Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[hazard]

Pa kapiram da može da se gleda tako, ali može da se gleda i da su morali da krenu sa maksimalnim zahtevima da bi dobili bilo šta što je iole opipljivo. A i nisu mogli da momentalno backtrack na ono što su pričali u kampanji. Iskreno, kad malo saberem svačije poteze, meni se čini da je nekako Nemačkoj i cilj da ih izbaci iz EZ. Ne verujem doduše da to važi sa ITA i ESP. Mislim da žele i njih da izbace, nego je ovo kao "odd man out".

 

Zasto bi Nemacka zelela da izbaci Italiju i Spaniju iz evrozone? Ako izbaci njih, ode evro u nebo, a nemacki izvoz u cabar

[MancMellow]

Paa, nisu dobili nista opipljivo osim obecanja za buducnost oko fleksibilnosti budzeta.

 

+ mnogo su pricali a nisu bili proaktivni.

 

Ni jedan zahtev do ovog ponedeljka nisu poslali, vec se vise svodilo na verbalnu dijareju Varufakisa. Jednostavno, grcki protiv-plan ne postoji.

 

I sada je glavna caka na tax evasion i corruption. Posto se krupna evazija ne moze tek tako iskoreniti, cenim da ce biti vise pritisak na naplatu PDVa, fiskalne kase i tako to, a sto ce super da odjekne u Sirizinoj birackoj bazi.

 

Zavisi koga prvo budu napali za porez.

 

A dobro sad, svi znamo politiku toliko da je jedno momentalno kapitulirati, a drugo to go down with a fight. Ovo je objektivno set-back, ali realno ova igra nema kraj osim ili solidnih ustupaka Grčkoj ili grčkog izlaska iz EZ. Ako je tačno da Nemačka zapravo preferira GREXIT, onda je ovo samo dobrodošla pauza za Grke. Četiri meseca je dug period u politici. Mada će morati da se naobjašnjavaju, to stoji. Međutim, oni su u koalicionoj vladi sa partnerom koji je tek anti-austerity. Osim što je još štošta. Lepo im je prethodna vlada uvalila kosku sa neprodužavanjem aranžmana do posle izbora. 

[MancMellow]

Zasto bi Nemacka zelela da izbaci Italiju i Spaniju iz evrozone? Ako izbaci njih, ode evro u nebo, a nemacki izvoz u cabar

 

obrnuto - mislim da njih ne žele da izbace, nisam jasno napisao. 

Edited February 20, 2015 by MancMellow

[aram]

pa da je prethodna vlada produzila aranzman pre izbora, syriza bi imala apsolutnu vecinu :D

Edited February 20, 2015 by aram

[MancMellow]

Pa…

[hazard]

 Lepo im je prethodna vlada uvalila kosku sa neprodužavanjem aranžmana do posle izbora. 

 

Nije im prethodna vlada uvalila nista u tom smislu, izbori nisu bili redovni vec su bili iznudjeni neuspehom izbora predsednika u parlamentu. A upravo je Siriza blokirala u parlamentu izbor predsednika i izazvale izbore

[MancMellow]

Nije im prethodna vlada uvalila nista u tom smislu, izbori nisu bili redovni vec su bili iznudjeni neuspehom izbora predsednika u parlamentu. A upravo je Siriza blokirala u parlamentu izbor predsednika i izazvale izbore

 

Ne mogu sad da se setim tačne hronologije, ali nešto kroz maglu mi je ostalo da su mogli, a nisu. Dbro, sad više nije bitno. Ako neko ima sumnje o raspoloženju javnog mnjenja u GR

 

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-bailout-berlins-stance-during-the-negotiations-left-greeks-defiant-10060951.html

 

užasno je ovo. mislim ok, neće se recimo Budja nešto posebno potresti jer je i inače anti-EU :D ali meni je užasno

[MancMellow]

Zanimljiv tekstić

 

 

 

Greece and the André Szász Axiom

André Szász, a former senior Dutch central banker, brilliantly explained this phenomenon. In his amazingly insightful history of Europe’s incomplete monetary union, Szász, who was present at the inner deliberations from the Werner Report right up to the euro launch, postulated the following axiom. The Werner Report, he said, was:

“[…] a compromise not in the sense that member states resolved their differences by meeting each other on intermediate positions, but rather they agreed on documents which they felt left them free to continue to push for their own preference.”[1]

Such has been the recurring history of the euro: words and documents that carry completely different meanings for the different parties. But safe within the rhetorical trap, the process keeps going. The incongruities keep piling up.

Consider the words in the alleged February 16 proposal from the European authorities. It calls on the Greeks to:

“[…] make the best use of the existing built-in flexibility in the current programme.”

Ah! That wonderful word “flexibility.” It is—with apologies—so flexible. When Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi called for “flexibility” in the application of fiscal rules, German Chancellor Angela Merkelwas puzzled. What exactly is the problem, she wanted to know. There was, she insisted, flexibility built into the rules. It just came along with “guard rails” to prevent disorder.

Renzi complained for days. And then, lo and behold, the European Commission issued a new set of instructions with guidelines specified in matrices embedded in other matrices. Describing these as the new “simple” rules that would operationalize flexibility of the fiscal rules, the matter was settled. The Eurozone authorities, who had for days been threatening Italy with fearsome sanctions, declared victory. The never-before-used sanctions were once again stashed away for future empty threats.

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Greece is important not just because it needs relief but because the Greek government also is insisting on changing the way Europe conducts business

Greece is important not just because the Greeks need relief—which is hugely important in and of itself—but because the Greek government also is insisting on changing the way Europe conducts business. Since October 2009, Greece has been at the leading edge of the Eurozone crisis. Each time, it has been brought back into the fold.

In early 2010, it was obvious to anyone who wanted to look—and there were plenty who did not want to do so—that Greek debt to private creditors would need to be restructured. Absent such restructuring, the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—one of diabolical “troika” along with the European Commission and the European Central Bank—found that Greek debt was not “sustainable with a high degree of probability.” Simply stated, Greece was drowning in debt. That would normally put a halt to the large IMF loan about to be extended to Greece. And many on the IMF’s Board of Executive Directors protested.

But there were words to help: “a systemic risk waiver.” More plainly put, the claim was that if losses were imposed on Greece’s private creditors, civilization as we know it would come to an end. Everyone fell into the policy-by-rhetoric mode.

And so, Greece received large official loans to pay off private creditors. And Greece accepted that Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt would run its economy.

In summer 2012, a new Greek government came to power. Its mandate was to ease the burden of austerity on the Greeks. But it was the grown-up thing to disregard the democratic mandate.

Europe has long been run on a self-avowed “benign despotism”. The leaders always know the right way forward. This idea comes from Jean Monnet himself, the intellectual founder of Europe’s post-19^thcentury state. He stated it directly:

“I thought it wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a community of which they had no practical experience.”

Today, many commentators who subscribe to the Monnet doctrine remain bewildered with the Greek government’s insistence on sticking to their election promises. Why, they ask, is the government reluctant to tell the Greeks that the hopes raised were unreasonable after all?  

The Greek government is challenging three European premises: (a) debt relief is a “no, no;” (b) democratic mandates are not a serious basis for negotiation and action; and © words can smooth over real differences. Of these three, it is this unwillingness to agree on words that is most galling.

For this reason, it is easy to sympathize with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble. A veteran of European negotiations—and a senior member of German governments that have consciously bypassed the German citizen on matters related to the euro—for him this is all quite improper. He understandably exclaims:

“None of my colleagues have understood so far what Greece really wants in the end. Whether Greece itself knows is also the question.”

It is also easy to sympathize with German citizens who have been repeatedly told that the euro conveys no costs to them.

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The sharpest decline in public support for the European Union has come from among the youngest

And so we come to these crossroads. The sharpest decline in public support for the European Union has come from among the youngest. For long, the young, although far removed from the shadow of the war, regarded Europe as a natural extension of their identity. The crisis has been harsh to them. Many are fleeing.

The new Greek prime minister was born well after the Werner Report was written, well after the Szász axiom came to govern Europe, well after it became customary to make compromises in documents that meant different things to different people.

Where others have failed miserably, will the new prime minister finally be the one to undermine the Szász axiom? If he does, that will be a victory for Europe. If he does not, the string of bogus deals to resolve the Greek crisis will continue. The stalemate will be escalated, with future resolutions increasingly more costly. The Greek tragedy will spread wider beyond its borders, and Europe’s Greek test will continue until the right answers are given

Ashoka Mody is Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor in International Economic Policy at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Previously, he was Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund’s Research and European Departments. He was responsible for the IMF’s Article IV consultations with Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and Hungary, and also for the design of Ireland's financial rescue program. 

 

http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1575-greece-and-the-andre-szasz-axiom/

Edited February 21, 2015 by MancMellow

[Budja]

Zavisi koga prvo budu napali za porez.

 

A dobro sad, svi znamo politiku toliko da je jedno momentalno kapitulirati, a drugo to go down with a fight. Ovo je objektivno set-back, ali realno ova igra nema kraj osim ili solidnih ustupaka Grčkoj ili grčkog izlaska iz EZ. Ako je tačno da Nemačka zapravo preferira GREXIT, onda je ovo samo dobrodošla pauza za Grke. Četiri meseca je dug period u politici. Mada će morati da se naobjašnjavaju, to stoji. Međutim, oni su u koalicionoj vladi sa partnerom koji je tek anti-austerity. Osim što je još štošta. Lepo im je prethodna vlada uvalila kosku sa neprodužavanjem aranžmana do posle izbora. 

 

Zapravo, to je skroz ok i demokratski. Ne vidim sta je tu sporno.

Jok, nego treba da napadaju Vladu za vreme izbora a nakon toga uzivaju plodove produzavanja uz dalje napade na prethodnu Vladu.

[Budja]

Zanimljiv tekstić

 

 

http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1575-greece-and-the-andre-szasz-axiom/

 

Hm, koliko ja znam otpiz grckog duga je bio 50%.

[Budja]

I jedno optimisticko vidjenje od, ocigledno, neformalnog Varufakisovog portparola.

 

Paul Mason

http://blogs.channel4.com/paul-mason-blog/greece-deal-details-wrong-were-finished/3395

 

 

Da dodam da mi se sve manje svidja i ovo guslanje o demokratiji: demokratska volja gradjana nije populizam vec i svest o preuzetim odlukama. 

Cini mi se da se apeli na postovanje grcke demokratije svode samo na "Grci su oducili da zive bolje i tacka. Dajte nam kes.". Tu nema troskova, rizika, odgovornosti. To je populizam.

 

 

Da li sam ja jedini kome pregovaracka taktika Grka i pozitivni komentari iste lice na tapsanje po ramenu Vucica u vezi Briselskog sporazuma (Vucic skidao sako, Varufakis hteo da se tuce, ah, kako su se hrabo borili) i da tu ima vrlo malo racionalnosti a mnogo vise projektovanih zelja i nada?

Edited February 21, 2015 by Budja

[Muwan]

To su bezvezni detalji, bitno je ono što se krije iza njih. U slučaju Grčke, ako se krije nespremnost da se iz korena menja domaći lopovski sistem i na osnovu toga traže 'new deals' od Angele onda možemo komotno da zaključimo diskusiju o Sirizi. Ja do sada od tog njihovog silnog junačkog guslanja nisam čuo skoro ništa na temu kada će biti demontiran sistem Papandreu-Karamanlis i šta je od izborne pobede do danas pokrenuto po tom pitanju.

[Gandalf]

Ni jedno ni drugo nije tacno.

 

GET je model kao baza, kostur, osnova, a onda se uce deformacije i odstupanja od modela. Niko ozbiljan ne primenjuje GET. Da bi se doslo do Ajnstajna uci se prvo Njutn. Problem je sto se kritikom ekonomije bave oni koji nisu ucili dalje od ECON 101 pa misle da su pretpostavke o kojima govoris sve u ekonomiji i da se ne ide dalje od toga i onda se na osnovu tankog znanja pisu kritike.

ja sam GET izvukao jer se citirani autor time bavio. GET je posluzio kao osnova za "racionalna ocekivanja", modeli medjunarodne trgovine, vera u efikasnost trzista. matematicki dokaz moguce efikasnosti.  

 

i ne radi se samo o tome da direktno koristis ovaj ili onaj model, vec i o tome da se pretpostavke uzimaju kao polazna tacka. 

[MancMellow]

Ne vredi, ne mogu, nemam vremena vise za raspravu :(

[BlackGeorge]

znači evropa - varufakis 1:0. dobro, igra se i drugo poluvreme, ubaciće i svežeg škuntelaara u igru da zameni padavičara lazovića koji je "provaljen" :)

 

i ja očekujem da se uradi nešto na unutrašnjem planu (naplata poreza..) da ne bi bilo odmah na početku drugog poluvremena i 2:0, a kao što znamo 2:0 je najopasniji rezultat :)

Edited February 21, 2015 by BlackGeorge