Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Yoda]

 

Uvek pobegnes u pompeznu aroganciju. Bruko!

[Budja]

Pa odlučivanje je dovelo do toga da je više zemalja eurozone gurnuto u depresiju. Nerealno je bilo očekivati da se oni disciplinuju na način kako to Nemačka čini, a da pri tome ne učestvuju u odlukama u smislu zaštite svojih interesa.

 

Opet se ne razumemo.

Ne govorim o grckoj krizi, vec o tvom komentaru nominalizam vs. esencijalizam i Varufakisovom odnosu prema ekonomskoj disciplini/nauci u nacelu. 

O tome je bila rasprava.

[Bojan]

Sa druge strane i Amerikanci se mnogo konkretnije oglašavaju (verovatno posle izveštaja njihove delegacije koja je bila u Atini).

 

 

 

The Obama administration is pushing eurozone leaders to compromise more with Athens as fears grow that a protracted stand-off could damage the global economy, say senior EU and US officials.

 

The US lobbying comes amid mounting concern in Brussels and Washington about the hardline stand taken by some eurozone governments, particularly Germany, that Greece must press on with budget-cutting commitments made under its existing €172bn bailout regardless of last month’s election, which brought anti-austerity party Syriza to power .

 

 

...

 

US officials are expected to raise their concerns at this week’s meeting of the Group of 20 leading economies’ finance ministers’ gathering in Istanbul and during bilateral meetings in Washington on Monday between US President Barack Obama and Angela Merkel, his German counterpart.

 

...

 

“We’re not attempting to mediate . . . we’ve advised all sides there needs to be some compromise on everybody’s part,” a senior US official said.

 “There are limits to how much austerity a society can withstand.”

Officials in Brussels have raised concerns about some within the German government who have argued that a Greek exit from the euro is a survivable, though undesirable, outcome.

US officials have long argued such a result could lead to Europe-wide economic upheaval.

“We believe that any fragmentation would have a severe spillover effect,” the senior US official said.

Although Washington is not pushing a specific blueprint, the official said continued emphasis on Greek budget-cutting, as opposed to broader economic reform efforts, appears unwarranted — a position echoed by Yanis Varoufakis, the new Greek finance minister.

“They probably don’t need to do an enormous amount of additional fiscal adjustment,” the US official said.

“They need to hold on to the gains from the reforms they’ve already made and they need to press forward with the kind of structural changes that a lot of people believe are needed to make Greece more competitive.”

 

 

Stvarno ne znam kud je ovaj Šojble naumio...

Edited February 10, 2015 by Bojan

[Anduril]

Zanimljivi detalji ko je do sada profitirao i koliko od bejlauta:

 

 

 

https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/christina-laskaridis/false-dilemmas-critical-guide-to-greek-debt-crisis

False dilemmas: a critical guide to the Greek debt crisis

Christina Laskaridis 9 February 2015

Amongst all the cacophony, it is important to look back at the bailouts. All but approximately 11% of the bailout money has ended up in creditors' pockets.

Over the past few weeks Alexander Stubb, Prime Minister of Finland, amongst others in Merkel's camp have been adamant that Greek debt cancellation is out of the question. Whether this proves true or not will depend on whether such statements fall within the realpolitik of the euro crisis management thus far: “When it becomes serious, you have to lie”, as current Commission president and former Eurogroup president Jean Claude Juncker explained to the public in May 2011.

This is important as it concerns the most common lie about the reason for the Troika's interventions in the first place. With Syriza's election, the voices who maintain the bailouts are a signal of solidarity from northern Europe to south have grown louder and arguably more vicious.

However, let’s take a step back and see what has happened. Not so long ago one of the most powerful US think tanks, the Council on Foreign Relations, declared that “the IMF’s growth forecasts for Ukraine and Greece [are interpreted] not as forecasts at all, but rather as assumptions necessary to justify the IMF’s interventions”. Following the stir the nascent Greek government caused from day one regarding the EU sanctions against Russia, it is not a surprise that tensions in Europe are already running high. Now why might the IMF have considered it necessary to justify an intervention in Greece?

Each time a Troika functionary dictates why Greece (or any other country) needs to adhere to the harsh bailout conditions, it brings to mind the executive director on the board of the IMF, Karin Lissakers, calling a spade a spade: “The Fund is acting as enforcer of the banks’ loan contracts”. This was in 1983. Numerous bailouts were implemented since, so that countries would not default on their foreign lenders.

The ΙΜF’s European counterpart thinks exactly the same: the head of the European Stability Mechanism fund, Klaus Regling, leaves no doubt as to how the bailout system works: “What we in Europe are doing right now is precisely what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been doing all over the world for decades without ever losing money. IMF loans are tied to the condition that the country overhauls its economy, as are ours.”

Among the cacophony of commentary about the Greek debt, it is important to reflect on why the bailouts originated. The proof is in the pudding: all but approximately 11% of the bailout money has ended up creditors' pockets.

It is not however solely Greece's original reckless lenders that have been saved: Greece has been using Troika bailout money to repay the vultures that had manoeuvred their way into escaping the forced cancellation in 2012. With repayments on PSI holdout bonds due in March 2015, this precedent seems set to continue.

Stephanie Kretz, a private banking investment strategist at Swiss bank, Lombard Odier, repeats something that is oft and openly admitted about the original motives for the bailouts: “Germany, by lending money to the peripheral countries, is trying to prevent its fragile and leveraged banks from getting hit, effectively orchestrating a back-door recapitalisation of its own banking system”.

Senior German officials were equally frank; Peter Böfinger, an economic advisor to the German federal government, admits that the bailouts “are first and foremost not about the problem countries, but about our own banks, which hold high amounts of credit there.” There is no surprise as to why the bailouts originated, yet simple myths still dominate discussion.

Between 2008 and 2011 Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium approved astronomical sums to bolster their financial sectors, equalling 25%, 18%, 52%, 31% and 97% respectively of these countries’ 2011 GDP. Besides obvious embarrassments bearing names such as HypoReal Estate, Dexia, or the Landesbanken, a clear imperative of the huge injections was to minimize losses on investments into sovereign bonds. “It is an open secret”, explains Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackerman, “that numerous European banks would not survive having to revalue sovereign debt held on the banking book at market levels.”

Contrary to the officials’ whining, the bailouts so far were good for those who invested in them. Take for example the central banks: even though central banks eventually decided to forfeit their profits made on those Greek investments, due to political pressure, until that decision “the Finnish central bank contributed 227 million euros to the Finnish budget as a result of profits made on the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese government bonds it holds, 40 million euros more than it made in 2011. This year [2013], the profit should rise to 360 million”. Martti Salmi, of Finland's finance ministry, noted that “As an unintentional consequence of the crisis, Finland has benefited enormously. We have not lost a cent so far, the same as for Germany.” Ultimately this means that the Troika is making good money out of the bailouts, which are everything but a 'helping hand' for 'debt-stricken' countries.

The circularity of the debt mechanism just described, is absurd as it is starkly ruthless. In 2014, almost 17 billion euros needed to be repaid by the Greek government to eurozone officially held debts. Greece borrowed this money from the Troika, under the condition that several more severe austerity packages were pushed through. Once the neoliberal restructuring was complete, the profits the ECB and Eurosystem made, an amount equivalent to the income on the portfolio accruing to national central banks, were repatriated to Greece.

The vicious cycle of debt payments is thus more pronounced now that the majority of Greek debt is held by the official sector. The debt restructuring in 2012 changed the ownership profile of public debt rendering the Troika the largest creditors of the government.

Are all those who heralded it a success at the time, surprised by the outcome today? It is not a new occurrence that debt restructuring utterly failed to provide debt relief: Evidence from past experiences of 73 countries defaulting and renegotiating with private creditors shows that average creditor losses may have been in the realm of 40%, and may have taken seven years to resolve, yet debt relief was minimal.1 Other examples show that large bondholder haircuts can even correspond to increased debt burdens.2

The transformation of the Greek public debt into mostly officially held debt is an important leverage point for the new government of Syriza. With scaremongering surrounding the large repayment in the summer 2015 towards the ECB, let’s bring to mind the words of a Senior Advisor to Deutsche Bank that “Greece will not default on the troika because the troika is paying themselves”.

Following the recruitment by the new Greek finance minister,Yiannis Varoufakis, of Lazard to enter and help advise on the issue of public debt, the results of the negotiations await to be seen. Lazard is a member of the IIF, the private banking lobby that advised the Papademos government on the 2012 debt restructuring. This effectively led to the Greek tax payer borrowing millions to pay for its advice (25 million) on how its pension funds should be rinsed.

There is a growing chorus of voices calling for debt reduction and an end to austerity. The voice of Krugman has been joined by almost daily commentary by the likes of Stiglitz, by several other economists of similar clout, by discussions in the FT, Bloomberg and Reuters, all writing on variations of the same theme: in favour of Merkel backing down, and for some new arrangement to be found. The gist of what is said has been completely obvious from the start: the debt is unsustainable, the bailout loans benefited the banks, austerity has strangled the economy, and shattered the society.

The new political compromise across Europe has yet to be found. What is worth drawing our attention to however, is that whilst the Greek debt fiasco continues to dominate discussions, the central issues regarding debts and deficits in the euro and the EU remain unchallenged. Syriza, despite throwing a spanner into the Troika’s works by laying out a plan that revokes the Troika's conditions - such as the plans for increasing minimum wage - remains firm on its commitment for balanced budgets.

It seems these will be aimed to be achieved within the strict limits of the fiscal compact - the permanent austerity treaty that is the cornerstone of the new EU governance rules. It is essentially the memorandum that Merkel instituted for everyone. The conditions are so stringent, expansionary fiscal policy has been effectively outlawed. The OECD has calculated that “to stay within this rule for every year from 2014 to 2023, Greece will have to maintain a primary budget surplus of about 9% of GDP, Italy and Portugal about 6% of GDP, and Ireland and Spain about 3.5% of GDP.”

In this respect, and although much remains to be seen in terms of the configuration of power balances in the upcoming negotiations, it is the overall neoliberal straightjacket across Europe, that one can hope to be contested, and for these illegitimate debts to once and for all cancelled, and not smuggled away into the future.

The recently published critical guide to the crisis by Corporate Watch: False Dilemmas, covers the why, what and how of the crisis, providing in depth analysis to the get to grips with what really has been happening. It provides details of what the authorities have done, numerous arguments to debunk austerity, tools for debt resistance, and inspiration from social movements. It is available for purchase here.

References

1Wright, Mark (2011) “Restructuring Sovereign Debts with Private Sector Creditors: Theory and Practice” in C. Braga and G. Vincelette (eds.) (2011) Sovereign Debt and the Financial Crisis: Will This Time Be Different?, World Bank

2Zettelmeyer, Jeromin (2012) “How to do a Sovereign Debt restructuring in the euro zone: Lessons from Emerging Market Crises,” paper prepared for Resolving the European Debt Crisis, a conference Page 33 of 39

 

Naravno, jedno su profiti od kamata a nesto sasvim je glavnica koja nikada nece biti vracena...

[MancMellow]

Dobar članak. Ova politika mora da se promeni. Uništiće Evropu i ekonomski i politički. Naravno, esencija su strukturne reforme i tu će svako morati da plati cenu, bilo ekonomsku, bilo kada je reč o suverenitetu. Alternativa je jako loša. Ali osnova je da se istovremeno promeni ova sumanuto rigidna ekonomska politika. Ja ne znam da li je njen izvor ideološki ili nacionalni ili čisto vezan za ekonomske interese pojedinih struktura, ali ovo je sve igračka dok se ne dođe do nemačko-francuskog sukoba ( a ima naznaka da tome vodi ) i može se kako-tako podneti. Ali ako do toga dođe to će biti full-blown EU kriza. 

Edited February 10, 2015 by MancMellow

[Bojan]

Opet se ne razumemo.

Ne govorim o grckoj krizi, vec o tvom komentaru nominalizam vs. esencijalizam i Varufakisovom odnosu prema ekonomskoj disciplini/nauci u nacelu. 

O tome je bila rasprava.

 

A, da. Ovo disciplina sam shvatio bukvalno. OK. Moja greška.

 

Može se reći da je njegovo posmatranje šire od onog, recimo, vladajućeg u ekonomskoj disciplini/nauci. To se može podvesti pod ovo nominalizam vs esencijalizam. Ja sam dao primer u korist esencijalizma apostrofirajući da se pre svega treba baviti očuvanjem ideje Evrope, a ne isključivo manifestacijom krize. Jer, ako očuvaš ideju možeš prebroditi i krizu.

 

Slično kao kada bi imao brak u kome je jedan supružnik ekonomski jači, ali isto tako bespogovorno zahteva da on odlučuje o svemu i da se njegov autoritet i snaga stavljaju na prvo mesto. Drugi supružnik može to trpeti iz interesa. Ali je suština u tome da će ekonomski pad jačeg supružnika verovatno dovesti do krize i okončanja braka. Ako se pak ideja braka postavi na drugim pretpostavkama takva kriza se može prebroditi. 

[Anduril]

Malo detaljnije o razlozima nemacke dualne strategije i o problemu srednjih sila:

 

Germany Emerges

Geopolitical Weekly

February 10, 2015 | 09:00 GMT

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By George Friedman

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, accompanied by French President Francois Hollande, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 6. Then she met with U.S. President Barack Obama on Feb. 9. The primary subject was Ukraine, but the first issue discussed at the news conference following the meeting with Obama was Greece. Greece and Ukraine are not linked in the American mind. They are linked in the German mind, because both are indicators of Germany's new role in the world and of Germany's discomfort with it.

It is interesting to consider how far Germany has come in a rather short time. When Merkel took office in 2005, she became chancellor of a Germany that was at peace, in a European Union that was united. Germany had put its demands behind it, embedding itself in a Europe where it could be both prosperous and free of the geopolitical burdens that had led it into such dark places. If not the memory, then the fear of Germany had subsided in Europe. The Soviet Union was gone, and Russia was in the process of trying to recover from the worst consequences of that collapse. The primary issue in the European Union was what hurdles nations, clamoring to enter the union, would have to overcome in order to become members. Germany was in a rare position, given its history. It was in a place of comfort, safety and international collegiality.

The world that Merkel faces today is startlingly different. The European Union is in a deep crisis. Many blame Germany for that crisis, arguing that its aggressive export policies and demands for austerity were self-serving and planted the seeds of the crisis. It is charged with having used the euro to serve its interests and with shaping EU policy to protect its own corporations. The vision of a benign Germany has evaporated in much of Europe, fairly or unfairly. In many places, old images of Germany have re-emerged, if not in the center of many countries then certainly on the growing margins. In a real if limited way, Germany has become the country that other Europeans fear. Few countries are clamoring for membership in the European Union, and current members have little appetite for expanding the bloc's boundaries.

At the same time, the peace that Germany had craved is in jeopardy. Events in Ukraine have aroused Russian fears of the West, and Russia has annexed Crimea and supported an insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Russia's actions have sparked the United States' fears of the re-emergence of a Russian hegemon, and the United States is discussing arming the Ukrainians and pre-positioning weapons for American troops in the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The Russians are predicting dire consequences, and some U.S. senators are wanting to arm the Ukrainians.

If it is too much to say that Merkel's world is collapsing, it is not too much to say that her world and Germany's have been reshaped in ways that would have been inconceivable in 2005. The confluence of a financial crisis in Europe that has led to dramatic increases in nationalism — both in the way nations act and in the way citizens think — with the threat of war in Ukraine has transformed Germany's world. Germany's goal has been to avoid taking a leading political or military role in Europe. The current situation has made this impossible. The European financial crisis, now seven years old, has long ceased being primarily an economic problem and is now a political one. The Ukrainian crisis places Germany in the extraordinarily uncomfortable position of playing a leading role in keeping a political problem from turning into a military one.

The German Conundrum

It is important to understand the twin problems confronting Germany. On the one hand, Germany is trying to hold the European Union together. On the other, it wants to make certain that Germany will not bear the burden of maintaining that unity. In Ukraine, Germany was an early supporter of the demonstrations that gave rise to the current government. I don't think the Germans expected the Russian or U.S. responses, and they do not want to partake in any military reaction to Russia. At the same time, Germany does not want to back away from support for the government in Ukraine.

There is a common contradiction inherent in German strategy. The Germans do not want to come across as assertive or threatening, yet they are taking positions that are both. In the European crisis, it is Germany that is most rigid not only on the Greek question but also on the general question of Southern Europe and its catastrophic unemployment situation. In Ukraine, Berlin supports Kiev and thus opposes the Russians but does not want to draw any obvious conclusions. The European crisis and the Ukrainian crisis are mirror images. In Europe, Germany is playing a leading but aggressive role. In Ukraine, it is playing a leading but conciliatory role. What is most important is that in both cases, Germany has been forced — more by circumstance than by policy — to play leading roles. This is not comfortable for Germany and certainly not for the rest of Europe.

Germany's Role in Ukraine

The Germans did play a significant part in the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's government. Germany had been instrumental in trying to negotiate an agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, but Yanukovich rejected it. The Germans supported anti-Yanukovich demonstrators and had very close ties to one of the demonstration leaders, current Kiev Mayor Vitali Klitschko, who received training in a program for rising leaders sponsored by the Christian Democratic Union — Merkel's party. The Germans condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow's support for the Ukrainian secessionists in the east. Germany was not, perhaps, instrumental in these events, but it was a significant player.

As the Germans came to realize that this affair would not simply be political but would take on a military flavor, they began to back away from a major role. But disengagement was difficult. The Germans adopted a complex stance. They opposed the Russians but also did not want to provide direct military support to the Ukrainians. Instead, they participated in the sanctions against Russia while trying to play a conciliatory role. It was difficult for Merkel to play this deeply contradictory role, but given Germany's history the role was not unreasonable. Germany's status as a liberal democracy is central to its post-war self-conception. That is what it must be. Therefore, supporting the demonstrators in Kiev was an obligation. At the same time, Germany — particularly since the end of the Cold War — has been uneasy about playing a direct military role. It did that in Afghanistan but not Iraq. And participating in or supporting a military engagement in Ukraine resurrects memories of events involving Russia that Berlin does not want to confront.

Therefore, Germany adopted a contradictory policy. Although it supported a movement that was ultimately anti-Russian and supported sanctions against the Russians, more than any other power involved it does not want the political situation to evolve into a military one. It will not get involved in any military action in Ukraine, and the last thing Germany needs now is a war to its east. Having been involved in the beginnings of the crisis, and being unable to step away from it, Germany also wants to defuse it.

The Greek Issue

Germany repeated this complex approach with Greece for different reasons. The Germans are trying to find some sort of cover for the role they are playing with the Greeks. Germany exported more than 50 percent of its gross domestic product, and more than half of that went to the European free trade zone that was the heart of the EU project. Germany had developed production that far exceeded its domestic capacity for consumption. It had to have access to markets or face a severe economic crisis of its own.

But barriers are rising in Europe. The attacks in Paris raised demands for the resurrection of border guards and inspections. Alongside threats of militant Islamist attacks, the free flow of labor from country to country threatened to take jobs from natives and give them to outsiders. If borders became barriers to labor, and capital markets were already distorted by the ongoing crisis, then how long would it be before weaker economies used protectionist measures to keep out German goods?

The economic crisis had unleashed nationalism as each country tried to follow policies that would benefit it and in which many citizens — not in power, but powerful nonetheless — saw EU regulations as threats to their well-being. And behind these regulations and the pricing of the euro, they saw Germany's hand.

This was dangerous for Germany in many ways. Germany had struggled to shed its image as an aggressor; here it was re-emerging. Nationalism not only threatened to draw Germany back to its despised past, but it also threatened the free trade essential to Germany's well-being. Germany didn't want anyone to leave the free trade zone. The eurozone was less important, but once they left the currency bloc, the path to protectionism was short. Greece was of little consequence itself, but if it demonstrated that it would be better off defaulting than paying its debt, other countries could follow. And if they demonstrated that leaving the free trade zone was beneficial, then the entire structure might unravel.

Germany needed to make an example of Greece, and it tried very hard last week to be unbending, appearing to be a bit like the old Germany. The problem Germany had was that if the new Greek government wanted to survive, it couldn't capitulate. It had been elected to resist Germany. And whatever the unknowns, it was not clear that default, in whole or part, wasn't beneficial. And in the end, Greece could set its own rules. If the Greeks offered a fraction of repayment, would anyone refuse when the alternative was nothing?

Therefore, Germany was facing one of the other realities of its position — one that goes back to its unification in 1871. Although economically powerful, Germany was also extremely insecure. Its power rested on the ability and willingness of other countries to give Germany access to their markets. Without that access, German power could fall apart. With Greece, the Germans wanted to show the rest of Europe the consequences of default, but if Greece defaulted anyway, the only lesson might be that default works. Just as it had been in the past, Germany was simultaneously overbearing and insecure. In dealing with Greece, the Germans could not risk bringing down the European Union and could not be sure which thread, if pulled on, would unravel it.

Merkel's Case in Washington

It was with this on her mind that Merkel came to Washington. Facing an overwhelming crisis within the European Union, Germany could not afford a war in Ukraine. U.S. threats to arm the Ukrainians were exactly what she did not need. It wasn't just that Germany had a minimal army and couldn't participate or, in extremis, defend itself. It was also that in being tough with Greece, Germany could not go much further before being seen as the strongman of Europe, a role it could not bear.

Thus, she came to Washington looking to soften the American position. But the American position came from deep wells as well. Part of it had to do with human rights, which should not be dismissed as one source of decision-making in this and other administrations. But the deeper well was the fact that for a hundred years, since World War I, through World War II and the Cold War, the United States had a single rigid imperative: No European hegemon could be allowed to dominate the Continent, as a united Europe was the only thing that might threaten national security. Therefore, regardless of any debate on the issue, the U.S. concern about a Russian-dominated Ukraine triggered the primordial fear of a Russian try at hegemony.

It was ironic that Germany, which the United States blocked twice as a hegemon, tried to persuade the United States that increased military action in Ukraine would not solve the problem. The Americans knew that, but they also knew that if they backed off now, the Russians would read it as an opportunity to press forward. Germany, which had helped set in motion both this crisis and the European crisis, was now asking the United States to back off. The request was understandable, but simply backing off was not possible. She needed to deliver something from Putin, such as a pledge to withdraw support to Ukrainian secessionists. But Putin needed something, too: a promise for an autonomous province. By now Merkel could live with that, but the Americans would find it undesirable. An autonomous Ukrainian province would inevitably become a base for undermining the rest of the country.

This is the classic German problem told two ways. Both derive from disproportionate strength overlying genuine weakness. The Germans are trying to reshape Europe, but their threats are of decreasing value. The Germans tried to reshape Ukraine but got trapped in the Russian reaction. In both cases, the problem was that they did not have sufficient power, instead requiring the acquiescence of others. And that is difficult to get. This is the old German problem: The Germans are too strong to be ignored and too weak to impose their will. Historically, the Germans tried to increase their strength so they could impose their will. In this case, they have no intention of doing so. It will be interesting to see whether their will can hold when their strength is insufficient.

 

 

 

 

[hazard]

Da podvucemo ovo jos jedanput iz gornjeg clanka koji je postavio Anduril:

 

 

Stephanie Kretz, a private banking investment strategist at Swiss bank, Lombard Odier, repeats something that is oft and openly admitted about the original motives for the bailouts: “Germany, by lending money to the peripheral countries, is trying to prevent its fragile and leveraged banks from getting hit, effectively orchestrating a back-door recapitalisation of its own banking system”.

 

Senior German officials were equally frank; Peter Böfinger, an economic advisor to the German federal government, admits that the bailouts “are first and foremost not about the problem countries, but about our own banks, which hold high amounts of credit there.” There is no surprise as to why the bailouts originated, yet simple myths still dominate discussion.

 

Elem, da li ste (Nemci) brdo para ne da bi ste spasli Grcku, vec vase banke kojima je Grcka dugovala novac. U sustini, uradili ste bailout sopstvenog bankarskog sistema. Sad lepo pristajte da uz odredjene uslove otpisete dug i da zavrsimo s ovim.

[MancMellow]

Cekajte, pa  to sam ja napisao jos negde tamo kod izbora pitajuči Budju "šta su im dali?" :D Mislim, ok, dali su im tih 11%

 

Elem, po pitanju ovog drugog članka, upravo sam na to mislio kad sam napisao

 

 

Postoji sistemska greška u nemačkoj evropskoj politici koja se vidi gde god se okreneš od grčke, preko ukrajine do kosovske albanske bežanije. 

 

kao i da je sve to povezano. Inače, opet odličan članak. 

 

Ali, sve je to već rečeno na jedan prostiji, ali ubedljiv način od strane Waltera Laquera u onom intervjuu što ti se Nije dopao Andurile :) te preporučujem ponovno čitanje u novoj situaciji 

 

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-historian-walter-laqueur-on-the-decline-of-europe-a-912837.html

 

Evropi treba vizija. Na nesreću na njenom čelu se (faktički, ako ne formalno) nalazi osoba koja je ima - nula. I iza nje stranka koja je još mnogo gora od nje lično (evo ga Šojble sa načinm ophođenja dostojnim jednog opštinskog ćate kad mu dođe neko da traži uslugu - hej, ni kreditori se ne pitaju o zajmu, oh boy), ali ajd sad...

Edited February 10, 2015 by MancMellow

[Shan Jan]

Jesi ti to upravo kvotovao sam sebe Manc? :D
 

Aj neko uprosceno objasnjenje za nas finansijski neuke - sta bi se desilo da Grcka proglasi bankrot i odjebe ove kreditore? Koje su joj opcije tada?

 

I drugo pitanje: Sta bi se deislo da Grcka izadje iz eurozone? Zasto je to toliko strasno ne samo po Grcku vec i po celu EU?

[MancMellow]

Jesi ti to upravo kvotovao sam sebe Manc? :D

 

Aj neko uprosceno objasnjenje za nas finansijski neuke - sta bi se desilo da Grcka proglasi bankrot i odjebe ove kreditore? Koje su joj opcije tada?

 

I drugo pitanje: Sta bi se deislo da Grcka izadje iz eurozone? Zasto je to toliko strasno ne samo po Grcku vec i po celu EU?

 

kvotovo sam, jbg, kad sam unapred procito misli cijenjenog autora 

 

samo sam ograniceno finansijski uk™ te ce to Budja malo bolje, ali verujem tek kad sunce izadje na njegovom kontinentu  ^_^

[hazard]

Jesi ti to upravo kvotovao sam sebe Manc? :D

 

Aj neko uprosceno objasnjenje za nas finansijski neuke - sta bi se desilo da Grcka proglasi bankrot i odjebe ove kreditore? Koje su joj opcije tada?

 

I drugo pitanje: Sta bi se deislo da Grcka izadje iz eurozone? Zasto je to toliko strasno ne samo po Grcku vec i po celu EU?

 

Pa prvo, Grcka bi bila "izbacena" iz medjunarodnog trzista za pozajmice ne duze vreme, tj. nekoliko godina bi proslo pre nego sto bi joj iko pozajmio cent...no, posto Grcka sada ima primarni suficit (dakle, ako se obrisu dugovi, ima visak u budzetu), drzava bi mogla da nastavi da funkcionise bez nekih teskih rezova.

 

Drugo, drzava je jedno, a banke drugo. Grcke banke trenutno prezivljavaju uz pomoc zajmova od ECB, ako Grcka bankrotira i odluci da ne vraca dugove bas toj ECB kao i MMF i EU, ECB ce verovatno povuci ovu podrsku grckom bankarskom sektoru, sto u prevodu znaci - grcke banke cao. Dodaj na to da bi bankrot sam po sebi izazvao paniku, tj. ljudi bi pohrlili da dizu pare iz banaka, sto bi ih jos dodatno zakucalo. Dakle onda bi verovatno drzava uletela sa nekim zabranama, ogranicavanjima kretanja kapitala itd. Takodje, imao bi veliki beg kapitala iz Grcke ka inostranstvu (sto se vec desilo zbog svega od 2008. u velikoj meri). Tako da, s jedne strane drzava teoretski bankrot sada moze da podnese OK, ali bi otisao u cabar ceo grcki finansijski sektor i ekonomija bi ipak prezivela tezak udarac.

 

Trece, evrozona. Bankrot ne znaci automatski izlaz iz evrozone, jer ne postoji zapravo nacin da se jedna zemlja iz evrozone izbaci. Medjutim, u slucaju bankrota je mozda bolje po Grcku da izadje sama (imala bi kontrolu nad svojom valutom sto bi joj omogucilo da samostalnije upravlja svojim oporavkom; evri koji bi lako odlazili iz zemlje bi malo teze isli ako bi se pretvorili u drahme cija bi vrednost naglo pala; itd.). E sad, Grcka jeste najveci bolesnik u EU ali ne i jedini. Odmah bi krenula panika na medjunarodnim trzistima, krenule bi spekulacije ko "ispada sledeci" - Portugalija, Italija, Spanija? I ako je objektivno izlazak Grcke iz evra nesto sto bi EU mogla da podnese, kada se doda faktor trzisnih ocekivanja postoji velika opasnost domino efekta.

[Anduril]

Da podvucemo ovo jos jedanput iz gornjeg clanka koji je postavio Anduril:

 

Elem, da li ste (Nemci) brdo para ne da bi ste spasli Grcku, vec vase banke kojima je Grcka dugovala novac. U sustini, uradili ste bailout sopstvenog bankarskog sistema. Sad lepo pristajte da uz odredjene uslove otpisete dug i da zavrsimo s ovim.

 

Dobro, ovo je vec topla voda i nije tako jednostavno - grcki bejlaut je pre svega pomogao francuskim i italijanskim a ne toliko nemackim bankama. One su bile vise u Irskoj, Spaniji, itd.

Drugo, bejlauti sluze kao mehanizam da se sprovedu reforme koje se inace ne sprovode uopste.

Trece, kroz politiku ECB naravno da nemacke ustedjevine masivno nestaju ali se zato daje vremena na realokaciju tih resursa a ne da sve zavrsi sok efektom od kojeg niko ne bi imao koristi. 

U sustini, ovi mehanizmi koji su uvedeni (trojka, ERM, ECB potezi, bankarska unija itd.) samo kupuju vreme koje je potrebno da se sprovedu strukturalne reforme koje je samo politicki gotovo nemoguce sprovesti.

[Anduril]

Samo da dodam oko reformi - jedna dobra stvar oko dolaska Sirize i mozda i Podemosa na vlast jeste da strukturalne reforme najbezbolnije po vecinu gradjana mogu da sprovedu pre svega levicarske partije.

Jedan od problema osteritija nije toliko da se seku budzeti (sto je normalno ako si prezaduzen), nego sto se sece neravnopravno i tamo gde najvise boli.

Takodje, ove van-sistemske partije imaju sansu da konacno saseku birokratiju - ne mozes da imas  jedno trziste rada, kapitala i dobara sa zajednickom valutom a sa druge strane da imas ogromne razlike u procedurama i efikasnosti administracije.

Primer je ovde recimo lakoca privredjivanja - razlike su jos uvek velike izmedju EU zemalja:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ease_of_doing_business_index#cite_note-6

Edited February 11, 2015 by Anduril

[hazard]

 

Drugo, bejlauti sluze kao mehanizam da se sprovedu reforme koje se inace ne sprovode uopste.

 

U sustini, ovi mehanizmi koji su uvedeni (trojka, ERM, ECB potezi, bankarska unija itd.) samo kupuju vreme koje je potrebno da se sprovedu strukturalne reforme koje je samo politicki gotovo nemoguce sprovesti.

 

Jeste. I to je OK. Medjutim dosli smo do toga da imamo u sustini neotplativ dug i da zbog pokusaja da se stvori dovoljno veliki suficit da se on otplacuje imamo sunovrat privrede. Dakle, treba da se predje iz moda "evo bejlout a zauzvrat reforme" u mod "evo oprost dugova a zauzvrat reforme".