Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Anduril]

Ne, taj podatak zapravo govori o cinjenici da im se BDP smanjio za 25%

 

Mogao se smanjiti i vise u drzavnom udelu a manje u privatnom.

 

Hocu da kazem da da, bar vise nego ranije...

 

evo: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS

 

Tax revenue as a % of GDP:

2005.-2009: od 19,1% do 19,9%

2010: 19.6%

2011: 21.4%

2012: 22.4%

 

Dobro, a nisi pomislio da je to zbog nekoliko rundi povecanja poreza?

I naravno, povecali su poreze koji najvise pogadjaju nize klase - dakle, PDV i na plate.

[Prospero]

varufakis izgleda popio ecb pedalu, i to nakon što je objavio da će cb grčke i ecb "učiniti sve što je neophodno da podrže države članice evrozone":
 

ECB cancels soft treatment of Greek debt in warning to Athens

BY JOHN O'DONNELL AND JAN STRUPCZEWSKI
FRANKFURT/BRUSSELS Thu Feb 5, 2015 2:30am EST


(Reuters) - The European Central Bank abruptly canceled its acceptance of Greek bonds in return for funding on Wednesday, shifting the burden onto Athens' central bank to finance its lenders and isolating Greece unless it strikes a new reform deal.

The move, which means the Greek central bank will have to provide its banks with tens of billions of euros of additional emergency liquidity in the coming weeks, was a response to what many in Frankfurt see as the Greek government's abandoning of its aid-for-reform program.

The decision came just hours after Greece's new finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, emerged from a meeting with ECB President Mario Draghi to say the ECB would do "whatever it takes" to support member states such as Greece.

In stark contrast, the ECB move, which required the support of a majority of central bank chiefs across the euro zone, shows widespread dismay with the new Greek government's plans not only in Frankfurt but across the 19-country bloc.

The ECB announced its decision, which will take effect from Feb. 11, after those governors met in Frankfurt on Wednesday.

It means that the tens of billions of euros of Greek government bonds as well as bank bonds guaranteed by Athens will no longer qualify as security in return for ECB funding to those banks.

Instead, it will now be up to Greece's central bank to provide those banks with Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), a step it takes at its own risk, ringfencing those banks' funding problems from the rest of the euro zone.

Were the central bank to run into difficulties as a result, it would be up to the debt-strapped Greek government, which can ill afford it, to step in.

The unexpected ECB move followed an appeal from Greece's new leftist government to the ECB to keep its banks afloat as it seeks to negotiate debt relief with its euro zone partners.

The ECB has now effectively refused that request, adding to Greece's problems as Germany rejected any roll-back of agreed austerity policies.

The ECB move was a setback for Greece's Varoufakis, who had earlier pledged speedy talks with international lenders on setting up a new program of reform after abandoning its earlier aid plan.

It puts Greek banks in a difficult position. Two Greek banks had already begun to tap emergency liquidity assistance from the Bank of Greece after an outflow of deposits accelerated after the victory of the hard left Syriza party in a general election on Jan. 25, banking sources had told Reuters.

The health of Greece's big banks is central to keeping the country afloat.

Greece's Finance Ministry said on Thursday the country's banking system was fully shielded through its access to emergency liquidity assistance available from the domestic central bank.

The ministry also said the ECB's decision puts pressure on the Eurogroup to reach a deal that would be "mutually beneficial" for both Athens and its eurozone partners.

Under emergency liquidity assistance, the national central bank can lend to commercial banks, but borrowing from the domestic central bank's ELA window against various types of collateral is more expensive than ECB funding.

GERMAN RESISTANCE

Promising to end five years of austerity, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Varoufakis are meeting senior officials across Europe to seek support for a new debt agreement.

But a document prepared by Germany for a meeting of EU finance officials on Thursday made clear Berlin wants Athens to go back on promises to raise the minimum wage, halt unpopular sales of national assets, rehire fired public sector workers and reinstate a Christmas bonus for poor pensioners.

"The Eurogroup needs a clear and front-loaded commitment by Greece to ensure full implementation of key reform measures necessary to keep the program on track," the document, seen by Reuters, said in reference to euro zone finance ministers.

"The aim is the perpetuation of the agreed reform agenda (no roll back of measures), covering major areas as the revenue administration, taxation, public financial management, privatization, public administration, health care, pensions, social welfare, education and the fight against corruption."

The new Greek leaders have had a cool reception even in left-leaning countries such as France and Italy which Athens had hoped would support its case for debt relief.

French President Francois Hollande said the euro zone's rules applied to everyone. European Parliament President Martin Schulz, a Socialist, said Greece risked bankruptcy if the country did not stick to its commitments to EU partners.

'NO DOUBT'

Tsipras, 40, said after talks with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker that Greece respected European Union rules and would find a solution to its economic problems within the framework of EU law.

After meeting Draghi, Varoufakis told Reuters: "The ECB is the central bank of Greece. ... The ECB will do whatever it takes to support the member states in the euro zone."

Without the support of its creditors and the ECB, Greece may soon find itself back in an acute financial crisis. Unable to tap the markets because of sky-high borrowing costs, the government has enough cash to meet its funding needs for the next couple of months. But it faces around 10 billion euros ($11 billion) of debt repayments over the summer.

"We outlined to him the main objectives of this government, which is to reform Greece in a way that has never been tried before and with a determination that was always absent," Varoufakis said after his session with Draghi.

"We also stated categorically that the debt-deflationary cycle in which Greece finds itself is detrimental to all efforts to reform Greece."

With the Greek public determined to cast off the stigma of supervision by a troika of EU, IMF and ECB inspectors, and to regain economic sovereignty, the semantics of any new arrangement may be crucial.

A source familiar with the Greek position said after the talks with Draghi: "We are thinking of a bridging program. You may not call it a 'program' for political reasons but perhaps a contract."

The German document demanded that troika oversight continue.

ECB officials in the meeting talked about the rules on emergency funding and their desire that the Greeks reach an interim arrangement with the Eurogroup of euro zone finance ministers, which next meets on Feb. 16, the source said.

Tsipras won the election promising to negotiate a debt write-off, reverse some key reforms and end budget cuts.

(Additional reporting by Lefteris Papadimas and George Georgiopoulos; Writing by Paul Taylor; Editing by Andrew Roche and Ken Wills)

[MancMellow]

Odluka doneta vecinom? Mogu da zamislim kako je lobiranje izgledalo :D

[InvisibleLight]

jedna ozbiljna analiza, sa neoborivim argumentima!

 

kad je index postao cro kurir?

[Bojan]

 

After meeting Draghi, Varoufakis told Reuters: "The ECB is the central bank of Greece. ... The ECB will do whatever it takes to support the member states in the euro zone."

 

 

Dobar je Varufakis. I šteta što sada ne može da se otvori pitanje šta radi ECB.

 

Naime, svaka centralna banka brine o protoku kapitala, kursu i referentnoj stopi. Ali ako se pobrine za dve stvari onda treća ostaje van kontrole. Do pre stotinak godina je važio standard slobodnog protoka kapitala i fiksnog kursa. Ali su onda kamate bile van kontrole jer su se formirale na tržištu.

 

ECB je usvojila politiku koja Nemcima odgovara - određuje referentnu kamatu pri slobodnom protoku kapitala, ali onda ne bi mogla da kontroliše kurs i euro bi morao da ojača. Međutim, u ovakvoj situaciji u eurozoni kurs se ponaša onako kako to Nemcima odgovara. Ispada bolje nego da imaju sopstvenu centralnu banku.

 

I niko se ne suprostavlja. Nemačka se i dalje pušta da gura svoju retoriku. Verovatno kada bi Varufakis i potegao pitanje na ovakav način rekli bi mu da to nije tema današnjeg razgovora.

[MancMellow]

jedna ozbiljna analiza, sa neoborivim argumentima!

 

kad je index postao cro kurir?

 

za tratinčicu manje opterećen od onog...(jel se beše Kuljiš zove?), ali i dalje izbija... 

 

naravno, tekst nema veze ni sa čim

Edited February 5, 2015 by MancMellow

[reginald]

Krugman je pisao o ovome. Kao nerazumnom scenariju.

 

 

I can’t think of what basis Germany can use to reject this proposal out of hand. If the German position is that debt must always be paid in full, no relief in substance even if it manages to avoid debt write-offs on paper, then that position is basically crazy, and all assertions that Germany understands reality are proved wrong. If Germany thinks that the Greeks are demanding too much, well, we’re in a negotiation — hopefully one that does not rely on the threat that the ECB will destroy Greece’s banks if it fails to cave.

 

 

 

3. If the creditors do play hardball, their leverage does not come from the ability to refuse new loans to the Greek government. With Greece running a primary surplus, all new loans — and then some — are going to pay principal and interest on old loans, with less than nothing going to the Greeks. There was modest de facto aid to Greece in 2010-2012, but no aid is currently flowing, nor will it.

4. Instead, the power of the creditors over Greece comes via the ability to crash the Greek banking system, which is heavily dependent on the ability to borrow at need from the ECB. Cut off that support, and Greece suffers banking collapse. So yes, the creditors have a large club they can use on a recalcitrant Greece. But do they really want to do that? Within a European Union supposedly dedicated to democratic ideals? Actually, you have to wonder whether the ECB, which surely understands the stakes, would even be willing to go along. If the situation continues to look like unraveling, I would expect Draghi to say something to reassure the markets that a Greek bank cutoff is not on the table.

5. Ideals aside, the consequences of playing hardball with Greece over its banks could very easily be immense. Up until now, the euro has proved very durable, largely thanks to the point Barry Eichengreen emphasized: any country that even hinted at the possibility of leaving would face the mother of all bank runs. But as I worried some time ago, this argument becomes moot if the banking system has already collapsed. Grexit — the often speculated about, never so far materializing Greek exit from the euro — becomes a very real possibility if European creditors try to exert leverage by taking away the safety net for Greek banks.

6. And if Greece really does leave the euro — if it turns out that the single currency is not irreversible — do you really think there would be no contagion? Wanna bet on it?

7. In particular, think about what happens if Greece leaves the euro and then manages to find its footing — which it probably would after a chaotic year or two. The EU could prevent that by deliberately undermining the post-euro Greek economy. But that would be a betrayal of European principles.

8. At the moment, Germany is talking as if it intends to follow the Michael Corleone strategy. But do we really think that Syriza will or even can retreat with its tail between its legs immediately after winning a dramatic election victory? Again, wanna bet on it?

Daniel Davies tells us that “European policy makers aren’t stupid.” But they do say stupid things, still talking about expansionary austerity, still treating debt as a purely moral issue. Can and will they be realistic, accept that they can’t extract blood from a stone — at any rate not at the rate of 4.5 perce

[MancMellow]

Ma ne može Syriza da se "kapitulira" 100% samo 10 dana pošto su dobili izbore upravo sa strategijom sa kojom su dobili. To je političko samoubistvo. 

[Ariel]

varufakis izgleda popio ecb pedalu, i to nakon što je objavio da će cb grčke i ecb "učiniti sve što je neophodno da podrže države članice evrozone":

 

 

Ovakav hardlajn ECB-a (Švaba, pre svega) deluje kao zatezanje, ali s kojim ciljem, mislim, šta Nemci dobijaju insistiranjem da neće biti popuštanja prema Grčkoj i da mora da se drži zacrtanog dogovora? Da se reše Sirize i nateraju ih na samoubistvo? Možda je to već rečeno na ovom topicu, ali nije mi jasno kako određeno olakšavanje uslova Grčkoj nije u interesu i kreditorima, naročito jer sada Grčka ima taj primary surplus. Hoću reći, ovo meni deluje kao politički pritisak zamaskiran u neku kao etiku tipa "dogovorili smo se a dogovori se poštuju". Ako nekog ko se bolje razume od vas ne mrzi, molio bih da mi pojasni malo.

 

Ovo što Krugman piše, meni kao laiku, ima smisla, jer ne vidim koji bi drugi konačni rezultat ovakvog stava ECB-a mogao da bude osim izlaska Grčke iz evra.

[MancMellow]

Ovo jeste igra "who blinks first", ali...treba imati u vidu da su to švabe, lako može da se desi da ne "blinknu" :D

[Anduril]

Kritika Krugmana i Stiglica:

 

 

 

Greece and the euro crisis

An odd view of democracy

Feb 3rd 2015, 14:42 by Buttonwood

 

Timekeeper

 

JOSEPH Stiglitz has a post on Project Syndicate arguing that Greek debt should be forgiven and that austerity has failed. Some people may argue with the economics or point out that Greek debt servicing costs have been substantially reduced in previous deals. But let us happily accept that some Greek debt will need to be forgiven and that the target for the primary surplus (4.5% of GDP) is ridiculously high.

 

It asks rather more of the general reader to accept a couple of the professor's debating points. The first is that:

 

There is a fear that if Greece is allowed to restructure its debt, it will simply get itself into trouble again, as will others. This is sheer nonsense

 

Actually Greece has a long record of debt problems with around half of its history as an independent nation spent in default. One need only look to Latin America to see countries which have a history of high debts and write-offs (the 1890s, the 1930s and 1980s and for Argentina, 2002). So it would actually be an act of the purest optimism to imagine that it would not happen again. But my bigger struggle is with his closing argument that:

 

Seldom do democratic elections give as clear a message as that in Greece. If Europe says no to Greek voters’ demand for a change of course, it is saying that democracy is of no importance, at least when it comes to economics.

 

Yes, the Greek voters have given their opinion but what about voters in other democracies? German voters, when polled, seem pretty clear that they don't want Greece to be given debt forgiveness. Why should their views count for nothing? And what about the Finns, Dutch, Austrians etc?

 

This is hardly an issue of democracy. Or if it is, then some tricky questions would arise; since there are a lot more Germans than Greeks, surely the former would "win" any vote if the two were combined? Perhaps the Germans should, as a moral imperative, take the hit. But as I tried to point out in my last post, it is easy for people in Britain (and America) to lecture the Germans about what they should do with their taxpayers' money, even though voters in their own countries would not be happy to bail out Greece. We can all be moral with other people's money. (Another modest proposal. Why doesn't the US suggest that Greece's debt to the IMF be written off, with the US taxpayer taking all the hit? Since the US is one of the shareholders in the IMF that may eventually happen anyway. But one can't see such a proposal getting through Congress, let alone a referendum of US voters. Democracy won't get a look-in.)

Voters in any nation are entitled to have any social benefit or economic system they choose, provided that they themselves bear the cost. If they choose to fund themselves by borrowing internationally, they must expect creditors to impose some conditions.

[Budja]

Govno od clanka.

 

Demokratski deficit postoji, i to na nivou EU jos od onog Ustava. I to rezultira polovicnim-kompromis merama i puzajucom federalizacijom koju niko nije odobrio i sa kojom niko nije u vom trenutku srecan, ni Nemci ni Grci.

Sledeci push je ka daljoj federalizaciji "jer ovako vise ne ide" ali problem je kako to prodati glasacima.

Dakle, da, pitanje Grcke jeste pitanje odsustva demokratije na nadnacionalnom nivou odlucivanja.

 

Sto se buduceg bankrota tice, i to je tanak argument u smislu da moraju i Grci na nesto da se obavezu pre opustanja kaisa. Problem je, opet, politicko-ekonomske prirode: politicki contagion na Italiju i Spaniju, pa i Francusku: ako mogu Grci mozemo i mi, pa je neka vrsta pokazne vezbe potrebna. I drugo, moral hazard bankarskog tipa, jebe nam se sta radimo, doci ce bailout pod povoljnim uslovima.

 

Nema iz ove krize lakog izlaza a kojim ce establisment biti zadovoljan.

[reginald]

Danasnji Krugmanov post. Procitajte prvi link. Triler.

 

 

Update: Frances Coppola has the same take, with much more detail.

Family stuff, which leaves me with almost no time for posting just as stuff goes semi-crazy in the Greek drama. But a quick note.

What happened was that the ECB declared that it will no longer accept Greek government bonds as collateral when lending to Greek banks. The initial reaction of some observers was that this was the end, that the ECB was pulling the plug arbitrarily and abruptly.

But even before I had a chance to look at the details, I assumed that must be wrong. You can say many things about Mario Draghi; it’s quite possible that he will fail to save the euro, and quite possible that he is making big mistakes; but stupid and crude is not his style. Sure enough, this is a much subtler action that the first headlines suggested. This funding channel is one that Greek banks no longer use very much, and it’s not necessarily to keep them afloat; they can continue to borrow indirectly via the Greek central bank. So this is not a crisis-provoking event.

What’s the point, then? Well, it’s posturing and signaling. But to whom, and to what end?

Maybe it’s an effort to push the Greeks into reaching a deal, but my guess — and it’s only that — is that it’s actually aimed more at the Germans than at the Greeks. On one side, it’s the ECB making tough noises, which might keep Germany off their backs for a little while. On the other, it’s a wake-up call: dear Chancellor Merkel, we are *this* close to watching a Greek banking collapse and euro exit, and are you really sure you want to go down this route? Really, really?

So this wasn’t brinksmanship; it was sort of pre-brinksmanship, a warning shot to all sides about what will happen next.

Does Draghi know what he’s doing? Of course not — nobody in this situation knows what he or she is doing, because it’s structurally a mess. But don’t panic — yet.

[Ariel]

Hvala, reginalde, to mi je trebalo, tj. hvala Krugmane :D

[Bojan]

Kakav igrač ovaj Varufakis. Ako Dragi vidi šansu da natera Nemce u defanzivu biće to pravi spektakl za gledati.