Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Anduril]

Ne, ako taj novac iz Target2 ne bi bio vracen, recimo grcka CB odbije da prizna saldo koji ima sa nemackom CB, to bi bio kraj bilo kakve trgovine jer sve transakcije idu preko centralnih banaka.

To bi bio totalni raspad i zato je to pomalo nerealno. Ja oko te price i pretnji vidim vise politicki rizik u samoj Nemackoj da na vlast dodju pravi evroskeptici.

[hazard]

1 zanimljiv tekst od juce (dakle iz daleke proslosti). Koliko je tacno ovo za Target2, zna li ko?

 

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/11421500/ECB-risks-crippling-political-damage-if-Greece-forced-to-default.html

 

Meni se cini da 1 default od skoro 300 milijardi evra nema sanse da prodje tek tako na svetskim trzistima, a kamoli u okviru EZ. Prosto nije logicno

 

I zbog toga Grčka treba da ide do kraja. Realno, Grčka je već ujebana, ako nastavi sa merama štednje biće još ujebanija, nema šta da izgubi. Neka i pristani na neki truli kompromis za sledećih 6 meseci, ali nakon toga treba da traže nešto radikalno drugačije i da otvoreno prete bankrotom ako to ne dobiju. Nemcima se mora uterati malo pameti u glavu.

[MancMellow]

I zbog toga Grčka treba da ide do kraja. Realno, Grčka je već ujebana, ako nastavi sa merama štednje biće još ujebanija, nema šta da izgubi. Neka i pristani na neki truli kompromis za sledećih 6 meseci, ali nakon toga treba da traže nešto radikalno drugačije i da otvoreno prete bankrotom ako to ne dobiju. Nemcima se mora uterati malo pameti u glavu.

 

Licno, mislim da sami ne mogu puno. Verovatno ce izlobirati poneku olaksicu, ali za vise im treba neki ozbiljan saveznik. Recimo danas je francuska scijalisticka vlada morala da posegne za kranjim merama da bi progurala neke reforme, a sledece nema sanse (mada moze da se desi i da padne vlada, pa onda nista). Ali to je na dugom stapu. Realno treba da nekako doguraju do kraja godine i da se nadaju da novu ESP vladu prave Pademos i PSOE i zajedno sa njima da nastupaju. Ni to nije bogznasta, ali je vec daleko ozbiljnije. Ali pitanje je da li bi PSOE bio mnogo radikalan, i sa kim bi pre u vladu. Na zajebanom su mestu Grci, ali i ovim sadasnjim merama idu u propast pa im je svejedno. Ovo sad realno rade na ludilo i dobijaju podrsku onih kojima se ceo mess ne svidja iz nekih drugih razloga - tipa Ameri, ali njih to nista ne kosta. 

Edited February 19, 2015 by MancMellow

[*edited by mod]

isus place zbog sirize i ciprasa, blic prenosi.

[MancMellow]

U wow :D

 

 

Ever since the initial bargain in the 1950s between post-Nazi West Germany and its wartime victims, European integration has been built on compromise. So there is huge pressure on Greece’s new Syriza government to be “good Europeans” and compromise on their demands for debt justice from their European partners — also known as creditors. But sometimes compromise is the wrong course of action. Sometimes you need to take a stand.

Let’s face it: no advanced economies in living memory have been as catastrophically mismanaged as the eurozone has been in recent years, as I document at length in my book, European Spring. Seven years into the crisis, the eurozone economy is doing much worse than the United States, worse than Japan during its lost decade in the 1990s and worse even than Europe in the 1930s: GDP is still 2 percent lower than seven years ago and the unemployment rate is in double digits. The policy stance set by Angela Merkel’s government in Berlin, implemented by the European Commission in Brussels, and sometimes tempered — but more often enforced — by the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, remains disastrous. Continuing with current policies — austerity and wage cuts, forbearance for banks, no debt restructuring or adjustment to Germany’s mercantilism — is leading Europe into the ditch; the launch of quantitative easing is unlikely to change that. So settling for a “compromise” that shifts Merkel’s line by a millimeter would be a mistake; it must be challenged and dismantled.

While Greece alone may not be able to change the entire monetary union, it could act as a catalyst for the growing political backlash against the eurozone’s stagnation policies. 

For 

 

More immediately, Greece can save itself. Left in the clutches of its EU creditors, it is not destined for the sunlit uplands of recovery, but for the enduring misery of debt bondage. So the four-point plan put forward by its dashing new finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, is eminently sensible. This involves running a smaller primary surplus — that is a budget surplus, excluding interest payments — of 1.5 percent of GDP a year, instead of 3 percent this year and 4.5 percent thereafter. Some of the spare funds would be used to alleviate Greece’s humanitarian emergency. The crushing debts of more than 175 percent of GDP would be relieved by swapping the loans from eurozone governments for less burdensome obligations with payments tied to Greece’s GDP growth. Last but not least, Syriza wants to genuinely reform the economy, with the help of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), notably by tackling the corrupt, clientelist political system, cracking down on tax evasion, and breaking the power of the oligarchs who have a stranglehold over the Greek economy.

Had the Varoufakis plan been put forward by an investment banker, it would have been perceived as perfectly reasonable. Yet in the parallel universe inhabited by Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, such demands are seen as “irresponsible”: Greece must be bled dry to service its foreign creditors in the name of European solidarity.

While the Greek government is certainly in the right, there is still fear that the might of the German government will prevail. The Greek government may run out of cash — perhaps as soon as next month. Faced with a run on Greek banks, the ECB could deny the country’s central bank the right to provide them with the emergency liquidity that they need to survive. At that point, compromise — surrender — could impose itself.

Or not. The belief that Greece has little leverage in its negotiations with eurozone authorities is false. If no agreement is reached and Greece is illegally forced out of the euro by Berlin and Frankfurt, it would doubtless default on all its debts to both eurozone governments and the ECB, as well as the Bank of Greece’s Target 2 liabilities. Speculation would soon start about which country might be next to exit the euro — Portugal? — and the single currency would suddenly look eminently revocable.

Do Berlin and Frankfurt really want to push Athens over the brink? I doubt it. Especially since, freed of its external debt and an overvalued exchange rate, Greece would doubtless be growing again once the immediate chaos subsided. After all, even an economy as badly managed as Argentina started growing again only a year after the government defaulted and junked its dollar peg in 2002.

Of course, eurozone authorities may miscalculate, or allow their emotions to trump economic logic. And since Athens does not want to leave the euro, it also has a fallback option, as Willem Buiter, chief economist of Citigroup, and John Cochrane of the University of Chicago have pointed out. The Greek government could meet its domestic obligations, such as pension payments, by issuing tradeable IOUs that could also be used to make tax payments — in effect, creating a parallel currency. This virtual money could also be used for other purposes: for instance, to recapitalize ailing banks. That would enable the Greek government to default on its EU creditors relatively painlessly, while remaining within the euro.

The eurozone establishment and much of the media think Greece is foolish to stand up to Germany. But what would be truly foolish is giving in. That would leave only the neo-Nazis of Golden Dawn in the anti-Merkelism camp, which might portend ill political omens. So long as the Greek government is willing to stand firm — as a vast majority of Greeks and many Europeans areurging it to — it can obtain a fairer deal for the Greek people and, with luck, the eurozone.

 

bold - 

• Philippe Legrain, who was economic advisor to the president of the European Commission from 2011 to 2014, is a visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics’ European Institute and the author of European Spring: Why Our Economies and Politics Are in a Mess -- and How to Put Them Right. 
•  
• https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/greece-should-not-give-in-to-germanys-bullying-euro-syriza-merkel-varoufakis/

 

Realno, covek je 100% u pravu u jednom - Evrozona se, uzevsi u celini, ocajno lose nosi sa krizom. A ko je No.1 u kreiranju ekonomske politike, znamo. Promena je imperativ. 

Edited February 20, 2015 by MancMellow

[Gandalf]

Poenta je da budemo malcice precizniji. Koji modeli?

jedan primer je upravo ono na sta se citirani tekst odnosi, General Equilibrium Theory. kada pogledas koje su pretpostavke, pa to je cudo jedno: trziste bez ogranicenja, puna informisanost o sadasnjosti i buducnosti, racionalnost, nepromenljivost indivudalaca.

 

ima naravno pun djavo ljudi koji znaju da su modeli falicni, ali mogu da budu korisni pod uslovom da uvek imas na umu da su falicni. takodje, ti modeli, takvi kakvi su, predstavljaju (mali?) naucni napredak i za 50 ili 100 ili 200 godina cemo mozda imati nesto sto bi bilo blizu psihoistoriji (uz obaveznu upotrenu kvantne teorije igara!  ).

 

receno drugacije, mozda nije problem u modelima koji nisu predvideli krizu. mozda je problem u ljudima koji su modele malo preozbiljno shvatili.

Edited February 20, 2015 by Gandalf

[Budja]

 

jedan primer je upravo ono na sta se citirani tekst odnosi, General Equilibrium Theory. kada pogledas koje su pretpostavke, pa to je cudo jedno: trziste bez ogranicenja, puna informisanost o sadasnjosti i buducnosti, racionalnost, nepromenljivost indivudalaca.

 

ima naravno pun djavo ljudi koji znaju da su modeli falicni, ali mogu da budu korisni pod uslovom da uvek imas na umu da su falicni. takodje, ti modeli, takvi kakvi su, predstavljaju (mali?) naucni napredak i za 50 ili 100 ili 200 godina cemo mozda imati nesto sto bi bilo blizu psihoistoriji (uz obaveznu upotrenu kvantne teorije igara!  ).

 

receno drugacije, mozda nije problem u modelima koji nisu predvideli krizu. mozda je problem u ljudima koji su modele malo preozbiljno shvatili.

 

 

 

Ni jedno ni drugo nije tacno.

 

GET je model kao baza, kostur, osnova, a onda se uce deformacije i odstupanja od modela. Niko ozbiljan ne primenjuje GET. Da bi se doslo do Ajnstajna uci se prvo Njutn. Problem je sto se kritikom ekonomije bave oni koji nisu ucili dalje od ECON 101 pa misle da su pretpostavke o kojima govoris sve u ekonomiji i da se ne ide dalje od toga i onda se na osnovu tankog znanja pisu kritike.

U makrou koji najvise pati u dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelima (koji su se pokazali kao neefikasni) ljudi se nicim drugim ne bave nego frikcijama, tj. odstupanjima od pretpostavki o kojima govoris.

 

 

I interesantno je da se uvek citira GET, a ne Miller-Modigliani koji je osnova corporate finance i koji je takodje sazdan na tim nerealnim pretpostavkama. No, corp finance se uci na drugoj godini, recimo, a u sklopu istog kursa se verovatno uce i odstupanja od MM pretpostavki pa je van lupe kriticara.

 

 

GET su jedino ozbiljno shvatili kriticari a ne ekonomisti.

 

Sto se krize tice, problem je drugih modela, onih za vrednovanje finansijske aktive. Tu su traderi i kontrolori slepo pratili modele koje su uzimali kao black box, i tu je nerealnost modela zaita problem.

[Zaz_pi]

Javlja se i Bepo:

 

[url=http://www.beppegrillo.it/en/2015/02/the_euros_up_in_smoke.htmlThe Euro’s up in smoke][/url]

“The Eurozone chess game has entered its third and final stage. Germany wins in three moves - Euro, deflation and purchase of public debt by the ECB (QE) – and in the last few years it has found a way to maximise its profits and reduce to zero its risks as Europe’s creditor.

Germany’s risks
Let’s try analysing the problems of the Eurozone as they really are: problems of conflicting interests of creditors and debtors regulated by demand and supply. If you agree to make a loan to your neighbour, you open yourself up to three risks:
• that he’ll pay you back in a different currency that has perhaps been devalued unless you had a prior agreement about the repayment currency (currency risk);
• that with the amount you get back, you can buy fewer goods or property (inflation risk);
• that you don’t even have either of the first two problems because your neighbour simply goes bust and thus you lose everything (capital risk).

How Germany gains
Germany is the Eurozone’s only big creditor with about 600 billion Euro loaned to various countries, most of which are on the periphery of the Eurozone, including Italy. The Euro has given it this enviable status. If you produce lots and you consume and invest very little and you keep domestic wages and prices low, then you’ll always have cheap unconsumed goods to sell to your neighbours. And you might also be able to make money by providing credit that they will probably ask you for so that they can buy your goods that are so cheap and so good. This is Germany’s situation. It has always had this approach to the market economy in European affairs ever since 1870 with its roots in Calvinism. Thus to sell and lend to the countries on the periphery of Europe was always Germany’s preferred economic activity when everything was going well, before the crisis in 2008. Since then its only objective has been to get that credit returned and to protect its purchasing power.

...
 

Germany’s checkmate
Basically, QE will give Germany the time needed to achieve the final objective needed to get checkmate: to get rid of the national jurisdiction over as much of the debt as possible and thus to reduce its own capital risk as much as possible. Only the debt issued under Italian jurisdiction can be redefined in a new currency and thus could impose losses on foreign creditors, mainly German, via devaluation of the new currency. Today that proportion stands at about 93%. So only 7%, not more than 150 billion of public debt, cannot be redefined and has to be paid by in Euro, in accordance with the contract. Assuming that there’ll be devaluation of 30%, implies that the cost of a Euroexit for Italy in relation to its public debt, would have been no greater than about 50 billion euro before QE. With the de facto QE, this number has gone up to about 80 billion given that if there’s a collapse, the cost of a “haircut” of let’s say 30% on 100 billion government bonds (BTP) that would be bought by the Bank of Italy, would be a cost borne by all of us. In the eyes of a German creditor, restructuring our debt or an exit with the devaluation of the new currency, in fact present the same capital risk.
So, from now on, the only thing that counts for us Italians in the game of ‘creditor v debtor’ is not to lose jurisdiction over our debt, so that we maintain the right to redefine it. This means we get the benefit if we do exit. Germany’s objective is exactly the opposite: remove our jurisdiction over our debt and thus increase the cost of an exit for us and give the advantage to them, thus continuing to protect the interests of the creditors, which is something it’s really good at.
If we wait too long before leaving the Euro, then Germany will get checkmate and after cashing in all the benefits of our entry into the Euro, it will also cash in on the benefits of our exit.

[MancMellow]

pola ćovek pola pokvarena ploča dolazi na 1 pregovore uz sledeću izjavu:

 

 

 

German Fin Min Schaeuble arrives for key meeting on Greece: 'everything that needs to be said has been said.'

 

 

 

(Shall we all go home then?)

 

:D

 

Austrijanac, normalno:

 

 

 

We have a letter. This letter has many sentences with much space for interpretation. We have to work on it now...”

 

a pa nije džabe jednima carstvo trajalo 800 godina, a drugi skršili igračku za 70 :D

[hazard]

Hoces reci steta sto Hapsburzi nisu ujedinili Nemacku? :D

[Zaz_pi]

To je igra dobar-los milicijac germanskih clanica EU, i onih koji se tako osecaju , da bi slomili Grke.

De Telegraph-Holandija

 

Inace je Bepo objasnio nemaki ekonomski uspeh, ne samo sada, vec od 1870.

 

Germany is the Eurozone’s only big creditor with about 600 billion Euro loaned to various countries, most of which are on the periphery of the Eurozone, including Italy. The Euro has given it this enviable status. If you produce lots and you consume and invest very little and you keep domestic wages and prices low, then you’ll always have cheap unconsumed goods to sell to your neighbours. And you might also be able to make money by providing credit that they will probably ask you for so that they can buy your goods that are so cheap and so good. This is Germany’s situation. It has always had this approach to the market economy in European affairs ever since 1870 with its roots in Calvinism

 

To su razliciti oblici merkantilizma.

Edited February 20, 2015 by Zaz_pi

[kapetanm]

Ничија није горела до зоре..

Журе се да скрше Грке пре шпанских избора

[Budja]

Javlja se i Bepo:

 

 

Kuknjava.

Nemci su krivi sto su uspesni.

Dajte im vise te lire i drahme pa neka se igraju devalvacije, ovo je postalo mucno.

[Zaz_pi]

GREEK OFFICIAL SAYS IT APPEARS EUROGROUP HAS REACHED AN ACCORD

[MancMellow]

al neko zaradjuje na ovom jojo kursu evra koji se menja svaki minut :D

Edited February 20, 2015 by MancMellow