander a few hundred billion euros: Much of it was stolen. Yet the European Union has done little to compel Greece to crack down on high-level corruption. The possible explanation for this does not bode well for the Union’s future. Conventional wisdom has it that the radical-left Syriza Party was elected by voters fed up with austerity. But this is just the lesser half of the truth. What Greeks most desire is justice and jobs. The European Union, obsessed by debt repayment, ignored both aspirations. 

 

 

To understand Syriza’s success, it’s critical to know that corruption by elites siphoned off countless billions. Practically every time Greece made a purchase — be it of medicines, highways or guns — a substantial cut went into the wrong hands. Banks issued tens of billions in loans without sufficient collateral. As a result, monopolies and oligopolies led by politically connected families choked competition and controlled much of the country’s banking, media, energy, construction and other industries. All this was hardly a secret: In December, Transparency International ranked Greece at the bottom among European Union members in its Corruption Perceptions Index (tied for last with Bulgaria, Italy and Romania), a spot it has occupied for years.

 

 

While nearly everyone in Greece can cite examples of egregious corruption, graft prosecutions are rare. Some schemes were byzantine: Reuters in 2012 painstakingly investigated likely fraud at a major bank. Others hid in plain sight: In Greece, middlemen often make millions in commissions on defense contracts and arms sales. (Earning commissions is not illegal, though how they are then dispensed could be.) The Greek air force doesn’t really need the help of agents to choose between an F-16 and a Eurofighter, but no one questions the practice. Meanwhile, the Greek news media, owned mostly by the oligarchs, was unwilling to root out graft. Reporters Without Borders last week ranked Greece 91st in the world in media freedom, behind Kyrgyzstan, Liberia and Kuwait. This is not to dismiss other problems, such as tax evasion, a bloated Civil Service, suffocating regulations and rife petty bribery.

 

 

But high-level corruption has generated huge losses: The Brookings Institution in 2010 estimated that 20 billion euros ($22.8 billion) were lost every year to such corruption. The kleptocracy also set a tone of impunity that enabled lower-level graft — the fish rots from the head. And the cycle became self-perpetuating, as oligarchs tightened their stranglehold over the political system (a trend evident elsewhere in the West, too). Where were Greece’s European partners as impunity prevailed? Why wasn’t Brussels focused at least as much on corruption as it was on debt? If the European Union’s absence on this front was lamentable before the crisis, it was inexcusable afterward. Officials from the so-called troika essentially took up residence at the Greek Finance Ministry in 2010, but rarely visited the Ministry of Justice.

 

 

As a result of European Union indifference, Greek prosecutors were left nearly helpless to investigate complex graft cases involving offshore accounts and overseas co-conspirators. No new hires were made and some prosecutors did not even have funds for long-distance calls (the more persistent prosecutors made them anyway, using their own mobile phones and paying personally). Meanwhile, the Greek Parliament was passing legislation giving immunity to ever-larger numbers of potential corruption targets. By failing to address this problem and instead doing the bidding of European banks, the European Union took a knife to its own credibility. If the rule of law is not at the heart of the Union, then what is? In choosing Syriza, Greeks were rebelling as much against the indifference of Greek and European elites to impunity, and the inequality it perpetuates, as against austerity. Similar anti-establishment anger exists in much of Europe, which is why foreigners were celebrating in the streets of Athens on election night. 

 

 

So why has the European Union turned a blind eye to corruption in Greece? One possibility could be that in order for someone to receive a bribe, someone else has to pay it. Of the few cases prosecuted in Athens, most have involved European companies like Siemens, Daimler and Deutsche Bahn being accused of bribing Greek counterparts. If Greece were to vigorously pursue prosecutions, many blue-chip European companies could land in the headlines. With anti-establishment forces resurgent, this could eat away at support for mainstream parties in the Franco-German heartland. Another reason might be that central banks were perhaps complicit in corruption as well. Rather than carefully monitoring the quality of loan issuance, for instance, the Greek central bank seems to have failed to prevent lenders from issuing billions in sweetheart loans. Pursuing such cases could undermine the credibility of Europe’s central banks and pose an existential threat to the euro project. 

 

 

The debt-relief plan proposed by Syriza, which links repayments to economic growth, is a reasonable one. But Greeks seek more than debt relief. The justice and jobs they crave will come only once the rule of law prevails and prospective investors feel safe doing business. Syriza’s government has pledged to stamp out corruption; the European Union and its member states should commit to helping it vigorously pursue prosecutions. This is essential not only because Greek prosecutors are starved of resources, but also because many graft cases are transnational in nature. 

 

 

Most Greek people are incredibly hard-working, a fact borne out by statistics from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It is therefore especially galling to be portrayed as lazy by the world’s media. The Greeks have suffered for the misdeeds of a few tens of thousands, perhaps, of their fellow citizens. Now, if Syriza and the European Union cannot reach a compromise, they risk being kicked out of the eurozone, a fate that would condemn another generation. Greece is the symptom of a broader European problem. The European Union should revive its own fortunes by focusing on its real deficit — justice. This is the debt it owes to future generations.

 

Gregory A. Maniatis is a senior adviser to the United Nations, a senior fellow at the Open Society Foundations and the Migration Policy Institute, and a co-director of the migration initiative at Columbia University’s Global Policy Initiative.

 

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/opinion/in-greece-focus-on-justice.html

Edited February 21, 2015 by MancMellow

[Budja]

Apsolutno tacno, no to nije bio deo politicke ofanzive grcke Vlade nakon izbora a trebalo je da bude.

[MancMellow]

pa nije da nisu pricali o tome tokom kampanje. e sad... s druge strane, u ove 2-3 nedelje su realno morali da se bave uglavnom ovim.

 

a evo ga i...kako ovo da nazovem...recimo zvanican stav Labour u vezi svega ovoga i ujedno predizborno saopstenje, mislim da je to to.

 

 

 

What is happening is not elegant, and very often bad-tempered and fractious.Greece will modernise its state after a fashion, will ultimately get its debts rescheduled, and will eventually get to relax austerity. Its electorate will get some of what it voted for – and other electorates in Europe will get partial protection from endless Greek demands. Spain and Italy will follow suit. The EU will hold together, managing rival democratic claims in an era of national interdependence – and it will resume growing. The banking system will get through intact. Britain, when it comes to it, will never vote to leave the EU. The European glass is half full and gradually filling. The debate in Britain would be healthier if this reality were better understood.

 

bold posebno zanimljiv :D

 

ali vredi prociatati ceo tekst, koji je od a do s u fazonu "mir mir niko nije kriv" :) Osim Putina, naravno, a i Turska je pomenuta u pomalo cudnom kontekstu...

 

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/22/observer-view-on-greece-bailouts-and-the-euro

Edited February 22, 2015 by MancMellow

[Shan Jan]

S druge strane, slavi se velika pobeda nad moćnim neprijateljem, koji neće majci nas i ostali pošten svet Evrope više uznemiravati svojim problemima i svojim cool i sexy izgledom. Bilo je teško ali u Schaeuble-u je Evropa konačno dobila nekog ko ume da kaže 10 puta slabijem od sebe kad je dosta!

 

 

 

http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/greeks-behaved-like-elephants-china-shop-germany-united-behind-schauble/

 

Slabo sam informisan pa mi nije bas jasno par stvari laicki:

 

1. Jel neko dao pare grcima/oprostio dugove ili se ovde kuka samo sto im je data nova kreditna linija? Ako je ovo drugo, to je i dalje dug (sada jos veci), tako da jadni nemacki gradjanin nema za cime da place, niko mu ni evrocenta uzeo nije.

2. Zar nije prihvaceno i normalno ponasanje u proslosti bilo da kada je zemlja u cabru se napravi dil gde se otpise deo dugova, deo se prebije sa necim trecim a deo nastavi? Na kraju krajeva placane su kamate na dugove godinama, sto nisu male parice. To se desavalo sa Nemackom posle ratova, sa SRJ, sa SSSR drzavama posle raspada... sta se sada promenilo? 

3. Sta je grcima pa se toliko upinju da ne proglase bankrot i izacu iz evrozone? Bankrot bi ih oslobodio dugova, drahma bi im dala mogucnost da se igraju kursa za svoje (a ne nemacko) dobro. Boje se da nece moci da hendluju inicijalnu paniku i da ce sve da se urusi?

4. Zasto bi se Nemacka plasila ako Italija i Spanija izadju iz evrozone? Da li bi evro onda izgubio na vrednosti? Pa to bi jos vise podstaklo nemacki izvoz. Plz neko sa finansijskim znanjem da objasni.

[MancMellow]

1. pa, ono, ako im je neko nesto uzeo, to nisu Grci

 

2. paradoks istorije - sto vece sranje napravis, vise ti oproste. ne vazi apsolutno, ali u lepoj meri, posebno za XX vek

 

3. u svakom slucaju to treba malo vremena da se spremi, da ne bude panike. ali recimo bas varufakis je to zagovarao 2010-te. ipak, 70% grka je protiv toga

 

4. ako bi samo najzdravije ekonomije ostale u EZ, evro bi (eventually) najverovatnije znatno ojacao.

[Shan Jan]

4. A Italija i Spanija bi mogle da se igraju kursom po svojim potrebama => nemacki izvoz bi pao.

 

Meni je potpuno nejasno ovoliko zatezanje od strane nemaca. Imaju oni puno toga da izgube ako sve ovo pukne.

[maximus]

Grci moji, stoko moja! Sve sto je varoufuckis trebao da kaze coveku u kolicima je 'izlazimo iz jura ako ne ispunite nase zahteve'

Covek u kolicima bi ga proverbijalno na nogama molio da ne izadje

Ali, sta je varoufuckis, profesor game teorije nonetheless, rekao coveku u kolicima - 'mi hocemo juro ali bolje uslove'

I onda mu je covek u kolicima rekao 'OK, kad je tako - karacemo vas u nedogled'

Grci moji, stoko moja

Edited February 22, 2015 by maximus