Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Budja]

Federalizacija bez zajedničke monetarne politike?

 

A šta je sa Ustavom? Zar taj pokušaj nije propao pre desetak godina na francuskom referendumu?

 

Propao bi ponovo ako se mere kakve je obrazlozio Anduril, a koje imaju smisla stave na debatu.

S druge strane, pretvoriti Evropu u federalnu na mala vrta izazvalo bi jos zescu krizu legitimiteta EU nego sto je danas.

 

Smanjena evro zona je sa te strane, politicki izvodljivija kao alternativno odrzivo resenje.

Edited February 2, 2015 by Budja

[Budja]

A ovo Krugmanovo sa rastom plata u Nemackoj su sokovi.

Dakle, Nemci su krivi jer imaju male plate.

 

 

Pitanje za Krugmana: Kako se to Nemci ne bune sto imaju male plate? 

Bice da tu ima jos necega.

[aram]

jesi siguran da se nemci ne bune?

[Bojan]

A ovo Krugmanovo sa rastom plata u Nemackoj su sokovi.

Dakle, Nemci su krivi jer imaju male plate.

 

 

Pitanje za Krugmana: Kako se to Nemci ne bune sto imaju male plate? 

Bice da tu ima jos necega.

 

Ima. I cene su manje rasle u Nemačkoj nego u ostalim delovima eurozone.

[MancMellow]

 

Smanjena evro zona je sa te strane, politicki izvodljivija kao alternativno odrzivo resenje.

 

i to verovatno zauvek. 

 

jednom kad bi Nemci, Austrijanci, Holandjani, Švedi, Finci, Danci (DKK je vezana za evro), Estonci uveli zajedničku valutu to više nije "evro" nego valuta neke moderne i proširene Hanzeatske lige i to je, realno, kraj EU kakve je znamo. Znam da je i Slovačka tu, ali pitanje dokle bi to trajalo, a ja iskreno ne vidim da bi takvoj monetarnoj uniji recimo Poljska ikada želela da priđe. Francuska u tom društvu nema šta da traži, njeni i privredni i politički prioriteti su skroz na drugoj strani. 

[Anduril]

Otkud ti to - i Francuskoj i Poljskoj je daleko najvazniji ekonomski partner Nemacka. Uz to je poljska ekonomska i fiskalna filozofija u potpunosti na nemackoj liniji.

[MancMellow]

to je u ovim uslovima, kad je Evropa cela ili u Evru ili se trudi da bude. Ta zamišljena valuta bi bila mega-jaka, iskreno ja nekako ne vidim da bi prvi Nemci to hteli. Plus zajednička valuta nije samo ekonomija ako jednog dana postane, a u tom slučaju bi postala i fiskalna unija. To je "Evropa u dve brzine" zapravo

[Anduril]

Pa da, u tom pravcu upravo i vodi ovo stvaranje levicarskog bloka juzne Evrope posle pobede Podemosa.

Odlucujuca ce na kraju biti naravno Francuska - da li ce se usled krize prikloniti jugu ili nece.

Jugoevro je naravno politicki mnogo lakse resenje od strukturnih reformi koje su u Italiji ili cak Francuskoj tesko zamislive.

[MancMellow]

Jugoevro 

 

:D 

 

Mediteuro  -_-

 

ali to je onda sasvim nešto drugo...

[Anduril]

Meni su ovi izbori u Spaniji i stvaranje ideolosko-geografskih blokova ono sto ce odluciti buducnost Evra.

Razlog lezi i u tome sto ce severne zemlje teziti biranju desnicarskih partija da bi se kao zastitile od levicara koji poklanjaju nase pare juznim kolegama.

Jos jedna velika politicka kriza oko Evra bi dovela nemacku AfD partiju na preko 10 posto i time prakticno u vladu umesto SPD-a.

[stoka]

U Sirizi izgleda zabranjena kravata ...

[MancMellow]

At Anduril

 

Slažem se ovo za Španiju i važnost tih izbora

 

Nemačka jedina može ovo da razreši, posle skoro, da budem malo dramatičan, 170 godina im se ukazala šansa da povedu primerom Evropu u pravom smeru i ne smeju da padnu na ovom ispitu. A čini mi se da hoće. Ne iz zlobe, nego iz straha, uskogrudih pogleda i prosto jednog nesnalaženja u velikim istorijskim procesima uzrokovanog neiskustvom. I usled viška tabua.  

Edited February 2, 2015 by MancMellow

[hazard]

:D

 

Mediteuro -_-

 

ali to je onda sasvim nešto drugo...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_Monetary_Union

 

[MancMellow]

ma znam za to, ali...tesko ce Grci u "Latin" 

 

mada bi moglo nesto..."Romeuro" :D to bi im možda bilo svarljivije. Možda. 

Edited February 2, 2015 by MancMellow

[Anduril]

Malo zanimljivih podataka:

 

 

Despite all the rumblings that Greece will be forced to leave the Euro, there is in reality no mechanism by which EU countries can force a Eurozone member to exit the currency union. It really is all a bluff. This is a standard scare tactic used by governments to induce people to give up freedom for a little security.

Greece currently owes a little over 300 billion euros to various creditors. About 200 billion is owed to the Eurozone institutions, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), that raised funds based on Eurozone guarantees. The remainder is owed to the IMF, ECB, and private creditors. If Greece were to default, it would probably be mostly on the debts owed to Eurozone members. To get Greece down to a manageable debt level, a default of at least 150 billion euros is necessary.

Greek Default Threatens EU

Of course, such a default would mean that the guarantees would then kick in. Government officials in Europe are currently in panic mode since this would likely be another Lehman moment. Spain, Italy, and France have guaranteed about 50 percent of this debt. A default would mean an important increase in the debt load of each of these countries. This would likely be the tipping point for Italy which has a current debt to GDP level of over 130 percent and several decades of essentially no growth. Italy is too big to bail out. Bail-ins and ensuing bank runs would then become an increasing possibility. The ECB would probably step in to essentially monetize the debt of these spendthrift countries. The pressure on Germany to leave the euro would then be overwhelming.

Greece is actually in the driver’s seat. It is currently running a primary surplus. Historical evidence shows that once a country reaches such a situation it is likely to default within the next two years. In 1947, Time Magazine attributed the following quotation to Keynes, “If you owe the bank thousands, then you have a problem. If you owe the bank millions, then the bank has a problem.” In the current situation, it is the EU that has a problem.

Germany has threatened to hold back further funding if Greece reverses or halts current reforms. This is also a bluff. If there is one thing we have learned from European governments is that they have no backbone and will always take the easy solution to kick the can down the road. Greece will likely get more money from the EU to pay interest and principal, on the promise of token reforms. Of course, this violates one of the most important lessons in finance. Don’t throw good money after bad. In Europe, we are constantly putting short-term bandages on a terminally ill patient. The crisis will be postponed, only to be worse down the road. You simply cannot solve a debt problem with more debt.

The Illusion of Austerity

One day, the whole system will come crashing down. Except for Hungary, government spending as a percentage of GDP has been rising year after year since the financial crisis of 2008. For the EU's twenty-eight nations, government spending hit 49 percent of GDP in 2013, up from 45.5 percent in 2007. For Greece the ratio has gone from 46.8 percent in 2007 to 59 percent in 2013: so much for the fiction of austerity.

It is irrational to believe that growth will pick up when you guide your economy in the direction of communist Cuba instead of Singapore. Mario Draghi talks about reform such as making labor laws more flexible. This would be funny if he was not serious. The real problem is a century of socialist meddling in everything: getting progressively worse since the 1960s. You cannot fix the system; you have to tear it down starting at the foundations.

....

 

Inace, za Grcku bi bankrot upravo sada bio najlogicniji:

 

 

Greece Has A Primary Surplus: Now's The Time To Default On That Debt

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This is a useful observation from the Wall Street Journal:

Budget data from Greece’s central government showed Monday a primary surplus for the first seven months of the year, turning around a steep deficit seen the previous year, according to the country’s Finance Ministry.

The data showed that the primary surplus reached €2.6 billion ($3.47 billion) against a deficit of €3.1 billion a year earlier.

The data, which don’t include payments on debt interest, local government and social security fund budgets, show that Greece is likely to secure a primary budget surplus for the year, for the first time in more than a decade.

I’m sure that most will read this as excellent news. Greece can start paying back its debts now and everyone’s money lent to them is much safer than it was. But that’s not how it works I’m afraid. Or at least potentially that’s not how it could work.

If you are running a primary deficit then you don’t have the luxury of being able to simply default on all of your debts. For you’re having to borrow to meet your pensions, social security, defence and so on spending. If you default you’ve still got to find the money from somewhere to keep the old folks and the soldiers paid: so you’ve either got someone to lend to you immediately after you’ve just defaulted or, you’ve got to cut somewhere else in the budget. Given that no one will lend to you immediately, you’ve got to do that cutting. But if you don’t default you can borrow the money and pay the soldiers etc.

With a primary deficit you’re therefore rather a prisoner of those lending you money. This is why Greece agreed to the last renegotiation of the debt. It didn’t actually solve the problem. For only private sector holders of the debt lost money: none of the official holders did (other EU countries, the ECB, IMF and so on). And so much of the debt was in the hands of the official creditors that near wiping out those private sector ones still didn’t solve the basic problem. Greece has too much debt to ever be able to pay it back.

This all changes when you move into a primary surplus. Sure, you’ve still not got enough money to pay all of your bills. But you can pay the ongoing cost of running the government and the country. The part you cannot pay is the interest on all that money you’ve borrowed. At which point a unilateral default begins to look very attractive indeed. We don’t need to borrow more to pay the pensioners and the soldiers. We’re only borrowing more to pay the interest on what we’ve already borrowed. If we just tell all those we’ve borrowed money from that we’re not going to pay then our budget problems are over.

And yes, sovereign countries do indeed have the ability to do that. It’s happened many hundreds of times over the centuries (800 times in fact and Greece has done it for 50% of the time since it became an independent nation in the 1820s).

The really key point here is that, in the circumstances of a heavily indebted nation, moving from primary deficit to a primary surplus actually increases the room for policy choices. Up to and including making outright default a more attractive proposition.

Myself, as a purely personal opinion, I think that Greece should default: as I’ve been arguing for some years now, I think that several of the most heavily indebted EU states should. But I agree that that’s a somewhat extreme view. My point here though is that if you want to default it’s something that’s very difficult to do when you’re running a primary deficit. It becomes very much more attractive when you’re running a primary surplus. Which means that Greece now has rather more policy options as it discusses what will happen next. Which is all to the good: a more even handed distribution of power is likely to lead to a much better outcome for Greece and its people. Until now they’ve had to do what they’ve been told to do, sign up or else. Now their own negotiators have an “or else” of their own.

Diego Iscaro, a senior economist at IHS IHS +1.75% Global Insight, described the figures as being positive for Greece. He said that “reaching a primary surplus will be key to unblock further support from its euro-zone peers.”

“On this regard, we expect a decision during the second quarter of 2014,” Mr. Iscaro said.

However, Germany’s finance ministry stuck with its steadfast rejection of further debt relief for Greece, following a weekend report in news magazine Spiegel suggesting the country’s central bank expects a new Greek aid package will be necessary by the beginning of next year at the latest. The Bundesbank declined to comment on the report.

With less than six weeks to go until nationwide elections in Germany, a spokesman for the German finance ministry told reporters “a second haircut [on debt] is out of the question.”

If Greece now has the possibility of unilateral default in its armoury of possible responses I have a feeling that a further haircut or not isn’t going to be something that the German Finance Ministry gets to decide upon. Not on its own it doesn’t, at least.